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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is about the decisions made in markets: whether decisions 
and what decisions are made by consumers. It isa study in consumer 
sovereignty and particularly In the way this may be used In ensuring 
social responsibility In business. 
Pressure group influence on purchase behaviour, particularly in the 
use or threat of consumer boycotts, suggests an extension of consumer 
sovereignty beyond its mere technical meaning within economics to a 
more literal meaning. Consumer authority in the marketplace may not 
simply refer to the more immediate characteristics of the offering 
such as product features or price but, as boycotts show, other charac- 
teristics such as whether the firm has investments in South Africa. 
Consumer boycotts are but the most manifest and organised form of 
purchase behaviour influenced by ethical concerns. Yet ethical 
purchase behaviour, although found in many markets, is largely unre- 
cognised In the literature. 
The novelty of this topic and the perspective on consumer sovereignty 
entailed an emphasis on conceptualisation in the research. The nature 
of capitalism and consumer sovereignty, the ideology of marketing, the 
problem of the social control of business, and pressure groups in the 
political process and their strategies and tactics, are explored to 
develop an argument which supports the notion of ethical purchase 
behaviour. A model is proposed identifying a role for pressure groups 
In the marketing system, explaining ethical purchase behaviour at the 
micro level by recognising negative product augmentation. Survey 
research and case studies support the model and the argument. 
Guidelines for action are proposed for pressure groups and business, 
suggesting both seek to influence a legitimacy element in the 
marketing mix. At a more conceptual level, consumer sovereignty is 
shown to offer potential for ensuring social responsibility in busi - 
ness. Of the three mechanisms for social control of business, the 
market may be used to greater effect through ethical purchase beha- 
vi our. However, consumer sovereignty requires choice as well as 
information. Pressure groups may act as a countervailing power by 
providing the necessary information, but competition is essential for 
choice. 
Consumer sovereignty Is the rationale for capitalism, the political- 
economic system in the West. This study questions the basis of such a 
system if political or ethical, as well as economic decisions, are not 
made by consumers in markets. Hence the argument for ethical purchase 
behaviour becomes an argument for capitalism. 
"Some of the owner men were kind because they hated what they had to 
do, and some of them were angry because they hated to be cruel, and 
some of them were cold because they had long ago found that one could 
not be an owner unless one were cold. And all of them were caught in 
something larger than themselves. Some of them hated the mathematics 
that drove them, and some were afraid, and some worshipped the mathe- 
matics because it provided a refuge from thought and from feeling. If 
a bank or a finance company owned the land, the owner man said: The 
Bank - or the Company - needs - wants - insists - rust have - as 
though the Bank or the Company were a monster, with thought and 
feeling, which had ensnared them. These last would take no respon- 
sibility for the banks or the companies because they were men and sla- 
ves, while the banks were machines and masters all at the same time. 
Some of the owner men were a little proud to be slaves to such cold 
and powerful masters. The owner men sat in the cars and explained. 
You know the land is poor. You've scrabbed at it long enough, God 
knows. 
The squatting tenant men nodded, and wondered and drew figures in the 
dust, and yes, they knew, God knows. If the dust only wouldn't fly. 
If the top would only stay on the soil, it might not be so bad. 
The owner men went on leading to their point: You know the land's 
getting poorer. You know what cotton does to the land: robs it, sucks 
all the blood out of it. 
The squatters nodded - they knew, God knew. If they could only rotate 
the crops they might pump blood back Into the land. 
Well, it's too late. And the owner men explained the workings and the 
thinkings of the monster that was stronger than they were. A man can 
hold land if he can just eat and pay taxes; he can do that. 
Yes, he can do that until his crops fail one day and he has to borrow 
money from the bank. 
But - you see, a bank or a company can't do that, because those 
creatures don't breathe air, don't eat side-meat. They breathe 
profits; they. eat the interest on money. If they don't get i t, they 
die the way you the without air, without side-meat. It isa sad 
thing, but itis so. It is just so. 
The squatting men raised their eyes to understand. Can't we just hang 
on? Maybe the next year will be a good year. God knows how much cot- 
ton next year. And with all the wars - God knows what price cotton 
will bring. Don't they make explosives out of cotton? And uniforms? 
Get enough wars and cotton'll hit the ceiling. Next year, maybe. 
They looked up questioningly. 
We can't depend on it. The bank - the monster has to have profits all 
the time. It can't wait. It'll die. No, taxes go on. When the 
monster stops growing, it dies. It can't stay one size. 
Soft fingers began to tap the sill of the car window, and hard fingers 
tightened on the restless drawing sticks. In the doorways of the sun- 
beaten tenant houses women sighed and then shifted feet so that the 
one that had been down was now on top, and the toes working. Dogs 
came sniffing near the owner cars and wetted on all four tyres one 
after another. And chickens lay in the sunny dust and fluffed their 
feathers to get the cleansing dust down to the skin. In the little 
sties the pigs grunted inquiringly over the muddy remnants of the 
slops. 
The squatting men looked down again. What do you want us to do? We 
can't take less share of the crop - we're half-starved now. The kids 
are hungry all the time. We got no clothes, torn an' ragged. If all 
the neighbors weren't the same, we'd be ashamed to go to meeting. 
And at last the owner men came to the point. The tenant system won't 
work any more. One man on a tractor can take the place of twelve or 
fourteen families. Pay him a wage and take all the crop. We have to 
do it. We don't like to do It. But the monster's sick. Something's 
happened to the monster. 
But you'll kill the land with cotton. 
We know. We've got to take cotton quick before the land dies. Then 
we'll sell the land. Lots of families in the East would like to own a 
piece of land. 
The tenant men looked up alarmed. But what'll happen to us? How'll 
we eat? 
You'll have to get off the land. The ploughs'll go through the door- 
yard. 
And now the squatting men stood up angrily Grampa took up the land, 
and he had to ki 11 the Indi ans and drive them away. And Pa was born 
here, and he killed weeds and snakes. Then a bad year came and he had 
to borrow a little money. An' we was born here. There in the door - 
our children born here. And Pa had to borrow money. The bank owned 
the land then, but we stayed and we got a little bit of what we 
raised. 
We know that - all that. It's not us, it's the bank. A bank isn't 
like a man. Or an owner with fifty thousand acres, he isn't like a 
man either. That's the monster. 
Sure, cried the tenant men, but it's our land. We measured it and 
broke it up. We were born on i t, and we got killed on i t, died on i t. 
Even if it's no good, it's still ours. That's what makes it ours - 
being born on It, working It, dyi ng on It. That makes ownership, not 
a paper with numbers on It. 
We're sorry. It's not us. It's the monster. The bank isn't like a 
man. 
Yes, but the bank is only made of men. 
No, you're wrong there - quite wrong there. The bank is something 
else than men. It happens that every man ina bank hates what the 
bank does, and yet the bank does it. The bank is something more than 
men. I tell you. It's the monster. Men made it, but they can't 
control it. " 
John Steinbeck 
The Grapes of Wrath 
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Previ ew 
The powers of ordinary men are circumscribed by the everyday 
worlds in which they live, yet even In these rounds of job, 
family and neighborhood they often seem driven by forces they can 
neither understand nor govern. 'Great changes' are beyond their 
control, but affect their conduct and outlook none the less. The 
very framework of modern society confines them to projects not 
their own, but from every side, such changes now press upon the 
men and women of the mass society, who accordingly feel that they 
are without purpose in an epoch in which they are without power. 
C Wright Mills (1) 
We have the power, nonviolently, just by controlling our appeti- 
tes, to determine the direction of the American economy. If 
black people In thirty cities said simultaneously, "General 
Motors, you will not sell cars in the black community unless you 
guarantee us a franchise here next year and help us finance it, " 
GM would have no choice but to comply. 
Jesse Jackson (2) 
These two quotes illustrate, In the first instance, the powerlessness 
of the masses, and in the second instance, how this powerlessness can 
be transformed by organised consumer action. Jackson envisages, and 
has on occasion successfully realised, a harnessing of consumer 
sovereignty to bring power to disadvantaged and powerless groups. A 
fundamental question Is thereby posed by the juxtaposition of these 
quotes: How can the masses be without power in the mass consumer 
society, when consumer sovereignty is a prominent feature and prin- 
cipal rationale for capitalism? 
Such a question is of Galbrai thi an and Fri edmani to qualities and pro- 
portions. This author is neither Galbral th nor Friedman and must 
therefore be suitably modest in any attempt to address such a 
question. The question is approached indirectly by looking at what is 
here termed ethical purchase behaviour. Even this is too large a 
topic for full examination here and, after presenting a heavily 
substantiated theoretical case for such behaviour, the study con- 
centrates on a particular form of ethical purchase behaviour: pressure 
group organised consumer boycotts. At this much lower level of 
abstraction, some evidence can be found to support the argument, 
Including the empirical work. This must, however, be seen in the con- 
text of the broader and significant issues illustrated above. The 
study is consequently, and inevitably, a combination of much theoreti- 
cal argument, much conceptualisation, and some, limited, evidence. 
A thesis, by definition, is an argument. This, within the confines of 
the task prescribed, is what is presented here. This chapter outlines 
that argument and its implications. It also describes the way in 
which the study was, necessarily, delimited, and how the thesis is 
organised. 
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1.1 The Argument 
1.1.1 An Unexplored Phenomenon 
What decisions do consumers make in markets? In command economies 
decisions on the allocation of resources are centralised and made by 
the state. In market economies these decisions are decentralised and 
made by 'the people'. Consumers under capitalism are, according to 
the ideology, the decision-makers on the allocation of society's 
resources. This thesis considers this notion by looking at some of 
the ethical decisions consumers make - or could make - In markets. 
Ethical purchase behaviour abounds! It can be seen everywhere. It 
can be found in industrial markets as well as consumer markets. It is 
practiced by people of all ages, classes and nationalities. Yet it is 
largely unrecognised in the literature. 
Ethical purchase behaviour can mean people not buying a certain pro- 
duct. There are one million vegetarians in Britain, all choosing not 
to buy meat for ethical reasons (3). During the Falklands crisis many 
people chose not to buy Argentinian products, such as corned beef and 
wine. Ethical purchase behaviour can also mean a deliberate restric- 
tion of choice in purchase behaviour. People often prefer to buy 
domesti cally-produced goods. Many private and fleet car buyers will 
still only buy British cars (4). However, ethical purchase behaviour 
is not always as straightforward and clear-cut as this. While in some 
cases ethical concerns will dictate that a specific product (meat) 
must not be bought, or that a specific product must be bought (British 
cars), in other cases ethical concerns are one influence among a 
number in the purchase decision. This is neatly illustrated in the 
following quotation: 
"Times are surely hard for the consumer with a conscience. That 
Chilean wine may have a military , 
bouquet, but can we afford the 
alternative? " (5) 
Of course, it has long been recognised In the marketing literature 
that there may be many influences on purchase behaviour, buyer charac- 
teristics In particular. Ethical concerns do not, however, appear to 
have been specifically identified, at least not in the broad sense 
intended here. Some forms of ethical purchase behaviour, such as eco- 
logically concerned consumption, have been examined. This very 
limited work is considered in1.1.3, after the next section. 
The less straightforward type of ethical purchase behaviour, where 
purchases are influenced by ethical concerns but these concerns are 
not so strong as to override all other concerns, suggests the product 
isa bundle of considerations, concerns, or attributes, in the eye of 
the consumer. Such a conception of the product is not new, but as is 
shown In Chapter Eight, there may be negative product attributes as 
well as the conventionally identified positive ones. In other words, 
the product is more accurately conceived as a package of costs as well 
as benefits for the consumer, with ethical considerations being 
possible costs or benefits. One way of acknowledging that products 
may have undesirable characteristics in addition to desirable ones is 
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to use the term offering instead of product. This term has been used 
before (6), and it does have the advantage of avoiding the semantic 
problem of whether products include services (service products), as 
both are incorporated into the one term. Hence, one could say, some 
offerings will for some people have ethical dimensions. The outcome 
is ethical purchase behaviour. However, the use of the term product 
will predominate, meaning both products and services, to conform with 
common usage. 
Ethi cal purchase behavi our is all-pervasive. But itis not always 
readily-identifiable. After having presented the argument for ethical 
purchase behaviour therefore - and to appropriately delimit the 
investigation - this study examines one specific form of ethical 
purchase behavi our. This form is clearly identifiable and readily 
accessible, and the most manifest and deliberate form of ethical 
purchase behaviour: pressure group organised consumer boycotts. These 
boycotts of business are where people choose not to buy certain 
offerings as part of an organised boycott action. 
Agai nitis worth commenting here on termi nology. The term customer 
boycott would be more accurately descriptive of the form of ethical 
purchase behaviour investigated in detail here. For boycotts by orga- 
nisations such as local authorities are included as well as boycotts 
by individual consumers. But itis again necessary to conform with 
common usage as found in the limited literature on consumer boycotts, 
as that term is employed there, and also because of the need for con- 
si stency wi th the term consumer sovereignty. Consumer sovereignty is 
an important concept here and if that term is accepted when customer 
sovereignty is more accurately descriptive (7), then consumer boycott 
should be likewise accepted. Some sources use the term economic 
boycott, but this term is more widely used to refer to international 
economic sanctions (as fully explained in Chapter Seven). So consumer 
boycott is the term used here. 
To say consumer sovereignty is an important concept is an understate- 
ment. Consumer sovereignty is the key to this thesis. It is the 
basis for the argument. It i s, moreover, the rationale for capita- 
lism, as Chapter Three shows. And it is central to the marketing con- 
cept - possibly even a paradigm for the marketing discipline if one 
needs such things and wishes to think of marketing as a science. 
Questions, such as the one at the outset of this section, about the 
decisions made by consumers in markets, are questions about consumer 
sovereignty. They generally attempt to assess consumer authority In 
the marketplace. By referring to how much competition there i s, the 
question is usually considered to be answered. Here, In contrast, the 
concern is not so much with the amount of authority the buyer has vis- 
a-vis the seller, though that is important, but with the domain of 
that authority. Put otherwise, it is not the degree of consumer 
sovereignty, how much influence the buyer has, but the extent of con- 
sumer sovereignty, the issues over which the buyer may have influence. 
This distinction made here between the degree of consumer sovereignty 
and the extent of consumer sovereignty is employed throughout the 
study. 
Consider a simple example. Consumers may choose to buy Israeli 
oranges in preference to South African oranges because they taste 
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better or are cheaper. They may, alternatively, choose to buy Israeli 
oranges In preference because they do not wish to support apartheid. 
In either case there must be consumer choice, there must be com- 
petition to provide some degree of consumer sovereignty. The extent 
of consumer sovereignty, however, refers to whether consumers can only 
express concern about such features as the price, colour or taste of 
the product, or whether they can express concern about much wider 
Issues. Country of origin, dubious activities of the firm in some 
remote sphere of its operations, and many other ethical considerations 
can or could feature in purchase behaviour. Whether they do or 
whether they could - or not - depends on the extent of consumer 
sovereignty. This thesis is therefore ultimately a study of the 
extent of consumer sovereignty. 
Ethical purchase behaviour is identified here. Such behaviour prompts 
this novel perspective on consumer sovereignty. Why and how this 
behaviour should occur, and its implications, are explored In the 
study. The importance of this topic relates back to the quotes in the 
Preview to this chapter about power. If it is not already self- 
evident, it will become more so. 
The theoretical argument as to why and how ethical purchase behaviour 
arises forms Part Two of the thesis together with an exami nati on of 
boycotts, the specific form of ethical purchase behaviour focused on, 
which is also further support for the argument. This argument is more 
fully introduced In 1.1.4. Firstly, however, section 1.1.2 considers 
the meaning of ethical as used here. 
1.1.2 Defining Ethical Purchase Behaviour 
The term ethical purchase behaviour came about in an effort to provide 
a unifying concept for very different influences on purchase beha- 
viour. Indeed, one person may practice ethical purchase behaviour by 
not buying a product, another by buying that same product. (As will 
be seen, such was. alleged to be the case with Saran Wrap, and this 
frequently occurred during labour boycotts, as discussed in Chapter 
Seven). Inspiration came from the literature on ethical Investments. 
An activity which often has similar motivations but is found In pro- 
duct markets rather than investment markets, could be suitably 
described as ethical purchase behaviour. The two activities are quite 
closely analogous. 
Those responsible for investing the funds of unions, universities, 
professional associations and others, have over the'past twenty years 
been regularly urged "to consider the social consequences of corporate 
activities from which these institutions derive an endowment return" 
(8). Vogel and others have written extensively about ethical invest- 
ment in the United States (9). Currently prominent of course are the 
demands for Institutions such as the : University of California at 
Berkeley to di si nest from companies involved In South Africa. But 
actions on other issues continue, even if they are no longer In the 
limelight, as Vogel's recent review shows (10). 
Ethical investment has even acquired some prominence In Britain. 
Prompted by the British Medical Association (BMA), which acted on the 
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basis of a report by Social Audit, charities and health organisations 
recently sold off their share holdings in tobacco companies, causing a 
noticeable fall in tobacco share prices (11). The BMA had previously 
severed its links with unit trusts investing in tobacco companies 
(12). The National Union of Mineworkers trustees of the miners' pen- 
sion fund attempted, but were prevented by legal action, to refuse to 
back investments in overseas markets or in energy related interests 
which compete with coal (13). While the Trades Union Congress (TUC) 
has urged trade union trustees of pension funds to press for a com- 
plete ban on direct pension fund investment In South Africa. 
Recognising the legal difficulties involved in trustees attempting to 
make ethical investments on the behalf of others, the TUC counselled 
that South African investments are commercially ill-advised because of 
the increasing instability of the country (14). 
Meanwhile, the Church of England General Synod passed a resolution in 
1982 calling for total disinvestment from companies involved in South 
Africa, though this has not been implemented. The Church favours a 
policy of "positive engagement, " whereby through maintaining contact 
with firms' managements it may influence policy. In 1984 it sold its 
£u. um. holding in Carnation, the United States dairy products company, 
because despite contact with management it was dissatisfied with the 
wages paid to the company's South African workers (15). 
These examples show how ethical investment can operate by selling-off 
investments or by keeping them and using them to press for changes in 
the companies concerned. Another form of ethical investment is posi- 
tive rather than negative. This is where investors only invest in 
ethical concerns, as distinct from di si nvesti ng or pressing for 
changes in unethical concerns. The counterpart in ethical purchase 
behaviour is the purchase of an ethically acceptable product, instead 
of the boycott of an ethically unacceptable product. In the United 
States, investors may invest ina number of ethical investment Insti- 
tutions, such as Working Assets Money Fund (16) or Shearson/American 
Express (17). In the UK, there is Mercury Provident, Friends' 
Provident and The Ecological Building Society (18). Unity Trust, a 
union bank established In 1984 in conjunction with the Co-operative 
Bank, has a prohibition on dealing with South African interests and 
all its lending is confined to the United Kingdom to support domestic 
enterprise (19). 
The Quakers refuse to invest in liquor, drugs, nuclear energy, 
weapons, pollution, firms with bad labour relations and South Africa. 
They played an important part In recently establishing in Britain the 
Ethical Investment Research and Information Service (EIRIS), to "meet 
a long-standing need on the part of institutions and individuals who 
want to know more about the enterprises in which they invest than the 
rate of financial return" (20). Similar institutions have existed in 
the United States for some time (21). EIRIS recognise that ethical 
investment decisions require information. However, they do not seek 
to identify 'clean' Investments, itis for the investor to decide what 
constitutes 'clean'. They merely provide details on those activities 
of the companies concerned that might be of interest to a potential 
investor. In other words, they do not attempt to define what is ethi- 
cal. The same principle applies to defining ethical purchase 
behavi our. 
8 
Ethics is about what is right and wrong in human behaviour. . There 
are, however, no absolute standards. Ethics may be defined as "a 
theory or morality which attempts to systematise moral judgements, and 
establish and defend basic moral principles" (22). When applied, such 
systems are expressions of what people think ought to be. There are 
many bases for such systems, or rather, commonly used principles. 
Steiner and Steiner identify fourteen, such as Kant's categorical 
imperative: "one should not adopt principles of action unless they 
can, without inconsistency, be adopted by everyone else; " the utili- 
tarian principles of philosophers such as Bentham and Mill: "the 
greatest good for the greatest number; " the Golden Rule, found in 
every great world religion: "Do unto others as you would have them do 
unto you; " the means-ends ethic, most commonly associated with 
Machiavelli : "worthwhile ends justify efficient means; " and the 
might-equals-right ethic, as expressed in Nietzsche's understanding of 
master-morality: "What is ethical is what an individual has the 
strength and power to accomplish" (23). These different possible 
bases for ethical systems are In themselves indicative of likely 
divergence of opinion on whether an action is ethical or unethical. 
There are many further factors leading to an individual's judgement, 
including the individual's values, cultural experience, and Infor- 
mation on and understanding of the circumstances of the action. Some 
philosophers such as AJ Ayer have, because ethics are so individually 
determined, concluded that ethics and moral judgements do not exist, 
but are meaningless expressions of emotion (24). 
Ethics isa complex subject of profound philosophical inquiry. Of 
importance here, however, is simply the recognition that defining one 
behaviour as ethical and another as unethical is the outcome of an 
individual's moral judgement, an act of moral reason, and, as such, 
likely to differ from person to person. For this reason, ethical 
purchase behaviour is In itself also an outcome of an individual's 
moral judgement. It could then result in different responses to the 
same product by different individuals who are yet both consciously 
indulging in ethical purchase behaviour. This observation is also 
true of ethical investment. Responses by practitioners to an article 
by Purcell on ethical investment made this clear. One respondent com- 
mented "Were there no ethical investors ten, five, or two years ago? 
Of course there were. " It is probable that this respondent's view of 
these earlier ethical investors was that they were ethical in the 
sense of fulfilling their duties to those who had entrusted capital to 
them. He continues by asking if there isa magical dividing line bet- 
ween ethical and unethical investors, observing that some draw the 
line at investment In South Africa, while others at between unionised 
and non-unionised companies. In the latter case "they outlaw three- 
fourths of private employment in America" (25). 
For these reasons, EIRIS do not identify 'clean' investments and no 
attempt can be made here to say what is ethical purchase behaviour in 
any specific case. Yet there is some consistency to such behaviour 
indicating common standards, even if they are only emotional responses 
or expressions of the values of the ruling elite. So while there are 
no absolutes, there are shared perspectives on ethical behaviour, some 
of which are more prevalent than others. Purcell's reply to his cri- 
tics recognises this: 
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"People differ In their philosophical and theological reasons 
underlying ethics, but I think there is fair consensus about 
applied ethics, a kind of a garden-variety definition meaning 
integrity, virtue, and consideration for others, which I think 
most HBR readers would share" (26, Purcell's emphasis). 
In the case of EIRIS, the ethical judgement is simply implicit rather 
than explicit. For one must ask how they provide the information 
necessary for their clients to make ethical judgements. They, of 
course, assess the performance of companies on what they define as 
ethical issues: involvement in armaments, nuclear power, South Africa 
and so on. They permit some flexibility, as a range of issues is con- 
sidered, but a moral judgement is still made, which largely reflects 
the concerns of the church groups responsible in setting up EIRIS and 
their clients. 
Such is also the case wi th ethical purchase behaviour and many of the 
issues prompting ethical purchase behaviour and ethical investments 
are common, as will be seen. Some of these issues are considered in 
the next section which looks at forms of ethical purchase behaviour 
previously examined. This section has shown that ethical purchase 
behaviour is an expression of the Individual's moral judgement In his 
or her purchase behaviour. As such judgements are individual, ethical 
purchase behaviour may involve a considerable variety of possibly 
conflicting issues and priorities, but some consensus can be expected. 
1.1.3 Some Forms of Ethical Purchase Behaviour Previously Examined 
Section 1.1.1 noted ethical purchase behaviour was largely unre- 
cognised In the literature. However, some forms of ethical purchase 
behaviour have been recognised, though not by this name, and this 
should be acknowledged. These various forms previously identified 
come together under the all-embracing term ethical purchase behaviour, 
together with other forms not already identified and possibly others 
not even practiced as yet. 
Within what may be broadly described as the marketing literature, this 
study follows in the tradition of the work of Anderson and Cunningham, 
Kassarjian, Kinnear et al, and others, on socially responsible or eco- 
logically concerned consumption. They consider some forms of ethical 
purchase behaviour, but their concern is principally with identifying, 
for segmentation purposes, who the consumers are that practice this. 
So Engel and Blackwell include this work under the heading 'Catalysts 
to Consumerism', suggesting it has identified soci opsychologi cal 
variables associated with an interest in consumerism activities. For 
them, the contribution of this work is In having helped to describe 
'socially conscious consumers', that is "those persons who not only 
are concerned with their own personal satisfactions, but also buy with 
some consideration of the social and environmental well-being of 
others" (27). 
Webster (28) refers to the 'socially responsible consumer' and 
suggests "In general, he (sic) has been found to be a pre-middle-aged 
adult of relatively high occupational, economic and social status. He 
tends to be more cosmopolitan, less dogmatic, less conservative, less 
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status conscious, less alienated, and less personally competent than 
the less socially concerned citizen. " He points out that these 
discriminators are more problematic than demographic variables and 
"the task of developing workable definitions of segments will be a 
difficult one. " Webster then goes on to discuss phases in market 
development and changes in the marketing concept as a system of econo- 
mic exchange, where the focus moves from the market, to the seller, to 
the buyer, and finally to the public. In the final phase "the revised 
marketing concept is not fundamentally new or different from the old 
one. It merely represents a fine tuning to make sure that public 
needs are consistent with private wants, a piece of unfinished busi- 
ness under the old marketing concept. " This is an early statement of 
Kotler's societal marketing concept (29), though less adequately 
expressed. It seems - but this is not made explicit - that Webster 
assumes socially responsible consumption i s, or will be, the norm, in 
spite of having identified it as being particular to a market segment. 
So his justification for a revised concept of marketing rests on the 
notion of socially responsible consumption. It therefore comes across 
as little more than wishful thinking. He writes: 
"How else could business enhance the quality of life except by 
offering goods and services that find value in the marketplace 
and return profit to the shareholders? That is the only function 
of business! But as the definition of value changes, so does the 
criterion of marketing effectiveness change, that for which pro- 
fit is the reward. " 
He argues, in other words, that value in the marketplace now includes 
social considerations, suggesting a revised concept of marketing. It 
pays to have a broader social purpose because consumers demand it. 
This isa remarkably convenient argument given that it was written at 
a time when criticism of business was at its height. It i s, however, 
unacceptable. A quantum leap is made between some very limited evi- 
dence of socially responsible consumption by some consumers, to an 
ideal solution to the problem of social responsibility in business. 
Yet while such an argument is so obviously flawed, the concept 
suggested - the societal marketing concept -is thought to be valid. 
As the next section shows, the argument presented in this study 
attempts to fill the gap between the well-intentioned rhetoric of the 
societal marketing concept and examples of ethical purchase behaviour. 
It eventually provides some support for such a concept, not 
unqualified, but at least fully justified. Webster does, to be fair, 
recognise some of the implications of socially responsible consump- 
tion, even if he does overstate them and fail to acknowledge any of 
the intervening considerations. 
Both Webster, and Engel and Blackwell, cite the paper by Anderson and 
Cunningham on the socially conscious consumer (30). (Indeed, this is 
the only paper Webster cites In support of his claim for socially 
responsible consumption! ) It's important to note that although 
Anderson and Cunningham claim to have identified an image of the 
socially conscious consumer, this is not based on any observation of 
socially conscious consumption, the dependent variable was the score 
on a social responsibility scale, for "it can be assumed that socially 
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conscious individuals, whose orientations are reflected ina variety 
of socially responsible behaviours, would manifest social 
consciousness in consumption decisions. " Consequently, despite their 
large sample and sophisticated multivariate data analysis, they have 
to concede "It would be useful to determine whether consumption pat- 
terns are different between high and low scorers on the 
Berkowitz-Daniels Social Responsibility Scale, particularly with 
respect to products and/or brands which claim environmental benefits. " 
Their claims are further weakened by the likely colli neari ty of the 
dependent and independent variables and their dubious use of discrimi- 
nant analysis (31). 
Kassarjian's paper on incorporating ecology into marketing strategy, 
cited by Anderson and Cunningham, comes a little closer to socially 
responsible consumption by looking at behavioural Intention. He was 
mainly concerned with measuring attitudes towards air pollution and 
whether people say they would pay more for a pollutant-free gasoline, 
that ist their behavioural intention. He shied away from attempting 
to find out whether those with a concern for air pollution actually 
did pay more and buy the pollutant-free gasoline, offering only extre- 
mely limited circumstantial evidence to suggest that they did. He 
suggests "With a good product based on ecological concerns, the poten- 
tial for a marketer seems to be impressive" (32, his emphasis). 
This, however, conflicts with a study reported by Engel, Kollat and 
Blackwell where "In spite of aggressive marketing by the refiners, the 
no-lead/low-lead gasolines received less than half of the 10 per cent 
volume expected of them" (33). They suggest the discrepancy may be 
due to the acute pollution experienced by the respondents in 
Kassarjian's study, but also comment "Possibly consumers are concerned 
about pollution generally but do not perceive their own consumption of 
gasoline to be serious enough to result in a problem that would 
generate extended problem solving. " Moreover "an individual consumer 
risks paying for societal benefits while other consumers can get away 
without paying. " In other words, a problem of the logic of collective 
action where, as discussed in Chapter Six, it is often found that 
voluntary collective action is unlikely even if the would-be par- 
ticipants could anticipate collective good (34). Consequently, Engel, 
Kollat and Blackwell further on write that voluntarism has its limits, 
that "There i s, In the literature of consumerism, a persistent belief 
expressed that consumers ought to voluntarily act in a way that is 
beneficial to the society they live In. At the same time, there is 
persistent evidence that they will act ina way that is beneficial to 
themselves as individuals" (35). The belief they refer to is to be 
found in the previously mentioned papers and others (36), but the evi- 
dence either way is scant. 
The point about all these studies - and there are more (37) - is that 
they assume ethical purchase behaviour, even if it is referred to only 
In part, as ecologically concerned consumption or socially responsible 
consumption. They offer only limited evidence of ethical purchase 
behaviour and mostly In an indirect way. No explanation is offered as 
to why or how such purchase behaviour may come about. This omission 
is redressed here, In the provision of direct evidence and an argument 
for ethical purchase behaviour. Moreover, ethical purchase behaviour 
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Is more than socially responsible or ecologically concerned consump- 
ti on. Others have come nearer to a wider definition and this work, 
although conceptual rather than empirical, is worth considering here. 
Thomas, for example, has written about purchase votes on social 
impacts, allowing consumers to express their social preferences in the 
marketplace with firms broadcasting their social impacts (38). More 
realistically, perhaps, he has also written about those impacts being 
broadcasted by 'informed partisan groups'. His 'Consciousness Four' 
marketing sees "consumers as accepting (or rejecting) the total social 
impact of an organisation. " He's not clear about how this will come 
about - for example, who these informed partisan groups are and their 
role In practice - but his use of Li ndblom's concept of disjointed 
i ncrementali sm gives credence to the notion of each individual 
consumer's vote contributing towards some change In the socioeconomic 
system. The type of purchase behaviour he has in mind is broader than 
socially responsible consumpti on: "Individual consumption decisions 
today require us both to determine our 'needs' and to consider an 
intricate pattern of social, economic, legal and ecological 
variables. " Even in this paper, however, Thomas is primarily advo- 
cating organisational broadcasting of social impacts (39). 
In Can the Market Sustain an Ethic? Yale Brozen suggests markets 
reflect the ethics of participants, in which case one might presume he 
would argue there already is ethical purchase behaviour. He refers, 
in example, to American firms that refuse to sell goods to Russia 
although they would, at least in the short run, profit from doing so. 
Their justification, he suggests, lies In the belief that in the long 
run they could be conferring benefits on a government which may become 
an enemy in some future situation. Alternatively, there are those 
that choose to trade with Russia, not so much for profit, but in the 
hope that economic interdependence will reduce enmity and the chances 
of a future war. So, he sees a place for ethical conduct in the 
market: 
"In terms of whether or not some kinds of transactions occur, a 
free market simply reflects the notions of right and wrong 
already possessed by participants, The market does not mecha- 
nistically determine any kind of conduct. Moral or ethical 
choices are made by individuals. In a free market, respon- 
sibility for such choices is left in the hands of each person. 
To that extent, a free market places responsibility on each for 
his or her own conduct" (40). 
In The Public Use of Private Interest, Schultze argues that greater 
use could be made of the market, in preference to increased government 
intervention, on social issues. In acknowledging the problem of self- 
Interest overriding social concern, he suggests "the prerequisite for 
social gains is the identification ... of the defects in the incentive 
system that drive ordinary decent citizens into doing things contrary 
to the common good. " 
Yet he still wishes to employ self-interest in addition to any 
"preaching" that might lead to more appropriate behaviour (ethical 
purchase behaviour). So he writes "If I want drivers to economise on 
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gasoline usage v advertising appeals to patriotism, warnings about the 
energy crisis, and "don't be fuelish" slogans are no match for higher 
prices at the gas pumps" (41). Schultze isa great believer In the 
market: "Harnessing the "base" motive of material self-interest to 
promote the common good is perhaps the most important social invention 
mankind has yet achieved" (429 his emphasis). 
Robin Wight is another with great faith In the market. He suggests 
"power grows out of the shopping basket" and that consumerism is In 
recognition of this. He makes frequent reference, in illustration, to 
consumer boycotts: "a militant method of responding to an unsatisfac- 
tory product as perfect competition says one should" (143). While 
Vogel (44) recognises that consumer sovereignty need not be limited to 
responses to unsatisfactory products. Referring to both ethical 
investments and consumer boycotts, he writes that although in theory 
consuming and investing "are "economic" decisions ... legitimately 
guided by only self-interest, " there is "an increasing consideration 
of social factors in both investment and consumption decisions ... 
citizens are beginning to consider the possibilities of employing 
"public" standards of judgement in the economic arena. " He suggests 
the distinction between the 'public' act of voting In the poll ti cal 
marketplace, which is public and political because it involves an 
attempt by the individual to advance a perception of the general good, 
is becoming blurred when ostensibly 'private' acts of voting in the 
economic marketplace, guided entirely by self-interest, are beginning 
to incorporate social factors. He refers to consumer boycotts on the 
production of war materials (by ITT and Dow), Investment in Angola 
(Gulf )p and participation in the identity card system in South Africa 
(Polaroid), by way of example. Such boycotts "have become a major 
vehicle of popular protest against business, " and it seems that he is 
in favour. He refers, moreover, to ecologically concerned 
consumption: 
"As environmental concern increases, there is a tendency - still 
more celebrated than measurable - for "ecologically responsible" 
citizens to express their identification with the public interest 
by their private purchasing decisions. People can thus influence 
environmental issues by "voting" with their dollars, as well as 
with their ballot. In effect, they are taking seriously the ana- 
logv betwen "dollar" votes and political votes, which forms the 
basis of the corporate defense of consumer sovereignty. Thus, 
one is encouraged to purchase biodegradable detergents, smaller 
cars ... " 
It was earli er noted that soci ally responsi ble consumpti on is but one 
form of ethical purchase behaviour. It is concerned with, as Vogel 
shows in this quote, the environmental impact of consumer purchases. 
It is limited to non-returnable bottles, high-phosphate detergents, 
leaded petrol and so on. In other words, socially responsible or eco- 
logically concerned consumption seeks to limit the pollution created 
by the consumer in consumption. Ethical purchase behaviour is con- 
cerned with these and much wider social impacts. The arguments for 
such behaviour, by Thomas, Brozen, Schultze, Wight and others, 
recognise that consumer sovereignty need not be so restricted. Of 
course consumer sovereignty can be employed to express concern about 
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and possibly remedy product defects and products that pollute, but why 
not, as these conceptual contributions seem to imply, all the social 
impacts of the firm? 
Vogel differentiates between the types of consumer boycotts he earlier 
referred to and ecologically concerned consumption: 
"Ecologically "responsible" consumption differs from purchasing 
which is politically or ideologically motivated chiefly In that 
for the former, the relationship between what is consumed (or not 
consumed) and the social problem being addressed is direct. " 
Yet there 3s no need to so di fferenti ate. It is all ethical purchase 
behaviour, as here identified and defined. 
The next section introduces the argument presented here for ethical 
purchase behaviour. The evidence for such behaviour - and here, in 
contrast to the studies on socially responsible consumption, direct 
evidence is offered - lies in an examination of ethical purchase beha- 
viour expressed in consumer boycotts. 
1.1.4 A Theoretical Case for Ethical Purchase Behaviour 
To some extent, much of this study represents the necessary concep- 
tualisation that should have been conducted prior to the research 
referred to in the last section on ecologically concerned consumption. 
These authors assumed ecologically concerned consumption. They 
offered no argument as to why or how such behaviour comes about. 
Ethical purchase behaviour, which includes socially responsible or 
ecologically concerned consumption but also a great deal more, Is not 
assumed here. An argument for ethical purchase behaviour is presented 
together with direct evidence. 
Consumer boycotts are interpreted as an expression of ethical purchase 
behaviour. This, In turn, suggests an extension of consumer 
sovereignty beyond its mere technical meaning within economics to a 
more literal meaning, such that the consumer can not only dictate pro- 
duct characteristics of the offering, but also other characteristics 
such as whether the manufacturer has investments in South Africa, 
manufacturers the P1119 or whatever ethical issue associated with the 
offering is of concern to the consumer. But on what basis can one so 
refer to the extent of consumer sovereignty and what limitations are 
there? 
The nature of capitalism and consumer sovereignty is explored, through 
the works of Friedman, Galbraith, the Austrian economists, and many 
others. It is suggested that consumer sovereignty is the rationale 
for capitalism, but this may in practice be extremely limited. Choice 
and information are found to be vital. However, given the limitations 
on consumer sovereignty, one must consider how the social control of 
business may be realised, if not through the market. 
The problem of the social control of business is examined via the 
business and society literature. The meaning of social responsibility 
in business is considered for society as a whole, for interested 
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'stakeholders', for companies, and for managers. But social respon- 
sibility In business, as a doctrine, is problematic and an inadequate 
solution to the problem of the social control of business. However, 
ideal solutions to the problem of the social control of business are 
difficult to find. Three forms of social control of business are 
identified: legislation, the market and moral obligation, which Inclu- 
des the self-regulation efforts In adhering to a doctrine of social 
responsibility In business. Legislation has its limits and moral 
obligation is inadequate ina number of ways, so this suggests greater 
reliance must be placed on the market for the social control of busi- 
ness. One possibility therefore is ethical purchase behaviour. But 
how can such a solution, albeit only a partial one, be reconciled with 
the perceived limitations to consumer sovereignty referred to above? 
The distinction has already been made between the degree and the 
extent of consumer sovereignty. It is not an artificial one. Both 
depend on the provision of consumer choice (through competition) and 
information. When referring to the extent of consumer sovereignty 
though, informed choice involves more than knowing about suitable 
alternative products. The extent of consumer sovereignty depends on 
the consumer having awareness and understanding of issues related to 
the producing firm, as well as knowing about the physical product. 
For a consumer boycott, the consumer must be concerned, willing and 
able to express preferences on firms' social impacts in the 
marketplace. This suggests a role for pressure groups active on the 
issues involved. Pressure groups may not be able to ensure com- 
petition, but they can provide the information for awareness and 
understanding which is necessary for ethical purchase behaviour. 
The role of pressure groups within pluralistic interpretations of 
politics and particularly the growth and limited resources of promo- 
tional pressure groups is examined. Pressure group strategies and 
tactics are also considered. The conclusion reached is that there is 
a legitimate information role for pressure groups in the marketing 
system and not only may ethical purchase behaviour need pressure 
groups, but pressure groups may also need ethical purchase behaviour. 
This then provides a case for ethical purchase behaviour. It is 
suggested that at the micro level products may be augmented negatively 
as well as positively, to explain individual consumer responses. 
The boycott, as a form of non-violent direct action and a pressure 
group tactic, is considered in depth to show how consumer boycotts, 
one form of ethical purchase behaviour, may come about. 
This, in essence, is the argument for ethical purchase behaviour pre- 
sented here. Some of the implications of this argument are considered 
next. 
16 
1.2 Scope of the Research and Thesis Outline 
1.2.1 The Research Questions 
Three research questions are addressed here. Firstly, at the prac- 
tical level: How may pressure groups most effectively employ the con- 
sumer boycott tactic and how should boycotted businesses respond? 
Guidelines for action are suggested on the basis of previous studies 
of pressure group tactics, descriptions of consumer boycott actions 
given In the literature, and the empirical work. The empirical work 
consists of survey research on boycotts of business and five case stu- 
dies of consumer boycotts employing primary and secondary data. 
Secondly, and at a more conceptual level of abstraction, there is the 
concern with describing and to some extent explaining ethical purchase 
behaviour. This is expressed In the research question: Can consumer 
sovereignty ensure social responsibility in business and in what way? 
The answer lies largely in the argument as discussed in the last sec- 
tion. 
Finally, at the highest, philosophical level of abstraction: How far 
does consumer sovereignty extend? This question, which comes closest 
to the one posed at the beginning of this chapter in the Preview, is 
about whether and what decisions are made in markets. 
The implications and importance of these questions is largely self- 
evi dent. For marketing, the thesis is concerned with a significant 
form of purchase behaviour. There are also the implications for 
market segmentation, as noted by Engel et al, and others, on the 
limited form of ethical purchase behaviour previously examined, 
socially responsible consumption. There is the issue of how manage- 
ment may respond to ethical purchase behaviour, and consumer boycotts 
In particular. But perhaps most importantly, the thesis isa study in 
consumer sovereignty, the central concept to the marketing discipline. 
For business and society, the thesis is an examination of the problem 
of the social control of business and an appraisal of one way In which 
the market may increase social control. Ethical purchase behaviour 
seems a particularly attractive way of increasing social control 
because it would mean greater political participation, given the 
pressure group role and influence. In looking at pressure group stra- 
tegies and tactics, the study also contributes to the pressure group 
(political sociology) literature. 
Parameters have necessarily been placed on this research. Not all 
forms of ethical purchase behaviour could be specifically considered, 
only pressure group organised consumer boycotts. Furthermore, 
although some might conceive of this study as involving consumerism, 
this area too has been considered outside the scope of the study to a 
large extent. Consumerism is predominantly about consumer protection 
and other issues arising in the consumption of the product. The con- 
cern here, as well indicated, is with less parochial matters. There 
is also an emphasis on the extent or domain of consumer sovereignty, 
rather than the degree of consumer sovereignty, and on promotional 
rather than sectional pressure groups (for reasons explained in 
Chapter Six, where the two types are differentiated). 
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1.2.2 Thesis Outline 
The thesis has four principal parts. Part One is the introduction and 
methodology. This chapter has served to introduce the study. Chapter 
Two describes the research origins, perspective and methodology. The 
origins are worth noting because they give an important indication as 
to where the researcher is coming from, but also because they show how 
and why the research questions came to be so posed. The research 
perspective is given so that itis clear as to whom the thesis is 
addressed. Finally, the research methodology, in the sense of the 
overall approach to the research, is included here. (Research methods 
are described later. ) This discussion of the research approach is 
important because it differs from the more frequently occurring posi- 
tivist approaches. 
Part Two comprises Chapters Three to Eight inclusive and the bulk of 
the thesis. This is the theoretical argument and the examination of 
the boycott tactic. Chapter Three explores the nature of capitalism 
and consumer sovereignty. Chapters Four and Five, the social control 
of business. Chapter Six, pressure groups. Chapters Seven and Eight, 
the boycott tactic, boycotts of business and pressure groups in the 
marketing system. 
Part Three describes the survey research and case studies. Evidence 
for ethical purchase behaviour and on the mechanism of the boycott and 
We factors in its success have already been provided in Part Two, but 
in this part further evidence, including primary data, is offered. 
The survey research - its objectives, method, form, response and fin- 
dings -is described in Chapter Nine. The following chapter presents 
the case studies. Chapter Eleven analyses the data with respect to 
pressure group use of the boycott, corporate responses to boycotts, 
empirical support for the model presented in Chapter Eight, and the 
proposed concept of ethical purchase behaviour. 
Lastly, Part Four, comprising Chapter Twelve, gives the research 
conclusions. They focus on the effective use of the boycott tactic 
and management responses, consumer sovereignty and its role in 
ensuring social responsibility In business, and ethical purchase beha- 
viour and the extent of consumer sovereignty. In other words, answers 
to the research questions. However, further conclusions are also 
given on the role of pressure groups as a countervailing power, the 
potential for greater political participation and pluralistic poli- 
tics, and, finally, the status of the marketing discipline. 
Directions for further research conclude the thesis. 
Summaries are provided at the end of each of these parts. Notes and 
references appear at the end of each chapter, with a full bibliography 
provided after Part Four and before the appendices. 
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Previ ew 
Although business researchers may need to learn even more about 
techniques, their notable weakness is their inadequate emphasis 
on the research process. Knowing how to use the tools and tech- 
niques of research does not in itself guarantee the effectiveness 
of an individual in carrying out a scientific investigation. 
Paul H Rigby (1) 
The most important advice I can give the contemporary sociologist 
has nothing to do with the validity of my arguments. It is this: 
you do not have to believe anything about theory and methodology 
that is told you pretentiously and sanctimoniously by other 
sociologists - including myself. So much guff has gotten mixed 
with the truth that, if you cannot tell which is which, you had 
better reject it all. It will only get In your way. No one will 
go far wrong theoretically who remains In close touch with and 
seeks to understand a body of concrete phenomena. 
George C Homans (2) 
Chapter One introduced the research topic and the argument presented 
here. This argument is the result of an investigation of the phenome- 
non of pressure group influence on purchase behaviour in consumer 
boycotts. To round-off this introductory part to the thesis, 
something must also be said, albeit briefly, about the form of the 
investigation undertaken. This chapter is about the research 
methodology; not the research methods - or as Rigby puts it "the tools 
and techniques" - they are described later, but the research process, 
the approach to answering the research questions. Ri gby's observation 
on the failing of management researchers to address this issue is 
almost as valid today as it was twenty years ago. However, methodolo- 
gical concerns - be they ontological, epistemological or simply about 
the reliability of a research instrument - must not predominate, they 
are secondary to the subject of the investigation. As Homans implies, 
It Is very easy to end up in a methodologi cal maze. Provi di ng the 
researcher has a basi c grasp of the i ssues and remains close to the 
phenomena studied, meaningful research is likely to be conducted. 
This chapter therefore gives due but not lengthy consideration to the 
research methodology. 
The weaknesses of positivist approaches are recognised In 'new para- 
digm research'. In particular, the issue of researcher bias. 
Accordingly, this chapter starts by describing the research origins - 
In sex-role stereotypes in advertising. This also shows how and why 
the research questions came to be so posed. It then turns to the 
research perspective on marketing. This shows that the concern evi- 
dent in the sex-role stereotypes investigation with the way the market 
operates, is central to marketing. It also indicates as to who the 
study is addressed. 
The context of research - including the social experience of the 
researcher, the research origins and the research perspective - give 
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rise to a research posture. The research posture adopted here is 
characterised by: a rejection (as far as possible) of positivism, an 
ethnomethodological qualitative research approach, and social criti- 
cism. Given the research task of description and developing an argu- 
ment, conceptualisation plays an important role here, It too forms 
part of the research posture. 
There Is always it seems, in any delvings into methodology, a risk of 
getting trapped in the methodological maze. The alternative is to 
remain as close as possible to the phenomenon under investigation. 
This was the aim here within an understanding of the basic methodolo- 
gical issues. 
This chapter, in describing the research methodology, says what sort 
of study this Is. 
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2.1 Research Origins and Perspective 
2.1.1 Social Experience and Social Science Research 
Marketing, In common with other social science disciplines, has fre- 
quently considered whether it can claim to be a science (3). One 
marketing writer, Hunt, in his exploration of the issue, quotes Carl 
Hempel: "Science strives for objectivity In the sense that its state- 
ments are to be capable of public tests with results that do not vary 
essentially with the tester" (4). This requirement of science for 
objectivity and the role of the researcher or 'tester' in influencing 
this, has been documented in the natural sciences as well as the 
social sciences. Medawar quotes Whewell: "Facts cannot be observed as 
Facts except In virtue of the Conceptions which the observer himself 
unconsciously supplies" (5). Undoubtedly however, as the social 
sciences deal with social phenomena, then the social experience of the 
researcher is likely to present an even greater threat to objectivity. 
This added complexity need not mean that researchers of social pheno- 
mena should ignore the requirement for objectivity or that such work 
should not be classed as science, as some have claimed (6). 
Investigations of social phenomena can be 'scientific'. But the 
social science researcher should be aware of how social experience, 
the researcher's "social construction of reality" (7), affects the 
research. 
Recognising that the social experience of the researcher will 
influence the research is an important step towards more objective 
research; and, though this is less important, towards confirming the 
status of the social sciences as sciences. Yet, it has been suggested 
that this is not sufficient. In particular, Rowan and Reason argue 
that not only should the part played by social experience in research 
be recognised, but it should be explicitly acknowledged. Rowan 
writes: 
. "... research situations stir up anxieties and other feelings at 
various levels within the researcher, some of which may have much 
more to do with the researcher's own problems than with anything 
going on out there In the world ... this raises the alarming 
possibility that a great deal of social science, as at present 
practiced, may be a species of autobiography. And so long as 
researchers ignore the unconscious, and pretend that they can be 
totally objective, this will continue to be the case" (8). 
Rowan and Reason advocate an "objectively subjective approach, " which 
they term 'new paradigm research'. They write that a researcher 
should be "making clear where one is coming from in taking a par- 
ti cular view; the traditional way of doing this is to give references 
to previous work, but we think itis also desirable to give details of 
political standpoint, current work and relationships, general way of 
being in the world or whatever" (9). While sympathetic to this 
approach, this author does not go so far as they suggest. There are 
three reasons for this. Firstly, 'where one is coming from' is 
thought to be more apparent than Rowan and Reason would suggest. It 
is evident not only In the choice of references to previous work, but 
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also in the way that work and much else is interpreted. In other 
words, itis largely implicit. Secondly, there is the pragmatic con- 
sideration of giving over valuable and sufficient space to an auto- 
biography. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the 
paradox In their position. Acknowledging the researcher's social 
experience could in itself only be subjective. This, under another 
guise, is the old Marxist problem of claiming if the masses were not 
indoctrinated by the ideology of the ruling class In a society they 
would realise their oppression, when the person making that claim is 
also part of the same society and presumably similarly indoctrinated. 
So as Berger and Kellner conclude "direct access to facts and laws ... 
is never possible, no matter what one's standpoint ... there is no 
magical trick by which one can bypass the act of interpretation" (10). 
As science is inevitably interpretive, objectivity can never be 
achieved in any absolute sense. Objectivity is relative, and the 
judgement of one study as more objective than another is itself also 
an act of interpretation and thus subject to variation between Indivi- 
duals or different disciplines or scientific communities. So saying 
'where one is coming from' probably doesn't matter very much, as the 
research findings are more likely to be assessed for validity on the 
basis of the particular criteria used by the reader - plausabi li ty, 
extent to which they meet expectations, rigour of method, and so on. 
If the reader is greatly concerned about researcher bias, much will 
already be implicit in the report of the study and if more were to be 
added, there is the paradox consideration of its subjective nature, 
and the pragmatic consideration of space. 
However, while it may be suggested that reporting one's "general way 
of being in the world" is problematic and largely unnecessary, this 
does not deny the importance of the researcher recognising the 
influence of this in his or her efforts to get at the 'truth'. 
Moreover, as far as this study is concerned, it is felt that something 
can be usefully said on the research origins and perspective, not only 
because it reveals where the researcher is coming from, but also 
because itis likely to aid appreciation of the research problem. It 
should, as well, not be forgotten that the social experience of the 
researcher, while a source of bias in research, Is also a valuable 
source of data; itis, indeed, the sole source of data for the social 
criticism methodology (discussed In 2.2). 
The following section thus discusses the origins of the research in an 
investigation of sex-role stereotypes In advertising. Elsewhere, if 
appropriate, further attempts are made to acknowledge the researcher's 
position. But exclusion rather than inclusion has been the rule, for 
the reasons indicated above and so as not to tire the reader. 
Researcher as human being and researcher as researcher are not 
separate entities. It is foolish and misleading to suggest they are. 
This is clearly demonstrated In an investigation such as this, as it 
deals with highly political and emotive issues, from apartheid in 
South Africa to nuclear disarmament. 
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2.1.2 Sex-Role Stereotypes in Advertising - The Starting Point 
The starting point for this research was an investigation of the issue 
of sex-role stereotypes In advertising. A brief overview of the issue 
and the conclusions reached will quite adequately serve as an explana- 
tion of the research origins and their part In formulating the 
research questions addressed here. 
Criticism of sex-role stereotypes in the media stems largely from the 
Influence these stereotypes are claimed to have on society. Such cri- 
ticism is frequently polemic, with one writer, for example, claiming 
"the mass media moulds everyone ... " (11). Feminist critics are of 
the opinion that the meanings reflected and reinforced within adver- 
tising portraying or directed to women, are distinctly undesirable. 
They see advertising as yet another determinant of a sexist status-quo 
(12). More reasoned or, at least, less overtly angry criticism, comes 
from those working in the area of sex-role formation. Current 
theories on sex-role formation largely attribute the sex-role to 
social rather than biological determinants (13), and advertising plays 
a part in this process (14). 
These arguments about the influence of advertising are widely 
accepted. Research on the content of advertising confirms that tradi- 
tional sex-role stereotypes prevail (15). While socialisation 
theories and research on sex-role formation and sex-role stereotypes 
supports the idea that such stereotypes have an effect (16). Even 
some advertisers are prepared to acknowledge this (17). However, they 
suggest advertising has to reflect majority attitudes, that it must be 
congruent with the market segment with which itis intended to com- 
municate (18). 
What is at issue here? If one 
stereotypes In advertising are 
conclude that advertisers are not 
manner, that they are not acting 
issue is concerned with social rest 
dies does society have? 
accepts that traditional sex-role 
socially undesirable, one would 
behaving In a socially responsible 
In society's best interests. The 
ponsi bi li ty in business. What reme- 
Advertisers could be coerced by legislation. This seems extremely 
unlikely, not least because of the difficulties of legislating, short 
of banning all advertising. Could advertisers then be persuaded to 
voluntarily adjust their advertising? 
Advertising is more heavily criticised than the rest of the media for 
the use of traditional sex-role stereotypes. This may be because 
advertising is the worst offender or because the critics of sex-role 
stereotypes have a more general dislike for advertising. But it is at 
least partly due to the concern that advertising is selling sexism as 
well as the product featured. The irony is that consumers seem to buy 
It. So advertising is not likely to change through advertisers volun- 
tarily meeting the wishes of their critics, unless, of course, tradi- 
tional portrayals were found to be detrimental to advertising 
effectiveness. 
This interrelationship between the audience and the media, and adver- 
tising In particular, is acknowledged In a report for UNESCO by 
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Gallagher. She concludes that women should be more concerned with 
changes In the political and economic structure - matters of far 
greater importance - than in the media. But at the same time, it 
should, if possible, be ensured that the media does not lag behind the 
broader social system: For even if the media cannot be expected to 
initiate change, they can certainly be expected to reflect It. " She 
asks whether and which mechanisms can be developed to ensure the 
currency of the media (19). 
Her questions reflect a concern for the social control of business. 
But as far as advertising is concerned, it would seem that an 
appropriate mechanism already exists. Jane Reed, as editor In chief 
of Woman, says that she is not greatly worried about "the mildly 
sexist ads that do appear now - using female stereotypes and tradi- 
tional female concepts. " This is because "advertising is about 
selling things, and if the advertisement misses the mark - through 
adopting the wrong sell-line, image or target - then it is the manu- 
facturer who should worry" (20). Moreover, if advertisers carry on 
regardless, the market can be employed deliberately to put the matter 
to rights by using the consumer boycott. As Beasley and Silver write 
"Pressure has been applied on advertisers through demonstrations, mail 
and telephone complaints, and, in some cases, boycotting of a product 
marketed via a sexist ad. Advertisers have yielded to the pressure, 
knowing that women spend more dollars in the American marketplace than 
men or teenagers" (21). 
So, this author concluded that the problem - if one sees it as such - 
of sex-role stereotypes in advertising could not be directly resolved. 
Furthermore, advertisers, if doing their job properly, could not be 
criticised for not being socially responsible, because of the self- 
regulating role of the market. The market ensures social control of 
business (in this case, advertisers). As Baroness Lockwood, former 
Chairman (sic) of the Equal Opportunities Commission, suggests In a 
research report on Adman and Eve: "there need be no conflict of 
interests between those whose job it is to sell, and those who seek to 
further equality of opportunity In our society" (22). With wider 
adoption of feminist thinking or perhaps simply changes in the roles 
of women, the traditional sex-role stereotypes in advertising w1119 of 
necessity, largely disappear (23). 
The issue is not so much resolved as dismissed. However, this is only 
so long as one accepts the market as an effective mechanism for the 
social control of business. Put otherwise, it assumes consumer 
sovereignty can ensure social responsibility in business. 
Many, if not most, would accept this is the case. With advertisers in 
particular, the concern for effective communication must make the 
interests of the consumer of overriding Importance. Given a marketing 
orientation, one could argue such an observation surely applies with 
equal force to all elements of the marketing mix. After all, this is 
what capitalism and free competitive markets are all about. This is 
expressed in the following quote from Thomas A Murphy, as Chairman of 
General Motors: 
"... competitive markets and free consumer choice could be relied 
on to set an economic course which would maximise human welfare 
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... The individual cl ti zen has great capacity to modify his con- 
sumption patterns through free markets. If he does not like qne 
product, he can choose any of several other possibilities - or 
none at all ... This sensitive tailoring of productive resources 
to the complex and diverse preferences of people, expressed 
through free markets, is a fundamental, though often under- 
appreciated characteristic of our system. Each consumer, given 
his free choice, can purchase those products which he feels most 
suit his own special needs and resources. Unlike the political 
system, every person can win In an economic "election"" (24). 
This idea of 'purchase votes t (as Gist and others put it (25)) for 
expressing preferences in product markets as conveyed above, is what 
is explored In this study. In particular, the interest is with the 
expression - and realisation - of preferences on what may be referred 
to as issues of social responsibility in business. As is apparent 
from the previous chapter, such an expression of preferences is 
described here as ethical purchase behaviour. However, this 
integrating concept was not identified until the survey research was 
conducted and analysed (as discussed in Chapter Nine). Moreover, the 
focus of the study is on the more deliberate attempts to realise pre- 
ferences in markets, In consumer boycotts. As this discussion of such 
an approach to the issue of sex-role stereotypes in advertising shows, 
one isa part of the other; consumer boycotts are a form of ethi cal 
purchase behaviour. 
The idea of purchase votes on social responsibility issues is not in 
principle new, In practice or in theory, as the examples in Chapter 
One and the discussion of the work on socially responsible consumption 
indicates. It has, however, not been conceptualised as here. Neither 
has it been subjected to much objective criticism. A major reason for 
this is that the view of the market expressed is ideological. The 
market philosophy - belief In the market and all that goes with it- 
is, moreover, probably the most dominant ideology in the West. 
Consider the reasoning behind the conclusion given above on the issue 
of sex-role stereotypes in advertising. 
The conclusion makes certain assumptions about how the market 
operates: advertising which lacks congruity with its audience may not 
only fail to communicate the intended message, but may also com- 
municate something entirely unintended - the sexism in the advertising 
may be seen as part of the offering and the offering as well as the 
communication is rejected. The advertising expenditure then gives no 
return or possibly a negative return, itis at least less effective 
than it mi ght be. The result is competitive disadvantage. The 
requirement to maximise competitive advantage is in accord with the 
survival of the fittest notion and affects all the company's activi- 
ties. So those competing In the market, to ensure their survival, 
would seek to maximise their competitive advantage by adjusting their 
adverti sing In line with social change, or changing any other activity 
that likewise influences competitiveness. Pursued to its logical 
conclusion, such an argument suggests the market mechanism, in 
demanding efficiency, may also as a consequence pass judgement on 
social practices of firms - be an arbiter of 'good' and 'bad'. But 
does the market 'really' operate in this way? What evidence, if such 
may be obtained, is there for these claims? 
33 
Advertising effectiveness, like the effectiveness of most of the pro- 
motional elements of the marketing mix, is notoriously difficult to 
measure. As Wight wryly observes "if sales go up, it's because of the 
advertising but if they go down it's because of something else" (26). 
Indeed, advertisers, with support from marketing academics, like to 
distance themselves from measures of the sales effectiveness of adver- 
tising, preferring awareness or some other proxy variable. This is 
sensible - but also justifiable. Advertising must be assessed against 
the objectives set, even if the long-term overall objective is to sell 
the product. However, this does illustrate one difficulty in 
suggesting advertisers are accountable to the market. Understanding 
the way advertising is produced casts further doubts on claims about 
market pressure for effectiveness (27). 
There are more important and generalisable factors. Probably most 
important is the degree of consumer sovereignty, that Is, the amount 
of competi ti on. Some markets are highly competitive, many less so, 
and some not at all. There is also the requirement for consumer 
information, not only of competitive offerings but about the alleged 
grievance, the social practices of concern. Consumers do not all have 
an equal vote and not all are enfranchised on all issues. They may 
not even wi sh to use their vote when itis contrary to their economic 
self-interest. To some, the idea of the market as an arbiter of good 
and bad is sacrilege, if not dangerous, for the market is assumed to 
be at its most efficient where decisions are guided solely by self- 
interest. But, of course, self-interest need not be so narrowly 
defined as to exclude non-economic considerations (28). Though it 
might still be argued that if consumers are prepared to define their 
self-interest quite widely - perhaps as enlightened self-interest - 
then this distorts the market mechanism, entailing inefficiency. 
Another factor is that competitive advantage is the outcome of an 
aggregate of company efforts, some inefficiencies - such as Ineffec- 
tive advertising - may continue either beause they are counterbalanced 
by greater efficiency in other areas or because they are hidden or 
unknown. Further factors include company accountability to other 
constituencies such as employees and/or unions (an influence even if 
the consumer takes precedence), government intervention and consumer 
dependence on and expectation of government action on misdemeanours, 
and the conflicts in the consumer choice process (29). 
So there are many weaknesses to the proposition that the way the 
market operates will ensure changes in advertising portrayals of women 
In line with social change. They cannot all be considered here. What 
this study attempts to do is to show how the market can operate in 
this way, by providing an argument In justification and part explana- 
tion of ethical purchase behaviour and some evidence. For this 
author, having come to the conclusions stated on the issue of sex-role 
stereotypes in advertising, then looked for evidence that consumer 
sovereignty could ensure social responsibility in business - and on 
issues more remote from the consumer's purchase behaviour than adver- 
tising content. In so doing, the concept of ethical purchase beha- 
viour was developed, a role for pressure groups identified in the 
marketing system, and so on. 
There remains one further important observation on the research on- 
gins, which also has particular bearing on the social experience of 
34 
the researcher. As noted, the understanding of the market expressed 
by Murphy and elsewhere above, is Ideological. Yet it wouldn't have 
been seen as such by the researcher prior to the investigation of sex- 
role stereotypes In advertising. It was only through this Investiga- 
tion that the researcher came to fully understand the meaning and 
function of ideology (30). This understanding, or as Mills would 
prefer, this use of 'the sociological imagination' (31)p features pro- 
minently in the research methodology of this study. The research 
topic has many ideological components and, partly because of this, the 
research methodology emphasises an attempt, as far as is possible, to 
disentangle the ideological elements from the scientific elements or 
the 'truth'. The research methodology implications are considered 
further in 2.2, this section can most usefully conclude with some 
early observations on ideology and the market. 
Berger and Kellner briefly define ideology as "a set of definitions of 
reality legitimating specific vested interests In society" (32). So 
Murphy's statement above, encapsulating the market philosophy, could 
be interpreted as an ideological validation of General Motors' posi- 
tion and practices. As, indeed, could the-response by advertising 
practitioners to the criticisms of sex-role stereotypes In adver- 
tising, be interpreted. Yet ideologies do serve other functions, as 
well as justifying interests they may also offer explanations. So as 
Silk and Vogel write of the ideologies of managers: "Ideology func- 
tions not simply to advance a particular interest ... but to enable 
people to orient themselves to a complicated and confusing world" 
(33). It is not sufficient to think of them in Machiavellian, manipu- 
lative terms. Managerial ideologies are considered In more detail in 
Chapter Four. Suffice to note here, such ideologies should be 
respected as legitimate views of the world. 
To conclude; the research origins, an investigation of sex-role 
stereotypes In advertising, have two principal implications for this 
study. Firstly, the prompting of the research questions, which seek 
support for the conclusions reached on the sex-role stereotypes issue, 
by asking how, whether and why the market should or could work in the 
way suggested: How may pressure groups most effectively employ the 
consumer boycott tactic and how should boycotted businesses respond? 
Can consumer sovereignty ensure social responsibility In business and 
in what way? How far does consumer sovereignty extend? Ethical 
purchase behaviour was not found to be an influence on the issue of 
sex-role stereotypes, but whether it could have an influence on other 
issues and whether it has, is the concern here addressed. Thus the 
origins of this research do not lie In previous work In the area, but 
in the ideology of the market, with the study attempting to 'test' the 
ideology. Secondly, the researcher has been alerted to the 
possibility of being (unacceptably) ideological in the conduct of the 
research. This does, however, seem to be a criticism that may be made 
of the marketing discipline, as the next section shows in considering 
the research perspective. 
2.1.3 Markets and Marketing: The Research Perspective 
It is suggested that the investigation reported here is most accurate- 
ly seen as being within the domain of the marketing discipline. Yet 
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much of the content would be more likely found in a business and 
society study. The posi ti on taken - and to some it might seem quite 
novel - is that marketing has something to do with markets. As 
Chapter One showed, this investigation isa study In consumer 
sovereignty, a central feature of product markets. 
Bartels' The History of Marketing Thought (34) shows that marketing 
has its origins In economics. Yet it seems this is often forgotten. 
The consequence is that marketing is rarely considered to be about the 
study of markets. So Barnhill and Lawson write: 
"Despite the advances made In the discipline of marketing, 
several shortcomings persist. One of the most fundamental short- 
comings has been the absence of one or more central theories and 
a number of related, general principles. While considerable 
effort has been devoted to developing the theory of markets, 
those developments have been predominantly in the field of econo- 
mics. There has been little development of the theory of markets 
in the field of marketing, yet markets are a central and 
necessary state of being as well as a precondition for the func- 
tioning of common marketing components such as buyer behaviour, 
pricing ... None of these marketing components are viable without 
a market in which to function" (35). 
Howsoever tautological it might appear, to claim that the subject 
matter of marketing is markets, this isa minority perspective. As 
Barnhill and Lawson indicate, marketing should be concerned with 
markets, yet there is little evidence of this. For example, the defi- 
nition by the Institute of Marketing suggests "Marketing is the mana- 
gement process responsible for identifying, anticipating and 
satisfying customer requirements profitably. " However, this, in com- 
mon with many other definitions of marketing (36), is restricted to 
the practices of marketing management. 
Foxall notes this restriction, distinguishing between marketing- 
oriented management and marketing as exchange or, as is his pre- 
ference, matching. Yet despite his concern to discourage the 
excessive broadening of the marketing concept, he does not expedite 
his argument by explicitly stating that when marketing is viewed as 
exchange and/or matching, it Is only if these activities are found in 
markets. However, he does, In contrast with many other writers in the 
area, acknowledge that marketing, In the sense of marketing-oriented 
management, is not of universal relevance, but simply a structural 
response to economic conditions where supply exceeds demand giving 
rise to highly competitive markets. As he puts i t, firms' 
"consumer-centred outlook stems not from managerial philanthropy or 
political fashion but from the need to react to the nature of the 
markets in which they operate" (37). 
The question 'What is marketing? ' cannot be addressed here in any 
detail. It cannot be simply answered and it has been subject to con- 
siderable debate within the discipline. However, itis appropriate to 
convey the researcher's position on marketing, as itis an important 
part of the research perspective with implications therefore for the 
interpretation of the research findings, and because it differs from 
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the majority or at least dominant position. What follows, therefore, 
isa brief explanation of the researcher's position, which goes beyond 
saying marketing is about markets, and some indication as to whom the 
study is addressed. 
Virtually every other issue of Journal of Marketing carries an article 
attempting to conclusively answer the question 'What is marketing? ' A 
brief answer to this question Is, for the reasons given, provided in 
this section. A more comprehensive answer will be found to be impli- 
cit throughout the thesis, for as 2.1.2 showed, the study is about 
markets: how they operate (the positive concern) and how they should 
operate (the normative concern). As already suggested, and as 
Barnhill and Lawson indicate, this is viewed here as an appropriate if 
not central concern for the marketing discipline. 
Within the many articles attempting to define marketing, a great deal 
has been written about marketing as a developing science in Kuhnian 
terms. However, the position taken here is that marketing cannot 
appropriately be seen as a science. These enthusiastic tirades look 
forward to the day when the marketing discipline is respectable, a 
recogni sed science complete wi th paradi gm. Their authors bemoan the 
slow progress towards this goal. Like Barnhill and Lawson, they point 
to the absence of central theories, general principles and so on. 
These writers - their consciences salved, another publication under 
their belts, and the academic status of marketing defended, if not 
enhanced - then go back to their teaching of marketing and the four 
P's, to managers or would-be managers. Is it really surprising that, 
despite these many apologists for the marketing discipline, little 
progress is made? 
Bi ggadi ke's reasonably comprehensive review of the contributions of 
marketing is both critical and pessimistic (38). He suggests 
"Marketing has made a number of conceptual contributions but few 
theoretical ones. " He acknowledges the concern in marketing to be 
scientific, almost going as far as to suggest that this stems from a 
desire for academic status and respectability: "business administra- 
tion academics have been under pressure to be more "problem-oriented" 
and more "scientific" (read "quantitative"). These pressures have led 
to a preoccupation with applying techniques to ... commercial 
marketing research problems ... This kind of research has met some 
criteria of managerial and academic respectability, but it is not 
theory-building research. " (He does, however, also concede that it is 
easier to build theory in narrowly defined areas. ) But for these 
reasons, research in marketing has not concentrated on specifying and 
validating the relationships suggested by the paradigm he identifies 
(39). Consequently: 
"The enormous and diverse array of research in marketing has not 
led to many "general facts and laws" ... Most reported research 
... is ad hoc problem-oriented research with little attempt to 
integrate and extend relationships to other situations ... many 
marketers today are not scientists In the theory-building sense 
but technological virtuosi in solving problems at a brand or, 
occasionally, product level. " 
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He concludes "we can expect more of the same. " Perhaps he should have 
questioned whether marketing isa science - though his reluctance is 
understandable as this isa thorny Issue. Of course marketing isa 
science If the qualifying criterion is attempting to be scientific; as 
Hunt quotes Bunge: "No scientific method, no science" (40). But while 
scientific method is necessary, it may not be sufficient. Moreover, 
as Bi ggadi ke implies, being scientific is more than being quan- 
titative. Hunt writes "the substantive characteristics differen- 
tiating sciences from other disciplines have been shown to be (1) a 
distinct subject matter drawn from the real world and description and 
classification of that subject matter, (2) the presumption of 
underlying uniformities and regularities interrelating the subject 
matter, and (3) the adoption of the method of science for studying the 
subject matter" (411). Where, in such a schema, is the aim of 
objectivity? Does it remain, merely implicit, in the third criterion? 
One of the major difficulties in claiming marketing isa science is 
the partisan substance of most marketing writing, research and 
teaching. Marketing thought is predominantly concerned with the 
problems of producers. 
Baker offers similar reasons to Hunt for viewing marketing as a 
science (42). Again, if one examines the substance of marketing 
thought it does not meet the criteria identified. There has been 
little attempt to integrate marketing thought, much research has been 
ad hoc problem-solving and there is the overwhelming problem of objec- 
tivity. As later argued, much marketing thought is largely Ideologi- 
cal. Yet perhaps Baker's pragmatic reasons of the futility of the 
debate on whether marketing isa science and the benefits of a more 
integrated approach, are sufficient. After all, other management 
disciplines may be likewise criticised, as Honour and Mai nwari ng argue 
when writing in criticism of the "attitudes and values of business 
studies lecturers who seem untroubled by the basis and uses of the 
knowledge and values they seek to pass on" (43). Moreover, Andreski 
argues that "much of what passes as scientific study of human beha- 
viour boils down to an equivalent of sorcery" (44). So, for example, 
he finds ideology underneath scientific terminology, referring by way 
of illustration to Talcott Parsons' conception of power as explained 
by Upset, which legitimates excesses by authority holders because 
they are. "socially necessary" (45). 
So marketing as it stands now cannot be considered a science, but it 
may have the potential for being one - as much as any other science - 
and hence, as Baker suggests, debates about its scientific status are 
futile and itis better to act as if marketing isa science. This 
potential for 'sci enti fi cness' does of course assume, among other 
things, that the discipline can to a degree escape from its 
paymasters, that it can become independent in some measure from busi- 
ness. This may be difficult when the teaching and consultancy 
interests of those within the discipline centre on business problems. 
This difficulty can be expressed In another, perhaps more palatable 
way. One long-standing argument for rejecting the notion of marketing 
as a science is its applied nature. Indeed, as Rigby writes of all 
the management disciplines: "Business administration, like engineering 
and medicine, is an applied art rather than a science. It is con- 
cerned primarily with using knowledge to solve problems rather than 
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With increasing knowledge. But like engineering and medicine, bu6i - 
nes s administration should be scientific In solving problems" (46). 
And, writing In a similar vein, Hutchinson suggests: 
The medical profession sets us an excellent example, if we would 
but follow it; its members are called "practitioners" and not 
scientists. It is the work of physicians, as itis of any prac- 
titioner, to apply the findings of many sciences to the solution 
of problems ... It is the drollest travesty to relate the 
scientist's search for knowledge to the market research man's 
seeking after customers" (47). 
Hunt is prepared to accept this argument: "If ... the entire concep- 
tual domain of marketing is profit/micro/normative, then marketing is 
not and (more importantly) probably cannot be a science" (48, his 
emphasis). However, ignoring the actual substance of most marketing 
writing, research and teaching, he continues "If ... the conceptual 
domain of marketing includes both micro/positive and macro/positive 
phenomena, then marketing could be a science. " Thus, what is known as 
macromarketing would count as scientific; or a perspective of the 
total marketing system (49). Such was the position adopted here, 
although not in acceptance of marketing as a science because of the 
emphasis (which is likely to continue) on mi cromarketi ng, producer 
concerns (50). The researcher assumed the position of being a social 
scientist looking at marketing (51). (Some would prefer to consider 
this a public policy or even a consumer perspective. ) The object of 
the concern was macromarketing. 
The question 'What is macromarketing? ' cannot even be considered here. 
Two definitions from the quite substantial literature must suffice. 
Firstly, Bartels' definition, which, not surprisingly, harks back to 
economics: 
""Macromarketi ng" should connote an aspect of marketing whi ch is 
"larger" than that is otherwise considered. In economics, 
macroeconomics has reference to the economy as a whole, in 
contrast to microeconomics, or the economics of the firm ... It 
has meant the marketing process In its entirety, and the aggre- 
gate mechanism of institutions performing It" (52). 
In other words, in keeping wi th his argument in The Hi story 
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of 
Marketing Thought, based largely on the work of Polanyi , he suggests 
marketing is an extremely important social institution and much more 
than a business function. It is "a highly developed and refined 
system of thought and practice characteristic of a period In the deve- 
lopment of market economy" (53). Appropriately enough, McCarthy defi- 
ned macromarketing (in 1978) as: 
"A 'socioeconomic process that directs an economy's flow of goods 
and services from producers to consumers in a way that effec- 
tively matches heterogenous supply capabilities with heterogenous 
demand and accomplishes both the short run and long run objec- 
tives of society" (54). 
This approach to marketing entails more than the narrow concerns of 
improving the effectiveness of marketing management. And by the 
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researcher also adopting the position of a social scientist looking at 
marketing, not only can more important questions be addressed (55), 
but a multi -di sci pli nary input employed. So the researcher can be 
interested In, and contribute on, what would not be traditionally 
regarded as marketing issues, such as political participation or the 
role of pressure groups. Alternatively, one might choose to define 
such concerns as about marketing and society (56). There is, however, 
a drawback, In that being multi -di sci pli nary dilutes effort to an 
extent and demands either a simplistic and/or lengthy exposition to 
ensure that the reader understands concepts which might be quite basic 
In, say, politics but are foreign to marketing as traditionally con- 
ceived (57). 
The macromarketi ng perspective is largely an American one. Even in 
that context it would seem to be a minority perspective. Despite 
Cannon's warnings on the likely inapplicability of American research 
and writing (58)v it cannot be ignored in this case because there is 
so little else to go on (59). This is equally true of the business 
and society literature, as wi 11 be seen. Yet as already indicated, 
even within the American marketing work there are many weaknesses. 
Methodologically this is particularly the case, as a recent issue of 
Journal of Marketing on marketing theory reveals (60) and Bi ggadi ke's 
comments support. Rigby's observations on management research, quoted 
in the Preview, seem to remain valid of marketing today. One par- 
ticular weakness is inadequate conceptualisation, this is discussed 
further in2.2.3. It is another factor contributing to the low acade- 
mic status of marketing, aside from the issue of whether marketing is 
or can be a science. 
This secti on has opened a can of worms. It has raised many complex 
issues, but incompletely resolved them because they are outside the 
scope of the study. However, it has shown to whom the thesis is 
addressed, given some indication of the researcher's perspective on 
marketing and, therefore, the research perspective, and demonstrated 
the centrality of the thesis topic to marketing (61). In sum, it has 
been claimed that marketing - at least from the macromarketing or 
marketing system perspective - is about markets; that marketing as a 
discipline is not currently or likely to become a science; but that 
this does not prevent the researcher from being scientific, if only 
because the position can be adopted of the social scientist looking at 
marketing. 
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2.2 Research Postures 
2.2.1 The Context of Research 
Just as the previous section could only but be incomplete in 
describing the research perspective, this part will be incomplete in 
describing the research posture. The essence only can be conveyed. 
As explained in the Preview, these methodological issues cannot be 
allowed to predominate - if only to avoid the methodological maze. 
All research is influenced by context, be it the social experience of 
the researcher, the ethos of the institution in which the research is 
undertaken, the nature of the research topic, or the norms of the 
discipline. The context of doctoral research differs from other types 
of research because the research is subject to an examination; as this 
author has elsewhere written, there are constraints particular to 
doctoral research that are a result of this context (62). The context 
of the research will, to some extent, dictate the research outcome. 
The researcher must seek to minimise influence by context such that 
claims made - arguments advanced - are plausible to others and 
perhaps, if appropriate, capable of replication In other contexts. In 
other words, insofar as such terms are meaningful, research findings 
should have validity and reliability. 
The influence of the research context is recognised by many writers on 
research methodology. Glaser and Strauss, for example, make their 
position clear: 
"Our criteria are those of theoretical purpose and relevance - 
not of structural circumstance. Though constrained by the same 
structural circumstances of research, we do not base research on 
them" (63). 
Would that such a position were always easy to adopt l Wi thin the 
positivist research model itis relatively easy to have the criteria 
of theoretical purpose rather than structural circumstance. But as 
the next section shows, positivism is rejected here - because the 
theoretical purpose could not (if it ever can be) served by positivist 
research. Of course, Glaser and Strauss do not advocate what is 
generally considered to be positivism. But their approach was not 
entirely appropriate here, for reasons also given in the next section. 
The context of this research demanded a particular research posture. 
Before describing this, the term research posture needs some explana- 
tion as it has not, as far as is known, been used elsewhere. 
Science aims to create order, to make sense of facts. It seeks pat- 
terns or regularities. In so doing, a process of systematic obser- 
vation, description, explanation and prediction is employed. At least 
this much can be agreed on. Yet to say much else about science is 
liable to be contentious, requiring a detailed discourse on the philo- 
sophy of science . Even in the natural sci ences, order may be di f- 
ficult to identify. As Latour and Woolgar observe: 
"A body of practices widely regarded by outsi ders as well orga- 
nised, logical, and coherent, In fact consists of a disordered 
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array of observations with which scientists struggle to produce 
order ... actual scientific practice entails the confrontation 
and negotiation of utter confusion. The solution adopted by 
scientists is the imposition of various frameworks by whi ch the 
extent of background noise can be reduced and against which an 
apparently coherent signal can be presented" (641). 
How are such frameworks constructed? They are, for the most part, 
implicit within a discipline or school of thought. Ultimately, they 
are a social construction like any other part of human life. Yet 
simply acknowledging the social determination of scientific ideas is 
not in itself useful. It is necessary that the framework adopted is 
both accepted and understood by the audience addressed by the 
researcher, if the research findings are to be plausible. Such a fra- 
mework is here referred to as a research posture. It includes, as is 
no doubt apparent, the researcher's ontological and epistemological 
stance, as well as the research perspective as discussed In the last 
section. 
The term posture is preferred because it suggests the adoption of a 
position In relati on to something. The something of significance Is 
the phenomenon under investigation. Hence a researcher adopts a 
posture in relation to the object of the study. The importance of 
this is that it conveys this author's belief that there is no superior 
research posture or, if one prefers, research approach. Different 
research postures may be demanded by different phenomena under 
investigation. Research postures will always be partly a consequence 
of individual or disciplinary preferences, but they should be prin- 
cipally determined by the research problem. So even though positivism 
is rejected In the next section, this does not mean that the author 
cannot identify instances where positivism might form a necessary part 
of a research posture. Of course, all research should be judged 
according to the canons of the research posture adopted, at least in 
the first Instance. 
It is not possible to give any indication of the range of possible 
research postures and their dimensions, an inventory. One may, 
however, conceive of them as existing within a multi -dimensional 
matrix. Perhaps the complexity of such a model has deterred writers 
on methodology from attempting to construct it (65). Though itis 
frustrating to find that most methodological tracts can be reduced to 
a series of arguments in favour of one part of a dichotomy. 
Dichotomies can be useful as an aid to understanding, forcing argu- 
ments into one of two categories clears the mind. But they are Inevi- 
tably a simplification (66). So there is inductive versus deductive 
research, positivist vs. humanist, objectivist vs. subjectivist, sym- 
bolic i nteracti oni sm vs. functionalism, and so on. In each case, the 
categories would form dimensions of the matrix that may be employed to 
describe the research posture. They are also not discrete categories 
but form continuums. Hence, as will be shown, being positivist or not 
being positivist isa matter of degree not an absolute. 
The next section describes the essence of the research posture adopted 
here. 
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2.2.2 The Research Posture: A Rejection of Positivism 
Positivists only rarely define themselves as such. Partly because to 
be so described is all but a term of abuse; though positivism does 
have some strong points. But also because positivists rarely need to 
validate their epistemological position, for itis dominant and, 
indeed, to adopt a positivist position almost demands ignorance of 
epistemological issues. The waters beyond positivism are dangerous. 
They are best avoided by the faint of heart. To operate within a 
positivist framework allows the researcher the luxury of not having to 
question whether the research is meaningful. Given the dominance of 
the positivist position, some explanation must here be given as to why 
this research had to be conducted outside the epistemologically clo- 
setted security of the positivist paradigm. Moreover, some attempt 
must be made to describe the epistemological alternative adopted. 
Positivism can, for the purpose here, be defined as "working as 
natural scientists are believed to" (67). It reflects, therefore, a 
belief that the social sciences can investigate In the same way as the 
natural sciences. Many Writers on research methodology have argued 
against positivism (68). The arguments are well known and have to 
some extent already been introduced in this chapter. To do full 
justice to the case against positivism would require a lengthy treat- 
ment, so given the widespread understanding of the issues a summary of 
this author's position on positivism will suffice here. This should 
be sufficient to show why the research posture is characterised by a 
rejection of positivism (69). 
Consi der the nature of this particular human activity known as 
science. Hughes, In confirmation of the quote from Hempel in 2.1.1, 
notes "scientific methods seek deliberately to annihilate the Indivi- 
dual scientist's standpoints and are designed as rules whereby 
agreement on specific versions of the world can be reached: a distinc- 
tion, in short, between the producer of a statement and the procedure 
whereby it is produced" (70). The outcome of these methods is scien- 
tific knowledge: "a systematic body of concepts, theories, principles 
and laws or law-like statements designed to explain phenomena" (71). 
This outcome is achieved where, to use the term earlier applied, 
plausibility is recognised or where, as Hughes puts It, there is 
agreement on specific versions of the world. The problem for the 
social sciences is that this involves a human attempt to explain human 
phenomena. This Is problematic because itis doubtful as to whether 
method can ever "annihilate" the individual scientist's standpoint. 
Such is the dilemma posed, that Hughes feels obliged to ask: "is a 
science of social life impossible? " (72). 
In reference to Schutz, Hughes explains the dilemma of the social 
sciences In terms of the social construction of reality: "like all 
sciences they make objective meaning claims, or at least aspire to do 
so, but In the case of social sciences. these have to be within the 
context of the human activity which has created them and which cannot 
be understood apart from this scheme of action" (73). This is the 
basic epistemological problem of social science. How can the human 
world be objectively known in subjective, human terms? Indeed, scien- 
tific activity and what is associated with It, including the status of 
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scientists and scientific knowledge i s, after all, like the phenomena 
studied by social scientists, a social construction. Ford observes 
that "When academics take off their white scientific coats and funny 
philosophical hats they turn into ordinary people ... " (74). This is 
the problem, and one that social scientists cannot escape. Moreover, 
if they didn't have their white scientific coats and other accoutre- 
ments of scientific activity - including the title of doctor - would 
the outcome of such activity, scientific knowledge, still have 
intellectual authority? For, as Hughes observes "it is necessary to 
ask what itis about the procedures and methods used by sociological 
researchers, or economists, psychologists, historians, etc., which 
makes them superior, gives them greater intellectual authority than 
those used by, say, the man or woman in the street, the journalist, 
the racial bi got, the poll ti ci an, the revolutionary, or a Trobriand 
Islander. " 
The answer, of course, Is that it is precisely the use of those 
methods In combination with the other 'accoutrements' , that gives 
scientific knowledge intellectual authority. However, the 'absolute' 
superiority of scientific knowledge stems from whether the scientist 
qua scientist was able to 'stand back a bitt, achieve some measure of 
objectivity. Morally, there is an obligation on the scientist to do 
this if claims of superiority are to be made. But even though social 
science involves human efforts to investigate human phenomena, a 
natural science, positivist approach to the social sciences is likely 
to ignore the Inevitable act of interpretation by the scientist. It 
then becomes invalid because the attempt at objectivity is illusory. 
Moreover, because of this artificial distancing, the researcher is not 
sufficiently close to the phenomena under investigation to understand 
It. Positivism is rejected because the positivist researcher is too 
far removed from the data and likely to produce spurious findings- 
often a concern for precision results in a loss of accuracy. So, just 
as there isa moral obligation to 'stand back a bit', there is an 
equal moral obligation not to stand back so far that the findings are 
distorted by distance as well as by the act of interpretation (75). 
Few scientists are charlatans. Many may delude themselves, however, 
as to the meaning of their work. The moral obligation to ensure 
scientific knowledge deserves intellectual authority isa consequence 
of the uses to which that knowledge is put. If management researchers 
are to make the claim, regardless of their ignorance of epistemology, 
that management isa social science (if only in the use of scientific 
methods) and that their investigations are scientific, then these 
issues must be recognised. For management research the case may be 
particularly strong and go beyond abstract philosophical concerns, 
because of the potential use of the research findings and the often 
managerially partisan nature of the research conducted (as earlier 
discussed). 
As can - be seen in Part Three, an element of posi ti vi sm has crept into 
this study. For positivism isa matter of degree not an ei they/or. 
But the research problem demanded a qualitative approach to any 
empirical investigation attempted and a dependency on soft data. The 
survey research, an attempt to produce hard data, is an indication of 
the limitations of positivist approaches and their restricted use- 
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fulness Without adequate prior conceptualisation. The research 
posture then is only in the smallest part posi ti vi st oit reflects in 
the mai nga combination of grounded theory and social criticism. 
These methodologies are discussed In the remainder of this section. 
Glaser and Strauss' exposition of the discovery of grounded theory 
describes a strategy for qualitative research. The research here is 
qualitative and incorporates many of their observations. It would be 
incorrect, however, to suggest that the theory generated, if it may be 
so called, has been produced in the way they advocate. Glaser and 
Strauss are not made reference to here to legitimate 'ad hocery' (76). 
This was because of the dependence on serendipity that a genuine 
attempt to employ their research strategy would involve. Grounded 
theory is based on the notion that the theory emerges from the data 
with the minimum of pre-existent conceptualisations imposed by the 
researcher. Here, extensive conceptualisation and the development of 
some sort of theory was conducted prior to the empirical investiga- 
tion. Many of the ideas developed could not be empirically tested 
anyway, they remain as hypotheses. Many may never be tested because 
they cannot be tested and must stand, as later explained, as social 
criticism. The nature of the research problem and particularly the 
requirement for extensive conceptualisation demanded a different 
approach. The research had also to be so structured to minimise 
ri sks . 
Glaser and Strauss give some consideration to this problem of the lack 
of requisite (in some research contexts) structure. They refer to 
this as a problem of research tempo: 
"The tempo of the research is difficult to know beforehand, 
because itis largely contingent on the tempo of the emerging 
theory ... This raises a problem: In presenting proposals for 
research grants, how does the sociologist who intends to generate 
theory anticipate the amount of time necessary, for data collec- 
tion and for the whole project? This isa question review boards 
want answered - but itis difficult to answer for studies focused 
on generating theory, while relatively easy for those devoted to 
verification and description, which require pre-planned 
schedules" (77). 
The grounded theory approach is intrinsically problematic for any 
research context. Inevitably itis something that funding bodies will 
be suspicious of because of its abstract nature - even if they are 
fully acquainted with it as a methodology. The problem is that it 
does not offer the comfortable, concrete reassurance that the 
hypothetico-deductive methodology offers. There is not the security 
of knowing precisely that the researcher is examining, because no 
hypotheses have been proposed or method suggested by which they should 
be treated. The researcher could not accept this, even if the 
research topic had been sufficiently studied beforehand to permit It. 
In all research there is an element of chance, but if one is so unfor- 
tunate as not to substantiate the hypotheses under test, at least one 
has something to say. This is not the case if one is sti 11 waiting 
for a theory to emerge from the data, there is nothing to report. 
Inevitably, then, the research involved 'testing', in the positivist 
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sense, of hypotheses - albeit implicit hypotheses (propositions), not 
stated as such, and in an exploratory manner. 
Yet as is apparent in Part Three, the case studies have been 
approached in a way incorporating many of Glaser and Strauss' obser- 
vations. In the conceptualisation, an important input was articles in 
the press on issues of social responsibility In business and other 
topics. The researcher sought to scan the business environment in the 
way advocated by Aguilar (78), but also In recognition that there is 
no 'proper' source of data, as Glaser and Strauss emphasise (79). The 
social experience of the researcher was in this way an important 
contributor to theory generation, as Glaser and Strauss observe "The 
root source of all significant theorizing is the sensitive insights of 
the researcher himself" (80). It is difficult to know whether the 
period of conceptualisation, characterised by informal data-collection 
of this sort, is not better described as research. Perhaps it should 
be referred to as informal empirical work. 
Social criticism as a methodology is best exemplified by C Wright 
Mills, of whom Glaser and Strauss write: "Much of C Wright Mills' 
work, we believe, is exampled with only little theoretical control, 
though he claimed that data disciplined his theory. In contrast, 
grounded theory is derived from data and then illustrated by charac- 
teristic examples of data" (81). Mills describes it as the use of 
'the sociological Imagination'. In many respects, itis little more 
than advocacy within a concern for the human condition. However, it 
may be necessary or inevitable where issues are largely ideological 
(see, for example, sections 2.1.3 or 3.6.3) or where the research 
questions are (too) big. With the latter, a large leap from the data 
to the conclusions may be required which is not justified in terms of 
the data. 
Fletcher distinctly favours this approach. Of qualitative research he 
writes: 
"The qualitative method is an act of faith. The believer begins 
with a perspective, states his assumptions and arrives close to 
proving the latter with his researches ... I must confess a pro- 
found antipathy to the qualitative method ... yet I find this 
method more honourable than the quantitative method. The honour 
comes from the integrity of being able to admit that much is 
still a mystery" (82). 
This research as qualitative research is discussed further in Part 
Three, in reference to the case studies. Social criticism, however, 
is to be found throughout this study. It is tempting to suggest all 
research is ultimately social criticism -itis just that the social 
critic is not encumbered by method. Equally tempting perhaps, is the 
suggestion that social criticism, In lacking identifiable method, is 
not science. Fletcher In rejecting this suggestion (by Bottomore, as 
it happens )9 observes that being reflexive, radical and critical is 
essential to sociology (83). He argues that social criticism is part 
of sociology's role, just as Berger refers to its "debunking" charac- 
teri sti c (84). Fletcher best reveals what he means by social criti- 
cism by example, if such is needed. On the practice of critique he 
writes: 
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"A cri ti que engages its author to the extent that his ideas 
clarify while itis being written. A critique makes changes in 
its author. This change comes through the fire of his words. 
The subject matter is broad, the topic is urgent, the concern is 
immediate. The whole tone is one of brittle brilliance ... 
... In being partisan, creative and belligerent the author is as 
comforting as an Old Testament prophet. He is speaking of vir- 
tue, the good life and more especially a moral sociology ... 
... his message has a constancy: look, see and seize ... 
The man isa bundle of action on. He no longer worries what 
sociology i s. He isa sociologist. The author of a cri ti que is 
a sociologist in action" (85). 
Fletcher's entire book may be described as social criticism. It may 
be stimulating, entertaining, even humanistic sociology, but is it 
science? Perhaps it doesn't matter. Social criticism seems difficult 
to avoid, In part at least. It is the antithesis of positivism. 
Positivism is all method, no scientist. Social criticism is no 
method, all scientist (if such a title the writer would accept). 
Neither seems entirely acceptable. 
The positivist approach is comfortable if one can remain untroubled by 
issues of ontology and epistemology. It offers a certainty about 
social facts and the methods of social research that other approaches 
lack. An element of positivism is for this reason to be found here. 
However, the research -posture - which some may now view as simply 
another more positive way of defending eclecticism -is more largely 
comprised of the ethnomethodological (86) qualitative research 
approach advocated by Glaser and Strauss and, to a lesser extent, 
social criticism. How this posture has affected the research outcome 
is apparent in the balance of this study. 
The final section to this chapter briefly explains the role of concep- 
tualisation in the study. 
2.2.3 The Role of Conceptualisation 
This study reports a largely theoretical argument. The case presented 
is wide-ranging, closely argued and heavily substantiated. Perhaps it 
can be criticised for not being sufficiently delimited, but this is 
not thought to be the case. The task was one of conceptualising a 
largely unexplored area, drawing on contributions from diverse sources 
and presenting an argument. As scientific work itis observati on and 
description. This conceptualisation is vitally important. As Blalock 
writes: 
"Conceptualisation involves a series of processes by which 
theoretical constructs, ideas and concepts are clarified, 
distinguished and given definitions that make it possible to 
reach a reasonable degree of consensus and understanding of the 
theoretical idea we are trying to express" (87). 
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Conceptualisation is an essential preliminary to any work in the 
social sciences. Blalock, as many others, claims that the social 
sciences will only advance given adequate conceptualisation. A 
research study therefore need not be an extensive collection of data 
on the basis of a limited formulation of hypotheses. Even if hypothe- 
sis testing is conceived as an essential element of science, there 
must first be description. This vital role of conceptualisation, as 
Biggadike was noted to have observed, is noticeably absent from 
marketing. The work on socially responsible consumption is but one 
example. 
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SUMMARY TO PART ONE 
Part One has introduced the research topic and described the research 
methodology. 
Ethical purchase behaviour occurs where people are influenced in 
purchase by ethical concerns. This may mean a specific product must 
be bought, or must not be bought, or involve ethical concerns as one 
factor in the purchase decision. The study is delimited by con- 
centrating on the most clearly identifiable, accessible and deliberate 
form of ethical purchase behaviour: pressure group organised consumer 
boycotts. This is where people do not buy a speci fi c product as part 
of an organised boycott action. 
Although fairly commonplace, ethical purchase behaviour is not really 
recognised in the relevant literature. Yet it is important not simply 
as a form of consumer behaviour, but, in its implications, in three 
other quite major ways. Firstly, a role for pressure groups is indi- 
cated in the provision of information for the awareness and 
understanding which is necessary for ethical purchase behaviour 
(though it is acknowledged that this information may come from other 
sources). Secondly, ethical purchase behaviour constitutes an attempt 
at the social control of business via the market. Finally, it 
suggests a novel perspective on consumer sovereignty, drawing atten- 
tion to the extent or domain of consumer authority in the marketplace. 
In so doing, it raises questions on what decisions consumers make or 
could make in markets and thereby, in its absence may challenge con- 
sumer sovereignty as the rationale for capitalism. 
Accordingly, three research questions are addressed in this study: How 
may pressure groups most effectively employ the consumer boycott tac- 
tic and how should boycotted businesses respond? Can consumer 
sovereignty ensure social responsibility in business and in what way? 
How far does consumer sovereignty extend? 
Ethical purchase behaviour is closely analogous to ethical investment. 
Ethical concerns may influence investment decisions in the same way as 
they influence purchase behaviour. Yet in both cases, itis not 
possible to specify what is ethical. Ethics concerns what is 'right' 
and 'wrong', but while some consensus might be expected, this is indi- 
vidually defined. So ethical purchase behaviour is an expression of 
the individual's moral judgement in his or her purchase behaviour. 
Previous work in the area is limited to a few, rather unsatisfactory, 
empirical studies of socially responsible consumption, and more con- 
ceptual work that only vaguely suggests or implies ethical purchase 
behaviour as identified here. The studies of socially responsible or 
ecologically concerned consumption assume ethical purchase behaviour 
and are methodologically weak. They also address only one form of 
ethical purchase behaviour, that intended to remedy problems created 
by consumers in consumption, rather than more specifically producer 
created problems. Others have written about the use of purchase votes 
on a wider range of issues. But their ideas are not developed, nor 
are the implications considered. 
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However, the impetus for the study did not arise from previous work in 
the area. It stemmed from a desire to explore how the market works to 
account for social issues, following an investigation of sex-role 
stereotypes in advertising. The conclusion reached in this investiga- 
tion was that advertising would change in response to consumer 
pressure. Yet such a conclusion is optimistic and dependent on a par- 
ticular understanding of how the market works. Most notably, it assu- 
mes the market may make judgements on the social practices of firms. 
It is this assumption which is examined here. So the study did not 
originate in previous work in the area, but in the ideology of the 
market. 
This interest in the workings of the market is claimed to be central 
to the marketing discipline, though this is not a dominant perspec- 
ti ve. Such an interest is acknowledged within macromarketing, but 
most marketing writing, teaching and research is about mi cromarketi ng. 
It is devoted to the concerns and interests of producers. This par- 
tisan feature of the marketing discipline means that it is unlikely to 
become a science. Yet the researcher in marketing may operate as a 
social scientist or sociologist, looking at marketing as a form of 
human behaviour and a social process. 
This interesting discourse on the scope and status of marketing also 
clearly establishes that the study is most appropriately conceived as 
being within the marketing discipline. Consumer sovereignty is at the 
core of marketing thought, if not the paradigm for marketing. It is 
to this discipline that the study is principally addressed. It is 
intended to contribute in its examination of consumer sovereignty, by 
identifying an interesting form of consumer behaviour, and by con- 
sidering management responses and the implications for market segmen- 
tation. It may even serve to illustrate deficiencies in the 
discipline, particularly in showing how marketing's most central con- 
cerns may be investigated. The thesis also contributes to business 
and society, by appraising a form of social control of business, and 
political sociology by looking at the role of pressure groups therein. 
The study is most fundamentally about consumer sovereignty and the 
exercise of power in society. It is on thi s whi ch - di sci pli nary 
boundaries aside - it has most to say. 
The description of the research origins helps explain the research 
problem but is also in keeping with new paradigm research. Sayi ng 
where the researcher is coming from is in recognition of the impact of 
the social experience of the researcher on the research. The context 
of research will have a bearing on its outcome. The research origins 
contribute to the context, but also other factors such as the research 
perspective on marketing or even the events at the time during whi ch 
the study was conducted. 
The context of research gives rise to the researcher adopting a 
posture in relation to the research problem. The research posture, as 
it is here described, is characterised by a qualified rejection of 
positivism. Positivist methodologies in social science ignore the act 
of i nteri retati on by the researcher and involve too great a distance 
from the data. The ethnomethodological qualitative research methodo- 
logy and social criticism is most appropriate to this study. An 
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emphasis on conceptualisation also forms part of the research posture, 
one important result of which was the concept of ethical purchase 
behaviour. 
Part Two presents the theoretical argument as to how and why ethical 
purchase behaviour arises - the case for ethical purchase behaviour - 
together with an examination of pressure groups and consumer boycotts, 
the form of ethical purchase behaviour focused on. Part Three then 
reports the survey research and case studies, and Part Four, the 
research conclusions. 
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Preview 
What is the difference between Capitalism and Communism? 
Capi tali sm is the exploitation of man by man; Communism is the 
reverse. 
Polish joke (1) 
... every individual ... neither intends to promote the public 
interest ... he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as 
in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end 
which was no part of his intention. 
Adam Smith (2) 
Thi s chapter looks bri efly at the form of poll ti cal-economi c systems 
and then examines capitalism, the form predominant in the West. It is 
concluded that the rationale for capitalism is consumer sovereignty. 
This is demonstrated by exploring the origins of capitalism but, more 
importantly, the competitive model of capitalism, the dominant 
interpretation of capitalism. However, there are other interpreta- 
tions and these are briefly considered. 
According to the competitive model of capitalism, the individual's 
pursuit of self-interest results In the welfare of the community, as 
the famous quote above from Adam Smith Indicates. Capitalism provides 
material progress, but also economic and political freedom. This is 
both achieved by and expressed in consumer sovereignty. Consumer 
sovereignty as the rationale for capitalism and the degree to which it 
exists, is the theme of this chapter. 
While this feature of consumer sovereignty is shown to underlie 
classical economic thought, it is found to be questioned in later eco- 
nomic thought Which emphasises the concept as a technical term. 
Whereas in marketing, it is found that consumer sovereignty is central 
to the marketing concept. This rigid and theoretically incorrect 
application of consumer sovereignty to marketing Is shown to be a con- 
sequence of the Ideological basis of marketing thought. Consumeri sm 
is briefly considered in illustration of this. 
Not surprisingly, this whole area is clouded by ideology. The con- 
elusion is that despite the impact of one's ideological posi ti on in 
assessing consumer sovereignty, it may at least be presumed that it is 
both the rationale for capitalist systems and does exist In some form 
and to varying degrees in different markets. 
This chapter demonstrates the significance of consumer sovereignty in 
capitalist societies, but raises doubts as to its substance. The 
scene is then set for the examination of the social control of busi- 
ness and the consumer's role In this, the theme of Chapters Four and 
Five. Equally important though is the identification of a philosophi- 
cal basis for ethical purchase behaviour. Consumer sovereignty is 
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here examined from a quite radical perspective 
the decisions made in markets. The degree of 
refers to whether decisions are made In market! 
decisions. The extent of consumer sovereignty 
involved - to what those decisions are. If 
accepted, then there is recognition given to th, 
cal decisions in purchase behaviour. 
and shown to be about 
consumer sovereignty 
3- to who makes those 
refers to the issues 
this latter notion is 
e possibility of ethi- 
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3.1 Political-Economic Systems 
The role of the market In a society is the major distinguishing 
feature In identifying the form of the poll ti cal-economi c system. 
Western society is characterised by the extent to which the market 
predominates. This system is then justified in terms of efficiency 
and the freedom of the Individual. Central to markets, and a 
necessary feature for the achievement of these benefits, is consumer 
sovereignty. Capitalism, consumer sovereignty and the benefits which 
accrue are then inextricably linked. 
In the Preface to his treatise on the world's political-economi c 
systems, Lindblom writes: 
"Aside from the difference between despotic and libertarian 
governments, the greatest distinction between one government and 
another is in the degree to which market replaces government or 
government replaces market. Both Adam Smith and Karl Marx knew 
this" (3). 
The role of the market is then a major poli ti cal and economic issue. 
Economics texts, while tending not to be concerned with the political 
aspects, observe that the form of an economy will tend toward one or 
the other of the two possible extremes of the free market economy and 
the centrally controlled or command economy. Neither of these two 
extremes has ever existed, at least in recent history, and in practice 
all economies are mixed economies wi th some decisions taken by firms 
and households and some by central authorities (4). 
Accepting Mills' definition of power as "to do with whatever decisions 
men make about the arrangements under which they live, and about the 
events which make up the history of their period" (5)y this obser- 
vati on on decision-making indicates the political significance of the 
form of the economy. This is because the form of the economy deter- 
mines the locus of power within society. Hence the distinction bet- 
ween politics and economics is In this way arbitrary; a distinction 
which didn't exist when economics was political economy (6). 
Although simplistic (and In accord with Western Ideology), it can be 
claimed that decisions are decentralised and In the hands of 'the 
people' in a free-market form of economy, and centralised and in the 
hands of the state in a command form of economy M. Western econo- 
mists claim that the mixed economy in the West, which has a tendency 
towards the free-market extreme and is known as capitalism (8), is 
more efficient. Western politicians, not surprisingly, tend to agree 
with them, and claim that capitalism also means greater freedom. As 
Galbraith puts J t: 
"Its solution of the problem of efficiency was what commended the 
competi ti ve model to the economist ... For the businessman and the political philosopher, by contrast, the appeal of the com- 
petitive model was its solution of the problem of power" (9). 
Decentralised decision-making expressed in markets means consumer 
sovereignty. This thesis is fundamentally concerned with whether and 
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what decisions are made in markets. It asks: To what degree is the 
consumer sovereign? How far does this sovereignty extend? 
The theme of this chapter is that consumer sovereignty is the 
rationale for capitalism. This is implied above and is argued in more 
detail in what follows. This chapter then considers the degree of 
consumer sovereignty. Although, of course, the whole issue is plagued 
by ideology. Subsequent chapters then, in essence, examine the extent 
of consumer sovereignty or, if one prefers, the domain of consumer 
soverei gnty. 
As remarked earlier, the importance of these questions is self- 
evi dent. They strike not only at the core of marketing thought, but 
also, as this part has shown, the legitimacy of market society. 
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3.2 The Origins of Capitalism 
3.2.1 Capitalism, Progress and Freedom 
The development of capitalism has brought two fundamental features to 
Western society: progress, in the form of continual improvements in 
the standard of living for much of the population; and economic and 
political freedom. This, at least, is the claim by Western 
economists; though some might question the human costs of these 
features and dispute the claim that capitalism entails political 
freedom. 
These two features are briefly examined below and then shown to be a 
consequence of the development of capitalism. 
It is difficult to dispute the claim that material progress isa con- 
sequence of capitalism. Mises describes his Human Action as a 
treatise on economics, but it is perhaps more accurately described as 
an eloquent argument for capitalism. Yet one cannot but agree with 
his observations on the material progress benefits of capitalism: 
"The system of market economy has never been fully and purely 
tried. But there prevailed In the orbit of Western civilization 
since the Middle Ages by and large a general tendency toward the 
abolition of Institutions hindering the operation of the market 
economy. With the successive progress of this tendency, popula- 
tion figures multiplied and the masses' standard of living was 
raised to an unprecedented and hitherto undreamed of level. The 
average American worker enjoys amenities for which Croesus, 
Crassus, the Medici g and Louis XIV would have envied him" (10). 
Hei lbroner and Thurow's description of the origins of capitalism 
further confirms this, as will be seen. Freedom, however, is alto- 
gether a more complicated feature to establish. As Mises observes, 
"Freedom and liberty always refers to irterhuman relations" (11), but 
are they, as he claims, only obtainable within a market society? 
There is no kind of freedom and liberty other than the kind which 
the market economy brings about. In a totalitarian hegemoni c 
society the only freedom that is left to the individual, because 
it cannot be denied to him, is the freedom to commit suicide" 
(12). 
For Mises, there is no distinction between the economic sphere and the 
non-economic sphere. Freedom means economic freedom - which invites 
the Marxist criticism that one's personal worth amounts only to one's 
exchange value, a point considered later. Friedman is more cir- 
cumspect, permitting economic and political freedom: 
"Economic freedom is an essential requisite for political 
freedom. By enabling people to co-operate with one another 
without coercion or central direction, it reduces the area over 
which political power is exercised" (13). 
This amounts to the same argument however. As Mises explains, 
"Government means always coercion and compulsion and is by necessity 
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the opposl te of 11 berty. Government Isa guarantor of li berty and Is 
compatible with liberty only If Its range Is adequately restricted to 
the preservation of economic freedom" (14). Thl sIs an extreme 
perspective. But this, perhaps In a more diluted form, Is the argu- 
ment of all advocates of capitalism; for It Is posited on the recogni- 
tion, expressed In 3.1, that societies can best be distinguished on 
the degree to which the market replaces governmentp or vice versa, and 
on the assumption that freedom is determined by this. Mses describes 
how freedom Isa consequence of the market and the f orm whi ch It 
takes: 
"The freedom of man under capitalism Is an effect of competition. 
The worker does not depend on the good graces of an employer. 
The consumer is not at the mercy of the shopkeeper. He 1s free 
to patronize another shop if he likes. Nobody must kiss other 
people's hands or fear their disfavor. Interpersonal relations 
are businesslike. The exchange of goods and services is mutual; 
itis not a favor to sell or to buy, itisa transaction dictated 
by selfishness on either side" (15). 
While acknowledging that every man is, as a producer, ultimately 
dependent on the demands of consumers - because of consumer 
sovereignty - he i s, even in this, 'free to choose'. However "He may 
have to pay a price for conviction" (16). 
But freedom can have many other meanings. Hayek argues that 
socialism's promise of freedom from necessity, another meaning of 
freedomp meant "the great existing disparities In the range of choice 
of different people were to disappear. The demand for the new freedom 
was thus only another name for the old demand for an equal distribu- 
tion of wealth" (17). He elaborates: 
"The economi cf reedom whi ch Is the , prerequi si 
te of any other 
freedom cannot be the freedom from economic care whi ch the 
socialists promise us and which can be obtained only be relieving 
the Individual at the same time of the necessity and of the power 
of choJce; It must be the freedom of our economic activity whichp 
wi th the ri ght of choi ce ,I nevi tably also carri es the ri sk and 
responsibility of that right" (18). 
The Austrian and Chicago schools do not have a monopoly on the defini- 
tion of freedom. And this discussion of freedom cannot but be Inade- 
quate for such a profound concept. However, this view of freedom Is 
basic to what shall later by described as the competitive model of 
capitalism. It Is the vI ew of advocates of what Is here termed the 
market philosophy, belief In the market. As will be seen In 3.4.1, 
the competitive model of capitalism and the market philosophy are 
dominant within business and probably society as a whole. Thereforey 
accepting the limitations and simplicity of this position, It will be 
assumed that the concept of freedom Is as Misesq Friedman and Hayek 
claim: the freedom to choose In the market. This Is thought to be In 
keeping with the dominant Ideologyq but Is also a satisfactory posi- 
tion for this thesis, as will become apparent. This view of freedom 
Is considered further In the discussion of the competitive model of 
capitalismp particularly section 3.4.1. 
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3.2.2 The Road From Serfdom 
Given this all too brief consideration of freedom, It Is possible to 
trace the origins of capitalism and sensibly assess these features of 
progress and freedom, with the past as a standard for comparison. A 
perspective on the past offers a standard for comparison that As dif- 
ferent to and supportive of comparisons with other possible political- 
economic systems but perhaps less Ideologically tainted than 
comparisons with current and competing poll tl cal-economl c systems, 
such as communism. 
Heilbroner and Thurow's description of the origins of capitalism Is 
not sophisticated (19). Polanyip for example, Is far more detailed 
and analytical (20). They dog howeverg convey the basic features. 
These are simmarlsed below. 
Capitalism Is not tas old as the hillst, as some claim. The Egyptian 
pharaohs were not capitallstsq neither were the ancient Greeks or 
medieval Europe. These and the other societies prior to the sixteenth 
century lacked two special characteristics of capitalism: the Institu- 
tion of private property and a market system. Non-capitalist 
societies recognised the right of some Individuals to own wealthp but 
the Idea that a person's property was inviolate was not acknowledged 
and none of these societies accorded the right of ownership to all 
persons. Slaves were a common, If not predominant feature of most 
precapi tall st systems. Markets did exist prior to capitalismg but 
most production and distribution took place according to the dictates 
of tradition or the orders of a lord: "Markets were the ornaments of 
societyp tradition and command Its Iron structure" (21). Freedomq In 
the sense earlier described, was not a relevant concept. Peasants 
were subject to the commands of their lords; the right to withold 
one's labour could not be conceived: 
"The distinction Is crucial In separating capitalism from what 
came before: a capitalist employee has the legal right to work or 
not work as he or she chooses; and whereas this may seem to count 
for little under conditions of Dickensian povertyq It must be 
compared with the near-slavery of the serf legally bound to his 
lord's land and to the work his lord assigns him" (22). 
Moneymaking was close to sin and society's wealth was owned by the 
powerfulg not the rich. Indeedq riches flowed from powerg not power 
f rom rl ches. Economic life was stable for economic positions were 
fixedg and a comparison of Greek technology to that of the fifteenth 
century shows how little material progress took place over a thousand 
years, which ensured these fixed economic positions, but was perhaps a 
consequence too. 
So capi tall sm brought a phenomenal change In the way of 11 fe , when "a 
vast revolution undermined the world of tradition and command and 
brought Into being the market relationships of the modern world" (23). 
The gradual and often violent dismantling of the feudal way of life 
under the lanclen regime' gave rise to economic freedom. But this was 
a two-edged sword: 
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"For the up-and-coming bourgeois merchants, It was the passport 
to a new status In 11 f e. Even for some of the poorest classeso 
the freedom of economic contract was a chance to rise from a sta- 
tion In life from which, In earlier timesq there had been almost 
no exit. But economic freedom also had a harsher side. This was 
the necessity to stay afloat by one's own efforts In rough waters 
where all were struggling to survive" (24). 
The material progress whi ch came as a consequence of capi tall sm was 
realised through the unleashing of technology. There was no Incentive 
to Innovate In precapitalist society. The technology of the time, 
while lavished on the needs of the ruling class - In the building of 
the Egyptian pyramidsp for example - did not touch commong everyday 
(producti ve) work. It was competl ti on In the f ree-for-all of the 
market that brought the Incentive to Innovate - so as to maximise com- 
petitIve advantage. Capitalism gave rise to a gradual but sustained 
Increase In the standard of livingo particularly with the Industrial 
revolution and the recognition of the efficiency advantages of the 
division of labour. 
Hellbroner and Thurow warn against claimsy such as those by Mises and 
Friedman abovel that capitalism either guarantees or Is necessary for 
political freedom. But they do observe that "the rise of the mercan- 
tile classes was closely tied to the struggle against the privileges 
and legal Institutions of European feudalism. The historic movement 
that eventually swept aside the precapitalist economic order also 
swept aside Its political order" (25). While they would not claim 
that political freedom Is a consequence of capitalismp they do concede 
that "Along with the emergence of the market system we find a parallel 
and supporting emergence of more open, libertarian political ways of 
life" (26). 
In short thenp capitalism supplanted feudalism or similar systems of 
oppression (as they would be described from current perspectives), 
providing the benefits (and costs) of material progress and freedom. 
Vital to this Is the role of consumer sovereignty. And It-is this 
historical perspective, the understanding of this as expressed In the 
theory of classical capitalism, and the comparison of contemporary 
capitalism with socialist/communist systems, that leads laissez-faire 
advocates to criticise the goverment Intervention in the market which 
(they claim) threatens consumer sovereignty. Such Intervention is 
"The Road to Serfdom" (Hayek). As Heilbroner and Thurow conclude: 
from the beginningg capitalism has been characterised by a ten- 
sion between laissez-faire and Intervention ... that tension continues 
today" (27). 
Howeverg before considering the theory of classical -capitalism as 
expressed In the competitive model of capitalismg It Is useful to con- 
sider some of the other Interpretations of capitalism. These other 
vjews9 although they do not dispute the material progress of capita- 
lismv do question this view of freedom and the supposed benefits of 
capitalism. They are considered next. There are alsov despite the 
rosy Impression given abovep drawbacks to-the competitive model, 
acknowledged by Its advocates and others. The main drawbacks are con- 
sidered In 3.4-29 although some will be touched upon In 3.3. 
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3.3 Models of Capitalism 
3.3.1 Economics and the Real World 
The competitive model of capitalism prevails. Those that understand 
capitalism In this way are believers In the marketp advocates of the 
market philosophy, one of the most dominant Ideologies In Western 
society. The argument expressed In this thesis Is conceived within 
such a framework. Yet this does not permit Ignorance of other 
Interpretations of capitalism. Although the following sections are 
cursoryp they Illustrate the possibility for other views. Moreoverg 
as subsequent chapters reveal, the argument proposed does attempt to 
operate within the real world and some of the Inaccuracies of the com- 
petitive model are remedied by the other models and they will be 
employed where appropriate. 
Kamarck has analysed the fal lure of economi cs to deal wi th the real 
world. Much of this failure he attributes to an excessive concern for 
precision. He argues that loose concepts and rough approximations 
might make economics more realistic and useful. He observesq for 
exampleg that the organisational nature of the firm makes It unlikely 
to be a profit maximiser and that the consumer Is more likely to be a 
satisficer than an optimiser. Yet such considerations rarely figure 
within economic models (28). 
While recognising the danger In generalisation, It would seem that one 
f eature of thi s fal lure of economl es to deal wi th the real world Is 
the assumpti on of the competi ti ve model of capi tall sm. The fi rm as 
profit maximiser and the consumer as optimiser are two major features 
of thl s model. Thl s assumpti on of the competl ti ve model seems a 
likely consequence of the arbitrary distinction, discussed earlierp 
between politics and economiesp and the resultant Ignorance of politi- 
cal realities. 
This tendency to assume the competitive model of capitalism Is cer- 
tainly evident within economics texts9 for example. Some 9 such as 
Gill (29) and Samuelson (30), refer to the Ideas of those that have 
Interpreted capitalism In a different wayp but for the most parto they 
assume the competitive model. Thl sAs not to suggest that the other 
models do not Incorporate competition to some degreev a point con- 
sidered In the next section, merely that they recognise that the form 
of an economy cannot be and Is not divorced from political con- 
siderations. The only concession to this In most economics texts Is 
the acknowledgement of the mixed economy. This donev they do not then 
consider the economic consequences of thisp but continue to describe 
economic phenomena within the sterile notion of the free-market eco- 
nomy. 
This part will attempt to describe other interpretations on the basis 
of four models Identified by Honour and Mainwaring: the competitive 
modelv the crisis modelp the compromise model and the corporatist 
model (31). A categorisation they accept Is neither exhaustive nor 
exclusive. Each model could be said to be a description of capitalism 
in contemporary Western society and also an expression of how It could 
or should be. While It Is recognised that there are differences In 
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the form of the economies between different countries In the West, 
these differences do not detract from the applicability of the models 
other than In degree. It Is generally accepted that there Is a reaso- 
nablep and Increasing, degree of similarity In the form of the econo- 
mies between different countries In the West (32). 
3.3.2 The Competitive Model 
The competitive model of capitalisml as already Indicatedl Is the tra- 
di ti onal model of capi tall sm. The development of capitalism, 
described above, was given some semblance of order by Adam Smith, who 
"glimpsed In the social world of economics what Isaac Newton 
(1642-1727) had recognised In the physical world of the heavens: self- 
regulating natural order" (33). Classical political economy provides 
the origins for the competitive model, but the model also features the 
criticisms of the centrallsIng and equallsing tendencies of democracy 
as expressed by Alexis de Toequeville. It Is founded on the belief in 
economic Individualismv discussed In 3.4.1, as expressed In nineteenth 
century 11 berall sm. 
Prime contemporary exponents are Hayek and Friedman. "Economically, 
they justify market society on the grounds that It promotes efficiency 
and prosperity and permits choice; politically on the grounds that It 
does so with a minimum of state Intervention" (34). As the more 
detailed examination reveals In 3.4, It Is more than the free-market 
economy model of economists, for It Includes political elements. The 
distinction is between an economic system (the free-market economy) 
and a political-economic system (the competitive model of capitalism). 
Terming the model the competitive model Is perhaps a misnomerl 
possibly Inspired by the desire to have all four models beginning with 
the same letter. All of the models Involve competition to some 
extent. What distinguishes this model Is the emphasis on letting the 
market workv the market philosophy. It might be better described as 
the laissez-faire or classical model of capitalism. 
3.3.3 The Crisis Model 
The crisis model of capitalism assumes there are Inherent tendencies 
within capitalism towards recurrent crises. It rejects the Smithian 
notion of self-regulating natural orderp mentioned above. Its prime 
exponents are Marx and Schumpeterv although, of course, their 
Interpretations are from different Ideological and historical perspec- 
tives. As Honour and Mainwaring explain: 
"Both emphasi se the peri odl c cri ses that convulse capt tall sm and 
restructure Its economyl although Marx Interprets this as the 
failure of capitalism whilst Schumpeter Interprets this as Its 
success; both emphasise the Importance of class and class 
conflict, although for Marx It Is the proletariat and for 
Schumpeter the bourgeoisie that is crucial; both direct attention 
to the role of Ideologyp though for Marx its function Is to pro- 
tect capitalism while for Schumpeter Its effect Is to undermine 
capitalism; both call for purposive actiong although for Marx 
this Involves working with historical developments to transcend 
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capitalism, whilst for Schumpeter It Involves working against 
such developments to defend capitalism; both believe that the end 
result of capitalist development Is likely to be socialism, 
though they attach very different meanings to the term" (35). 
The emphasis In Marx's analysis of capitalism is criticism, of the 
costs Incurred and In the rejection of the notion of freedom under 
capitalism. In considering his central themes of alienation, 
exploitation and domination, Honour and MaInwaring show how Marx came 
to view capitalism as Inherently unstable, creating the conditions 
which make possible Its own transformation. 
Allenationg according to Marx, results from the worker selling him- 
selfy In the selling of his labour. Therein giving rise to the claim 
that "capitalism denies man's essential humanity, and that It must be 
and can be transformed by purposive collective action" (36). 
Exploitation results because It Is argued that the worker Is the 
source of all value, but does not receive all value for his efforts. 
Domination Is required to maintain such a system. This is performed 
by the state, which Marx viewed as class based, noting: "The executive 
of the modern state Is but a committee for managing the common affairs 
of the whole bourgeoisie. " More importantly, and part of thisp Is the 
role of Ideology; for as Marx and Engels wrote "The ideas of the 
ruling class are In every epoch the ruling Ideas. " But while capita- 
lism Increases the size of the proletariat, It also increases Its 
awareness of Its class Interests and organisation In pursuit of those 
Interests. It Is through this class consciousness that Marx saw the 
means for transforming capitalism. 
Schumpeter also anticipates a transformation of capitalism, but sees 
this as a consequence of the success of capitalism, not Its failure. 
The Instabilityp he suggests Is a result of 'waves of creative 
destruction'; necessary for Innovation, and which are disruptive and 
destabJlislng In the short run but the motive force behind capitalist 
development in the long run. Schumpeter defends oligopolies in 
contrast with the neo-classical economists, by arguing that they are 
essential for large-scale Innovation and therefore the success of 
capitalism. Howeverv this success has destructive consequences In 
three ways: 
Large-scalej bureaucratised enterprises entail a quantitative and 
a qualitative loss - In the reduction of the number of entrepre- 
neurs and In the creation of a growing body of managers imbued 
with 'the employee mentality' and thereby lacking entrepreneurial 
flair. 
2. The destruction by capitalism of' non-bourgeois groups who per- 
formed Important political functions for which the bourgeoisie 
are Ill-equippedl leaves the bourgeoisie politically vulnerable. 
3. The critical rationing tendencies encouraged by capitalism turn 
ultimately against capitalism Itself. As Schumpeter puts It: "the bourgeois finds to his amazement that the rationalist atti- tude does not stop at the credentials of kings and popes but goes 
on to attack private property and the whole scheme of bourgeois 
values. " 
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This latter problem Schumpeter attributes to the failure of the masses 
to appreciate the long-term 'success of capitalism and defend It, 
allowing a disillusioned Intelligentsia to vocallse their criticisms 
but thereby fostering a climate of opinion critical to capitalism. So 
as with the competitive model of capitalism, there Is a problem of 
reconciling liberalism and democracy. Schumpeter's solution is a 
highly elitist form of democracy: "the democratic method Is that 
Institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions In which 
Individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive 
struggle for the peoplets vote. " 
Habermas also posits a crisis model of capitalism. He suggests 
though, that capitalism has a great capacity to adapt and survivey 
achieved through state Intervention. In such a way, the economy beco- 
mes Increasingly politicised and no longer the consequence of the 
unchangeable laws of the market. This suggests the third model. 
3.3.4 The Compromise Model 
This Is the "attempt to graft some of the elements of socialism onto 
capitalismg with the aim of both reforming It and strengthening it" 
(37). Its prime exponents are JS Mill and JM Keynes 
"representatives of an educated and enlightened bourgeoisie who were 
fearful of the threat posed to liberalism by the failure of an unre- 
formed capitalism" (38). Both were concerned about the Injustice 
entailed by laissez-faire capitalism. For Mill, the solution lay in 
the sociallsation of production through Its communal ownership and 
operation. For Keynes, the solution lay In demand management. 
The Impact of Keynes' Ideas on economic policy - andq thereforev state 
Intervention In the marketplace - has been considerable; though, as he 
to some extent foretoldy his Ideas did not have a substantial Impact 
until after his death (in 1946). He rejected state socialism because 
he thought It Irrelevant, in Its emphasis on supply rather than 
demand; Inefficiento on the basis of his Russian experiences; and 
illiberal because of his belief In Individualism. He did, howeverp 
remark that "the battle of Socialism against unlimited private profit 
is being won In detail hour by hour. " Thi s he saw to be the con- 
sequence of big enterprise sociallsing Itself, by management being 
more concerned with the general stability and reputation of the Insti- 
tution than with maximising returns to shareholders. Keynes favoured 
a market systemp but subject to state intervention as he viewed 
laissez-faire capitalism unworkable and unjust "Indeedp it was 
unworkable because It was unjust" (39). He argued that there was no 
reason why savings and Investment should be In equilibrium at a level 
necessary to maintain full employment, that the injustice of the 
system lay In Its failure to provide full employment and In the 
arbitrary and Inequitable distribution of wealth and Incomeg and that 
the two are linked by the economic argument that excessive savings 
were responsible for the depression. Hence there was an argument In 
support of the redistribution of wealth and Income In favour of the 
poor - because the poor spent proportionately more than the rich - both on economic and moral grounds. 
Keynes' solution "Involved the state doing what the market could not 
do, namely managing the aggregate level of demand to ensure full 
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employment" (40). But In practice there werep as Skidelsky points 
outt two major assumptions that presented problems: Insulating the 
management of the economy from political pressures and preventing 
detailed state Interference with market forces. 
3.3.4 The Corporatist Model 
The corporatist model "is a rejection of the competitive market eco- 
nomy In favour of the concentration of productive resources In predo- 
minantly private handsp and their extensive regulation by the state" 
(41). Honour and Mainwaring Identify three forms of corporatism: an 
economic systemp a state form and a system of Interest intermediation. 
They refer to Winklerp Middlemas and Schmitterp respectively. 
Winkler's definition of corporatism Is "an economic system In which 
the state directs and controls predominantly privately owned business 
according to four principles: unity, orderg nationalism and success. " 
Winkler has noted that corporatism has become "a term of political 
abuse not economic analysis" through Its association with fascismp and 
therefore has few supporters In post-war Britain. 
If, howeverp one considers the Schmitter perspective on corporatism, 
It can be argued that there are elements of this model In evidence. 
His perspective views corporatism as a system of Interest represen- 
tationg similar In many respects to pluralism. Howeverg whereas 
pluralists suggest " 'spontaneous formationg numerical proliferationt 
horizontal extension and competitive Interaction', corporatists advo- 
cate 'controlled emergenceg quantitative limitationg vertical strati- 
fication and complementary Interdependence' 9" Schmitter argues. But 
he then claims that this Is an "Ideal type" definition and the 
distinction is found to be less precise In the real world. He finds 
that there Is both 'state corporatism, 19 where the system Is Imposed 
and controlled by the state, and also 'societal corporatismtg a system 
that has evolved gradually and spontaneously with some independence 
from the stateg and which seems very close to the notion of pluralism. 
Elsewhereq Schmitter has written that pluralism means "all with 
interests will get a democratic chance to play In the gameg noneg 
howeverv will be capable of controlling Its course or rigging its 
outcome. " He then goes on to suggest that corporatism Is the system 
that operatesq whereas pluralism Is the way In which the system opera- 
tes In an equitable manner (42). 
Hernes and Sel vIk have elsewhere shown the distinction between the 
corporatist model and the competitive model: 
a corporate system would partly supplement and partly 
replace the market as the automati a regulator of decentrall Sed 
economi c deel si ons ... By Joint action between the effected 
Interests and political authoritiest the free determination of 
prices could be modified (for examplet by public guarantees of 
minimum prices), free entry into the market could be limited (so 
as to prevent overcapacity or price wars), free establishment of 
firms could be confined (so as to secure balanced growth)v and 
free access to commercial activities could be regulated (so as to 
reduce wide fluctuations In Income). In this perspectivep cor- 
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poratism can be considered a way of systematically modifying the 
free operation of the market by incorporating Into the public 
decision-making apparatus those groups that are affected by the 
unhampered operation of the market" (43). 
Much more could be said about corporatism and the other models of 
capitalism. The brief sketches above consider only basic features 
from each model. 
It Is not the concern here to demonstrate that one model Isa more 
accurate Interpretation of contemporary capitalism, or more desirable. 
The correctness of each model either individually or in combination 
and both as a description of contemporary capitalism and as an objec- 
tive for capitalism, must at least be partly determined by one's 
Ideological position. However, part, 3.3 has shown some of the alter- 
native Interpretations of capitalism rarely encountered in marketingy 
which assumes the competitive model. They add a sophistication to the 
analysis which will become more apparent In subsequent chapters. Yet 
what Is most Important Is that the models have shown that freedom and 
the supposed benefits of capitalism are not Its inevitable consequen- 
ces when one considers some of Its complexities. Furthermore , there 
are alternative views to those expressed In the competitive model. 
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3.4 The Competitive Model of Capitalism 
3.4.1 Its Philosophical Basis of Individualism , 
A comprehensi ve deserl pti on of the competl ti ve model of capi tall sm 
would be lengthy and unnecessary. It Is only possible to discuss here 
those features that demonstrate the role of consumer sovereignty In 
such a model and that consumer sovereignty Is the rationale for capi-ý 
talism. 
A comprehensive description would be unnecessary not only because It 
would dwell on Issues Irrelevant to this thesis, but because It would 
simply be a reiteration of what Is widely available elsewhere. The 
workings of capitalism according to the competitive model are 
described In every economics textbook, for the model, economicallyl Is 
the free-market model. There As, however, the political dimension. 
The emphasis here will be on the latter dimension, Insofar as the two 
can be considered Independently. Againg thought a full exposition is 
not possibleg but can be obtained from FrIedmang Hayek and others 
(44). The following discussion of the model attempts to transcend 
these wrItIngs9 In adopting an analytical rather than an advocacy 
position. 
This section will show that the model Is founded on the philosophy of 
Individualism and that an expression, if not the supreme expression of 
Individualismy is consumer sovereignty. 3.4.2 will consider the main 
economic and political features of the model and the main criticisms. 
The term Individualism Is used In a number of ways and can create some 
confusion. Here the term Is used to express9 as Hayek puts Itp the 
Idea of "the respect for the Individual man qua man, that is the 
recognition of his own views and tastes as supreme In his own sphereg 
however narrowly that may be circumscribed, and the belief that It Is 
desirable that men should develop their own gifts and bents" (45). 
Individualism does not In this sense mean being Individualistic or the 
Individual approach (although this can be a consequence of 
IndIvIdualIsm)9 but it is sometimes used In this way (46). Schumpeter 
also Identifies different uses of the term Individualism. Again the 
terms are connectedt but there Is a distinction between them. 
Political Individualism Is "a laissez-faire attitude In matters of 
economic polICY. " Sociological Individualism is a perspective on 
social processes where "the self-governing Individual constitutes the 
ultimate unit of the social sciences. " Methodological Individualismg 
while not claiming the latter perspective Is a tenable theory of 
social processesp recognises that It can be a useful perspective for a 
particular set of Investigations (47). 
Methodological Individualism "is the consistent use of the Intelli- 
gible conduct of individuals as building blocks from which to 
construct models of complex phenomena" (48). It Is a distinguishing 
feature of Austrian economics (49). As Mises observes: 
"The hangman, not the state, executes a criminal. It Is the 
meaning of those concerned that discerns In the hangman's action 
an acti on of the state ... a social collective has no existence 
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and reality outside of the Individual members' actions ... Thus 
the way to cognition of collective wholes Is through an analysis 
of the Individuals' actions" (50). 
Yet this Is not so greatly removed from political Individualism. 
Methodological Individualism recognises the difficulty of knowing 
others' needsp other than In analysing each Individual (51). Hence in 
policy terms, shouldn't It be left to each Individual to express his 
or her preferences? Can a state presume to know all or even some of 
the preferences of Individuals that comprise collectives over which It 
may have jurisdiction? Consequently, Hayek writes: 
"0 Individuals should be allowed, within defined limitsp to 
foiiow their own values and preferences rather than somebody 
elselsp that within these spheres the Individual's system of ends 
should be supreme and not subject to any dictation by others. It 
Is this recognition of the Individual as the ultimate judge of 
his endsp the belief that as far as possible his own views ought 
to govern his actions, that forms the essence of the Indivi- 
dualist position" (52). 
Does such a position not point to laissez-faire policies? Certainly 
It Is the basis for Hayekts rejection of socialism: "Although we have 
been warned by some of the greatest political thinkers of the nine- 
teenth century, by de Tocqueville and Lord Acton, that socialism means 
slaveryý we have steadily moved In the direction of socialism" (53). 
This he attributes to a decline In Individualism, suggesting this phi- 
losophy has been basic to Western civillsation: 
"We are rapidly abandoning not the vi ews merely of Cobden and 
Bri ght , of Adam Smi th ... but one of the sal3 ent characteri sti es 
of Western civilization as It has grown from the foundations laid 
by Chri sti ani ty and the Greeks and Romans. Not merely 
nineteenth- and eighteenth-century liberalisml but the basic 
Individualism Inherited by us from Erasmus and Montaignep from 
Cicero and Tacitus, Pericles and Thucyclides Is progressively 
relinquished" (54). 
This claim that Individualism dates back to the earliest Western 
societies seems to conflict with the perspective on the historical 
development of capitalism described In 3.2. However, the conflict may 
be resolved If It is noted that the Idea of Individualism has a 
lengthy heritage but not the application of this Ideaq at least as far 
as the masses were concerned. Steiner and Steiner also claim that 
Individualism Is "a philosophy as old as antiquity, " but suggestp 
somewhat paradoxically, that "an Idea so old and so fundamental quite 
obviously has had different meanings to peoples at various times in 
history. " It seems neither obvious nor satisfactory to claim that an 
Idea can have different meanings and remain the same Idea. Howeverv 
more acceptable Is the claim that "Individualism to the Romans, for 
example, meant the Importance of Individuals of only certain classes" 
(55). But surely to claim that It Is applicable to one group of Indl- 
v1duals but not another contradicts the basic doctrine. To claim 
Individualism dates back to precapitalist societtesl other than as an 
Idea of Idealistic thinkersp seems suspect9 for It Is not possible to 
reconcile Individualism with the slavery prevalent In these societies. 
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Yet one can accept that Individualism has found an expression In capi- 
talist societiesv agreeing with Steiner and Steiner that "the opera- 
tion of the Individual enterprise system and political democracy Is 
predicated on the theory of Individualism. " Perhaps also with their 
observation that Individualism's "comparatively widespread acceptance 
In the eighteenth century altered the economic and political history 
of the world In the most profound sense - and for the better" (56). 
Howevery before examining how Individualism Is expressed In the 
marketq It Is worth considering further this link beween capitalism 
and freedom that occurs via Individualism. 
Individualism Isq at one and the same timep both the means by which 
liberty Is reallsed and liberty Itself, or, at leastq liberty as envi- 
saged by Friedman, Hayekq Mill and many others. Steiner and Steiner 
observe that Individualism: 
"oe Is the Idea of the supreme Importance of the Individual In 
soc; ety, the Idea of the Inherent decency of peoplev and a belief 
In their rationality. These concepts, of course, led to the 
conclusion that authority over people should be held to a 
mi ni mum" (57). 
This suggests the distinction crucial to this view of liberty: Are you 
forbi dden to do anythi ng whi ch Is not speci fI cally allowed? Or are 
you allowed to do anything which Is not specifically forbidden? As 
Robbins puts It: 
"The authorl tart an wi shes to I ssue f rom the centre ... post ti ve 
A nstructi ons about what shall be done ... the Classical Liberal 
99. proposes ... the state shall prescri be what at ti zens shall 
not do" (58). 
Howeverg liberty may have another form. Lindblom, In contrasting 
communism and liberal democracyp recognises that liberty as conceived 
under liberal democracyq Is of course repressed under communism. 
"Communist systemst everyone knowsq largely refuse to their citizens 
the civil liberties: freedom of thought, speech, religiong assemblyq 
and movementq as well as privacy ... Nor do communist systems maintain 
due process" (59). Yet he recognises that liberty may have the form 
of freedom from Indoctrinationg for under liberal democracy men are 
not really freev they only think they are: 
"A communist Intellectual asks: 'What are people free from In the 
Sovi et UnI on? I They are free from exploi tati, on jf rom all moral 
oppressiong and consequently their thinking and deeds are free 
from the age-old shackles created by the economic, political and 
moral rule of the exploiters. It Is not a ridiculous argument 
ý0" In polyarchy not only are people Indoctrinated - as Inevi- 
ably In all societies - but they are heavily Indoctrinated by 
leadership and a favored class" (60). 
Marxts Ideas about the role of Ideologyp referred to In 3.3-39 are 
central to this perspective. They are an Important source of criti- 
cism of Individualism and the Idea of freedom as a feature of capita- 
lIsmq discussed In 3.2. The flaws In the competitive model of 
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capitalism are considered, laterl suffice to note here that liberty can 
have more than one form and Individualism may be questioned in this 
regard (orp at least, the application of individualismp rather than 
the Idea). Given this perspectiveg one Is then better equipped to 
deal ýdth Mill's statement on libertyt as quoted by the FrIedmans and 
fundamental to their market philosophy: 
0 the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
o;; r any member of a civilized community, against his wIllq Is to 
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, 
Is not a suf fI cl ent warrant ... The only part of the conduct of 
anyonet for which he Is amenable to societyp Is that which con- 
cerns others. In the part which merely concerns himselft his 
Independence Is, of rightl absolute. Over himself, over his own 
mind and body, the Individual Is sovereign" (61). 
A review of Free to Choose describes the Friedmans as disciplesp their 
god as the market and their bible as Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations 
(62). A comment the Friedmans would likely endorse. In the 
Introductiony they trace their philosophy back to two documents, both 
published In 1776. Onev of coursep is the Wealth of Nations, and In- 
evitably they quote the passage about how the individual in intending 
only his own gain, promotes an end which was no part of his Intention. 
The other being the Declaration of Independence drafted by Thomas 
Jeffersong which embodies "certain unalienable Rights. " The quote 
above by John Stuart Mill is, the FrIedmans claim, a better expression 
of these rights (though not made In 1776). Their argument, of coursep 
Is that this Individual sovereignty should be allowed to be freely 
expressed In the market, I. e., as consumer sovereignty. 
Steiner and Steiner also recognise the Declaration of Independence as 
embodying Individualismg and In a specific way: 
"Politically It meant the right of people to legislate In their 
own behalf, to be taxed only by their representatives, to be free 
to choose their goverment representatives, to be free to 
overthrow the government If they so chose, and to have economic 
liberty. It meant that Individual liberty was a fundamental 
objective of the political system ... Economicallyp Individualism 
meant freedom of individual activity and association ... Indivi- duals should be free to choose their own occupationsp to choose 
their own economic ends and the means for realizing themp to 
choose to use resources at their disposal as they saw fItq to be 
freed from mercantilistic-type pressures on their economic 
valuationsp to exchange freely with others, and to be free to 
organize a business with others. In short, it was a freedom to 
improve their economic position as they saw fit, to enjoy freely 
the results of their labors, and to manage their own affairs with 
a minimum of government regulation" (63). 
Some wri ters ref er to thl s as economi aI ndl vi duall sm (64). However, 
within the competitive model of capitalism, politics and economics are 
Interdependent. So Schumpeter's definition of political Indivi- 
dualismo noted earlier as "a laissez-faire attitude In matters of eco- 
nomic policyp" amounts to the same thing (65). As Steiner and Steiner 
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put it "laJssez faire naturally grew from the Idea that the Indivi- 
dual, not the statel was the primary object of concern. The welfare 
of the Individual and society, It was arguedp could best be served by 
Individual Initiative rather than state dictation ... state I nter- 
ference on the whole was Inimical to the best Interests of Individuals 
and society" (66). Thi sIs clearly explained by Adam Smi th and 
Illustrated by hi s famous quote at the start of thl a chapter. The 
basis for laissez-faire is then both economic and political. 
Accordingly, the device for expressing and reallsing Individualism Is 
the free market. The market mechanism assures that "so long as co- 
operation Is strictly voluntary, no exchange will take place unless 
both parties do benefit" - Adam Smith's key Insight (67). In consump- 
tion decisions this beneficial facet of exchange ensures the indivi- 
dual sovereignty described by Mill and central to Individualism, 
resulting in what Is referred to as consumer sovereignty. So given 
the minimum of government Intervention, each Individual Is 'free to 
choose'. Thus the free market brings not only prosperity, but human 
freedom. 
This view of individualJsm and the market is basic to what Steiner and 
Steiner describe as the classical Ideology and which predominates In 
business (68). This Is Illustrated In the comment below by Thomas A 
Murphy as chairman of General Motors, 1973, and earlier quoted: 
"This sensitive tailoring of productive resources to the complex 
and diverse preferences of people, expressed through free 
marketsp Is a fundamental though often under-appreciated charac- 
teristic of our system. Each consumerv given his free choice, 
can purchase those products which he feels most suit his own spe- 
cial needs and resources. Unlike the political system, every 
person can win In an economic "election"" (69). 
So consumer sovereignty prevails. This view Is found throughout Silk 
and Vogel's bookq which Is based on their observation of meetings of 
The Conference Board 1974-1975, and captured contemporary business 
thl nki ng . The book Is both evi dence of the predomi nance of the 
classi cal, I deology and a descri pti on of the form It takes and how It 
relates to the problems of social responsibility In business. The 
claim that the competitive model of capitalism Is the dominant 
interpretation seems justified. 
Honour and Mainwaring acknowledge the renewed Interest In the com- 
petitive model of capitalism. Currentlyq both Britain and the USA have 
premiers with policies of minimising state Intervention In the marketp 
In accordance with the competitive model. In Britaing the Thatcher 
government has sought greater scope for letting the market work - as 
In the encouragement of private refuse collection services and the 
sub-contracting of laundryq catering and cleaning In the health ser- 
vice. In the 1983 election, a Tory party slogan was "Every man and 
woman a capitalist" (70). Underlying thisp as this section must showl 
is the more fundamental belief In Individualism. It Is undoubtedly 
Mrs Thatcher's attachment to this belief which is expressed not only 
In her attempts to 'let the market work' but throughout her policies. 
Recentlyp she said that she advocates: 
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a society where there Is both more power and finance In the 
hands of the people than In the hands of the government. That 
means a society where you have people willing to exercise respon- 
sibility as a condition of freedom" (71). 
Indl vI duall sm underll es her phi losophy and her poll cl es. The com- 
petitive model of capitalism Is her Interpretation of capitalismp and 
thisq of course, Is seen as expressing Individualism. The form of 
this expression Is consumer sovereignty. Capitalism brings the bene- 
fits of material progress and freedom, or freedom as envisaged In 
I ndl vI duall sm. Consumer sovereignty therefore becomes the rationale 
for capitalism. 
3.4.2 Main Features and Criticisms 
As noted abovel It Is not necessary to describe the workings of the 
competi ti ve model. The model works accordi ng to the game of the 
market. This has been described In every economics text since Adam 
Smith's Wealth of Nations. As he observed: 
"It Is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the 
baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their 
own Interest" (72). 
This Is not a zero-sum game, but one of mutually beneficial exchange. 
However, one must consider whether and In what ways, the game benefits 
the rest of societyp as Smith claims. And does It necessarily benefit 
the consumer? 
The purpose of economi a systems Is to allocate scarce resources. Le 
Grand and Robinson Identify four objectives specified by society: 
efficiencyp equityp freedom or civil liberty and altruism. Efficiency 
refers to the excess of benefits over cost. Equity refers to how fair 
or just Is the resultant allocation. Freedom refers not only to the 
freedom of choice In markets but also to political freedom. Altruism 
refers to the acting In the Interests of others without any expec- 
tation of personal gain (73). These are the criteria against which 
the competitive model need be assessed. 
Both advocates and critics rate the efficiency of the market as being 
very high. This Is because of its ability to deal with the countless 
decisions necessary In a decentrallsed manner. They dog howeverl 
acknowledge certain failings. These failings are a consequence of 
monopolies (including those that result from public goods), exter- 
nalities, Imperfect Information and other market Imperfections. 
Adam Smithl of courset observed that monopolies would limit the effi- 
ciency of the market because, as Galbraith has more recently notedo of 
the theory of capitalism's "pivotal dependence on competition. " A 
dependence which Galbraith viewed In 1952 as unrealistiog recognising 
that much of American Industry Is oligopolistic (74). This view was 
endorsed by Berlet In 1954, and many others subsequently (75). 
Concern about externalities centres on (but is not restricted to) 
pollutiong an early observation on the consequences of which was 
Rachel Carson's Silent Springt In 1962. The problem of Imperfect 
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information has been recognised for some time but did not seem to 
receive much attention until Ralph Nader became activeg particularly 
with his, Unsafe at Any Speed, in 1965. 
These failings are, again, considered In the basic economics texts 
(76). The point Is that the market will not answer all things, even 
on Its own terms. Howeverv relative to alternatives, It might still 
be the most efficient system despite these problems. 
The competi ti ve model of capi tall sm, rates hi ghly on the cri terl on of 
efficiency. Its proponents argue that It would rate even higher If it 
was given the opportuni ty. On the basis of the discussion In 3.2.1 
and 3.4.19 It would also seem to rate hi ghly on the cri terl on of 
freedom or civil liberty, the debate about what this means not- 
withstanding. It Is on the art terl a of equi ty and altrul sm that the 
competi ti ve model falls down. It Is thi s fat lure 9 more than the failures regarding efficiency and freedom, that gives the greatest 
justification for government Intervention. 
Individualism holds that each Individual should be the best judge of 
his or her own Interests. This places the burden of responsibility on 
the Individual. The Injustice results because some are less able or 
even unable to help themselves. The question arises: 'Should one help 
themy and who Is to help them? t 
Hellbroner and Thurow observe that while the market Is efficient and 
dynamic, It Is blind to any claim on society's output other than for 
those with wealth or Income. Consequently "To abide just by the 
market system of distributiong we would have to be willing to tolerate 
Individuals starving on the street" (77). Hence, 'the state must 
provide'. But "state help kills self helpl" as Friedman observes 
(78). As Spencer so eloquently puts it: 
"The ultimate result of shielding men from the effects of folly 
Is to fill the world with fools" (79). 
Hayek argues that Individualism has a bad name because of Its asso- 
ciation with egotism and selfishness (80). Yet this seems inevitable. 
As Honour and MaJnwaring writep In reference to the 'game of the 
market': 
"Plal nly the justi fi cati on for the game Is not to be f ound In 
Ideals of social justice but quite simply In its success In 
raising the general level of prosperity and In maximising Indivi- 
dual freedom from state controls" (81). 
7he Issue Is acknowledged by both Hayek and Friedman. Hayek recogni- 
ses the Injustice but Is swayed by the benefits In terms of output and 
I ndi vi dual freedom. Friedman argues likewisep suggesting capitalism 
is the best means by which Injustice may be minimised, (82), but also 
claiming equality Is not possible because "life Is not fair. " He 
argues there Is no difference between the Inheritance of wealth and the Inheritance of talent: 
Much of the moral fervor behind the drive for equality of outcome 
comes from the -vd despread bell ef that ItIs not fal r that some 
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children should have a great advantage over others simply because 
they happen to have wealthy parents. Of course It Is not fair. 
Howeverp unfairness can take many forms. It can take the form of 
the Inheritance of property ... It can also take the form of the 
Inheritance of talent ... But from an ethical point of view, Is 
there any difference between the two? Yet many people resent the 
Inheritance of property but not the Inheritance of talent. " 
Indeed, Friedman goes on to claim that this unfairness Is both 
desirable and a necessary benefit. He asks: "What kind of a world 
would It be If everyone were a duplicate of everyone else? " He then 
explaJns It Is this unfairness that motivates participation In the 
game of the market (83). In other wordsq the success of the market 
would "be threatened If the game were fairer and the stakes were 
lower" (84). 
Hencep It Is claimed that the criteria of efficiency and equity are 
Inevitably In conflict. Adam Smith's claim that the welfare of the 
general community would be an epiphenomenal consequence of the pursuit 
of Individual self-interest, assumed welfare to be material progress. 
This was undoubtedly the case In his day. It Is, howeverv less 
appropri ate today. As Friedman recognises In the quote abovep Ine- 
quities will be perpetuated. Is that acceptable In an affluent 
society? Can they be minimised without Impairing the efficiency of 
the market system? 
The competitive model of capitalism also falls down on the criterion 
of altrul sm. Again this seems to be In conflict with efficiency. 
Economic Injustice is not the only criticism of the game of the 
market. More profoundq less quantifiable and more contentious$ is the 
recognition by Marx that the market "resolved personal worth Into 
exchange valuel" that It "has left no other bond between man and man 
than naked self-interest, than callous 'cash paymentt. " As Lindblom 
explainsp 
"A hypothetl cal pure unmodl fi ed market system would be extraor- 
dinary - and Intolerable - In that It would strip the Individual 
of all but one claim on other members of the society. He could 
not ask for their help In distress ... In a pure market system 
his claim on others would be established If and only if he had 
something to offer In exchange. " 
of course , he concludes that such a pure market system has never 
existed and that the "world market systems are Intertwined An varying 
degrees wi th other methods of organi sati on to sof ten the severi ty of 
market systems alone" (85). And as GI 11 notes , John Stuart MI 11 was 
also critical of the Idea of mankind In a constant struggle for 
riches: 
"I confess I am not charmed with an Ideal of life held out by 
those that think that the normal state of human beings Is that of 
struggling to get on; that the tramplingg crushingg elbowing and 
treading on each others' heelsq which form the existing type of 
social lifeg are the most desirable lot of human kind, or 
anything but the disagreeable symptoms of one of the phases of 
Industrial progress" (86). 
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Would he agree with Friedman now quoting him In approbation? 
Lipsey defines individualism as where the household Is the best judge 
of its own Interests. Somewhat disparagingly, he defines the alter- 
native as being paternalism, where authorities are viewed as the 
better judge of the household's self-interest than the household 
Itself (87). The Issue Is not as clear-cut as he would Imply, for 
Individualism not only has consequences for freedom but Inevitably has 
consequences for equity and altruism. Yet If these criteria are to be 
accepted as Importantg It follows that state Intervention Is Inevit- 
able. Wherep then, does this leave consumer sovereignty? 
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3.5 Consumer Sovereignty In Economics 
3.5.1 In the Competitive Model of Capitalism 
There Is an Intuitive appeal to the competitive model of capitalism In 
Its efficiency and promise of freedom. Howeverp as the previous sec- 
tion showedp there can be market fallurep It can be Inequitable 
(perhaps Inevitably so), and It Is contrary to any community or caring 
ethos as evinced under collectivism. It should also be noted that 
one's vote in the market, as a consequence of consumer sovereignty, Is 
in proportion to one's wealth. There Is a limited franchise. 
It Is because of these problems that the game Is threatened by repre- 
sentatIve democracy. As Honour and Mainwaring observe: 
". true to the tradition of Tocquevlllep there is an underlying 
f;; r of the 'tyranny of the majority' in that the masses may not 
share Hayek and Friedmants appreciation of the gameq may use 
their political power to amend It, or more passively, may not use 
their power to defend It" (88). 
Howeverp despite this, and obvious extensive Intervention by the 
statel belief In consumer sovereignty prevails. The centrality of 
consumer sovereignty to the competitive model Is Illustrated In 
Smith's observation that consumption Is the sole purpose of production 
(89). Yet consumer sovereignty must Inevitably be limited and this 
claim somewhat suspect, in view of what has been noted In 3.4.2. 
Steiner and Steiner observe that the belief In consumer sovereignty Is 
basic to the classical Ideologyp yet they conclude reality and 
Ideology need not be that similar: 
"It Is fair and Important to say that no matter how far removed 
from reality some of these views may seem to beg most of them are 
still held by a majority of executives ... The significance of the ideology Is lost If It Is not understood thatl fundamentally, 
It Is not meant to be a description of what-is--going on today but 
rather Is a prescription of what ought to be" (90). 
The competitive model of capitalism as part of this classical Ideology 
should be seen in the same way. A good expression of this Ideological 
view of consumer sovereignty is given by Mises: 
"The direction of all economic affairs is In the market society a 
task of the entrepreneurs. Theirs is the control of production. 
They are at the helm and steer the ship. A superficial observer 
would believe that they are supreme. But they are not. They are 
bound to obey unconditionally the captain's orders. The captain 
Is the consumer" (91). 
It Is an attractive analogy, but one shown to be Incorrect and, even 
If viewed as prescriptiveg likely 'to be unattainable. Thl s As 
demonstrated In the next section. 
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3.5.2 Tn Mixed Markets 
Baumol and Blinder define consumer sovereignty In terms of purchase 
votes: 
"In a market economy, consumersp by registering their dollar 
votes, determine which goods and services shall be provided and 
In what quantities. Items that are not wanted , or that are 
overproduced, will suffer a fall In price, while Items that are 
In short supply will rise in price. These price movements act as 
signals to profit-seeking firms, which then produce larger 
amounts of the goods whose prices rise and less of the goods 
whose prices fall. This mechanism Is what we call consumer 
sovereignty" (92). 
They arep In contrast with Misesp more reserved about consumer 
authority In the marketv Identifying consumer sovereignty as a mecha- 
nism within the price system. They also make certain qualificationsp 
In line with the comments made earlier: 
"Of coursep the doctrine of consumer sovereignty must be 
qualified In several ways when we deal with the real (as opposed 
to the Ideal) world.. For one thingp governments interfere with 
the price mechanism In many ways - taxing some goods and services 
while subsidizing others. These Interferences certainly alter 
the bill of goods that the economy produces. For another ... in the presence of externalities the price system may send out false 
signalsp leading to Inappropriate levels of output for certain 
commodities" (93). 
Yet other economists also recogni se there may be a degree of producer 
sovereignty. A number refer to Galbraith's The New Industrial State. 
After having noted that In "virtually all economic analysis and 
Instruction, the Initiative Is assumed to lie with the consumer, " 
Galbraith suggests this "unt-directional flow of Instruction from con- 
s=er to market to producer may be denoted the Accepted Sequence. " 
This sequence he rejectsp and argues: 
". the accepted sequence IS no longer a descri pti on of the 
r;; IJty and Is becoming ever less so. Instead the producing arm 
reaches forward to control Its markets and on beyond to manage 
the market behaviour and shape the social attitudes of thosey 
ostensibly, that It serves It may appropriately be called 
the Revised Sequence" (94). 
The Revised Sequenceg claims Galbralthq Is achieved by advertising 
moulding consumers' preferences to conform with the wishes of 
suppliers. This Is generally held to be exaggerated. Kirzner soundly 
illustrates the confusion In this perspective by pointing out that 
contrary to neo-classical economiesl the demand curve can not be taken 
as given In the real worldq and production decisions are In anticipa- 
tion of patterns of demands. There Is, theng neither an Accepted 
Sequencep nor a Revised Sequence: "The entrepreneurial competitive 
process consists ... of selecting by trial and error opportunities to 
be placed before consumers" (95). For KIrzner and other Austrians, 
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there Is not a sequence p but an entrepreneurl al process. Yet thi s 
permits a form of consumer sovereignty (96). 
In the second edition of 
, 
The New Industrial Stateg Galbraith Is pre- 
pared to concede a little: 
"000 while my case may hold for the world of the very big cor- 
porationsl there still remains a world of the market. Farmers, 
lawyersq cleaners and cobblersq bookstores, musicians and houses 
of casual pleasure still surviveo Here the market still rules; 
here consumer sovereignty Is still Inviolate ... (but) with Increasing size and corporate power the market gives way to 
planning ... " (97). 
Fulop suggests there are degrees of consumer soverel gnty An the real 
world: "Broadly the more competitive the market the stronger the power 
of the consumer; the larger the element of monopoly, the more he is at 
the mercy of the producer" (98). This accords with Galbraith, 
although she disputes the extent to which the producer, In Galbraith's 
analysist predominates In the real world. As with Baumol and Blinderp 
she makes certain qualifications. Consumer sovereignty is limited by 
InformatJong Incomep and state restrictions on certain goods such as 
drugs, or drink before driving. She concludes that the degree of 
sovereignty will be determined by Information and, above allp choice: 
"In particular, the consumer must have the authority to exert his 
sovereignty over the producer by exercising the strongest sanc- 
tion of all - the ability to take his custom elsewhere. 
Informationg advice and guidance are valueless unless the 
customer has a choice between alternatives" (99). 
Thl s seems a fal r conclusi on. It Is worth menti oni ng her reply to 
arguments such as those by Galbraith that producers dominate consumer 
choice through advertising. Employing Galbraith's concept of counter- 
vaJling powerg she observes that the power of retailers curtails mono- 
poly pratices and, In effect, enhances consumer sovereignty (100). 
Furtherg retailers reduce the problem of decision-making In choice by 
acting as preliminarv assessor for the consumer, particularly valuable 
when the product requires technical knowledge for adequate assessment. 
In short, consumers are not sovereign but one can refer to a degree of 
sovereigntyp enhanced by choiceg information and possibly (though not 
necessarily In all cases) retailer assessment; but restricted by limi- 
tations on competitiong actions by the statep and individual wealth. 
Lindblom describes consumer sovereignty as being a technical term and 
not accurately descriptive (101). Before concluding this section It is necessaryp for reasons that will become apparent In 3.6.1, to 
describe the conditions under which consumer sovereignty as an 
accurately descriptive terml would occur. Consumer sovereigntyp In 
this sensep can only occur In conditions of perfect competition. The 
misunderstandings consequent on the use of the term stem from, as Galbraith observes above, economic analyses. Thl s Is due to the 
failing of economics to deal with the real world and to only deal In Idealp free marketsp a point discussed In 3.3-1. 
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Hellbroner and Thurow observe that real world markets are charac- 
terised by Imperfecty not perfect competition. They explain the 
Importance of this for consumer sovereignty. Under perfect com- 
petitiong the consumer Is kingg allocating resources by virtue of his 
or her demand and enjoying goods sold as cheaply and abundantly as 
possible. There are no profl ts (the fI rm Isa pri ce taker) and each 
firm produces the goods consumers want In the largest quantity and at 
the lowest cost possible. Under Imperfect competitiong the consumer 
loses much of this sovereignty as firms have strategies, Including the 
strategy of Influencing consumer demand, and profits are not competed 
awayg so consumers' surplus Is transferred to firms and output Is not 
maximised but reduced by whatever amount results from higher-than- 
competitive prices (102). 
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3.6 Consumer Sovereignty In Marketing 
3.6.1 Consumer Sovereignty and the Marketing Concept 
Marketing Is the application of the competitive model of capitalism. 
Definitions of marketing emphasise the consumer: "... the 'marketing 
view' looks at the business as directed toward the satisfaction of a 
customer want and as a purveyor of a customer utility" (103); 
"Marketing Is the performance of business activities which direct the 
flow of goods and services from producer to consumer or user In order 
to satisfy customers and accomplish the company's objectives" (104); 
"Marketing Is the way In which an organisation matches its own human, 
financial and physical resources with the wants of Its customers" 
(105). The marketing discipline and a marketing orientation In prac- 
ticev are predicated upon a belief In consumer sovereignty. This Is 
implicit In all definitions of marketing. Kotler makes It explicit: 
"The marketing concept expresses the company's commitment to the 
time-honored concept In economic theory known as consumer 
sovereignty. The determination of what Is to be produced should 
not be In the hands of the companies or in the hands of govern- 
ment but In the hands of consumers. The companies produce what 
the consumers want and In this way maximise consumer welfare and 
earn their profits" (106). 
Howeverg as 3.5.2 revealedq this Is erroneous In two ways. Firstly, 
the concept of consumer sovereignty In economic theory is only found 
In perfectly competitive markets. Secondly, perfect competition would 
not permit marketing activities because firms cannot have strategies, 
they are price takers and can only compete In this sense. Hence, not 
only Is consumer sovereignty unlikely to be found In practIceq but It 
is Incompatible In theory with the notion of marketing strategies. So 
even If markets In the real world were characterised by perfect com- 
petition one could then not have marketing. The notion of marketing 
and of consumer sovereignty are not, at least In a pure sensev comple- 
mentaryo they are contradictory. 
This seemingly Irreconcilable connection between marketing and con- 
sumer sovereignty Is dominant within the marketing discipline. 
Indeedv without this connectionp there could not be marketing as It Is 
currently understood and practiced. It seems that At Is because 
marketing Is the application of the competitive model of capitalism 
that this conection Is made. Given the observations above about the 
Ideological nature of this model, It would follow that the unlikely 
combination of consumer sovereignty and marketing Is the consequence 
of the Ideological underpinnings of the discipline. This Is explored 
In the next section. 
3.6.2 Marketing, Ideology and Consumer Sovereignty 
It could be countered In reply to the observation that marketing and 
consumer sovereignty are incompatible, that this is only In some pure, 
abstract sense. This Is correct. However, It does not deny that con- 
sumer sovereignty Is employed as the central concept to marketing and 
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In the way described by Mises In 3.5.1, where "the captain Is the 
consumer. " If consumer sovereignty and marketing are not Inapm- 
patiblep then consumer sovereignty Is at least a suspect basis for the 
disciplinel given the reservations expressed In 3.5.2. The com- 
petitive model of capitalism as the Interpretation dominant In 
marketing andq thereforep marketing as the application of this modelp 
points to the Ideological basis to marketing thought. For these 
reasons, as this section will showq marketing may be more of an 
Ideology than a science. 
Bakerv after having pointed to the problems In the definition of 
marketingg concludes: 
"From a negative point of view, theng marketing Is just a hotch- 
potch of Ideas 'borrowed' from other disciplines. More positi- 
vely It rests on the simple principle that supply must be a 
function of demand. In the opinion of marketing men this offers 
the best approach to the solution of the central economic problem 
- the allocation of scarce resources so as to maximise 
satisfaction" (107). 
if one also acknowledges that marketing has developed some unique con- 
cepts and techniquesq this seems a reasonable position to adopt. 
Although Baker probably did not see It In these terms, marketing as a 
discipline may best be described as: 
'The study of the application of the Ideology of the competitive 
model of capitalism, central to which is the notion of consumer 
sovereignty,, by drawing on the social science disciplines and by 
developing unique concepts and techniques so as to enable produ- 
cers to most effectively reallse mutually beneficial exchanges 
with consumers In markets'. 
This position on marketing will be considered further. The Intention 
here Is not to justify this definition against the many other conten- 
dersl although It would seem a reasonable definition to adopt given 
the conclusions reached in this chapter. Of Importance here, is the 
degree of consumer sovereignty In real world markets. The purpose of 
this section Is to conclusively show that marketing expressions of 
consumer sovereignty may be somewhat suspect, by revealing the Ideolo- 
gical basis to marketing thought. 
After having shown that marketing rests on the notion of consumer 
sovereignty - "a truism which has been In currency since Adam Smith 
wrote his Wealth of Nations" (108) - Baker goes on to explain the 
relative recency of the marketing concept. This he attributes to the 
affluence of contemporary society where there Is 'excess' supply and 
therefore "large numbers of producers are competing for the privilege 
of supplying the consumer" (109). Of course, as has been suggested 
elsewhere (110)9 this happy situation may only be a phase. Howeverp 
Baker Is confident that technology will ensure the continuation of an 
excess of supply over demand. 
Thl s explanati on for the relati ve recency of marketi, ng of f ers the best 
support for the claim that there is consumer sovereignty. Yet It Is 
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not a new argument pIt merely pol nts to the Importance of competi ti on 
for consumer sovereignty. While Baker's later claim that marketing Is 
"one of man's oldest activities" (111) seems questionable In view of 
the version of the origins of capitalism given earlier in this 
chapterg It would seem that consumer sovereignty has always been a 
function of capitalist societies according to the degree of com- 
petition. This must always be the case. Marketing simply recognises 
that competition In contemporary society Is acute, In some markets. 
Baker suggests In his later book that society has merely come full 
circleg back to a position where consumer sovereignty predominates 
(112). More likely, Is that consumer sovereignty exists, and always 
will existp but only to a degree and according to how much competition 
there Is within the market In question. Howeverp this Is not the con- 
sumer sovereignty envisaged In marketing or by Mises. The consumer Is 
not king. The consumer may be king In certain markets, at certain 
timesp and the producer Is then required to meet the consumers' needs 
to remain competitive. 
There are then degrees of sovereignty In different markets. The 
extent or domain of this sovereignty Is yet another consideration - 
can the consumer express concern about matters not related to the 
product and expect remedy? ThIsq of course, is a key question within 
this thesis. Both the degree and extent of consumer sovereignty are a 
function of competition. Yet as the rationale for capitalismp there 
must surely be the absolute consumer sovereignty described by Mises? 
The role of the Ideology Is to suggest this is the case. 
Ideologies serve two purposes, as discussed In Chapter Two; they pro- 
vide explanation for and the justification of Interests. The Ideology 
of the competitive model of capitalism both explains capitalism and 
justifies the Interests of capitalists (producers). A cynic might be 
tempted to observe that the activities and power of business are made 
acceptable to society by an Ideology that proclaims business Is not 
powerful at allp but under the control of consumers. Thi sIs the 
latent function of marketing. To twI st the quote from Lindblom 
employed earlierp consumers are not really sovereign under capitalismy 
they only think they are. Marketing fosters this belief. 
The connection between consumer sovereignty and marketing Isq from the 
economics perspectivep erroneous. However ,ItIs not erroneous f rom 
the marketing perspective because it is the dominant view. It isq 
theng Ideological. As the previous section showed, marketing Is pre- 
dicated upon a belief In consumer sovereignty. This In itself is 
fcorrectIv even though there may be no legitimate theoretical or 
empirical foundation for this. 
Ideology both serves as an Idea structure for understandingg and also 
for legitimising one's Interests. Founding the marketing concept on 
consumer sovereignty might be seen as highly convenient. At the base 
level It permits corporate power - expressed in strategies and other 
ways - while claiming the corporation has no power and Is merely 
acting In accord with the wishes of the consumer. Of coursep this As 
not the way the corporation would see it - oro perhaps, the marketing 
academics speaking on their behalf. The corporate executives believe 
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In the power of the consumer because this Is how Ideologies work. Any 
guilt they may have, about dubious practices that are a consequence of 
corporate power or merely the recognition of that powerv Is allayed In 
the process. Bartels has shown that marketing's origins lie in the 
separation of economics and marketing with the practitioners falling 
In the latter camp (113). Is it surprising that they should build a 
body of knowledge legitimising their activities, and on the most con- 
venient grounds of all, that they are merely serving the best 
Interests of the consumer and are tools at his or her command? 
Andreski In Social Sciences as Sorceryq claims that the social scien- 
ces frequently act to serve the Interests of the wielders of power, 
putting a pseudo-scientific gloss on the crude realities of power and 
giving their blessing to the status-quo. Thi s is more of a latent 
than a manifest function, but marketing as a discipline may well be a 
prime exponent of this (114). 
Howeverp what matters Is the degree to which Ideology conforms with 
reall ty. Whi le many marketi ng academi cs and practl tI oners genul nely 
believe that consumer sovereignty Is the basis for marketing thought 
and actiong what evidence Is there for this? Surely If practitioners 
and academics alike believe In consumer sovereignty, then their 
actions will reflect this? 
3.6.3 Cons=erism - The Antithesis of Marketing 
The advent of consumerism provides evidence that consumer sovereignty 
Is the basis for marketing thoughtp but not necessarily marketing 
action. It also questions whether belief In consumer sovereignty will 
be reflected In action. 
Baker observes that "the nature of marketing and consumerism reflect a 
fundamental paradox for while they are Invariably seen as being in 
conflict both activities possess the same objective - consumer 
satisfaction" (115). That such a paradox should arise, he attributes 
to the changes In society's expectations of business and some firms 
being less responsive. This Is acceptable, but not If one claims some 
sort of absolute consumer sovereigntyl as he Implies In observing 
that: 
free market economics largely permit the evolution of con- 
sumer sovereignty by allowing consumers to express their pre- 
ferences as between goods and services through the daily casting 
of their money 'votes' ... marketing economies and the marketing 
philosophy rest upon the same fundamental proposition that con- 
sumer preferences will determine the allocation of available 
Inputs to the creation of the most desired outputs" (116). 
Consumer sovereignty Is not In this sense reconcilable with con- 
sumerism. Perhaps It was the Ideology of the competitive model of 
capitallsmg expressing consumer sovereigntyq that led to consumerist 
demands; the Ideology and the reality were too far out of step. 
Howeverg the reply to consumerism as advocated by Bakerl Christopher 
et alq Kotler and others (117)v Is that It should be seen as an oppor- 
tunity. Somewhat reluctantlyp It seems, this Idea was adopted by 
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business. Consequently business now claims to practice consumerisml 
Consumerism has been Incorporated within the Ideology and become con- 
sumer sovereignty: 
"Consumer sovereignty: Power of consumer to influence production 
presentation and distribution of goods and services in a com- 
petitive market, thus expressing demand, and emerging more 
recently as consumerism" (118). 
A remarkable example of doublethink. 
So consumerism results In the reaffirmation of consumer sovereignty In 
marketing thought but notp necessarily, In action. 
' 
The ideology Is 
upheld. Consumer sovereignty In marketing action will still be but a 
consequence of the degree of competition within the market. The 
response to consumerism Is then a demonstration of the Ideological 
basis of marketing thought. 
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3.7 Consumer Sovereignty -A Myth? 
This chapter has shown that consumer sovereignty Is the rationale for 
capitalism. However, It has also shown that consumer sovereignty may 
not be as prevalent In practice as supposed. It emerges that there 
are two forms of consumer sovereignty. One, which may be described as 
absolute consumer sovereignty, Is the form as expressed within the 
competitive model of capitalism and underpinning marketing thought. 
The other form Is consumer sovereignty as a technical termq which 
recognises degrees of consumer authority In markets. The former seems 
to be grounded In Ideology, the latter seems to be grounded In fact. 
Yet It may be that there Isa greater degree of consumer soverel gnty 
today than there has ever been. For Adam Smithq consumer sovereignty 
was an Ideap perhaps even an Ideal. As Hughes obs6rves "Economics 
still bears the marks of the Smithean morality of attempting to recon- 
cile and derive the good of the collective out of the Individual pur- 
suit of self-interest" (119). While Galbraithian critiques suggest 
oligopolistic competition limits consumer sovereignty, it may be, as 
Austrian economists claim, that this form of competition provides the 
greatest degree of sovereignty (see 3.3-3). It can, of courseq be 
more efficient because of the economies of scale achieved through not 
having an Innumerable quantity of small producers as would be the case 
under perfect competition. And, as Lindblom observesp despite 
Galbraith's claims In The New Industrial State, the market is not dead 
(120), and "big corporations are clearly not generally co-ordinated by 
a goverment plan or any other overarching govermental directiong but 
through market exchanges"-(121). 
But If there Is a greater degree of consumer sovereignty todayq why is 
there so much cri tI cl sm of busl ness? Why 91f consumer soverel gnty Is 
at Its heightq Is there so much complaining about the limits to con- 
sumer sovereignty? There seems to be two immediate possible answers 
to this. Firstlyp as Fisk puts It, "the more consumer sovereignty the 
greater the opportunities for Its abuse" (122). Secondly, and this Is 
relatedq greater affluence might mean greater discontent. As Fulop 
explaIns: 
"00 It may seem an odd paradox that higher Incomes and more 
d; scretionary spending power should lead shoppers to be morep 
rather than less, critical about their purchasesq it Is only 
variety and choice that encourage criticism and make rejection 
possible. While any washing machine would probably be welcome to 
a housewife accustomed to scrubbing clothes at the nearest river 
bankq she would no longer be satisfied easily when there Is a 
choice of automated washing machines, laundries and launderettes" 
(123). 
Chol ce I tself leads to greater cri ti cl sm. Thi sIsaf eature of the 
'phenomenon of rising expectations' (124). The point Is that greater 
consumer sovereignty may mean greater demands for more consumer 
sovereigntyp because the amount of abuses will Increase and those abu- 
ses will be perceived as being more detrimental. 
it seems saf e to conclude that absolute consumer soverel gnty Isa 
myth. Howeverg one can accept there are degrees, perhaps quite con- 
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siderablep of consumer sovereignty In certain markets as they are 
today. Yet where does this leave marketing? It may be that marketing 
Is more of an Ideology than a science and the search for that elusive 
paradigm Is meaningless. One might alternatively suggest that con- 
sumer sovereignty Is the paradigm for marketing. But of course It 
can't be seen as such for this would mean, If given any serious 
thoughtv acknowledging the Ideological basis to the discipline. This 
point will be pursued further. 
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Previ ew 
The consumer Is, so to speak, the king ... each Isa voter who 
uses his votes to get things done that he wants done. 
Paul A Samuelson (1) 
"But the Emperor has nothing on at alll" cried a little child. 
Hans Christian Anderson 
The Emperor's New Clothes (2) 
What Is left of consumer sovereignty when stripped of the Ideology of 
the competi ti ve model of capi tall sm? If v as the previous chapter 
concludedq the market will not or cannot answer all things because the 
consumer Is not sovereign, how may the social control of business be 
reallsed and what will the market answer? This Is the theme of this 
and the following chapter. 
Business and societyv the study of the relationship between business 
and societyp Is a recognised academic discipline. It examines the 
social role of business and Issues which arise from this relationship. 
Yet It offers few clear-cut answers. This chapter concentrates on the 
social role of business as Identified In the business and society 
literature and as It relates to the problem of the social control of 
business. 
A cla1mq which Is endorsed hereq is that this problem of the social 
control of business Is at the core of the business and society 
discipline. Earlier business and society writing Is preoccupied with 
the social responsibilities of business. More recentlyq there seems 
to be an emphasis on the social control of business with social 
responsibility viewed as an aim of social control mechanisms. 
Howevery the notion of social responsibility in business cannot be 
ignored. In examining the social role of businessp this chapter looks 
at the meaning of social responsibility In business in theory and In 
practice, and the arguments for and against It. In other wordsl the 
view Is taken that If business has a social rolev it therefore has 
social responsibilities. 
But what are these responsi bi 11 ti es? For what I ssues and to what 
degree Is business responsible? Is profit maximisation sufficient or 
even necessary? These questions are addressed In the part of this 
chapter which looks at the meaning of social responsibility In busi- 
ness. A model Is proposed which Identifies four different levels of 
social responsibility; so In theory at least, the extent of social 
responsibility can be Identified. Howeverg while both the stakeholder 
and social cost approaches offer some scope in Identifying social 
responsibility Issuesj It Is difficult to see how management should 
decide between conflicting social Issues, and determine Issue 
priority. This assumes, of course, that one favours or even 
acknowledges managerial discretion on social Issues. 
Soci al, responsi bi 11 ty In practi ce can be consi dered In terms of mana- 
gerial creeds. These are examined In part 4.4. Three contributions 
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are considered, Identifying two or three different creeds or, If one 
prefersq Ideologies. 3: mportantly, It Is recognised that managerd do 
not, regardless of creedy view themselves as not having social respon- 
sibilities. Some, If not the majority howeverg view profit maximisa- 
tion as fulfilling their social responsibilities. Although this 
position may seem rather unsophisticated, there are sound philosophi- 
cal arguments for supporting It - whether managers are aware of them 
or not - as Friedman has shown. 
The final part of this chapter examines the arguments for and against 
social responsibility In business (against In the sense of against 
going beyond profit maximisation). These philosophical arguments 
against social responsibility In business are shown to be based In the 
competitive model of capitalism as discussed in Chapter Three. Yetq 
In keeping with Chapter Three, it Is recognised that this model of 
capitalism lacks verisimilitude. This In Itself provides a strong 
counter-argument to the arguments against social responsibility. 
There are also the arguments for social responsibility of the 'moral 
minimumlo enlightened self-interest and the long-term profitability 
and survival of the firm, and the extent of corporate power. It Is 
recognised that In practice managers will to some degree be respon- 
sible for social Issues because they have discretion and because of 
human nature. 
The extent of corporate power Is an argument for social responsibility 
because It Is suggested that this power needs to be tempered by self- 
regulation. If this Is not achieved then governments may step In and 
take away corporate power and perhaps also threaten the market economy 
system. So, social responsibility Is partly achieved by self- 
regulationg Indeedq many practitioners view social responsibility as 
being about their voluntary (and perhaps arbitrary) efforts to be good 
corporate cl ti zens. But the extent of corporate power Is also the 
reason for the social control of business, as part 4.2 shows. Chapter 
Five examines the mechanisms for the social control of business 
including self-regulation and the market. The latter mechanismp of 
course, Involves consumer sovereigntyp with ethical purchase behaviour 
and consumer boycotts In particular being an Interesting attempt at 
the social control of businessq or at least making business aware of 
its social responsibilities. Firstly, howeverg it Is necessary to 
consider the social role of business, the basis for identifying the 
social responsibilities of business. 
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4.1 Business and Society 
4.1.1 Academic Perspectives on Business and Society 
The previous chapter showed that the competitive model of capitalism 
Is suspect. This raises an important question about the role of buSi- 
ness In society: What Is, and what should bey the relationship of 
business to society If It Is not determined by the market? 
Jones suggests business and society Is "an emerging discipline. " He 
notes that there Is a clearly identifiable body of literature about 
business and society - going back at least as far as 1952, with 
Galbraith's American Capitalism - as well as courses with this title 
(3). Powers and Vogel, In a more detailed analysis, claim "The belief 
that business education should Include the teaching of the social 
dimensions of corporate conduct has been commonplace for at least 
twenty years among those responsible for shaping the focus of the 
business school curriculum" (4); though this may not be the case with 
the European business schools. They also report a 1972 publication by 
George Steiner that examines one hundred courses on business and 
society (5). Meanwhile in the third edition of his business and 
society text, George Steiner (togetherp in this edition, with John F 
Steiner) observes that "this field has grown rapidly" (6), and, citing 
a number of sourcesp claims "the importance of the subject has risen 
significantly on the agenda of curriculum revision In schools" (7). 
Yet despite this rapid growth In the study of business and society and 
the consequent proliferation of publications In the area (8), there Is 
no ready answer to the question raised above. Consensus about the 
role of business In society is limited. There are a number of reasons 
for this; principally, the dominant anti-business attitude, the undue 
Influence of values and the scope of the issue. 
Firstlyq there is the problem of "where one is coming from" in writing 
about business and society; to borrow the expression from Rowan and 
Reason quoted earlier. The academic perspective on the relationship 
between business and society seems notably partial. Busi ness and 
society as an academic field does not concern Itself with the benefits 
to society of business, butp in the maing with the criticism of the 
role of business In society. Perhaps in view of the managerial bias 
In the other busýness diselplinesv as cited by Honour and Mainwaring 
and others (9), this to some extent redresses the balance. 
Howeverp the anti-business attitude evident in many writers' work In 
this field does seem to cloud the Issues. There Is the persistent 
assumption that there Is something gravely wrong with the position of 
business In society. For exampleg Sethi, In the Preface to the second 
edition of Up Against the Corporate Wallp writes In reply to the cri- 
ticism that he omitted success stories In business and society 
controversies: "The Instances of business failure to handle social 
controversies have been far greater In number and magnitude than the 
Instances of success" (10). This conveniently Ignores the fact that 
every dayp every business Is making decisions which are potentially 
controversial In that they Involve the allocation of resources In one 
particular way rather than a number of other possible ways. One must 
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at least presume that as there Is only controversy over a small pro- 
portion of the numerous business decisions made, these non- 
controversial decisions are at least accepted, If not successful. But 
the business and society literature Is characterised by observations 
on the failures of business. This seems a partial perspective unless 
one Is Ideologically opposed to capitalism. 
Recognising this partiality, one can at least understand the obser- 
vation made by Silk and Vogel: 
"There seems to be a widespread feeling among businessmen that 
the university system has had Its loyalties captured by forces 
hostile to the business system and that this accounts for much of 
the public's misunderstanding of business" (11). 
Criticisms of business predominate In the business and society litera- 
ture and there is a consequent tendency towards polemics rather than 
analvtI cal thought. Description of what Is and what could be seems 
confused with what might be and what should be. 
A second reason for the lack of consensus on the role of business In 
society Is the muddiness of the Issue. This muddiness is a result of 
the different values and different Ideological perspectives which wri- 
ters In the area permit to play too great a part in their work. One 
outstanding exception to this is Friedman's famous position on social 
responsibilityp on which Hellbroner comments: "In an area In which 
syrup flows freelyg there Is something astringent and bracing about 
Friedman's position" (12). In terms of clarityv Friedman's position 
on the role of business In society Is far superior to the well-meaning 
rhetoric which abounds elsewhere. So, for example, two key officers 
of the American National Council of Churches write: "corporate 
decision-makers should begin to consider the social Implications of 
their decisions as carefully and with as much weight as they do the 
economic ... life and death are more Important than profit and loss" 
(13). Simllarlyg Sadler, a British writer In the areav notes: "A 
trade-off has been made between economic efficiency and the quality of 
life, In favour of the latter" and "society has the right to require 
Industry (which Is part of Itself) to pursue social objectives" (14). 
Although well-meaningg such forthright expressions of what business 
should do - and they are not uncommon - add little to the analysi s of 
the role of business in society. And as Ackerman observesp they give 
no practical guidance to the manager to whom one Imagines they are 
addressed (15). 
But perhaps the most Important reason for the lack of consensus on the 
role of business Is the scope of the issue. The question on the role 
of business at the start of this section Is a big question Indeed. 
Although this thesis attempts In part to answer It9 the response must 
Inevitably be limited. Because of the scope of the I ssue 9 there are 
many di ff erent approaches to I ts analysi s. For example, what should 
the writer's position be on the nature of the state In society? 
Sturdivant Identifies five perspectives: libertarian, Marxistg 
pluralistg welfare state and cynical (16), and various perspectives 
were considered In Chapter Three. Alternatively, what should the 
writer's position be on the function of business organisations In 
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society? There is the Friedman view of the firm which defines Its 
function in economic terms aloneo while at the other extreme there is 
Bell's view of the corporation as a sociological Institution: 
"Corporations are Institutions for economising; but they are also ways 
of life for their members" (17). 
Analysis of the role of business In society Involves a great many dif- 
ferent Issues, positions and perspectives. So there are different 
approaches to the analysis. Yet a perspective can be taken without 
undue compromise between brevity and depth, and with minimum Inter- 
ference by anti-business attitudes and value or Ideological bias. 
This perspective Is considered In the next section. 
4.1.2 Social Control of Business - An Adequate Perspective 
The more analytical work In the business and society field tends to be 
that whichp while still concerned with the role of business in 
societyv adopts a focus on the problem of the social control of busi- 
ness. Indeed, there may even be a trend towards this focus. The 
earlier writings of the late sixties and early seventies seem pri- 
marily concerned with what business should do (the social respon- 
sibilities of business), while the later and current writings seem 
more concerned with how society can ensure business does as is 
required (the social control of business). Howeverv this Is only an 
Impression and should be seen as tentative (18). 
Steiner and Steiner observe on business and society: 
". that there Is no underlying theory Integrating the entire 
f;; ld, nor is there likely to be one In the foreseeable future. 
The field Is extremely diverse, complexq and fluldq and there is 
no consensus about Its precise boundaries" (19). 
Writing in a similar veing Jones suggests that while It may be some 
time before the elusive paradigm can be identified, It Is, howevery 
possible to postulate an Integrating framework. He then writes: 
"The central focus of the field can be refined further by Intro- 
ducing the notion of 'social control of businessIq defined as the 
means by which society directs business activity to useful ends. 
In essenseq the social control of business Is the core of the 
business and society field" (20). 
His framework will be considered later. Suf fI ce to note here 9 that the perspective of the social control of business does seem to be a 
meaningful focus. And other writers have Indicated this. For 
exampleg Beesley and Evans write about corporate social responsibility 
"as one element Ina strategy for the control of power and for stable 
progress" (21). 
This perspective Is also appropriate to the concern In the research 
with ethical purchase behaviour. As Jones notes "the field deals with 
two general questions relating to the social control of business: 
1. How compatible are the Outputs and processes of the economic 
system with the values of the cultural and political systems? (How appropriate are existing social control mechanisms? ) 
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2. How can the outputs and processes of the economic system be made 
more compati. ble wi th the values of the cultural and poll ti cal 
systems? (How can social control mechanisms be Improved? )" (22). 
This thesis addresses these questions In examining the role of con- 
sumer sovereignty as a social control mechanism and the potential for 
ethical purchase behaviour (23). The rest of this chapter considers 
why social control of business Is considered necessary and the notion 
of social responsibility In business. The following chapter examines 
the forms of social control of business and the potential for ensuring 
social responsibility In business through consumer sovereignty. This 
cannot be an all-embracing analysis of the role of business In 
societyp not even with the focus on the social control of business. 
The emphasis Is on the social control of business as It Indicates a 
role for consumer sovereignty. 
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4.2 The Requirement for Social Control of Business 
4.2.1 Digressions 
Business digressionsg Instances where business behaviour Is widely 
acknowledged as having been undesirable, provide an argument for the 
social control of business. 
In The Consumer and Corporate Accountabilityt Nader proposes federal 
chartering of businesses to ensure social control. 'Elsewhere In the 
book, business digressions are cited which would seem to support 'the 
need for this. They Include the advertising of cigarettes, the sale 
of flammable children's sleepwear, safety defects in automobilesp 
strip-mJnIng and claims without substance In advertising (24). Others 
refer to ITT's abortive coup attempts In Chile, the Illegal corporate 
contributions to the campaign to re-elect President Nixon as revealed 
In Watergateg the manufature of napalm, Investments In South Africa 
and General Motorst 'investigation' of Ralph Nader following the 
publication of Unsafe At Any Speed (25). 
Howeverp Identifying digressions requires considerable caution. While 
the Interference In the democratic process revealed In Watergate might 
be widely acknowledged as a business digression, there Is less 
agreement aboutp say, the advertising of cigarettes or the manufacture 
of napalm. Indeed, on the latter issueg Vogel observes that during 
the boycott of Dow Chemical's Saran Wrap, In protest at Dow's manufac- 
ture of napalm, the purchase of Saran Wrap became, In ef feet 9a 
referendum on the war (26). Similarlyg there might be less agreement 
on safety defects In automobiles than Nader supposes, because of the 
additional cost that safety features can entail. And, as Simon et al 
observev requests received by Institutions to Invest ethically may 
come not only from those concerned about shareholdings In companies 
that make DDT9 pollute or fall to employ minorities but also from 
those concerned about shareholdings In companies that trade with 
Eastern Europe or manufacture the Pill (27). In other words9 while 
digressions do point to the requirement for the social control of 
businessg there will be differences of opinion as to whether a par- 
ticular Issue constitutes a digression. 
There will, though, be less disagreement about digressions that are 
widely viewed as atrocities. As Heilbroner notesq efforts to reallse 
the social control of business are often a consequence of such 
digressions: "Atrocities are not, of courseq the only, or perhaps even 
the central Issue with regard to the problem of corporate respon- 
sibility. But they serve to give life to questions that otherwise 
tend to become too abstract to command the thoughtful attention they 
require" (28). So as Hay et al noteg the thalidomide case opened the 
door for quite stringent regulations of drugs (29). 
In the Name of Profit, by Hellbroner and others, is largely a catalo- 
gue of business digressions. In his contributiong 'Controlling the 
Corporation', Heilbroner suggests the digressions described have simi- 
larities to the recent My Lai massacre In Vietnam: "For like My Lai, 
the Incidents In this book are atrocities. Moreoverg In one case as 
In the otherg the atrocities are not merely hideous exceptions butp 
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ratherv discovered cases of a continuing pattern of misbehavlqur" 
(30). Referring to Libby's sale of cyclamate-sweetened fruit overseas 
following a United States ban on cyclamates, he writes: "What we have 
here Is a business version of the principle behind the Vietnam War - 
the Imposition of casualties on other peoples In the name of some 
tenetj such as freedom or profits as the case may be. Not that Libby 
is the only adherent to this principle" (31). 
Digressions provide one argument for the social control of business. 
But as Hellbroner observed In the quote aboveo they may not be the 
central I ssue. Digressions point to the underlying problem, power 
, w! thout accountabi 11 ty. 
4.2.2 Power and Accountability 
Sethi writes: "The twentieth-century corporation has replaced the 
church as the domi nant soci al I nsti tuti on In the 11 ves of ci ti zens of 
the Industrialized nations. Like the white man's religions of a 
bygone eraq the white man's economic Institutions cast a long shadow 
on the rest of the world" (32). Digressions by business merely 
illustrate the extent of corporate power and why this Is undesirable. 
Bell observes: 
"Corporate powerg clearly, Is the predominant power In the 
socletyv and the problem Is how to limit It. The concern for 
public policy, summed up In the phrase "social responsi bill typ" 
derives from the growing conception of a communal society and the 
controls which a polity may have to impose on economic ventures 
that generate unforeseen consequences far beyond the Intentionsp 
or powers of control, of the Initiating parties" (33). 
Hel lbroner makes the pol nt even more forcefully. He observes that If 
people are asked what Is bad about corporationsp they will refer to 
the rape of the environment or the abuse of the consumer: "The chances 
are the answer will have something to do with smoke or sludge, or with 
faulty brakes or poisonous vichyssoise" (34). (Interestingly, he does 
also note that perceptions of corporate abuses change over time - 
pollution was not a concern when Industry was providing much needed 
material progress and employment. And, as a few others also commenty 
much environmental despollation cannot be entirely the responsibility 
of the firm when It results from the careless behaviour of consumers 
(35). ) Yet although such digressions are often cited in answer to 
questions about what Is bad about corporationsp the Issue Is about 
power: 
"Thus when corporati ons rape the envi ronment or abuse us as 
gul nea pi gs , suddenly we awaken to the reall ti es of our I ndi vi - 
dual powerlessness and of Our dependence on thel r smooth and 
presumably benign functioning. Then our frustrations and resent- 
ments surface with a rushl in the demand that corporate power be 
brought to heel and that corporate officials be made accountable" 
(36, Hellbroner's emphasis). 
Of course, the quotation from Mill's The Power Elite In the Preview to 
Chapter Oneg likewise emphasises the powerlessness of the Individual. 
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Hei lbroner then notes that the problem Is about how thi s power may be 
controlledv and solutions to this problemp from Heilbroner and others, 
are considered later. Yet thl s problem Is not so much a matter of 
corporate power per se, but the legitimacy of that power. This Is 
even recognised by practitioners. Sir Frederick Catherwood, as 
Managing Director of John Laing and Son Ltd. t observed at a British 
Institute of Management (BIM) conference on social responsibility 
"that alone of the great social Institutions In our western democra- 
cies, the company manager has no democratic base for his authority" 
(37). 
Vogel Interprets the American counter-corporate movement as an "effort 
on the part of cl ti zens to expand thel r defi nI ti on of poli ti cal con- 
duct to Include the policies and decision-making processes of the 
large business corporation" (38). In so doingg they demand the public 
scrutiny and accountability of business, to the same extent as govern- 
ment institutions. The basis for this demand Is what Vogel terms 'the 
crisis of corporate legitimacy'. Berger also sees the criticism of 
business as a problem of corporate legitimacy: "if the American people 
no longer believe In the rightness of business, the private sector 
faces a crisis of legitimacy" (39). This Is fundamental to 
understanding the social control of business and contemporary concern 
with this, for legitimacy, as "the social justification of power" 
(40), Is precisely what the methods for the social control of business 
attempt to achieve. It Is when these methods or forms of control are 
perceived to be Inadequate that corporate legitimacy Is questioned. 
As wl 11 be seen later 9 soluti ons to the problem of corporate power do 
not necessarily Involve an end to the corporation in its current form. 
Vogel (with Silk) In a later publication observes that "talk of the 
business corporation as facing a "crisis of legitimacy" does not imply 
that there exists any significant controversy as to whether it should 
exist. " They continue by suggesting this crisis of legitimacy means 
corporate leaders are faced with two basic questions: "By what right 
do you who manage these huge corporations exercise your power? And 
what means do we have to ensure that corporate power will be exercised 
In accord with some generally accepted notion of the public Interest? " 
(41). Answers to these questions are a prerequisite for legitimate 
corporate action. Yet they are not always evident. Consider 
Ackerman's analysis of corporate response to social demands. While 
quite comprehensiveg It somehow manages to overlook this Issue of 
legitimacy. In considering guidelines for strategy9 he suggests: 
"Top management should balance the numerous social demands 
pressing on the organization and the social goals It seeks. It 
should give priority to those areas that are most likely to have 
an Impact on the companyts business and should try to maintain a 
low profile on the others" (42). 
Such a suggestion Is of limited usefulness, If not naive,. While It 
may make sense not to overload the response processt by what right 
should management determine which social demands to respond to and, 
moreovert with what priority? Corporate action on social demands may 
not only be of questionable legitimacy but may also require justifica- 
tion In terms of the priority given to one action among a number of 
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possible actions. The problems of legitimacy and priority apply to 
all corporate action. 
In describing the concept of legitimacyp Berger writes that It Is the 
acceptance of power which Is Important: 
"Legitimacy ... concerns neither ethics or legality. A tyrant 
may exeral se power Ina manner both techni cally unlawful and 
ethically scandalous; but his power Is nonetheless legitimate as 
long as the people over whom It Is exercised accept It as right- 
ful. It Is their acceptance, not value judgements Imposed from 
the outside, that matters" (43). 
The grounds for corporate legitimacy have changed: corporate power has 
grown while, partly as a consequence, Its basis In property rights has 
been eroded. The scope of corporate power, as noted earlier In this 
sectionv is considerable. As Heilbroner observes: 
"The big corporation Is no longer a special case of business 
power and organisation; It is the normal form of business power 
and organisation ... Today many corporations have Incomes larger 
than the gross national products of some respectable nations" 
(44). 
This growth In size and power has brought with It the separation of 
ownership and control and, as a consequence, doubts about the legiti- 
macy of corporate action based on property rights alone. Most writers 
generally attribute the first recognition of this to the Berle and 
Means classic 1932 study (45)9 although Silk and Vogel suggest the 
creat3 on of US Steel as early as 1901 marked the beginning of a trend 
toward the replacement of owners by professional managers. They go on 
to quote Berle and Means' observation thatq 
"The di ssoluti on of the atom of property (the separation of for- 
mal ownership and effective control) destroys the very foundation 
on whi ch the economi a order of the past three centuri es has 
rested" (46). 
In a later workp Berle shows that much of American Industry Is oligo- 
polistiev and echoing Galbraith's earlier claim In American 
CaT)Italismp suggests In contrast to the competitive model of capita- 
11 sm v that competition is only a partial check on corporate power. 
Indeed, he suggests corporations are primarily checked by the require- 
ment for legitimacy rather than competition and the more commonly 
acknowledged constraints (47). A more recent empirical study by 
Blumberg confirmed his view of the scope of corporate power: 
"In 1973 the 1000 largest Industrials (ranked according to sales) 
accounted for about 72% of the sales, 86% of the employeesp and 
85% of the profits of all American Industrial corporations. 
Within this groupp the 200 largestv or the megacorporationsp 
represent the core of concentrated industrial power with about 
three-quarters of the total salesq assets, employees and profits 
of the entire group" (48). 
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He also concludes that this growth In power has led to a questioning 
of corporate legitimacy: 
"The I deologi cal foundati ons of the busi ness soci ety are bel ng 
severely shaken. Business Is no longer able to articulate Its 
objectives In a way that will command support. Many businessmen 
are no longer willing to assert profit maximization as the 
overriding goal of the corporation. Business Is In search of an 
Ideology that will embrace not only the drive for profit but the 
social responsibilities business has Increasingly assumed. With 
the erosion of confidence In the Ideological foundations of the 
business society the legitimacy of the corporation as an institu- 
tion has been challenged" (49). 
Yet again the argument can be seen to turn on the legitimacy of cor- 
porate action. Corporate power can be demonstrated by referring to 
the structural Importance of business In the economy, the resources 
business commands9 and this becomes all the more evident and 
disturbing when these resources are seen to be misused or some atro- 
city or digression forces a reluctant public to examine the Issue. 
The demand Is then that this power should only be exercised with ade- 
quate accountabi 11 ty. Only with assurances of accountability will 
corporate action then be able to claim legitimacy. 
If business can claim the right to Identify its social respon- 
sibilitiesq an Issue Blumberg dodges In the quote given abovev it must 
then administer them In accord with some sense of priority. This 
again is an Incredibly difficult Issue. As an alternative to further 
discussion of this In abstract terms9 consider Medawar's practical 
example. He asks whether It Is more 'responsible' for a company to 
Introduce Improved pollution control equipment and pass on the cost In 
the form of higher prices to consumersl or to allow more pollution and 
keep prices down (50). If, for argument's sake, this was a privately 
owned power utility, would one then wish that they could establish 
such a priority, or, for that matterg should even be able to consider 
the Issue? 
Medawar's position on the problem of corporate power Is that while 
what Is Important Is what an organisation actually does with Its 
power, there should, as far as possiblep be full accountability for 
the use of that power: "those within corporate bodies with decision- 
making powers should proposep explain and justify the use of those 
powers to those without" (51). He claims abuse will occur If the 
powers of an organisation are not checked and advocates social audits. 
"The main reason - self-evident as a democratic Ideal - Is to ensure 
that power of all kinds Is exercised to the greatest possible extent 
with the understanding and consent of the public" (52). In other 
words,. power requires accountability. 
Thl s section has demonstrated the extent of corporate power and shown 
that the exercise of this power lacks legitimacy and a sufficient 
basis for Identifying priorities. Resolution of the problem would 
seem to demand greater accountabilityl social audits being one 
suggested mechani sm. Corporate accountability Is the objective of 
attempts at the social control of business. The forms of socl al 
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control of businessy both deliberate attempts and otherwiseq are exa- 
mined In the next chapter. Before considering them, it Is necessary 
to examine the Intention behind these attempts; that Isq social 
responsibility In business. Moreoverp social responsibility In busi- 
ness through the voluntary assumption of tresponsl bill ties', Is seen 
by many practitioners as an adequate solution to the problem of cor- 
porate power. Part 4.3, which followsp examines social responsibility 
as both a practitioner doctrine and as a goal for corporate accoun- 
tability measures. 
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4.3 The Meaning of Social Responsibility In Business 
4.3.1 A Diversity of Views 
Dow Votaw I llustrates the ambi gul ty surroundi ng the tem soci al 
responsibility; he suggests the term: 
Is a brilliant one: It means somethingg but not always the 
same thing, to everybody. To some It conveys the Idea of legal 
responsibility or liability; to others It means socially respon- 
sible behaviour in an ethical sense; to still others the meaning 
transmitted is that of tresponsible for', In a causal mode; many 
simply equate It with 'charitable contributions'; some take it to 
mean socially 'conscious' or 'aware'; many of those who embrace 
It most fervently see It as a mere synonym for tlegitimacylv In 
the context of tbelonging' or being proper or valid; a few see it 
as a sort of fiduciary duty Imposing higher standards of beha- 
viour on businessmen at large" (53). 
And as Sethi observes , because of the posi ti ve connotati ons of the 
term It has been co-opted by many di f ferent groups such that It has 
come to mean all things to all people and "language so debased becomes 
meaningless and simply breeds contempt" (54). So Si lk and Vogel 
suggest "The doctrine of 'corporate social responsibility' emerged In 
the United Statesp precisely because it Is seen by many businessmen as 
a way of reducing the role of government In their affairs" (55). 
of course ,It then comes as 11 ttle surpri se that corporati ons bell eve 
they act responsl bly. Indeed , some go to great lengths to publi ci se 
the fact (56). Yet as Medawar notes "virtually any government, trade 
uniong political party or other major organisation will have the same 
perceived vI ew of Its own propri ety - and can always be counted on to 
provide such evidence of its activities as will support these claims" 
(57). He then suggests that because the claim to be acting respon- 
sibly Is 'natural', It should also be as natural to be suspicious of 
such claims, not least because they are so universally made and there 
Is little to distinguish them In content. One might then conclude 
that responsl bill ties, so professed, should go hand In hand with 
accountability. 
While corporate social responsibility may be seen to have a number of 
different meanings, they are, as Beesley and Evans note, based on the 
recognition of the growth of corporate power and the consequent 
"perception of a relative shift from government to companies as the 
source of social Improvement and the means to promote specific items 
of social welfare" (58). So Farmer and Hogue define corporate social 
responsibility In terms of: 
"4.. actions that, when judged by society In the future, are seen 
to have been of maximum help In providing necessary amounts of 
desired goods and services at minimum financial and social costsy 
distributed as equitably as possible" (59). 
Unfortunately, unless one Is endowed with foresightp this definition 
offers little guidance to practitioners. Howeverv It does indicate 
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the usefulness of the social costs concept In Identifying social 
responsibilities. This Is explored In the next section. 
4.3.2 The Social Costs and Stakeholder Approaches to Defining 
Responsi bi 11 ti es 
In explaining an economic solution to pollution, Hoskins observes that 
"most of the costs and benefits associated wi th resource use are con- 
centrated upon the person doing the producing or consuming" (60). 
However "market prices do not always accurately reflect the total 
costs of production and consumption to society ... As a result, the 
private cost associated with his use of resources differs from the 
social cost" (61). These social costs, or externalitiesg can, If 
thought of In such economic terms, provide a criterion for corporate 
decision-making. 
But while pollution might be something to which costs can be ascribed 
- albeit with great difficulty, as Hoskins, Marlin and others 
acknowledge (62) - It Is far more difficult to ascribe a cost to the 
human suffering that results from, say, the manufacture of napalm. 
Furthermoreq as Ackerman notes, there Is the tendency to view social 
expectations of business as only legitimate when government requires 
compliance and will exact penalties otherwise; thereby "a social Issue 
Is converted Into an economic one and so can be managed just like any 
other business problem. " Yet this Ignores the history of a social 
issue which Involves a "zone of discretion" where corporate respon- 
siveness Is most Important, but Is neither voluntary nor required 
(63). In other wordsp social costs are not always immediately 
apparent or willingly recognised. Despite these problems9 this con- 
cept of social costs is of value in determining social respon- 
sibilities. It also features In the argument for ethical purchase 
behaviourg as later discussed, for social costs may be at least par- 
tially converted Into private costs via ethical purchase behaviour. 
In Social Costs and Benefits of Businessq Klein points to the problems 
In Identifying who bears the costs of externalities (64), and 
Schwartzq In his examination of corporate governance and accoun- 
tability observes that: 
the governed are not the stockholders of the corporationg at 
1;;; t not the stockholders alone, but Include all those signifl- 
cantly affected by large corporations. Thusp the proper consti- 
tuencies Include employees, customersp and Indeed the public as a 
whole who breathe the air and drink the water contaminated by 
corporate activity - the group sometimes referred to as the 
"neighbors" of the corporation" (65). 
Hence the meaning of social responsibility can Involve the respon- 
sibilities of the corporation to the various constituencies which may 
benefit and suffer from Its effects. These constituencies are also 
known as stakeholders. ThIsp for Ansoff et alp means "an Interest 
group which has expectations of the firm and which attempts to 
Influence the fI rmts objectivesp the way these objectives are achieved 
or the conditions under which the f1m operates" (66). More compre- 
hensivep and less managerially partisan, is the definition by 
Sturdivant: 
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"The stakeholder concept suggests that stockholders are by no 
means the only corporate constituents who have a vested Interest 
In the conduct and performance of a given firm. Stakeholder 
groups consist of people who are affected by corporate policies 
and practices and who see themselves as having a stake In the 
business" (67). 
Typically four major constituencies are identified. One practitioner 
observes: "Our corporate statement of philosophy Identifies the four 
major publics that we serve: our customersp our employees, our share- 
holdersp and the communities In which we do business. " He continues 
by suggesting there Is no conflict In serving all four constituencies 
because their Interests are mutually entwined. This philosophy Is 
justified In terms of enlightened self-interest (68). Yet while the 
stakeholder concept may Identify who bears social costst what criteria 
are available when there Is a conflict between the interests of two 
constituencies? Powers and Vogel write: 
"In Its more sophisticated forms, corporate responsibility has 
come to mean that the Interests of the several corporate consti- 
tuencies are no longer seen as constraints on corporate activity 
which must be managed; Instead these constituencies are seen as 
stakeholdersp groups which have legitimate Interestsp and at 
least some of whose claims should be met and reconciled in the 
management process. But nowhere, In our view, have there been 
developed adequate criteria for managerial decision by means of 
which a manager can tmake sense' of the corporate responsibility 
concept In the regular managerial process" (69). 
This Issue Is also raised by Jones. He defines- corporate social 
responsibility as "the notion that corporations have an obligation to 
constituent groups In society other than stockholders and beyond that 
prescribed by law or union contract" (70). But he then asks tHow can 
corporate managers decide what behaviour is socially responsible? ' 
Jones rejects the use of public policy decisions as a basis for cor- 
porate deal sion-making, as suggested by Beesley and Evans (71)9 for 
example. He suggests social responsibility should be viewed as a pro- 
cessp with full consideration given to the social Impact of corporate 
decisions. Although he Is not clear about the criteria for decision- 
makingg his example would suggest that the company should formally 
incorporate the views of the constituency most directly affected. 
Buty of coursep Identifying this constituency Is likely to be less 
than straightforward. 
Thl sIs close to the practi ti oner doctri ne of soci al responsi bi 11 ty 
referred In the previous section. For such a doctrine, as Jones also 
notesq Is "a form of self-control. " Indeed, Beesley and Evans 
advocate such a doctrine as a solution to the problem of corporate 
powerv In addition to external controls (regulation and the market) 
(73). Howeverg as discussed later, this does not resolve the problem 
of power without accountability. And If social responsibility is 
viewed as a doctrineq there Is still little Indication as to what 
issues business should be responsible for, and with what priorities. 
There Is still a further complication of how far such a responsibility 
should extend. An executive from Marks and Spencers neatly reveals 
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the difficulties faced by management In dealing with these three 
problems, of determining which Issues to respond top with what 
priorityq and the extent of the efforts made: 
"What are we expected to do? Improve product safetyl employ 
school leaversy Introduce pension schemes, prevent redundancies, 
Increase productive Investmentv recycle waste products, engage 
ethnic minoritiesg Improve welfare facilities, conserve energyq 
repackage, depackageg open up the board room to the unions as 
well as to consumer representatives (something the Co-op has been 
doing for agesl) or cut prices? And If we are socially respon- 
sible and try to satisfy all these demands as far as honourg com- 
passion and the cash flow will allow, then customers have a 
perfect right to ask - who the hell's minding the shop? " (72). 
The next section considers how far business responsibilities should 
extend. 
4.3.3 The Extent of Corporate Social Responsibility 
As Rockefeller observes "Put quite simplyp the difficult question 
inherent In the challenge of corporate responsibility Is: How far 
should business go In helping to resolve the problems of our society? " 
(74). Farmer and Hogue propose a continuum with four principal 
degrees of responsibility: profit maximisation, where social goals are 
Incidental; profit growth, where social goals are also Important; 
social goals, with a break-even on money; and social goalsq with money 
losses acceptable (75). While this Is clear In Itself, It does not 
define corporate responsibilities, but merely Identifies possible cor- 
porate goals. Beyond profit maximisation, defining corporate respon- 
sibilities Is extremely difficult. Hellbroner asks: 
"Should a business be held responsible for the social consequen- 
ces of Its profitable products? Are antipersonnel weapons, fast 
cars, electronic surveillance equipment, detergents, pesticides, 
and the like, just "economic commodities"? Is business respon- 
sible for the human consequences of arranging work In boring and 
monotonous ways In order to achieve Its lawful profit? Is busi- 
ness supposed always to support the policies of Its national 
goverment by producing goods that the government orders, even If 
It disapproves of these policies? May business legitimately seek 
to alter goverment policies In ways that will enhance its 
profits? " (76). 
Such questions point to the difficulty In putting boundaries around 
corporate power. Howeverg some resolution of the problem Is possible 
by distinguishing between negative Injunctions -a moral minimum 
requirement - and affirmative action. Simon et a19 In considering the 
responsibilities of the Individual, show that the choice portrayed by 
Friedmanp Levitt and others, between profit maximisation and creating 
munificence for all Is artificial, because there Is always the moral 
minimum of making profits In such a way as to minimise social Injury: 
"The negative Injunction to avoid and correct social Injury 
threads Its way through all morality. We call Ata "moral 
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minimump" Implying that however one may choose to limit the con- 
cept of social responsibilityt one cannot exclude this negative 
Injunction" (77). 
Competing obligations can override thisp but they do not deny the 
basic obligation to avoid harming others. Howeverl Simon et al do 
concede that there may be disagreement over what constitutes affir- 
mative action for public good, and disagreement over what constitutes 
social Injury. So, for example, some might see positive discrimina- 
tion In the recruitment of minorities as an affirmative actiong while 
others might see It as the correction of social Injury caused by years 
of Institutionallsed racism. 
Furthermore, by referring to Individual social responsibility, Simon 
et al show that there may be a responsibility for correcting or 
averting Injury even if one may not or may not appear to have caused 
or helped to cause the social Injury: "Life Is fraught with emergency 
situations In which a failure to respond Is a special form of viola- 
tion of the negative Injunction against causing social Injury: a sin 
of omission becomes a sin of commission" (78). Here they invoke what 
they term the 'Kew Gardens Principle'. This Is based on a tragic and 
disturbing emergency situation: the stabbing and agonisingly slow 
death of Kitty Genovese In the Kew Gardens part of New York while 
thirty-eight people watched or heard and did nothing. On analysis of 
this, they conclude that critical needl proximity, capability and 
being a last resort determine the responsibilities of the Individual 
in such situations. Moreoverg because of the danger of assuming 
someone else will act when others are present, or because one is 
trying to find out who Is the last resort, or because of the possibi- 
lity of pluralistic Ignorance - not acting because no one else Is and 
the situation therefore seeming less serious - there may be a 
situation where no one acts at all. This suggests the criterion of 
last resort Is less usefulq particularly In an organisational contextj 
and there should be a presumption In favour of taking action when the 
first three criteria are present. 
Their particular purpose In delineating Individual responsibility In 
this way Is to point to the responsibilities of Investors and the role 
of ethical Investment. So, for example, they might argue that 
Investing In companies operating in South Africa becomes a special 
form of the violation of the negative Injunction against causing 
social Injuryp through Inaction (whereby omission becomes commission)p 
and by employing the above criteria of critical needp proximityv capa- 
bility and last resort. Such an analysis would suggest Investors In 
such companies should press for changes In company policy (79). 
Howeverv such a perspective Is equally useful In determining the 
responsibilities of managers. One can conclude that the extent of 
corporate social responsibility Is at least the 'moral minimum': 
"From the conclusion that all citizens, Individual and Institu- 
tional, are equally subject to the negative Injunction against 
social Injuryp It follows that there is a prima facie obligation 
on the part of business corporations to regulate their activities 
so that they do not Injure others and so that they correct what 
Injury they do cause" (80). 
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Simon et al then continue by Identifying four different categorie: 3 or 
meanings of corporate responsibility. These are: 
1 Self-regulation in the avoidance of social Injury (the negative 
injunction). 
2. The championing of political and moral causes unrelated to the 
corporation's business activitlesq perhaps Including some gifts 
of charity. 
Affirmative action extending beyond self-regulation but falling 
short of the championing of causes, such as cooperation with 
goverment In the training of the hard-core unemployed. 
Internal reforms and changes In corporate structure affecting the 
voting rights of shareholdersq or the prerogatives of management, 
or Increased disclosure. 
The last category relates more to corporate accountability than to 
responsibilityp although a great deal of the British writing on social 
responsibility Is concerned with such Issues of accountability as 
employee participation on Boards, the 'fifth directive', or respon- 
sibilities to shareholders (81). Putting this category asidep 
howeverv one Is left with a continuum describing three different 
degrees of corporate social responsibility, from self-regulationg to 
affirmative actiong to the championing of political and moral causes. 
Of coursep a fourth category could be added where the negative Injunc- 
tion Is Ignored and one has corporate irresponsibility. 
Yet thl s model Is not easy to combi ne wi th that by Farmer and Hogue 9 
described above. A composite model relating goals (Famer and Hogue) 
and responsibilities (Simon et al) would be useful, as the Farmer and 
Hogue model falls down In Its Inadequate definition of respon- 
sibilitlesq while the Simon et al model suffers from too little con- 
sideration of corporate goals. The problem Is the uncertainty about 
the role of profit: Is profit a prerequisite for corporate social 
responsibility or is social responsibility necessary for profit? 
Vogel, Beesley and Evansl Chamberlain and many others (82) argue that 
profitability and responsibility are on the opposite sides of a cost 
equation: 
"It Is within the parameters of the law and the marketplace that 
firms conduct their business with varying degrees of respon- 
sibility ... the more profitable a company or the more secur 'e 
Its 
market position, the more able are Its managers to consider the 
Impact of the company on the welfare of Its various constituen- 
cies. From this perspectivet profitability can be regarded as a 
necessary condition of responsible social performance. But It Is 
by no means a sufficient one. Some firms have compiled records 
of outstanding economic performance while remaining Insensitive 
to social concerns" (83). 
As a practitioner at the Conference Board meetings on corporate social 
responsi bi 11 ty put I t: "It Is true of compani es as ItIs true of man 
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that It Is easier to be moral when you are successful than when your 
back Is to the wall" (84). While Drucker observes: 
"The first "social responsibility" of business is then to make 
enough profit to cover the costs of the future. If this "social 
responsibility" Is not met, no other "social responsibility" can 
be met" (85). 
Others, howeverl take a different view (86). As Henry Ford put It: 
"There Is no longer anything to reconcile, If there ever wasq between 
the social conscience and the profit motive ... Improving the quality 
of society ... Is nothing more than another step In the evolutionary 
process of taking a more far-sighted view of return on Investment" 
(87). While Marlin's study of the US Iron and steel Industryp paper 
industry and petroleum-refining Industry, showed that the best 
pollution-control performance was achieved by the more profitable com- 
panies. This she claims Is because "Good managements are likely both 
to earn higher profits and to be more careful In protecting the 
environment" (88). But although this shows profitability and respon- 
sibility are not mutually exclusive, It may be this is merely support 
for Vogel's argument that profitability is a prerequisite for respon- 
sibility. 
The view that responsibility comes first Is based on enlightened self- 
Interestj a longer-tem perspective. It Is surnmed up In Sethi's claim 
that "It is a fallacy that business can prosper - or, indeedl even 
exist - without regard to broader social concerns" (89). And as Haas 
argues, there are three rationales for corporate social 
responsibility: moral obligationg long-term self-interest and the 
necessity to preserve the private sector - longer-term self-interest 
(90). Put otherwise, adequate profitability Is necessary for long- 
term survivall not profit maximisation. 
Perhaps the I ssue can best be resolved by 
responsibility up to some minimum level Is 
Interests of business, but beyond thisv while 
it can onlv be possible given adequate profital 
suggest four positions on the extent 
responsibility: 
accepti ng that sool al 
In the best long-term 
It mi ght be desi rable , 
Dility. This would then 
of corporate social 
1. Profit maximisation and social irresponsibility. 
2. Profit maximisation tempered by the 'moral minimum' through self- 
regulation. 
Profl t as a necessary but not suf fl ci ent goal , wi th affi mati ve 
action extending beyond self-regulation. 
Profit as a necessary but not sufficient goalg with social 
responsibility extending beyond self-regulation and affirmative 
action to Include the championing of political and moral causes 
unrelated to the corporation's business activities, perhaps even 
Including gifts of charityg but only as long as profitability 
perml ts. 
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The notion of social Irresponsibility will be explained In the sub- 
sequent discussion of the Friedman position on social responsibilfty. 
Suffice to note here, anything less than the 'moral minimum' Is viewed 
as social Irresponsibility. It is also worth noting that profit need 
be interpreted broadly. It refers not so much to the declared profit 
in the annual report but to the true 'bottom line' of financial suc- 
cess* As the discussion at the BIM conference on social respon- 
si bi 11 ty I ndi cates ,ItIs not so much the loss of profl ts per se that 
represents the threat from socially responsible actionsg but the 
threat of takeover. In other words, In Britain at leastq the City 
calls the tune (91). 
Yet despite this model, a problem for the practitioner remains: 
"Every manager faces an area, everyone of us In a whole series of 
decisionsv between the strict letter of the law, which of course 
we all comply with, and on the other hand the maximum possible 
profit for this year's balance sheet. We are I nall ned to the 
latter because we are afraid of being taken over If we don't. 
Somewhere In this area we make an ethical judgement ... Are we 
entitled to put In some margin as responsible citizens as well as 
managers? " (92). 
This area of discretion Is discussed In the next section. 
4.3.4 The 'Friedman Misconception' 
Sir Frederick Catherwood's affirmative reply to this question of 
discretion would not have the support of Milton Friedmang nor Hayek. 
There Is little confusion In the competitive model of capitalism on 
the Issues for which business has a social responsibility or the 
extent of this responsibility. Hayek writes: 
"00. If we want effectively to limit the powers of corporations 
to where they are beneficialg we shall have to confine them much 
more than we have yet done to one specific goal, that of the pro- 
fitable use of the capital entrusted to the management by the 
stockholders ... the fashionable doctrine that their policy 
should be guided by 'social considerationst is likely to produce 
most undesirable results" (93). 
Social responsibility is viewed as a fundamentally subversive 
doctrine. Friedman argues that to suggest corporations should have a 
social responsibility Is to fail to understand the way In which the 
game of the market Is and must be played: 
there Is one and only one social responsibility of business 
- 
ýo 
use Its resources and engage In activities designed to 
I nerease I ts profi ts so long as It stays wi thl n the rules of the 
game, which Is to sayq engages In open and free competitionp 
without deception or fraud" (94). 
Friedman Is concerned as to how a corporate official Is to know how to 
act if not guided by profit maximisation - as a surrogate for the 
self-interest of the entrepreneur of Adam Smith's day. He asks 9 
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although these questi ons are overlooked by many of hi s cri ti es , "If 
businessmen do have a social responsibility other than making maximum 
profits for shareholders, how are they to know what It Is? Can self- 
selected private Individuals decide what the social Interest Is? " 
(95). So Friedman's position Is more than the blind self-interest 
many of his critics argue againstq It Includes the recognition of cor- 
porate power and the need for that to be appropriately limited. 
His position Is attractive In both Its clarity, simplicity and ele- 
gancep and also In Its solution of the problem of the social control 
of business. Given such a positiong profit maximisation within the 
rules of the game would give little discretion to managers. There 
would be no need for the confusing and potentially dangerous - as well 
as possibly illegitimate - ethical judgement referred to at the end of 
the last section. Yet social policies would not necessarily be 
precludedp for they may well contribute to long-term profitability. 
So, for examplej one could, within the Friedman position, justify when 
building a new plant the fitting of pollution control equipment that 
exceeds the minimum legal requirement, but Is In anticipation of 
changes In the legislation and the recognition of the higher costs of 
fitting retrospectively. 
Heilbroner admires Friedman's positiong although not reconciled to It. 
He asks: Shouldn't stockholders be allowed to do with their money as 
they see fit? But, more importantly: Should corporations be allowed 
to 'play God'? 
"When the Dow Chemical Company announces that It Is making Napalm 
not for profit but for patriotism, I am sure that Its directors 
swell with feelings of social responsibility; and when It discon- 
tinues the manufacture of Napalm In response to public protestp I 
have no doubt that Its officers again experience the flow of 
social benefaction. But I am not sure that such motives provide 
the best grounds on which social decisions should be made. Forg 
Indeed, when Friedman asks on what basis the businessman Is 
qualified to make good social decisions, he Is asking a question 
that Is not easy to answer. Why should we entrust the disposi- 
tion of large sums to men whose sympathies and prejudices, not to 
say lphilosophyly are different from minel or from yours? How 
far does the philanthropic Impulse properly go? By whose say-so 
are boards of directors authorised to play God? " (96). 
Yet, claims Hellbronerl businessmen are less than keen on the Friedman 
position, not because It potentially limits their power but because 
they are averse to such explicit recognition of their self-interest. 
They "recoil from the Implication that they are "only" moneymakers ... 
capitalists do not like to act like the creatures of pure self- 
Interest that they are supposed to be" (97). Hellbroner also Iden- 
tifles three major failings of Friedmants position. 
Firstly, there is little evidence of pure profit maximisation In the 
real world because this would not be socially responsible, but 
socially Irresponsible. Hellbroner suggests Friedman's positiong 
does not squarely face up to the consequences of Its own 
F1 rst Rule. For If corporati ons In fact sought to maxi mi se the 
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profits of their stockholdersl we would find General Motors 
lowering the pri ce of Its cars enough to dri ve Chrysler and even 
Ford to the wall ... All this would be entirely legitimate and 
perfectly consistent with profit-maximising, but It would of 
course be generally viewed as an exercise of supreme corporate 
irresponsibility" (98). 
Thl s, of course , explal ns why the fI rst posi tI on on the extent of 
social responsibility continuum described In the last section, Is pro- 
fi t maid mi sati on and socl al I rresponsi bi 11 ty. 
Secondlyp Friedman's position assumes that the rules of the game can 
be established without cheating, In spite of the Influence of busi- 
ness. Hellbroner cannot accept the assumption that government makes 
the rules Independently of business or that business will willingly 
acquiesce to such rules If It has no part In the making of them. He 
cites previous regulatory attempts which show that the rule-making 
agencies of government are almost Invariably captured by the 
Industries which they are set-up to control. A pol nt whi ch the 
Friedmans acknowledge In Free to. Choose, but then use to justify 
deregulation. So on this pointg Heilbroner concludes that Friedman's 
proposals are not "anything more than a license for business to define 
its "social responsibility" behind the respectable screen of a govern- 
ment frontg after which It will indeed more or less live up to Its own 
standards" (99). 
Yet perhaps the most Important argument against Friedman's position Is 
Hellbroner's third point. Here he observes that such a view of social 
responsibility rests on a curious conception of modern capitalism. 
One must be aware of the context in which such a position Is advanced: 
a restatement of the tenets of classical capitalism - the competitive 
model of capitalism described In the last chapter. Can Fri edman 
realistically claimp using such a modelp that the rights of share- 
holders should pre4ominate? Such a position assumes property rights 
which hardly seem applicable when the 'ownership' exercised by the 
shareholder over his corporation Is so different to that of the small 
businessman over his property. The stockholder Is no longer a signi- 
ficant source of venture capital "merely a passive holder of cer- 
tificates of varying degrees of risk and potential return" (100)p with 
little knowledge of the real performance of this' corporation. Surely 
the other stakeholders deserve some return? 
Bell's rejection of Friedman's argument also questions shareholder 
ownership. He asks: "Is the corporation primarily an Instrument of 
"owners" - legally the stockholders - or Is It an autonomous 
enterprise whicho despite Its particular history, has become - or 
should become - an Instrument for service to society In a system of 
pluralist powers? " (101). He concludes that "today ownership Is 
simply a legal fiction" and while "the corporation may be a private 
enterprise institution ... it Is not really a private property 
Institution. " Hence "One can treat stockholders not as "owners" but 
as legitimate claimants to some fixed share of the profits of a cor- 
poration - and to nothing more" (102). Hellbroner goes on to suggest 
who should be viewed as more legitimate claimants: 
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"That these wholly Ineffectual Individuals should have a "right" 
to the earnings of the company from which they have already been 
given the privilege of extracting some dividends and gambling for 
capital gainsv seems based on a philosophy of ownership that has 
long since lost all accord with the facts. In the end , the 
profi ts of the corporati on are extracted from the sweat of I ts 
labour force, the shrewdness and Intelligence of Its managementp 
and the desires - pristine or manipulated - of the public ... 
labourt management, and the public at large would seem to have a 
far more legitimate claim than stockholders" (103). 
Recognition of corporate response and responsibilities to a number of 
stakeholders as well as the stockholdersp clearly weakens Friedman's 
posi ti on. Banks suggests the "most trenchant scholarly rebuttal to 
Friedman" (104) Is Jacoby's Social Environment Modelp of which "The 
most Important characteristic ... Is the explicit recognition that 
corporate behavior responds to political as well as to market forces" 
(105). Although Jacoby Is less forthcoming himself: , 
"Unfortunatelyl Friedman failed to add that social involvement Is 
consistent with self-Interestv and that corporate managers need a 
sophisticated understanding of business-societal relationships In 
order to operate on that principle. Those economists and busi- 
nessmen who assert that the purpose of business Is "business" and 
not social "do-gooding" are as much in error as the radicals of 
the New Left who would compel business to concentrate on social 
Improvement" (106). 
Jacoby would do better If he concentrated on the role of other stake- 
holders as Implied In his modelq rather than being less than gracious 
to Friedman and suggesting he has not recognised that long-term profit 
maximisation may demand consideration of social goals. As Steiner and 
Steiner observe: "If the words "rules of the game" are modernizedp 
there may not be as much difference between the Friedman view and 
those who argue for social responsibilities" (107). Similarly, 
Bradshaw explains: 
"Friedman overlooks two things: Firstj the businessman does not 
exist solely In a world of cold, gray economics; he also exists 
In a real world where people's needs go far beyond their economic 
needs. He Is a man before he Is a businessman. He has pressures 
on him from within himself ... He also has pressures on him from 
without becausep as a businessmang he is a part of the power 
structure ... he must di rect hi s porti on of that power to 
accomplish some of the broader alms of the society in which he 
lives. Second, Friedman overlooks the fact that the rules have 
been changing and are going to change at an explosive rate In the 
future" (108). 
Thl s fal lure to recogni se the context of corporate acti on Is ref erred 
to by Johnson as the tFrIedman Misconceptiont - "the view that the 
enterprise Is altogether and solely an economic organisationg divorced 
from Its sociocultural setting. " Though as he also notes "many others 
fall Into the error" (109). 
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So It can be seen that the argument that the soci al responsi bi 11 ty of 
busl ness Is to make a profi t01s more sophl sti cated than It mi ght at 
first appear. It Is more than simply asserting the property rights of 
shareholders and fulfilling their expectations of maximum returns on 
Investment. Both Friedman and Hayek, as prime exponents of this argu- 
mentq are concerned not only about these rights but also about mana- 
gers having an area of discretion in decision-making relating to 
social Issues. They ask 'How is a manager to know what his or her 
social responsibilities areV and 'What right has a manager to assume 
social responsibilities - by what mandateV 
Vall d though these concerns may be . they both I gnore human nature and 
the Inevitability of managerial discretion In practice. Wi thi n the 
classical economic model there Is scope for Friedman's position but 
even then one must be wary of business Influence when government 
intervention in the market is Inevitable. Moreever, as discussed In 
the last chapterg this model assumes that material progress Is the 
most Important goal of the economic system In bringing welfare for 
allv whereas latter-day affluence may suggest other goals are now more 
important. In other words , profi t may not be able to provi de the 
means for achieving today's social goals. Outside the classical eco- 
nomic modelq In the real world of mixed marketsq Friedman's argument 
is a misconception. 
Yet shareholders must be permitted some return. More Importantly, 
some control must be exercised over managerial discretion on social 
Issues. There must then be social control of business. The mecha- 
nisms for social control of business - actual and potential - are exa- 
mined In the next chapter. Prior to looking at these howeverv it Is 
worth considering management practice and perspectives on social 
responsibility Issues. These are examined In part 4.49 which follows. 
The chapter then concludes with an assessment of the arguments for and 
against corporate social responsibility. 
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4.4 Management Creeds and Social Responsibility 
4.4.1 Profit Maximisingy Trusteeship and 'Quality of Life' Management 
Included within those that fall Into the error of the 'Friedman 
Misconception' would be a substantial proportion of managers, as Indi- 
cated by the various managerial creeds Identified by Hay et al, Silk 
and Vogelp and Steiner and Steiner. Although this seems to conflict 
with Hellbroner's suggestion that Friedman's position Is not popular 
with managers, who do not wish to be seen as creatures of pure self- 
Interestj it can be seen that the managerial creeds espousing a 
Friedmanite position do not do so in a pure sense. 
Hay et al Identify three phases of corporate social responsibility. 
They then suggest that each of these phases also represents different 
managerial values that may be currently found. Phase one , or type 
onev is profit maximising management. Here "the Individual's drive 
for maximum profits and the regulation of the competitive market place 
would Interact to create the greatest aggregate wealth for a nation 
and therefore the maximum public good" (110). Such a posi ti on Is 
based not only on economic logic, but also society's goals and values: 
the problem of economic scarcity at the time this phase was predomi- 
nant meant economic growth and the accumulation of aggregate wealth 
were primary goals; Calvinism stressed that the road to salvation was 
through hard work and the accumulation of wealth. 
Hay et al note that such a posi ti on follows the logi a of Mi lton 
Friedman: "... a corporate manager Is an agent of the stockholders and 
any diversion of resources from the task of maximising shareholder 
wealth amounts to spending the stockholders' money without their con- 
sent. Moreover ... government, not business, Is the institution best 
suited for solving social problems" (111). Typical managerial values 
are shown In Table 4.1. 
It Is suggested that the difficulty In maintaining this position 
results from the problem In drawing a line between spending the 
stockholders' money for charity and spending It In the enlightened 
self-interest of the firm. And It Is worth noting Blumberg's comment 
on this here. He observes that adhering to the neo-classical standard 
is difficult because the rules of the game have changed - with 
increasing governmental Intervention and changes In public attitudes. 
Both of these factors require responsey whether regarded as public 
relations techniques or socially responsible conduct. So "Although 
such behaviour may be picturesquely described as "good citizenship", 
or "long term profit-maximisation"p "enlightened self-interest"O or as 
defensive measures to defuse minority hostility or to prevent further 
government Interventiony they all Involve an acceptance of the costs 
Involved because of the conclusion that It is required for the long- 
run welfare of the firm" (113). In other words, the distinction bet- 
ween enlightened self-interest and charity may be very arbitrary, and 
corporate response may be equally arbitrarily defined - as public 
relations activities or socially responsible conduct. The poi nt Is 
that the changes In the rules of the game demand some sort of social 
response from businessp however such a response may be justified and 
defined. 
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Table 4.1 : Comparison of Managerial Values (112) 
PHASE 1 PHASE II PHASE III 
PROFIT MAXIMISING TRUSTEESHIP "QUALITY OF LIFE" 
MANAGEMENT MANAGEMENT MANAGEMENT 
Economic Values 
1. Raw self-interest 1. Self-interest 1. Enlightened self-interest 
2. Contributor's 2. Contributor's Interests 
Interests 3. Society's Interests 
"Whatts good for me "What's good for my "What's good for society is 
Is good for my country" company Is good for good for our company" 
our country" 
Profit maximiser Profit satisfier Profit Is necessary, but ... 
Money and wealth are Money is Important People are more important 
most Important but so are people than money 
"Let the buyer beware" "Let's not cheat the "Let the seller beware" 
(caveat emptor) customer" (caveat venditor) 
"Labor Is a commodity "Labor has certain "Employee dignity has to 
to be bought and sold" rights which must be be satisfied" 
recognised" 
Accountability of Accountability of Accountability of manage- 
management Is to the management Is to the ment is to the owners, 
owners owners and customers, contributorsp and society 
employeesp suppliers 
and other contributors 
Technological Values 
Technology Is very 
Important 
Social Values 
Technology Is important People are more important 
but so are people than technology 
"Employee personal "We recognise that "We hire the whole man" 
problems must be left employees have needs 
at home" beyond their economic 
needs" 
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Social Values (continued) 
"I'm a rugged 
Individualistj and I'll 
manage the business as 
I please" 
"I am an Individualist 
but I recognise the 
value of group 
participation" 
"Group participation Is 
fundamental to our 
success" 
"Minority groups are 
Inferior to whites. 
They must be treated 
accordingly" 
Envirormental Values 
"The natural environ- 
ment controls the 
destiny of man" 
Poll ti cal Values 
"That goverment Is 
best which governs 
least" 
Aesthetic Values 
"Minority groups have 
thei r place In soot ety 
and their place Is 
Inferior to mine" 
"Man can control and 
manipulate his 
environment" 
"Goverment is a 
necessary evil" 
"Minority groups are 
people like you and I are" 
"Man must preserve the 
environment" 
"Business and government 
must co-operate to solve 
society's problems" 
"Aesthetic values? "Aesthetic values "We must preserve our 
What are they? " are okayj but not aesthetic values and we'll 
for us" do our part" 
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Phase two, or type twoq Is trusteeship management. This notion has 
already been touched upon In the earlier discussion of corporate 
social responsibilities to various constituencies or stakeholders. As 
Hay et al put It: 
"Corporate managers were responsible not simply for maximising 
the stockholders' wealth but rather for maintaining an equitable 
balance among the competing claims of customersp employees, 
suppliers, creditors, and the community. In this view the 
manager was seen as a "trustee" for the various contributor 
groups to the firm rather than simply an agent of the owners" 
(114). 
Hay et al suggest this phase emerged In the 1920's and 30's- They 
attribute it to two factors. Firstlyp the separation of ownership and 
controlv discussed earlier In this chapter. The 'trusteeship' concept 
provided an answer to the question prompted by the Increasing dif- 
fusion of ownership of the shares of American corporations: 'To whom 
is management responsible? t According to this concept, management was 
responsible to all contributors to the firm. The second factor Is the 
emergence of a largely pluralistic society. They employ Steiner's 
definition of a pluralist societyv as "one which has many semi- 
autonomous and autonomous groups through which power Is diffused. No 
one group has overwhelming power over all othersq and each has direct 
or Indirect Impact on all others" (115). Pluralism Implies the 
trusteeshi p role. In the 1930's as Hay et al, and others noteg the 
major groups were unions and government, now there are many more. So 
"management's task is to reconcile and balance the claims of the 
various groups" (116). Typical managerial values are again shown In 
Table 4.1. 
Hay et al suggest this type Is currently predominant: 
"Probably the majority of business managers today adhere to a 
Phase II concept of social responsibility. These Individuals 
understand the pluralistic nature of our society and are 
generally committed to being equitable In dealing with the 
various contributors to the firm and the concerned outside 
pressure groups. Such business people emphasise good wagesq good 
working conditionsl and fairness and forthrightness in dealing 
with their customers and suppliers" (117). 
Others concur and a number refer to Franks Abram's 1950 comment, as 
chairman of Standard Oilq that the manager should conduct his affairs 
"in such a way as to maintain an equitable and working balance among 
the claims of the various directly Interested groups - stockholders, 
employeesp customers and the public at large" (118). Blumberg descri- 
bes this view of management duties to various groups as managerialism 
and suggests this Is held by both the British Institute of Directors 
and the Confederation of British Industry. These views he notes 
"reflect the changing position of the shareholder In the large public 
corporation from part owner to Investor" (119). 
The third phase Identified by Hay et al Is "quality of life" manage- 
ment. Thisq perhaps not surprisingly, is a little more nebulous than 
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the other two phases. They suggest that this phase has become popular 
In recent years within an affluent society In which the aggregate 
scarcity of goods and services Is no longer the fundamental problem. 
Hence "a new set of national priorities which stress the "quality of 
life" appear to be emerging" (120). Referring back to the typology of 
extents of corporate social responsibility, described In section 
4.3.3, this would mean the affirmative action position, category 4. 
For the fl m this means: 
"Societal consensus seems to be demanding that business, with Its 
technological and managerial skills, and Its financial resources, 
assume broader responsl bi 11 ti es - responsi bl 11 ti es that extend 
beyond the tradl ti onal economi a realm of the Phase I concept or 
the mere balancing of the competing demands of the sundry contri- 
butors and pressure groups of the Phase II concept. The socially 
responsible firm under Phase III reasoning Is one that becomes 
deeply Involved In the solution of society's major problems" 
(121). 
Yet, as In this author's category 4, Hay et al also stress the Impor- 
tance of profitability: "Profit and positive cash flow are still the 
sine qua non for all firms" (122). Profit Is both necessary for 
social responsibility and economic well-being Is the first 
responsibility: 
". a busi ness fl MIs sti 11 fundamentally an economl a enti ty 
ano; must be concerned first with Its own economic well-being. It 
Is true that the public does expect business to become socially 
involved but not at the expense of Its primary mission - making a 
profit and thereby contributing to a healthy and vigorous 
economy" (123). 
In Illustration of this, they quote the case of the Boise Cascade 
Corporation's disastrous venture Into the promotion of a minority 
enterprise in the heavy construction Industry, which resulted In a 
loss of around $40 million and a fall In the stock price of sixty 
points. Similarly, In Britain, one might question Briscoe's assertion 
that the Co-Operative movement is successful by making Improved human 
welfare a precondition of profit (124). its current problems seem to 
Indicate this Is no longer tenable, If It ever was (125). Although 
one might accept Briscoe's claim that the successful cooperatives 
"have refuted the belief that the single-handed pursuit of self- 
Interest automatically produces maximum benefit for the rest of 
mankind" (126). 
Howeverp the Importance of the role of profit notwithstanding, Hay et 
al do claim a growing number of business executives and academics seem 
to be accepting the Phase III position. Thisq they suggestp has 
resulted In a number of large US corporations becoming involved In 
major social action programmes - such as IBM, Chase Manhattan Bankq 
Xeroxq Ell Lilly and Coca Cola. Such actions are justified In terms 
of the enlightened self-interest economic value shown In the list of 
typical Phase III managerial valuesp Table 4.1. Thisp they claimp Is 
both an Important value for Phase III managers but also a major 
Intellectual concept for convincing profit maximisation oriented mana- 
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gers to be aware of and Include societal considerations In their 
decision-making. 
They define enlightened self-interest "as an action by a firm which 
cannot be clearly justified on the basis of cost and revenue projec- 
tions but Is taken because It Is believed to be In the best Interests 
of the firm In the long run" (127). There are three positive dImen- 
sions to this: the recognition that anything a firm does to produce a 
better environment for society will at least be of long-term benefit 
to It; the enhancing of the public Image, as a form of Institutional 
advertising, In providing a recruitment advantage with Idealistic stu- 
dents, and In giving employees a sense of doing something worthwhile; 
and the provision of possible profitable market opportunities, such as 
In pollution abatement equipment. 
There are also three negative dimensions to enlightened self-interest: 
Insensitivity will eventually lead to government Interventiony such as 
with worker safety Issues and the resultant health and safety at work 
legislation; harrassment by social action groups and other critiesp 
such as boycotts or demands at annual general meetings, Is averted; 
and insensitivity may result In lower stock values through ethical 
Investments. This perspective Is similar to that expressed by 
Ackerman In his analysis of the advantages and disadvantages In a 
decision to lead or lag In response to social demands: 
0 by electing to respond earlyq the manager accepts the burden 
oý*acting under conditions of greater uncertainty as to the even- 
tual dimensions of the Issue and the appropriate means for 
dealing with It than would be the case should he delay. In addi- 
tion, he absorbs whatever cost may be Involved at a time when 
they appear to be more nearly voluntary In the minds of Investors 
and coworkers. In return, he protects to some extent the flexi- 
bility to set policy without undue outside Interference. He may 
also have the hope of benefits that will ultimately outweigh any 
Immediate penalties" (128). 
Howeverl Ackerman is perhaps more realistic than Hay et al In his 
acknowledgement of the disadvantages of social responsiveness. 
To conclude on the Hay et al analysis of managerial creeds. It can be 
seen that they claim a shift In managerial emphasis: from owners' 
Interestsp under the Adam Smith and, latterlyo Friedman notion of 
general welfare resulting from the pursuit of self-interest -a profit 
maximisation model; to group Interestsj under the pluralist notions of 
the trusteeship model; top most recentlyq society's Interests, in 
accord with a recognition of affluence permitting a concern for a wide 
range of social Issues -a quality of life model. On the current 
state of social responsibility of management, they suggest: 
"Each new phase has not merely replaced the earli er phase but 
rather has been superimposed on It. Thus, a modern vi ew of 
social responsibility would to some degree Incorporate essential 
parts of all three phases of the concept. It would encompass not 
only a deep commitment to social problemsq but also an 
understanding of the firm's responsibility to Its contributors 
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and, most Importantlyp a realistic comprehension of the need for 
profl t as an essenti al prerequi sl te for operati ng at hi. gher 
levels of social responsibility" (129). 
So the concept of social responsibility has gone through each of the 
three distinct phases described abovep each phase corresponding to a 
particular set of managerial values. In practiceg the extent of 
social responsibility will depend on whether the manager Is type onev 
two or three, at least In so far as he or she Is permitted discretion. 
But as already noted, this area of discretion can be quite con- 
siderable. Hay et al suggest, somewhat optimistically perhaps, that 
type three Is becoming Increasingly popular: 
"Since business as an Institution exists only because It Is sanc- 
tioned by societyp It Is Inevitable that business managers will 
come In line with society's expectations. Hence the modern con- 
cept ... will become more and more accepted by businesspeople In 
the future" (130). 
Howeverp it may be that this should be viewed as less likely given 
recent world economic problems. Affluence may no longer be such a 
probleml One might also ask where It leaves the lesser-developed 
countries. 
4.4.2 Business Ideologies and Classicalt Managerial and Consent 
Creeds 
The managerial creeds described by Silk and Vogel, and Steiner and 
Steinerg are similar In many respects to those described aboveg and 
need not be considered in great detail. Steiner and Steiner link 
changes In the concept of social responsibility with different mana- 
gerial creeds, but only two types are Identified that correlate with 
the Hay et al model. They refer to these creeds within a discussion 
of managerial Ideologies and their definition of Ideology can be use- 
fully considered here: 
"A business ideology Is the content of the patterns of thought 
that are characteristic of the business classes. It Is thel r 
system of beliefs, values and objectives that concerng defendp 
and justify business behaviour. In this respeotp Ideology Is 
synonymous with business creed and philosophy" (131). 
Importantlyq they observe that not all managers subscribe to a busi- 
ness I deology. They also go beyond the simple Interpretation of 
Ideologv as a reflection of the narrow self-interest of Its adherents. 
They quote Monsen's observation that "Ideologies may be designed to 
fill a number of purposes of the groups espousing them" (132). One 
such pu 
' 
rpose may, In this easel be to help business people meet the 
strain of their occupations, particularly with the conflict between 
the various roles people in business play as managersp owners, voters, 
husbands or wivesy etc. (As Bradshaw puts It% "He Is a man before he 
Is a businessmany" to use again the quote earlier In this chapter. ) 
The uncertainty of the business environment and the limited control of 
managers over outcomes for which they are responsible add to this. 
Perhapsp In sum, Ideology Is best viewed as a shieldl as expressed 
below: 
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typical managers think of themselves and of business. In 
general as being Important to the progress of' society. They 
believe that threats to the business system are threats to 
society In general and to their Important roles In particular. 
Their Ideology, therefore, Is a shield against the erosion of 
their own group's role" (133). 
Steiner and Steiner's two types are the classical business Ideologyj 
which has dominated business thought and action for two hundred yearst 
and the modern socioeconomic managerial Ideology. The former extolls 
the values of IndIvIdualismg private propertyt free competition and 
limited government. The description of the competitive model of capi- 
talism In the last chapter covers most of the facets of the classical 
Ideology as described by Steiner and Steiner. : Et Is, of courset com- 
parable to Hay et al's Phase 19 profit-maximising management. As pre- 
viously noted In the last chapter, the Ideology Is not so much a 
description of what is, but a prescription of what ought to be. 
The modern socioeconomic managerial Ideology Is comparable to an 
amalgum of Hay et al's Phase II and Phase III, with a leaning towards 
the latter. The basis for their description of this ideology Is the 
publications by the Committee for Economic Development (CED), a group 
of about three hundred business executives and educators who conduct 
research and prepare policy recommendationsp formed because Its origi- 
nators felt the old Ideology was deficient In dealing with the antici- 
pated economic problems following the end of World War II. In one 
1971 report they suggest society has broadened Its expectations of 
business Into what may be described as three concentric circles of 
responsibilities: 
"The Inner circle Includes the clear-cut basic responsibilities 
for the efficient execution of the economic function - productsp 
jobs and economic growth. The Intermediate circle encompasses 
responsibility to exercise this economic function with a sen- 
sitive awareness of changing social values and priorities: for 
exampleg with respect to environmental conservationg hiring and 
relations with employees ... The outer circle outlines newly 
emerging and still amorphous responsibilities that business 
should assume to become more broadly involved In actively 
improving the social environment" (134). 
These three cl roles may each be comparable to the three phases 
described by Hay et al, and Steiner and Steiner do acknowledge that 
the classical Ideology focuses solely on the first circle. (Yet they 
do not seem to recognise the trusteeship/stakeholder notion of the 
corporation beyond quoting David Rockefeller's description of the "new 
managerial roleg" which notes: "Today's manager serves as trustee not 
only for the owners but for the workers and Indeed for our entire 
society" (135). ) It comes as little surprise to learn that the CED's 
basis for going beyond the self-interest of the first circle Is 
enlightened self-interest: 
It Is In the "enlightened self-interest" of corporations to 
promote the public welfare In a positive way ... Indeed 9 the corporate Interest broadly defined by management can support 
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Involvement In helping to solve virtually any social problemy 
because people who have a good environmentv education, and oppor- 
tunity make better employeesp customersq and neighbors for busi- 
ness than those who are poorp Ignorant, and oppressed" (136). 
Steiner and Steiner note that the new Ideology Is not as well articu- 
latedv complete and specific as the classical oneg but claim there Is 
little doubt as to It growing In general acceptance In the future. 
They suggest Its origins go back perhaps a hundred yearsl but that It 
Is only within the past two decades In the United States that It has 
become accepted by businesspeople. Even sol there are some that 
suggest that expressions of social responsibility within this Ideology 
are little more than empty rhetoric: "more or less transparent defense 
or privilege masquerading as philosophy, the search for sanction 
cloaked as a search for truth" (137). There Is also the uncertainty 
about the role of profit - the Issue of whether profit and social 
responsibility are mutually exclusive (as discussed earlier). On 
this, Steiner and Steiner suggest: "A growing number of managers 
see no inconsistency between the social demands of the newer philo- 
sophy and the pursuit of maximum profits In the classical Ideology" 
(138). Not only do they feel the two roles can complement each othery 
but they also observe that the classical tradition does contain fun- 
damental Ideas and considerations of major Importance to this society! 
rigorous competitiong the pursuit of self-interestg the Importance of 
the individual and so on. As with the Hay et al model, they claim not 
that one Ideology has replaced the other, but that the new ideology Is 
becoming superimposed on the old Ideology: "The business creed today 
is composed of an underlying traditional Ideology upon which has been 
superimposed the new managerial Ideology" (139). 
The new Ideology attempts to fill some of the gaps In the classical 
I deology: 
"The classical Ideology ... covers only part of the landscape and 
generally Ignores things not easily explained, not agreeableg or 
not pleasant to consider. For instance, ... the social costs of 
progress9 such as unemploymentv water pollution, or urbanization 
problems ... the esthetic quality of modern life ... conflict ... between religion and capitalismp humanitarianism and money 
seeking ... The creed fal ls to poi nt out that there are many 
reasons for the success of this society in Improving the well- 
being of its members aside from business, as Important as busi- 
ness Is" (140). 
Yet the new Ideology Is not without gaps itself, though It recognises 
that the modern large corporation has still to win the prize of legi- 
timacy and this Is a step towards that goal. 
Steiner and Steiner do recognise that there are other business 
Ideologies: the small business ideologyq though this Is essentially 
the classical position; and the communitariardsm Ideology, though this 
seems to be a version of the new managerial Ideology emphasising that 
the Individual Is part of a community to which he or she has respon- 
si bi 11 tI es. There arep additionally, competing Ideologies - Of laboury Intellectuals and so on - which act as a neutrallsing force 
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for business Ideology. Howeverp the classical Ideology and the new 
managerial Ideology do form the basis for much business action. 
Steiner and Steiner conclude: 
"For the great majority of business institutionsp most of which 
are comparatively small companies, the classical Ideology Is 
accepted today by society and business people In those companies 
and probably will be for some time Into the future. Most people 
do not expect a person whose business Is desperately striving to 
break even to concentrate on much else besides makJng a profitp 
so long, of course, as that person abides by the law. For larger 
organizations, howeverg society expects much more, and leaders of 
such corporations accept the challenge of the socioeconomic mana- 
gerial Ideology" (141). 
But thl s may not be the case f or the vast majorl ty of managers wi thi n 
organisations. It Is worth emphasising the point thatq as Hay et al 
put It: "A managerial set of values Is Important because It determines 
what decisions he (the manager) makes" (142). Steiner and Steiner 
suggest that for the vast majority of managers In large corporationso 
their personal Ideology will be a mixture of the classical and the new 
position and this is likely to persist for some time. 
Silk and Vogel identify three creeds: the classi call the managerial 
and the consent creed. The fI rst two creeds are as I denti fi ed by 
Sutton et al In The American Business Creed, a source also used by 
Steiner and Steiner. The classical creed Is the Phase I position of 
Hay et all and the classical Ideology position of Steiner and Steiner: 
"The classi cal creed argues that the busi ness role In soci ety Is 
fundamentally passive, the businessman Is embedded In a network 
of contractual and market place obligations over which he has 
limited control. His pursuit of profit and his fulfilment of the 
desires of his shareholders are matters neither of greed nor of 
discretion, but an indication of how successfully he has served 
the social welfare" (143). 
The managerial creed is the trusteeship management, Phase II of Hay et 
alv and the essence of Steiner and Steiner's socioeconomic managerial 
Ideology. It, 
expands the boundaries of executive discretiong and hence 
managerial power and responsibility. Profitsp or obligations to 
shareholdersq are seen as a necessary but not sufficient measure 
of the boundaries of corporate resonsibility; ratherg the execu- 
tive should consciously make decisions that balance the often 
competingg though legitimatel claims of shareholderso employees, 
customersp and the general public" (144). 
The consent creed seems uni que to S1 lk and Vogel. It emphasi ses the 
legitimacy of corporate powerg or rather, the requirement for legiti- 
macy. It assumes "the privileges of business will depend on the 
extent to which corporations listen tog correctly Interprett and 
effectively respond to the Political and social preferences of the 
American people" (145). It Is based on the Idea of popular 
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sovereigntyp the notion as expressed by John Locket of a government 
only ruling ýdth the consent of the governed. (Vogel has elsewhere 
written about the corporation as a private government and explained 
such a connection (146). ) In Illustration of this creed, they quote 
one executive at the meetings of the Conference Board as saying: "The 
social responsibility of business Is to create material abundanceg but 
to do so on the basis of the ground rules that society sets" (147). 
Howeverv this was by no means the predominant creed at the meetings of 
the Conference Board and, as both Hay et al and Steiner and Steiner 
observep such creeds are superimposed on one another: 
"It Is Important not to exaggerate the sharpness of the Ideologi- 
cal di vi sl ons wl thl n the busi ness communi ty. Only a relatively 
few executives articulate a perspective that could be classified 
unambiguously Into one or the other category. Each of the three 
creeds here named - classical, managerial and public consent - Is 
best understood as an "Ideal type", useful In demonstrating and 
clarifying the range and variety of contemporary business opi- 
nions. Most executives probably Include elements of all three 
positions In their thinking. Among the senior executives at 
1974-75 conferences, the classical strain seemed dominant" (148). 
Silk and Vogel also suggest the split between the creeds may be less 
between different factions than within the minds of Individual busi- 
nesspeople. 
To conclude this examination of managerial creedst It would seem 
reasonable to claim that distinct managerial creeds are Identifiable 
and that they guide decision-making. Because of the area of discre- 
Mon permitted to managers In matters of social responsibility it 
would follow that socially responsible actions will be determined by 
the particular creed which the manager favours or Is dominant In his 
or her thinking at the time. Of course, some might argue that where 
guided by a managerial creedp the manager Is being socially respon- 
sible within the terms of that creed. The Issuep howeverp Is the 
extent of social responsibilityp as defined within the model at the 
end of 4.3-3. In practice, Steiner and Steiner and Silk and Vogel 
claimp most managers adhere to the classical creed. Hay et al , 
perhaps a little optimisticallyl claim they adhere to the trusteeship 
model. Howevert like so many issues In this areal this Is not clear. 
Following the model of the extent of social responsibility given In 
4.3-39 It would seem likely that In practice, most managers are at 
position 29 profit maximisation tempered by the 'moral minimum' 
through self-regulation. Andl again In view of Hay et allsl Steiner 
and Steiner'sp and Silk and Vogel's observations, there is a tendency 
towards position 3 and perhaps even position 4. 
Managerial recognition of social responsibilities and action In accor- 
dance with this, while It may not resolve the problem of the legiti- 
macy of corporate powerp does point to a form of control of that 
power. Self-control Is indeed a solution to the problem of corporate 
power and Is advocated by Beeseley and Evans and many others, 
Including business Itself. Before considering the forms of control of 
corporate power however, further consideration must be given to the 
arguments for and against social responsibility. 
143 
4.5 Arguments For and Against Corporate Social Responsibility 
4.5.1 Competing Claims - The Role of Profit 
There are fl ve prI nel pal arguments against corporate social 
responsibility: the problem of competing claims (the role of profit), 
competitive disadvantage, competencep fairness and legitimacy. Each 
will be considered In turn. 
Friedman argues that the notion of social responsibility In business 
"shows a fundamental misconception of the character and nature of a 
free economy" (149). Business' function Is economic, not social. 
Accordinglyp It should be guided and judged by economic criteria 
alone. Action dictated by anything other than profit maximisation, 
within the rules of the game, Impairs economic efficiency and repre- 
sents a taxation on those bearing the costs of such Inefficiencyp most 
notably the stockholders. The role of the corporation Is to make a 
profit and maximise social welfare through the efficiency that 
entallsp and as Simon et al put It "consideration of any factors other 
than profit-maximi sing ones either results In a deliberate sacrifice 
of profits or muddies the process of corporate decision-making so as 
to Impair profitability. Consequentlyp resources will not be put to 
the highest use dictated by a free-market system and the total sum of 
economic resources available for meeting social problems ... will be critically reduced" (150). 
So "In shortp the corporation will best fulfill Its obligation to 
society by fulfilling Its obligation to Itself" (151). Howeverp this 
falls down Ina number of ways. Simon et al Identify four reasons. 
Firstlyp It emphasises the profits of the Individual firm as opposed 
to the corporate sector, which may not mean the highest efficiency 
from society's point of view. Secondly, there Is the distinction bet- 
ween the short term and the long term. Social goals may be profitable 
In the long termv for the reasons considered In the discussion earlier 
of enlightened self-interest. So "the pursuit of social goals may 
enhance profits sufficiently to cast doubt on the efficiency objection 
to corporate responsibility. But the relationship Is not clear enough 
to constitute an Independent rationale for corporate responsibility" (152). Thirdlyq there are other Indicators of well-being besides pro- 
fitability. Because of the uncertainty about what will be profitablep 
corporate goals In practice place profitability secondaryp seeking an 
assurance of a required minimum profit. Fourthlyp and finallyt there Is the concern for the efficient use of national resources. Because 
of social costsp profitability Is not necessarily the best measure of 
effectiveness: "the argument for efficient allocation of resources 
would appear to require the corporation to locate and regulate the 
social consequences of Its own conduct" (153). 
Furthermore, they suggest that if these arguments are not accepted, the negative Injunction against social Injury would, at leastq have to be respected. In other words, Friedman Ignores the 'moral minimum': 
most of the debate on corporate responsibility, by rather 
carelessly focusing on what we have termed affirmative duties 
rather than the negative Injunctions and by raising efficiency to 
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the level of the hi ghest vI rtue 9 has obscured what seems to be the fundamental point: that economic activityp like any human 
activity, can have unwanted and Injurious side-effectsp and that 
the correction of these Indirect consequences requires self- 
regulation. This Is the meaning for the business corporation of 
what we have called the 'moral minimumt - the negative Injunction 
to avoid social Injury - which cannot be set aside where there 
are reasonsable ways to obey It" (154). 
There are also similarities here with Hellbroner's point that pure 
profit-maximisation could amount to social Irresponsibilityp as 
discussed In Section 4.3.4. Essentially, though, the main criticism 
of this argument against corporate social responsibility - the need 
for profit maximisation - Is Its basis In an Inappropriate economic 
modelp the competitive model of capitalism. Particularly because of 
social costs and the question of who the profits are for. Noting the 
argument about the separation of ownership and control and the con- 
sequent limited Influence of shareholders over the conduct of pro- 
fessional managers, Ackerman quotes a statement by the chairman of 
Xerox which pointedly illustrates the Inapplicability of the notion of 
profit-maximisation for shareholders: 
"If we ran this business Wall Street's wayl we'd run It Into the 
ground ... We're In this business for a hell of' a long time and 
we're not going to try to maximise earnings over the short run" 
(155). 
4.5.2 Competitive Disadvantage 
The competitive disadvantage argument against corporate social respon- 
sibility suggests that because social action will have a price for the 
fI rm It also entails a competitive disadvantage. So either such works 
should be carried out by government or, at least, legislated so that 
all corporations or Industries will be subject to the same 
requirements. 
Mintz and Cohen show such a consideration was paramount in Alfred 
Sloan's 1929 decision not to fit safety glass to Chevrolets: "one of 
the single most Important protections ever devised against avoidable 
automotive deathq disfigurement and Injury. " Sloan was concerned 
about public anxiety about automobile safety and did not wish to 
publicise hazards. In his correspondence with Lammot du Pont over the 
possible supply of safety glass he observes that despite General 
Motors La Salles and Cadillacs being equipped with safety glass, sales 
by Packardt one of their competitorsp had not been materially 
affected. So Sloan wrote "I do not think that from the stockholder's 
standpoint the move on Cadillac's part has been justified. " Sloan was 
still reluctant even when he recognised that such a feature would come 
in the-endq he didn't want to hurry It along: "The net result would be 
that both competition and ourselves would have reduced the return on 
our capi tal. " Even when Du Pont noted that Ford had started to fl t 
safety glass In the windshields of all their carsq Sloan observed: "it 
is not my responsibility to sell safety glass" (156). 
Green notes that Sloants rejection of safety glass because It would 
add slightly to the price and because his competitors lacked the 
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"lifesaving technologyp" should not be possible today because com- 
pani es could go to the government to urge minimum standards Oand 
thereby avoid placing the firm at a competitive disadvantage (157). 
And as Simon et al observel the competitive disadvantage argument 
agal nst social responsibility Is difficult to accept when the social 
I njury Is caused by one firm but not Its Industry peers - as In 
Sloan's refusal to fit safety glass even after It was fitted to the 
windshields of all Ford cars. But If the social Injury Is not unique 
to one firm then "the Individual corporation can at least be expected 
to work for Industrywide self-regulation within the limits of anti- 
trust laws; or the Individual firm can work for government regulation" 
(158). What this Ignoresp however, Is that many Industries are ulti- 
mately In competition with other Industries and there may then be a 
competitive disadvantage for the Industry as a whole In relation to 
substitution goods. 
This Issue of Inter-industry competition asideq the criticism of the 
competitive disadvantage argument Is essentially sound. In approba- 
tion of his positiong Friedman quotes Adam Smith's comment: "I have 
never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the 
public good" (159). While healthy scepticism might be desirablep the 
oligopolistic form of most markets and Increased consumer knowledge 
and awareness makes such a position Inappropriate. And there are 
other reasons besides. 
Ackerman's observations on the advantages and disadvantages of early 
corporate response to social demands have already been noted In 4.4.1. 
Importantly, he suggests an early response, while It may seem unne- 
cessaryp does provide flexibility. Perhaps more significant thoughg 
Is his recognition that the area of discretion within which managers 
act Is quite broad and as competition Is conducted on many fronts 
there Is scope for an early response, particularly when the potential 
benefits are also considered: 
"Amore cogent argument Is that competition limits the extent of 
discretionary expenditures. Despite the dim view of marketplace 
vitality held by Galbraith and others, one would normally expect 
competitive activity to be sufficient to exact a penalty from 
those who indulge In a significantly higher level of non- 
productive expenditure than others In the same Industry ... Yet 
within the relatively narrow bounds of corporate choice postu- 
lated hereq the market does not appear to be sufficiently 
exacting to force conformity In social responsiveness ... Competitive considerations *, * are only one among a number of 
elements Influencing corporate choice, and In many Instances may 
not be a particularly significant one at that" (160). 
4.5.3 Competence 
Friedman asks "If businessmen do have a social responsibility other 
than making maximum profits for stockholders, how are they to know 
what It Is? " This Implies the competence argument against corporate 
social responsibility. 
SI mon et al I denti fy three ways In whi, ch 91t may be alai med 9a fI rm Is 
not competent to deal with social Issues. Firstlyp there Is the claim 
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that corporations do not have the technical skills to deal with social 
Issues. ThIsq they suggestq will vary from case to case and, given 
the notion of last resort In the Kew Gardens Principle (discussed 
earlier)p can only be valid If some other party can do the job better. 
Secondly, there is the claim that corporations do not know what Is 
good for society and some other Institution, such as governmentq knows 
better. But "a corporation's alleged lack of Insight Into the nature 
of the good Is not a reason for objecting to Its social activities 
unless they are deliberately coercive" (161). Thirdlyl the claim that 
Incompetent attempts to resolve social Issues waste shareholders' 
money. Butp suggest Simon et alf this Is only true If management acts 
In accord with Its own predilectionsp In which case management needs 
to be made more accountable to the shareholders. Alternatively, such 
a claim could be countered by pointing to the separation of ownership 
and control and the role of the professional manager. These factors 
notwithstandlngg the argument of competence can only be applicable to 
affirmative actionsp there Is still, as Simon et al notev the moral 
minimum of the negative injunction against social Injuryl for which 
competence cannot be an Issue. 
Bradshawv a practitioner writing In this area (as President of 
Atlantic Richfield Company)v does point out that corporations cannot 
cure all social Ills: 
It must be obvious that corporations cannot cure all social 
I and , Indeed, In many areas should not even try - 
Corporations are special-purpose economic Institutionsg and part 
of my thesis will be that they depart from that purpose at their 
own peri 1. Thi s nati on Is ri chly endowed wi th many and varl ed 
Institutions. Social change isl I believeg accomplished through 
these many Institutions and not through any one" (162). 
He goes on to argue that the businessman should "stick to his own 
competencies, " but, bearing In mind his observation (noted earlier) 
that the rules of the game are changingg work "within those competen- 
cies (and) become a prime mover for change at the rule-making levely 
whether It Is In national governmentq regional areas or states. " 
Similarlyq Silk and Vogel report the comments of the executives at the 
Conference Board meetings who contended that If they try to operate 
outside their special area of competence they will Invariably get Into 
trouble: "We shouldn't accept responsibility for what we don't know 
about" (163). 
Elsewhereq Vogel observes that many social Issues do not present much 
scope for solution by business: "There are decided limits to what 
social efforts we can expect of business ... many of the most critical 
social problems confronting our economy are not subject to the dISCre- 
tion of senior management; they Involve Issues of government policy 
that are outside the control of any Individual firm. " He then con- 
tinues-by observing that It Is certainly not realistic to expect the 
business community to assume a leading role In balancing social needs 
with economic Imperativesp because It would be Inconsistent with the 
political views of business: 
"For at least a centuryq the overwhelming majority of the busi- 
ness community has held Political and social views located well 
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on the right of the political spectrum ... not only in the United 
States but In every other capitalist democracy ... The soal al 
reforms whose enactment fiave so dramatically improved the lot of 
the average American over the last 75 years mostly were adopted 
In spite of business lobbyingg not because of It ... It has been 
outside pressures - by journalists, academicst trade unionists 
and public-interest organisations - that have played an absolu- 
tely Indispensable role In challenging corporate complacency. 
The corporate role Is Inherently a conservative one; If business 
Is to perform as well as It can ,It requi res pressure f rom those 
outside It" (164). 
So on the competency argument one must conclude that while there Is 
the 'moral minimum', social actions beyond this are constrained by 
what business Is ablep competent and willing to do. And as 
Rockefeller notes: 
"- no one sector of our society Is competent to deal with these 
pr*o; lems - not business, not government, not laborý not the 
nonprofi t organi. zati ons. The only answer Is that all secti ons 
must become Involved, each In Its own distinctive wayg but in 
full and collaborative relationship with the others" (165). 
4.5.4 Fairness - Dmination by Business 
Friedman asks "Is it tolerable that these public functions of taxa- 
tion, expenditure, and control be exercised by the people who happen 
at the moment to be In charge of particular enterprisesp chosen for 
those posts by strictly private groups? " (166). This Is the fairness 
argument against corporate social responsibility. Heilbroner's con- 
cern about corporations playing God has already been noted (section 
4.3.4). In a similar vein, Davis and Blomstrom comment: 
"0 business already has enough social power ... society should 
noý*take any steps which give it more power ... business Is one 
of the two or three most powerful institutions In society at the 
present time. Business influence Is felt throughout society ... 
In education, In governmentp In the home, and In the marketplace. 
It molds many soci al values. The process of combining social 
activities with the established economic activities of business 
would give business an excessive concentration of power ... (which) would threaten the pluralistic division of powers which 
we now have among Institutionsq probably reducing the viability 
of our free society" (167). 
And as Levitt notes "The corporation would eventually invest Itself 
with all-embracing duties, obligations, and finally powers - 
ministering to the whole man and molding him and society In the Image 
of the corporation's narrow ambitions and Its essenti ally unsool al 
needs" (168). It Is a problem of power wl thout accountability: "The 
issue of fairness refers to the contention that corporate moral and 
social decisions will have coercive effect and that such coerelong 
operating without legal safeguardsv may be arbitrary and unfair" 
(169). Big business acting In accord with notions of social respon- 
sibilityp gives managers more discretionary power over the lives of 
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others In three ways, as Simon et al observe: by political action 
(lobbying)p the creation of pri vate government (within the 
orgardsation)p and by a smothering effect - domination by business 
values. 
However, they counter, If business does have this power then the 
problem Is to control Itp not think It presents a problem only In the 
social policy context. One must also consider what Is worse, a. lack 
of self-regulation may be more arbitrary In Its effects: 
"We grant that even corporate self-regulati on may have some 
spill-over effect - that the attempt to avoid or correct a self- 
caused social Injury may have some Influence on the freedom of 
action of others. Such effects will, we thinkv be relatively 
Insignificant when compared to the benefits of self-correction" 
(170). 
Moreover 9 they ask that even If af fI mati ve modes of corporate soci al 
responsibility Involve manipulation, should one fault genuine efforts 
to help? Besides which, the distinction between leadership and mani- 
pulation Is a fine one. They conclude on this Issue: 
"In sum, we are convinced that the type of corporate self- 
regulation we have proposed will help to limit the arbitrary and 
oppressive Impact of corporate ativity, rather than the oppositep 
and therefore does not present a fairness problem" (171). 
4.5.5 Legitimacy - The Role of Government 
The final principal argument against corporate social responsibility 
Is legitimacy: social Issues are the concern of goverment.. Orp as 
one executive commented at the Conference Board meetings: "We pay the 
government well. It should do I ts job and leave us alone to do ours" 
(172). As Silk and Vogel commentq the businessperson feels "non 
business" contributions should be voluntary and government has 
legitimate social concerns which business supports In the payment of 
taxes. 
Simon et al Identify three positions in this argument. Fi rstly , 
unless business acts then government will, with all the attendant 
disadvantages of government Intervention cited by critics of govern- 
ment encroachment In private spheres. Moreoverp corporate social 
problem-solving may be preferable because it Is pluralistic and is 
therefore likely to be preferred by the people. This position seeks 
to minimise the role of government. Secondly, as Levitt and Friedman 
suggestj corporate Involvement In social problems Is likely to be 
bungledv which In Itself will lead to government Intervention. This 
has the disadvantages of both government and business Interference in 
private spheres 
,. 
Again, a position which seeks to minimise 
government's role. The third position claims only government can deal 
with market Imperfections. This Is because some encroachment Is 
viewed as necessary (the mixed market position) and there needs to be 
an orderly division of labour. 
Simon et al counter that again these positions against corporate 
social responsibility reflect only on the affirmative duty and not on 
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the negative Injunction against social Injury. In any eventq therd Is 
still a ease for self-regulation because the duplication of effort 
cannot In Itself be harmful, federal agencies tend to represent 
Industry Interests anyway and much corporate activity Is overseas and 
outside government jurisdiction (though the recent attempts to make 
the Sullivan Rules on South Africa statutory, seem to go against 
this). 
They conclude on these five principal arguments against corporate 
social responsibility: 
these poi nts do carry wei ght wi th respect to some af fi r- 
ma*ý; ve modes of corporate social action, but we find these objec- 
tions unpersuasive In application to self-regulating -activity. 
Whatever debate there may be over more expansive notions of cor- 
porate responsibilityp a self-policing attempt to take into 
account the social consequences of business activity and at least 
attempt to avoid or correct social Injury represents a basic 
obligation" (173). 
The problem of competing claims, competitive disadvantagel competencyp 
fairness and legitimacy are the principal arguments against corporate 
socl al responsi bi 11 ty. Other arguments Include, the public being 
misled about who bears the cost of corporate social action, believing 
It to be free; the problem of determining benefitsp costs and 
priorities; the weakened International balance of paymentsq reduced 
efficiency raises costs and may put companies at a competitive disad- 
vantage Internationally; and the lack of a broad base of support among 
all groups In society (174). Alsog as Beesley and Evans observeg 
Friedman's argument must be seen within the context In which it Is 
presented: 
"It was part of an argument holding that property rights, as for 
Instance manifest in company shareholding, andl more fundamen- 
tally, the right to engage freely In economic activity are 
necessary (but admittedly not sufficient) conditions for the 
maintenance of Western-style political freedom. Capitalism Is to 
be defended not so much because of Its superior economic perfor- 
mance ... but because It helps to sustain a uniquely favourable 
framework for Individual expression" (175). 
This Is the argument about Political freedom considered In Chapter 
Three. Essentially this argumentq the others briefly mentioned, and 
the principal arguments, have been answered and found to be lacking. 
This Is due mainly to their dependence on an Inappropriate socio- 
economic model of contemporary societyl and their failure to account 
for social costs and the moral minimum of the negative injunction 
against social Injury. 
The arguments for corporate social responsibility are Implied above. 
They emphasise changes In public expectations of business, enlightened 
self-interestg the avoidance of government Intervention, the extent of 
corporate power and the need to balance this with responsibility in 
self-regulationg and business resources (176). It Is worth concluding 
this chapter by quoting Steiner and Steiner's summary In review of the 
arguments for and against corporate social responsibility: 
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"Business decision-making today Is a mixture of altruism, self- 
Interest, and good citizenship. Managers do take actions that 
are In the social Interest even though there Is a cost Involved 
and the connection with long-range profits Is quite remote. 
These actions traditionally were considered to be In the category 
of "good deeds". The Issue today is that some people expect - 
and some managers wonder whether they should respond to the 
expectation - that business should assume a central role In 
resolving major social problems of the day in the name of social 
responsibility ... Business cannot do this, nor should It try. 
Larger corporationsg howeverg clearly feel that the old-fashioned 
single-minded lust for profits tempered with a few "good deeds" 
must be modified In favor of a new social concern. Society also 
expects its business leaders to be concerned. The Issue Is not 
whether business has social responsibilities. It has them. The 
fundamental Issue Is to identify them for business In general and 
for the Individual company" (177). 
The Identification of these responsibilities and ensuring they are met 
- as well as the continuing problem of corporate power Ignored by 
Steiner and Steiner - demands social control of business. The mecha- 
nisms for thisp Including the marketp are considered In the next 
chapter. 
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Previ ew 
You think you are helping the economic system by your well- 
meaning laws and Interferences. You are not. Let It be. The 
oil of self-interest will keep the gears working In almost mira- 
culous fashion. No one need plan. No sovereign need rule. The 
market will answer all things. 
Paul A Samuelson (1) 
Today the grounds of legitimacy for corporate power are shifting. 
The Impact of corporations on their social and physical environ- 
ments has become too great for the exercise of managerial power 
to be justified by the legal rights of property ownership alone. 
The conception of the marketplace as a sphere of activity where 
an Impersonal mechanism would hold power accountable Is a slim 
fiction for critics. 
George A Steiner and John F Steiner (2) 
Samuelson's precis of Adam Smith's message is a statement of how the 
market operates as a social control mechanism, or, at leastj how it 
works within the competitive model of capitalism. The quotation from 
Steiner and Steiner is a suitable riposte. No longer It seems is the 
market an adequate controlv as discussed in the previous two chapters. 
Yet Is the corporation's social role limited to Its own attempts at 
self-regulation and benevolent gestures? The claim here is that there 
are other social control mechanisms as well as self-regulation, and 
there Is sti 11 a vi tal role played by the market -a role whi ch gi ves 
credibility to the notion of ethical purchase behaviour as an attempt 
to make business socially responsible. 
Benevolent gestures In the form of donations to charity and other 
arbitrary measures might be businesst view of social responsibility. 
This Is notp howeverp social responsibility as defined In Chapter 
Four; It Is philanthropy. This, as a consequence of self-regulation, 
is Insufficient. Moreoverp the problem of corporate power Is not 
resolved without accountability. Hence this chapter develops the 
argument by moving from responsibility and particularly responsibility 
as philanthropyp to accountability. The question now posed Is 'How 
may social responsibility In business be ensured? ' Oro 'How may busi- 
ness be made accountable for its actions? ' The answer lies in an exa- 
mination of the mechanisms for the social control of business. 
The problem of corporate power Is not new. Concern about monopoly 
distortions reducing efficiency and the treatment of labour both gave 
rise to proposals for Improving social control of business. Current 
concerng howeverv Is far greaterg focusing on the very legitimacy of 
corporate power. Many solutions to the problem of corporate power 
have been proposed but they all, It Is claimed herev Involve govern- 
ment Interventiong market control or self-regulation. Radical solu- 
tions Involving an end to the market economy are not relevant here, 
but those which would maintain the market economy Include breaking up 
the larger firmsq nationallsation and market socialism. Yet none 
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offers an effective solution because the problem of power stems 
irom 
the economic requirement for large-scale organisations and operations. 
Less radicalt piecemeal solutionsl seek either to achieve gradual 
change from within or from without. Solutions based on change from 
within seek changes In corporate governance. Solutions based on 
change from without emphasise Increased disclosurej by legislation, 
social auditsp ethical whistle-blowing and the activities of pressure 
groups. This, of course, Is where the role of pressure groups In the 
marketing system and ethical purchase behaviour fit into the social 
control of business. 
A simple model Is proposed classifying the forms of social control of 
business according to the type of power Involved: condignq compen- 
satory or conditioned. Each corresponds to the forms of controlq as 
identified above, of legislation, the market or moral obligation. Each 
is examined In turn and Its strengths and weaknesses considered. 
Legislation can be effective but not always, and there are limits to 
its use. The market has already been shown to have many drawbacks as 
a social control mechanism, but it Is not totally Ineffective. Moral 
obligation resulting In self-regulationg while having some effect, 
seems 'unfair' In the creation of elites and Insufficient as It does 
not Involve accountability. 
The conclusion Is that If the legislation mechanism Is overloaded and 
potentially damaging to market economies, and that moral obligation Is 
Inadequate or undesirable, then further social control of business 
must come from the market mechanism. This suggests a case for ethical 
purchase behaviourp for consumer boycotts and a role for pressure 
groups In the marketing system. It Is also In keeping with the 
current poll ti co-economl a climate, In the UK and the United States at 
least, In arguing that one should 'let the market work'. 
Chapter Six follows on from this chapter by examining pressure groups, 
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5.1 Solutions to the Problem of Corporate Power 
Introduction 
A great many different soluti ons to the problem of corporate power 
have been advocated. As the previous discussion of corporate social 
responsibility Indicated, one solution Is self-control by business. 
In other words, the practice of social responsibility by business. 
This will be considered further. The problemv however, as with all 
forms of social control of business, Is ensuring accountability. For 
Medawar, power demands accountability: "... In a democracyp decision- 
makers should account for the use of their power ... their power 
should be used as far as possible with the consent and understanding 
of all concerned" (3). But as Silk and Vogel show, even the most 
socially responsible of the managerial creeds does not actively seek 
accountability. Having noted that the consent creed "seeks to apply 
to the corporation the legitimating concept of John Locke that a 
government rules only with the consent of the governed, " they add a 
proviso: 
"But the "consent creed" of business must be interpreted only 
analogicallyg not literally - for no American business executive 
really wants to hand over direct control of the corporation to 
the electorate ... They declare that they are prepared to be 
"accountable"l but are not clear on what forms their "public 
accountability" should take or what social mechanisms should be 
used to Insure It" (4). 
The recognition of this does, of course, point to other solutions to 
the problem of corporate power. Many of these solutions are not 
directly relevant to this research and Will therefore only be con- 
sl dered bri efly. 
The discussion of managerial creeds has reported the belief that many 
managers holdq and Is a feature of the classical position: that the 
market Is the mechanism by which the control of business Is or can be 
realised. Traditionallyl business was the servant of the market. A 
number of sources note that although the Issue of social respon- 
sibility In business came to the fore In the 1960's, "the most tur- 
bulent years In the history of American society" (5), it Is not a new 
concern. Originally, concern focused on ensuring competitiony on 
keeping business as the servant of the market. Monopoly wastage 
through the assumed misallocation of resources was the Issue. But as 
Heilbroner writes: 
"I would say that unti 1 fal rly recently, the mi sallocati on-of- 
resources argument ... provi ded the mal n thrust of the ef f ort to 
control corporate behaviour. Recentlyq howeverg technical stu- 
dies by economists have considerably lessened fears about the 
degree of resource misallocation... the average percentage of 
profit on sales during the 1960s has been around 5 percent. This 
does not seem a piratical margin" (6). 
He continues by suggesting that concern then moved on to the exploita- 
tion of labourp although now "it is difficult to believe that labour 
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relatl ons was once a burning Issue with respect to corporate 
responsibility" (7). He remi nds the reader of the abuse of labour 
common at the turn of the century and later, and the anti-union posi- 
ti on and actl vI tI es of compani es until government Intervention, when 
"the unthinkable came to pass In the Institution of collective 
bargaining" (8). Although labour exploitation is still an Issue in 
some quartersq concern now centres on the legitimacy of corporate 
power. 
Thl s concern about competi ti on and the later I ssue of labour explol ta- 
tion was met with government Intervention (which In Itself limited the 
validity of the classical position). As Silk and Vogel note: 
"The growth of the great corporations also brought In Its train a 
much expanded role of government In the economy. Pressures from 
business Interests concerned about Insuring a greater degree of 
market stability and also from citizen and consumer Interests 
concerned about the political dangers of unregulated monopoly 
forced the federal governmentp for the first time in American 
historyo to systematically Intervene in business affaJrs. By the 
time the Progressive Era had run Its course, a variety of reforms 
and regulations covering rail transportation, food and drugs, 
tradeq mergers and acquisitionsp banking and much else had become 
accepted and Integral parts of the American business setting" 
(9). 
Goverment Intervention and regulation is then another way In which 
the social control of business Is reallsed. Thus far, three forms of 
social control of business have been Identified: self-control In 
social responsibility, the market, and goverment intervention. 
Indeedq as part 5.2 shows, these are the major forms of social control 
of business and all other solutions to corporate power are either 
variations or are so radically different that they amount to a 
solution to the problem of corporate power that effectlvelý does away 
with the problem by removing the corporation. In other wordsv they 
present an alternative economic system to capitalism. 
Jacoby Identifies a typology of corporate criticism, grouping business 
critics Into three categories (10). Firstlyg there are the Ireformist 
critics' "who accept the basic institutional framework of the contem- 
porary American economy and society. " Secondly, the tleftist 
criticstv who "seek to substitute authoritarian socialism for the 
capitalistic system of competitive private enterprise. " Finally, the 
tutoplan crItIcs19 who "reject both capitalism and authoritarian 
socialism and seek to establish new social orders based upon different 
human values. " The concern In this research Is principally with the 
first category; not only because they are, as Jacoby notesq the 
majorityg but also because the argument expressed here assumes a 
market based economy and would therefore be largely Irrelevant to the 
changes sought by the latter two categories of critics. Unlike 
Jacobyq this Is not an all-too-swift dismissal of the criticisms and 
aspirations of such cr1tIcs9 merely recognition that their proposed 
solutions to the problem of the social control of business go outside 
the status-quo and outside the scope Of this work. 
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Jacoby Identifies five major theses of the corporate criticso the 
reasons for the current concern about corporate power. He suggests 
big business corporations are alleged to: 
Exercl se concentrated economl a power contrary to the publi c 
Interest. 
2. Exercise concentrated political power contrary to the public 
Interest. 
3. Be controlled by a self-perpetuatingy Irresponsible 'power 
elite'. 
Exploit and dehumanise workers and consumers, 
Degrade the environment and the quality of life. 
He then examines these allegations in detail (11). The essence of 
their allegationsp however, Is that corporations have excessive power 
which Is abused and requires some form of social control. This argu- 
ment was presented In 4.2. 
Many different solutions to this problem of corporate power have been 
proposed. The more prominent proposals will*be considered in the next 
two secti ons. Firstly, the more radical solutions, which although 
maintaining the market economy would involve major change. (As 
already notedq solutions doing away with the market economy are not 
relevant here. ) Theng secondly, the 'piecemeal' solutions. 
5.1.2 Radical Solutions Within the Market Economy 
Hellbroner, having considered the Friedman solution which he decribes 
as "do nothing" (12) and has been amply coveredq and the solution of 
self-control, which has been discussed and will be considered again 
laterp then looks at other solutions. One approach might be to break 
up the big firms; after allq corporate power and the problems of cor- 
porate power have come about through the growth In big business (as 
reported earlier): 
In many Industries the minimum plant size to permit effi- 
cient operations Is much smaller than the average firm size ... 
Hence the suggestion to fragment large companies Into plant-size 
companiesp retaining all the efficiencies of assembly-line pro- 
ductiong but removing the agglomeration of financial strength 
from which corporate power emerges" (13). 
This would be technically possible In the United States through the 
rigid application of the anti-trust laws. Howeverp Hellbroner does 
Identify two major drawbacks to this solution. Firstly, it is politi- 
cally unacceptable: "it Is clearly beyond the limits of any realistic 
economic reform ... a rejuvenated antitrust movement might go so far 
as to split General Motors ... But the possibility of splitting these 
(still Immense) companies down to the size of a simple plant seems 
certain to encounter such a barrage of business opposition that Its 
chances for political passage are nil" (14). Secondlyl diminishing 
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size would not necessarily Increase responsibility, If only because of 
the precondi ti on of profi t9 as earli er di scussed. The showpieces of 
the economy are, as Galbraith notes (and Schumpeter, but for different 
reasons) the large firms. Whereas "the models of powerlessness - the 
highly competitive textile or coal Industriesp for example - have also 
been the models of Industrial backwardnessq characterized by low 
research and development, low wages and long hoursp antluniordsm, com- 
pany townsp etc. " (15). And not only does Heilbroner accept a rela- 
tionship between size and efficiencyp and also profitability and 
responsibilityv but he also sees, somewhat paradoxically, an advantage 
to corporate size for the social control of business: 
"The power of the corporati on to work soci al good or evi 1 would 
not be lessened by fragmenting I t. It would only be made less 
visible and hencep In the end, less accountable or controllable 
than by bringing It out Into the open at the top" (16). 
A third drawback to this solution - which Heilbroner doesn't mention - 
would be the loss of economies of scale In marketing and other 
operations. The proponents of this solution seem to assume economies 
of scale are only reallsed In production. 
Beesley and Evansl In considering attempts to Increase competition, 
note that not only does the regulator have the problem of being sure 
that such a move ýdll necessarily benefit the consumer, but also that 
there Is the difficulty of reconciling the Interests of the other par- 
ties Involved: 
". the control of the singleg big monopoly company see is much 
1;; s amenable to direct formal control ... The consumer Interest 
cannot be so easily equated with movements towards competition. 
The cost and benefits of reducing a specific company's market 
power are much less clear ... Also It Is Impossible In practice 
to confine the attention to the consumer ... the regulator Inevi- 
tably concerns himself with other Interests such as shareholders 
and employees" (17). 
Galbraith's favoured solution to the problem of corporate power Is 
national3sation. Although he acknowledges that "In nearly all of the 
non-Communist worldl socialismg meaning public ownership of industrial 
enterprisesq Is a spent slogan" (18)9 he does see advantages to this 
form of organisation: 
"There Is, In fact 9 more to the case for the autonomous publi c 
corporation than the modern socialist now sees. Public ownership 
Increases the amenability of the firm to social goals. It may be 
required In those industries such as housing and rail transport 
where an effective technostructure does not develop" (19). 
Both Galbraith and Heilbroner write approvingly of British nationall- 
sati on poll cl es followl ng World War II. They suggest it can provide 
the funds and management for failing industries and put them on an 
efficient footingg and a single nationallsed fl rm can serve as a stan- 
dard bearer for an Industry when In competition with other private 
companies. So "the nationallsation Of Inefficient industries or of 
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I ndi vi dual mi sperforml ng fl Ms may i ndeed serve as a means of rai si ng 
the general level of soci al performance" (20). In this resp6ct, 
Beesley and Evans suggest they "may even provide a model of social 
responsiveness for the private industrial sector" as their purposes 
are wider than the purely commercial. However, they also note that as 
models for managing social responsiveness, the nationallsed industries 
are lacking because of their ambiguous and changeable relationship 
with government (21). For Hellbroner, there Is a problem In that dif- 
ference In ownership need not mean greater responsibility: 
"The effect of nationalizing a firm is to transfer Its effective 
"ownership" - I. e. 9 the control over the disposition of its 
surplus, as well as the control over the nature of Its operations 
- from a group of private Individuals mixing their desire to make 
money with a confirmed set of social "ideals", to a group of 
public officials mixing their desires to make careers together 
with their confused Ideas as to social Ideals" (22). 
There Is also the Inefficiency that seems to result from 
nationallsation: 
"To be sure 9 the moti ve of soci al servi ce or publi a servi ce Is 
preferable to that of private profit-seeking. On the other hand, 
the curbs over profi t-seeki ng -In the f orm of competi ti on or of 
displacement by dissatisfied power groups who "raid corporations" 
- probably provides more active controls over the efficiency of 
private enterprise than can be exercised over public enterprise" 
(23). 
It Is not that Hel lbroner wi shes to wri te of f nati onall sati on as a 
misguided Idealq merely that he wishes to sound a note of caution: "It 
may be that the defl al enci es of publi a ownershi p and operati on are 
preferable to those of private enterprise ... " (24). However 9 he 
suggests It does not solve the problem of corporate responsibility "It 
merely makes explicit the ultimate nature of that problem, which Is 
how to exert effective political control over an economic Institution" 
(25). 
Public ownership of corporations need not be restricted to the 
nationalisation of weak and/or strategic Industries, as well as those 
that prove to be Insufficiently socially responsive. Socialismg with 
the public ownership of all corporationsl seems an attractive proposi- 
tion. Lindblom writes: 
"As an alternative to private enterprise, market socialism is, in 
principle at least, easy to establish. Merely remove top manage- 
ment from all existing corporations and put government officials 
In their places. Or put the same managers back In their jobsj 
but make them government officials. Instruct them to carry on as 
before: produce and sell whatever customers will buy, pay for 
whatever Inputs are necessary, avoid lossesp cover costs. An 
appropriate new rule might be: Make money but don't practice 
monopoly. Since corporate managers are already salaried 
bureaucratsp they should find it easy to operate under the new 
rulesp very Imperfectlyl of coursel as In any system" (26). 
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Noweverp while some point to Sweden or Yugoslavia as Illustrations of I 
a form of socialism along these lines working effectively, many others 
have doubts. Obviously the merits of capitalism versus socialism and 
vice versa - even market socialism - cannot be considered here. But 
the essence of the argument against market socialism Is as with 
nationallsationg but more so: the problem of inefficiency which 
results from removing orp at leastq weakening market pressurest and 
the likelihood of the social responsibility of the organisation not 
being greatly enhanced anywayg especially when placed under the poli- 
tical shelter of the government. For Heilbroner, this solution to the 
problem of corporate power merely dodges the Issue: "the corporation, 
with Its vast powers at best half controlled, Is a form of social 
organisation from which there will be no escape for many generations 
to follow" (27). Big orgardsations are required by the technology of 
the time. Hence, they cannot be avoided and neither can their 
consequences: 
In all Industrial societies, socialist as well as capita- 
list, something like the corporation dominates the economic pro- 
cess. That Is, In all advanced societies we find semi-autonomous 
bureaucratiep profit-oriented (even In socialist nations) 
enterprises carrying out these vast technological operations - 
and bringing In their train an accumulation of power and 
Influence that eludes effective control" (28). 
Heilbroner concludes there Is only the stark choice between big orga- 
nisations operating through the "motives of acquisitiveness" or 
through "bureaucratic conformity. " Either wayt they exert dominion 
over men. He sees little escape from bigness: 
"In small-scale communities, men cooperate. But men can no 
longer live in small communities on this crowded planet, even if 
they wanted to. In large communities, men contend; and some 
means must be found to concert their energies to the common needs 
of survival" (29), 
Unfortunately for socialism, as a collectivist ethiog the only way In 
which this concert of energies seems to be achievable Is In appeals to 
acquisitiveness or to patriotism. 
Aside from these quite radical (within this context) solutions to the 
problem of corporate power: smaller economi c uni ts 9 nati onall satJ on 
and soci all sm. - as well as more radi cal soluti ons stl 119 such as the 
corporate state or even communi sm - there are what mi ght best be 
termed 'piecemeal' solutions. They either seek to change corporate 
governance and make management more accountableg or seek to apply some 
form of external control. Again, It Is not possible or, indeedp 
appropriate to consider these solutions In any detail. But they do 
need to be noted and are therefore briefly considered in the following 
section. Moreoverp ethical purchase behaviour and especially boycotts 
would most accurately be described as piecemeal solutions to the 
problem of corporate power. 
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55-1-3 Piecemeal Solutions 
This section considers some of the less radical proposals for the 
solution of the problem of corporate power: changes In corporate 
governanceg Increased disclosure, ethical whistle-blowing and so on. 
These solutions would attempt to solve the problem gradually, by 
degrees. 
Changes In corporate governance tend to focus on the Inclusion of 
various stakeholders of the firm on the boards of directors: workers 
(30). for examplej or consumer representativesq or minorities (31). 
However, not only Is the solution viewed as Impractical because of the 
Inevitable conflicts of Interest and the problem of Identifying all 
significant Interests (32)9 but It also assumes decision-making is at 
thi s level. A number of studl es suggest the board may be merely a 
'rubber-stamping authority', as Brookes reports (but questions) (33). 
Another suggested change In corporate governance Is charteringg as 
favoured by Ralph Nader (34). 
These and other pi ecemeal 
soci al responsi bi 11 ty from 
other piecemeal solutions 
social responsibilltv from 
that falls within the la 
disclosure. 
solutions seek to Increase pressure for 
within the organisation. There are also 
which seek to Increase the pressure for 
wi thout. One major category of solutions 
tter group Is the methods for Increased 
Increased di sclosure Is favoured by many as a means for enhanci ng 
social control of business, both Indirectly by allowing regulation of 
business to operate and to a lesser extent market controlp and 
directly by embarrassing the firm Into action. It cang thenj enhance 
social control of business by all major forms of control: by regula- 
tiong by markets, and by moral obligation (self-control In social 
responsibility). 
One way of Increasing disclosure Is the social audit: "a commitment to 
svstematic assessment of and reporting on some meaningfulg definable 
domain of a company's activities that have social Impact" (35). Or, 
as Medawar puts It: "presenting the accounts of a company to show not 
what cash It spent or earned for itself - but what, p In social terms, 
it cost or gave to the community" (36). Howeverp the very notion of a 
social audit Is flawed In the assumption that there are objective 
standards by which social performance can be measured (37). In prin- 
ciple, social audits are attractive. In practice they are problema- 
tjcq if not Impossible. 
Sturdivant suggests the term social audit should not be used (quoting 
George Steiner) "because measurement of social performance does not 
now and probably never will approach In accuracy and acceptability the 
accountant's audit of economic performance" (38). He prefers the 
notion of a Social Assessment System. Whereas one executive at the 
Conference Board meetings reported by Silk and Vogell observed: "The 
social audit is a device for consulting firms to make money" (39). 
Another way of Increasing disclosure Is ethical whistle-blowing: 
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"An allegiance to one's employer should not, as corporations 
would have us bellevey supercede that of an Individual to 
socIetVq or to a higher moral authority. This does not mean that 
an employee should subvert or be disloyal to his corporate 
employer. But If an employee brings a specific safety or health 
hazard to the attention of his superiors and It Is ignored 
because profit Is placed above public safety, It then becomes the 
employee's duty to go outside the corporate structure and reveal 
the hazard to the authorities or private citizens who are In a 
position to expose and correct the situation" (40). 
Howeverg this obviously presents problems for the whistle-blowerg as 
Sturdivant points out (41), and as recent cases Illustrate (42). 
Revealing corporate misdemeanours may also be ineffective If the 
authorities are partisan, as an event In the UK Sizewell Inquiry would 
seem to bear out (43). 
Increased disclosure may also be reallsed through legislationg forcing 
corporations to report on hiring practicesp antipollution measures and 
so on. This Is one proposal advocated by Ralph Nader's Center for the 
Study of Responsive Law, and the Project for Corporate Responsibility 
(44). The problem here though Is the selective nature of such an 
approach. As Beesley and Evans observe In considering enforced 
disclosure of the rate at which complaints are received: 
"If disclosure results In coercive responsesq then the possibi- 
lity of unfair bias arises ... The number of complaints, for 
exampleg could be bolstered by an enthusiastic group of critics 
of the company, or depressed by the absence of an adequate 
complaints mechanism. A raw number of complaints would need to 
be related to the number of customers, the type of product and so 
on, to avoid bias. Though the obvious result of distortion Is to 
penallse the company, It also runs against the consumer's 
interest, In that the Information on which he Is to make his 
judgement does not reflect the service which would actually be 
provided for him" (45). 
These problems In state-organised disclosure are also found with the 
Code of Conduct for companies trading with South Africav discussed 
later (Part Three). 
Disclosure may also be realised by the actions of Interested pressure 
groups. This In Itself provides an argument for Internal social 
audits, to either refute an allegation or check Information a pressure 
group has obtained (46). One such group is the Council on Economic 
Priorities: "a non-profit organisation established to disseminate 
unbiased and detailed Information on the practices of US corporations 
In areas that vitally affect societyv Including equal employmentp 
environment quality, military productiong political Influence and con- 
sumer practices" (47). Commenting approvingly on their researchl 
Hellbroner notes that the Council believes the most effective weapon 
against corporate Irresponsibility Is unfaultable research. It has 
the aim of making both managers and Investors more aware of the social 
consequences of their actions: 
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"One (aim) Is to make companies themselves self-conscious about 
(or simply conscious of) their actions as members of a society as 
well- as of an economy. Directors do not like to be singled out 
as socially Irresponsible citizens any more than anyone else; and 
at least some kinds of practices can be lessened simply by making 
the generals aware of what the troops are doing" (48). 
The second aimp of coursep Is ethical Investment. This Involves 
either the sale of stock In 'bad' companies and the buying of stock in 
'good' companlesp or, and Simon et al suggest this Is preferablep 
keeping stock In 'bad' companies but using It to demand greater social 
responsibility (49). 
Of course, analogous to ethical Investment Is ethical purchase beha- 
vI our. Although no source has been found employing this term, a 
number of writers In the area have suggested it as a solution. S09 
for examplev John Tepper Marlin advocates that the public should 
"support socially responsible businesses In the marketplace by taking 
Into account social performance In Its buying" (50). Other advocates 
of ethical purchase behaviour are considered In subsequent chaptersp 
as well as those In Chapter One. 
This examination of specific solutions to the problem of corporate 
power has considered some of the proposals advocated, from major 
changes In the economic system to making the current system work 
better through greater disclosure. Other solutions have been 
advocatedg this examination has merely looked at some of the more fre- 
quently occurring proposals. The next part of this chapter examines 
the forms of social control of businessy how control Is currently 
reallsed and how It may be enhanced within the current system. As 
well as providing an answer to the question Identified In the Preview 
- 'How may social responsibility In business be ensured? ' - It provi- 
des a basis for classifying ethical purchase behaviour and boycotts as 
social control mechanisms, and for their comparison with other 
mechanisms. 
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5.2 Foms of Social Control of Business 
5.2.1 Types of Power and a Model for Classifying Forms of Social 
Control of Business 
Although unable to propose a paradigm for the business and society 
f1eld9 Jones does put forward an Integrating framework for research In 
business and society. This Is based on the methods of social control 
of business and Is described as "an attempt to provide a research 
agenda for this emerging discipline" (51). This framework Is given as 
a matrix In Table 5.1. The matrix categorises social control mecha- 
nisms along two dimensions: the level (or scope) of control and the 
mode (or philosophy) of control. Boycotts are Identified by Jones 
under level 1, Individual firm/industry and mode D, countervailing 
power; a categorisation which will subsequently be shown to be highly 
appropriate in its emphasis on countervailing power. 
This model does have value, but a simpler model can be Identified. 
The notion of social control of business Implies that society hasq or 
could havep some power over business. Power Isa concept for whi ch 
there Is some debate on definitiong principally because It can be 
studied In many different ways and In many different circumstances. 
Here Russell's definition of power Is preferred to that of Mills 
quoted earlierv namely: "the production of Intended effects" (52). 
Russell goes on to Identify three kinds of power: 
"The most Important organizations are approximately 
di stl ngui shable by the ki nd of power that they exert. The army 
and the poll ce exeral se coercl ve power over the body; economi a 
organizationsq In the maing use rewards and punishments as Incen- 
tives and deterrents; schoolsl churches and political parties aim 
at Influencing opinion. But these distinctions are not very 
clear-cutv since every organisation uses other forms of power In 
addition to the one which is most characteristic. " 
Most studies of power generally acknowledge three types of power in 
line with the above: forceq Inducement and manipulation. Etzioni has 
coerciveg remunerative and normative power (53). Whereas Galbraith, 
in a more recent studyq suggests condignq compensatory and conditioned 
power. Little difference between his categorisation and the many that 
have gone before somewhat belles his following observation: 
"It Is a measure of how slightly the subject of power has been 
analyzed that the three reasonably obvious instruments of its 
exercise do not have generally accepted names. These must be 
provided: I shall speak of condignq compensatoryq and conditioned 
power" (54). 
Of courseq given the concerns expressed In Galbraith's earlier work, 
noted previouslyp It Is not surprising -that Galbraith writes In this 
book about corporate power and the absence of consumer sovereignty: 
". much exercise Of power depends on a social conditioning that 
s;; ks to conceal A t. The young are taught that Ina democracy 
all power resi des In the people. And that In a free enterpri se 
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Table 5.2 : Social Control of Business -A Simple Model 
FORM OF CONTROL TYPE OF POWER 
Legislation Coercive 
(government Force 
intervention) Condign 
2. Market forces Remunerative 
Inducement 
Compensatory 
Moral obligation Normative 
(self-regulation) Manipulation 
Conditioned 
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system all authority rests with the sovereign consumer operating 
through the Impersonal mechanism of the market. Thus Is hidden 
the public power of organization - of the Pentagon, the weapons 
firmso and other corporations and lobbyists. Similarly concealed 
by the mystique of the market and consumer sovereignty Is the 
power of corporations to set or Influence prices and costsv to 
suborn or subdue politicians and to manipulate consumer response. 
But eventually It becomes apparent ... " (55). 
Howeverg although the emphasis In Galbraith's work Is on the power 
that business exerts over society, the three types of power can also, 
it Is here proposed, be seen In the way In which society exerts power 
over business. This Indicates a simpler model of the social control 
of business. 
As Table 5.2 shows, and as the previous and following discussion sup- 
ports, the social control of business is achieved by virtue of 
legislationg market forces and moral obligation; or, respectively, 
forceq Inducement and manipulation. This model will provide the basis 
for the analysis of ethical purchase behaviour, Including boycottsq as 
a social control mechanism. 
5.2.2 By Legislation: Condign Power 
Legislation over business Is society exerting power by force. 
Business has to act within the law or face sanctions. Recognition of 
this within society ensures legitimacy for the corporation providing 
it Is generally believed that the legislature and judiciary are effec- 
tive. That isq that there are suitable laws which are adequately 
enforced. As Beesley and Evans put It "Legislation Is seen as 
achieving Its effect through the serious prospect of enforcement" 
(56). 
They also note that legi slatl on may take the form of prescri ptl on or 
provide a framework for regulations "to guide and legitimise the 
detailed Interventions of the regulatorsq and to make them accountable 
to enforceable terms of reference" (57). Furthermoreq legislation can 
work in other ways. In particular, It can provide a framework within 
which people can regulate each otherts activities without recourse to 
litigation. 
Not surprisinglv perhapsp business complains that there Is excessive 
regulation of Its activities. It complains that regulations "threaten 
the functioning of a 'free' economy and Its ability to innovate and 
respond rapidly and creatively to economic opportunities" (58). 
Weldenbaum goes further and suggests there Is a cause and effect 
relationship between government regulation of business and the diminu- 
tion of business performance. He then Identifies five costs of 
government regulation (59): 
The cost to the taxpayer for supporting a galaxy of goverment 
regulators. 
2. The cost to the consumer In the form of higher prices to cover 
the added expense of Producing goods and services under govern- 
ment regulations. 
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The cost to the worker In the form of jobs eliminated by govern- 
ment regulation. 
The cost to the economy resulting from the loss of small 
enterprises which cannot afford to meet the onerous burdens of 
government regulations. 
The cost to society as a whole as a result of a reduced flow of 
new and better products and a less rapid rise In the standard of 
11 vi ng. 
Of coursel In addition to Ignoring the possible benefits of regula- 
tion, the above list does assume costs that will not occur in every 
case. Obviously business will seek to minimise the constraints within 
which It must act. But In so doing It can claJmq through spokesper- 
sons such as Weldenbaumq and somewhat paradoxically, that it Is 
helping society as a whole even though It Is society that seeks to 
applY the constraint. As Weldenbaum explains: "a reversal of the 
current trend of ever-increasing government Intervention In business 
Is essential not so much from the viewpoint of business, but primarily 
from the viewpoint of enhancing the welfare of the Individual citizen" 
(60). For similar reasonsq Foxall pointed to the costs of consumerism 
In an attempt to Introduce a sober and more balanced view of con- 
sumerism In contrast with the academic euphoria of the time (61). 
Howevery for many of the critics of businessp regulation Is Insuf- 
ficient or Inadeq uate. Medawar notes, In Illustrationg the Inadequacy 
of the UK Canned Heat Products Regulations 1967. They do not require 
that the percentage of meat content should be declared, only that the 
percentage of meat content should correspond to one of the nine dif- 
ferent descriptions that a tinned meat should be given. So whi le 
"chopped meat" must not contain less than 90% meat, "meat loaf" must 
not contain less than 65% meat (62). But 'poort law Is perhaps less 
of a problem than no law at all. In the Office of Fair Trading report 
for 1976, only about 14 percent of the 470,000 complaints referred by 
local authoritiest Citizens Advice Bureaux and other sources were 
covered by existing criminal legislation (63). 
Some of these complaints were probably covered by Industry established 
and controlled voluntary codes. Such codes are often established In 
anticipation andq so the Industry hopesp avoidance of legislation. 
The Press Council and the Advertising Standards Authority are two UK 
examples of bodies established to administer voluntary codes of con- 
ductq both of which proclaim their Independence and effectivenessq 
with great frequencyp while their critics suggest they are self- 
serving watchdogs without teeth (64). Medawar suggests self- 
regulation of this sort falls to provide a clear frame of reference by 
which conformity with given standards can be judged, fails to define 
or enforce high enough standards and falls to gain general acceptance: 
"As suchv many codes evolve and exist mainly as means of allowing 
business to proceed with minimum Interference from outside" (65). For 
Medawarp the major problems with both legislation and voluntary codes 
are as follows (66): 
By defining what Is unacceptablep by Implication everything else 
Is acceptable: "you also provi de a framework outsi de of whi ch 
tanything goes'. " 
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2. Codes and laws only establish minimum levels of performance, 
identifying behaviour which falls short of the required level. 
They do not measure performance. 
The associated costs (the point made by Foxall and Weldenbaum, 
referred to above). 
The problem of defining corporate social responsibilities (as 
discussed in Chapter Four). 
Added to these problems Is the Increasing belief In the Ineffec- 
tiveness of government (67), which In turn limits the effectiveness of 
legislation for the social control of business. Partly In recognition 
of the limited effectiveness of governmentq there has been a movement 
(in the UK) towards letting the market work. The Conservative Party 
under Mrs Thatcher has - with a few exceptions - reaffirmed its faith 
In the market mechanism and as the party of governmentq sought a new 
approach to social policy that places greater emphasis on the market. 
Meanwhileg In the United Statesq the Reagan administration Is 
attempting to Implement a mandate to deregulate the economy (68); 
also, presumablvp with the intention of letting the market work. 
These moves towards letting the mar] 
the limits to regulation and how It 
Beesley and Evansl In advocating 
"corporate social responsibility" - 
mechanisms are of limited capacity 
regulation might be encouraged so as 
measures: 
ket, work reflect a recognition of 
can Impair the market mechanism. 
self-regulation by business - 
- observe that society's control 
and substJ tutable. Hence self- 
to reduce the load on legislative 
"0 ". society employs a series of regulatory mechanisms, which are 
to some extent substitutablep and each of which has limited 
capacity or applicability ... Sol corporate social responsibility 
can now be regarded as one of a package of mechanisms through 
which a pluralistlep self-regulating social strategy can be 
sustained" (69). 
Similarlyp Lord Limerickp as ParlSamentary Under-Secretary of State at 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), has pointed to the limited 
capacity of regulation: 
"The communi ty must not ... look on 'the DTI as an all-purpose 
fire brigade to be called in with their hoses whenever anything 
goes wrong. Still less Is It realistic to expect 'that my 
Department will Install automatically triggered sprinkler systems 
In companJ es up and down the land. The primary responsibility 
for exercising surveillance over companies in which they have an 
interest lies with Its members themselves" (70). 
This vl*ewv expressed at the BIM conference on social responsibility in 
reference to forthcoming legislation on activities such as 'insider 
trading' and 'warehousinglg was no doubt heart-warming to the busi- 
nesspeople attending. As the Chairman of the conference noted in 
response to a discussion on worker directors: 
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"Personally, I think it would suit the British scene better to do 
It on a more pragmati c basJ s. That may take several years ... 
But In the final analysis the board of directors must have the 
authority - not a false sense of power, but the authority - to 
make decisions and to manage" (71). 
A typi cal example of how a powerful group In soci ety can 9 when that 
power seems threatened, find justification for avoiding the Issue? 
Howeverv there are still very real limitations on the effectiveness of 
regulation. 
Friedman and the Chicago School reiterate the classical position on 
regulation. They express the criticisms of government regulation as 
voiced by Weldenbaum. earlier In this section. They argue that 
government's natural function Is to make uniformly applicable rules 
within which markets can operatet and to serve as an umpire if these 
rules are violated. Other than thatt governments only other concern 
as far as business Is concerned should be with monopolies, exter- 
nalities and the protection of those unable to protect themselves. 
Anything beyond this Is considered an unreasonable intervention. 
Their criticism of government Intervention has an unusual ally. 
Consumer advocates are critical of government interventi 
' 
on not In 
theory, but in the form It takes In practice. Advocates are concerned 
more with equity than efficiencyg but they are suspicious of regula- 
tory agencies because as Marlin, for example, has notedp they tend not 
to serve the public, to raise prices and to reduce outputq creating 
bureaucratic and unresponsive industries. Consequentlyp Marlin 
observes: "The concept of the agency Itself as the representative of 
the public should In most cases be buried without further ceremony. " 
His solution Is "stop waiting for government" (72). These criticisms 
are In addition to those cited above by Medawar. 
So, while regulatJon clearly does have a part to play In the social 
control of businessp this can only be up to a point. Heilbroner 
writes: 
the businessman ... Is supposed to have a clear-cut mission 
to make profits; and a clearly defined boundary of respon- 
sibility - to conduct a law-abJding business enterprise. As the 
legal profession will testify, this narrow authorization is dif- 
ficult enough to delimit - there Is an Immense body of law as to 
what a business can and cannot "legally" do In its lawful quest 
for profit. But beyond this Ill-defined economic domain 
stretches the much larger and still less clear domain of the 
social and political responsibilities that reside In the lawful 
conduct of a profit-making business" (73). 
What happens 9 what fOms of control can soci ety apply Where the Law 
Ends? (74). 
5.2.3 By Markets: Compensatory Power 
The market as a mechanism for the social control of business Is 
society exerting power by Inducement. Simply stated, It Is a method 
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by which society rewards corporate social responsibility with profits 
and Irresponsibility with losses. If one accepts that the market can 
work In thl s way both In theory and In the I real world Iy then one has 
a ready explanation for ethical purchase behaviour and boycotts In 
particular. 
Howeverg Chapter Three showed this view of the market to be unaccep- 
tably simplistic. It was shown that It must be examined as an 
ideologyp for the market Is more than merely "a technical device for 
discovering preferences, " as the Institute of Economic Affairs claim. 
As Chapter Three has covered the way markets work In some depth, this 
section need only be briefv concerned only with markets as a form of 
social control of business. 
Social responsibility by virtue of market forces assumes the exercise 
of purchase votesp as Gist puts it: 
"A fundamental tenet of our economic system Is that scarce econo- 
mic resources are ultimately allocated by the preference patterns 
of final consumers; that Is, we as consumers vote, as It were, 
for particular types of Institutions and for particular types of 
products and services. We vote by purchasing things we wish to 
encourage In Institutions we wish to encourage. We vote by not 
buying things we wish to discourage" (75). 
As might be expectedv given the earlier discussion of managerial 
creedst Silk and Vogel found that businesspeople viewed the market as 
the arbiter for social responsibility: 
"In the market place 9 every person gets a vote every day. The 
market is more democratic than the government" (76). 
"Business Is the most responsible Institution by far. I resent 
Ralph Nader calling his organization a public service organiza- 
tion. My company Is a public service Institution. Critics of 
business claim to represent the public, but they have forgotten 
that business does what the public wants" (77). 
Of coursep the origin of this perspective lies In classical economics, 
and particularly Adam Smithy as revealed in the oft quoted passage 
about how Individual greed Isq through the market9 transformed into 
collective good (quoted In the Preview to Chapter Three). For Smith 
and for Friedman, howeverp collective good or 'what the public wants' 
seems only to be material welfare. While this was no doubt reasonable 
In Smith's dayt It Is Insufficient now given society's current 
affluence. Yet the market does provide a big Incentive for business 
to do as people want. 
"The fiction that business does not care about people. because 
profit comes first should be exposed for the errant nonsense that 
It Is. Business has all the Incentives to take actions that 
result In Improving human welfare. The reasons for dol ng so 
ariset of course, not out of benevolence but out of hard-nosedg 
practical and effective economic Incentives. More purchases by 
willing customers do tend to generate more profits and greater 
accumulation of capital" (78). 
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Yetv despite this, and for all the reasons discussed In Chapter Three 
"The conception of the marketplace as a sphere of activity where an 
impersonal mechanism would hold power accountable Is a slim fi cti on 
for critics" (79). To some extentv howevery there Is social control 
of business achieved through the market. As Lindblom observes and was 
noted In 3.7, the market Is not dead. Control might only be limited 
to economic goalsp as Friedman argues and clearly favours. Or It 
might extend to other goals as Gist Implies above and as Is a major 
thrust In this thesis - social control In ethical purchase behaviour, 
with a role for pressure groups In providing the necessary information 
for appropriate consumer choice. In either case though, the require- 
ment for competition must be acknowledged. 
5.2.4 By Moral Obligation: Conditioned Power 
The social control of business by virtue of moral obligation Is 
society exerting power through conditioningy resulting In self- 
regulation. As Berle writes "Corporate managements 9a* are 
constrained to work within a frame of surrounding conceptions which in 
time impose themselves" (80). There will Inevitably be cultural pre- 
cedents to business action. So Ackerman, for Instance, has written 
about the requirement to Institutionallse social responsiveness within 
the business organisation (81). While In the UK9 the Confederation of 
British Industry has stated: 
"While the law establishes the minimum standard of conduct with 
whi ch a company must comply IfItIs to be allowed to exi st and 
trade, a company, like a natural person, must be recognised as 
having functions, duties and moral obligations that go beyond the 
pursuit of profit and the specific requirements of legislation" (82). 
This 'moral Imperative' comes from the environment within which mana- 
gers work. As one practitioner writes, they must be guided by the 
"consensus of opinion" (83). It Is thl s that must gul de managers In 
that area of discretion discussed earlier. Silk and Vogel note "The 
problem that has always troubled critics and would-be reformers of the 
modern corporation Is by what criteria executives should make judge- 
ments about what Is In the best Interests of the various constituen- 
cies of the corporation or of society" (84). Again, the criteria are 
determined by what Is socially expected. Sop for example, even 
profit-maximising managers will maintain a respect for the rule of law 
and work within It. 
Heilbroner - while recognising that "Power Is thrust Irrevocably and 
Inescapably Into the hands of business management, who must exercise 
It according to some criteria" - notes that Berle's thesis of manage- 
ment guided by a 'corporate consciencet Is elitist and "therefore pla- 
ces more confidence for social progress In the benevolence of the 
upper classes than In the common sense of the lower" (85). This Is 
corporate social responsibility in the sense of self-regulation. Yet 
is it sufficient that management should be guided by what they think 
Is best? Is thi s socl al control of busi ness or a conveni ent (and 
elitist) Ideology to mask naked self-interest? 
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These questions cannot be directly answered. They are probably also 
the wrong questions to ask. Firstlyq managerial discretion on social 
Issues Isp as Chapter Four showed, unavoidable. Secondly, It Is 
misleading to Imply that this discretion Is extensive, at least In all 
cases at all times. Limits on managerial discretion are quite con- 
siderablep as a little thought about any suitable Issue and the stake- 
holders Involved will Indicate. Thirdly, and perhaps most 
Importantlyg as the term moral obligation Implies, managers will be 
guided by social norms. Self-regulation involves more than conscious 
management decision-making on the basis of defined criteria. Self- 
regulation also Involves, as Berle seems to convey but not to 
Hellbroner's satisfactiong the unconscious guidance of what society 
expects. Put crudelyq managers, like all members of societyv are 
conditioned In such a way that constrains their behaviour. So the 
extent to which they have discretion on social Issues depends on cir- 
cumstance and the social conditioning limitations on all human choice 
behaviour (86). 
However, where there Is discretion - and that Is not denied - there 
will always be the argument that this power Is lunfairIq or 
unwarranted. But If despite Friedman's arguments, there Is nothing 
that can be done about Itp If It Is unavoidableg then efforts must be 
concentrated upon limiting the extent of that power and ensuring that 
those who exercise Itj as Medawar and others have commentedg do so 
under conditions of accountability. 
Limiting the extent of corporate power Involves restrictions on mana- 
gerial discretion In decision-making on social Issues. Yet as has 
been seeng the governmenty through legislationg can only do so much. 
The legislative mechanism can become over-burdened. It Is also not 
always ef fecti ve. Moreover, government Intervention threatens the 
market economy system. An alternative approach might be to ensure 
that self-regulation operates more stringently by havingg as Ackerman 
arguesp Institutionalised corporate social responsibility and as 
others have advocatedq the professional manager. Professionalism, In 
this respectp would Involve conformity with a code of ethics and other 
guidelines on social responsibility. But Is such a notion realistic? 
it could never be meaningfully legislated and business would be unli- 
kely to collectively act and Institute, voluntarily, such a major 
constraint on Its practicesq even If the notion of professional prac- 
tice could be defined. 
Ensuring accountability is equally and similarly problematic. If even 
under the perhaps Inaptly named consent creed, managers are not pre- 
pared to accept accountability, what likelihood Is there of self- 
regulation ever producing accountability? Public outrage and 
condemnation at corporate atrocities such as Thalidomide or the Bhopal 
poison gas leak provide some measure of accountability, or at least 
the potential for accountability. But as was noted In Section 4.2.2, 
atrocities are not the central Issue. It Is not sufficient to argue 
that public displeasure following an atrocity amounts to true accoun- 
tabilityp even when that displeasure may be supplemented with legal 
action against the corporation as a whole and Its executives 
Individually. 
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The mechanism of legislation seems overloadedv limited In effec- 
tiveness and potentially threatening to the market economy system. 
Self-regulation seems 'unfair' and also to be Inadequate. The conClu- 
sion must then be that there Is a requirement Incumbent upon the 
market to play a greater role In the social control of business. The 
final part to this chapter considers a way In which this could be 
achieved. 
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5.3 Social Control of Business and Cons=er Sovereignty 
5.3.1 Purchase Votes and Social Responsibility In Business 
If the market mechanism Is to be effective In the social control of 
business In non-economic waysp as the previous section suggested, how 
can this be achieved? Put another wayq can consumer sovereignty 
ensure social responsibility In business and In what way? The answer 
Is in ethical purchase behaviour. But while such a claim as made here 
seems reasonable In theoryq to what extent can It be reallsed and has 
It been reallsed, In practice? 
The theoretical justification for the answer of ethical purchase beha- 
viour has been given In Chapter Three. It is based in the competitive 
model of capitalism and the notion of consumer sovereignty. But how 
far removed from reality Is the Ideology? The quote by Samuelson In 
the Preview to this chapter suggested the market will answer all 
things. Its way of doing this Is through consumer sovereignty: by 
providing purchase votes "We vote by purchasing things we wish to 
encourage In Institutions we wish to encourage, " as Gist was quoted 
earlier. If this doesn't happen one is without the rationale for 
capitalism. 
In practice, howeverv consumer sovereignty will exist to varying 
degrees depending (principally) on choice through competition, and 
I nformatl on. Consumer sovereignty In ethical purchase behaviourl as 
in all purchase behaviourg will depend on informed choice. 
Social responsibility In business, It has been earlier noted, means 
different things to different people. At the risk of over- 
simpli. fication, one could claim that the literature on social respon- 
sibility In business falls Into one of two categories: either 
advocating corporate social responsibility, how to be a good corporate 
citizen; or criticism of business, how many fi rms fail to be good cor- 
porate citizens. The distinction Is subtle. Both categories are nor- 
mativeg but one advocates a doctrine while the other Identifies 
shortcomings. The former category seeks self-regulation while the 
latter typically seeks greater government Intervention. So the notion 
of social responsibility can mean a form of self-control or It can 
mean saying what business should be doing, delineating a social role 
for business. (Here, In Chapter Fourg neither category was adopted. 
Corporate social responsibility was recognised as a doctrineq but not 
advocatedq only classified as one form of social control of business. 
And while no attempt has been made to say what business should do, 
making a value judgement on the social role of business, the options 
available to business have been Identified, saying what business could 
do. ) 
Social responsibility may not only mean different things to prac- 
titioners and academics, It Is likely also to mean different things to 
consumers, whose purchase behaviour Is here to be harnessed to this 
vagueg amorphous notion of social responsibility In business. 
Different people will have different Ideas as to what Is socially 
responsible. Considerg as a simple examplep the production of contra- 
ceptives. One group of consumers may view this as socially respon- 
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siblev while another group may view It as socially Irresponsible. 
Yet, this Is not a disadvantage to the notion of ethical purchase 
behaviourp It Is simply Indicative of the essence of consumer 
sovereignty and the right to choose. Social responsibility In busi- 
ness will not and need not be defined here, by this author. It will 
be defined by the consumer In the marketplace. 
Defl rd ti ons by consumers of soci al responsi bi 11 ty wi 11 be the outcome 
of many factors and Influences. Howeverg the particular Influence of 
concern here Is the pressure group. The role of pressure groups In 
the marketing system Is considered In the final section of this 
chapter. 
5.3.2 A Role for Pressure Groups? 
Ethl cal purchase behavi our requi res chol ce and I nformati on. Choi ce 
will be largely a function of competition In the marketplace. 
Howeverg the choice criteria employed by the consumer will depend 
partly on the Information available. Ethical purchase behaviour Is 
dependent on Informed choice, on the consumer being aware of the ethi- 
cal Issue and It therefore acting as a potential Influence on the 
purchase decision. While Information on ethical Issues can come from 
many sourcesq the concern here Is with a source that Is organised and 
directed towards providing such Information, the pressure group. 
The pressure group and Its potential Influence on purchase behaviour 
Is examined In detail In the next chapter. Its role In the marketing 
system Is considered more explicitly In Chapter Eight. Here the con- 
cern Is to show why such groups are relevant to the soci al control of 
business. 
In discussing the role of conditioning In the social control of busi- 
ness It was recognised that managers' decisions on social Issues will 
be guided by their 
* 
understanding of societyts expectations. But what 
happens when these expectations change? Will managers necessarily 
recognise and accept changes In society's expectations of their 
behaviour? It Is not certain that managers will acknowledge such 
changes, at least voluntarily. Pressure groups are often prominent In 
soci al change. They can attempt to alert managers to changes In 
society's expectations of corporate behaviour. Most likely, howeverp 
they will play a role In convincing or coercing managers Into 
accepting change. They are for this reason likely to be a major force 
In providing the Information necessary for ethical purchase behaviourg 
If not organising ethical purchase behaviour In boycott action. The 
pressure group seems likely to be a major Influence In consumer defi- 
nitions of social responsibility In business, which may subsequently 
emerge as ethical purchase behaviour. 
Ultimatelyp whether business Is socially responsible depends on the 
effectiveness of the three forms of social control of corporate power 
Identified. All three forms have a part to play. When they are per- 
ceived as Inadequatep corporate legitimacy Is questioned. Pressure 
groups are likely to be evident In demonstrating the Inadequacies of 
the social control mechanisms and seeking to enhance them. One way 
they go about this Is In organising boycotts of business. Chapter 
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Six, which follows, examines pressure groups. Chapters Seven -and 
Eight then turn to boycotts of businessl very specific instances of 
ethical purchase behaviourp organised by pressure groups. Thi s wl 11 
to some extent answer the question at the start of 5.3.1 about the 
extent to which ethical purchase behaviour can and has been reallsed 
In practice. The case studies and survey research reported In Part 
Three answer the question more fully. 
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Previ ew 
The chief social values cherished by Individuals in modern 
society are reallsed through groups ... the Individual has 
meaning only In his relations with others. 
Earl Latham (1) 
There Is more to democracy than the occasional votep and there Is 
more to democracy than political parties. Pressure groups, 
offering an alternative form of expression, are a healthy com- 
ponent of genuine democracy. 
Des Wilson (2) 
The previous chapters have examined consumer Sovereignty under capita- 
lism and the extent to which it may be employed, along with other 
mechanisms, for the social control of business. Choice and infor- 
mation have been shown to be vital for consumer sovereignty and it Is 
suggested that pressure groups could be a principal source of the 
Information required by consumers for ethical purchase behaviour. 
Consumer boycotts, the most manifest form of ethical purchase beha- 
viourv are of course predominantly pressure group Inspired. A role 
for pressure groups In the marketing system has therefore been iden- 
tifiedv but little has yet been said about the nature of pressure 
groups. This chapter addresses the question 'What Is a pressure 
group? ' considering the pressure group role In the political process 
and pluralism. 
While It has been claimed that pressure groups are a central feature 
In the political process, It soon becomes apparent that this Is only 
true for a certain category of pressure group. There Isa great 
diversity In the types of pressure group which may be found In terms 
of a number of dimensions, but particularly the subject of the group's 
concerng the way that concern Is exhibited and the group's Influence. 
A typology of pressure groups shows that promotional pressure groups 
with open membership and high political speciallsation are of most 
relevance to this study. 
Promotional pressure groupsq despite the role which might be attri- 
buted to them In pluralistic modelsq do not seem to have the Influence 
afforded to sectional pressure groups. Because of their limited 
resources, particularly their weak strategic location, they do not 
have 'insider' status and therefore must rely on public opinion as 
their primary avenue of pressure. The other avenues of pressurej the 
executive and parliamentp are very often closed to them. Howeverg a 
fourth avenue or pressure, often overlooked In the literature, might 
be corporations, especially given the acknowledgement of corporate 
power In the previous two chapters. Corporations may be an avenue of 
pressure as an ultimate target of pressure group activity In their own 
right - so as to change corporate behaviour. Alternatively, they may 
be an avenue of pressure Intended to Indirectly Influence the public 
authorltiesq either by motivating public opinion or by employing the 
finsiderl status or business. 
194 
Corporations as a target of pressure group activity are most likely to 
be Influenced by direct action tactics. One such tactic being the 
consumer boycott. This brings the argument full circle. Promotional 
pressure groups have grown rapidly In recent years offering the scope 
for greater political participation. However, they lack Influence 
because they are rarely afforded 'insider' status and must therefore 
work outside the conventional channels. Direct action may compensate 
for their weak strategic location and the consumer boycott may Indeed 
be a tactic which with a well supported pressure group suggests a 
stronger strategic location. Given the earlier argument about con- 
sumer sovereignty as the rationale for capitalism, It would be highly 
appropriate If the boycott tactic were to provide greater political 
participation. A potential for pluralism through direct action by 
pressure groups seems to be Indicated. 
While the previous chapters demonstrated the case for ethical purchase 
behaviour and the need for Information provided by pressure groupsy 
this chapterv In addition to identifying the nature of pressure 
groups, shows that promotional pressure groups are In need of effec- 
tive tactics; the consumer boycott tactic seemingly particularly 
appropriate because (in an economic sense) it strengthens the group's 
strategic location and has the legitimacy of consumer sovereignty to 
justify it. Political participation can In this way be increased with 
the market at least attempting to tanswer all thingst. Pressure 
groups may then wish to assume a role In the marketing systemq for not 
only does ethical purchase behaviour need pressure groups, but 
pressure groups may need ethical purchase behaviour. 
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6.1 The Role of Pressure Groups 
6.1.1 A Paradise of Groups 
Pressure groups, at least within pluralistic Interpretations, are an 
Integral and legitimate part of the fabric of society and the politi- 
cal process. Indeedp one school of thought In political science (the 
'group theorists') claims that understanding the role of groups In 
politics Is essential to explanations of the political process, with 
Bentley going so far as to suggest, in an oft-quoted passage: "When 
the groups are adequately statedl everything Is stated. " For Bentley, 
the analysis of group activity offered a complete understanding of 
politics. And Earl Lathamq building upon thisp suggested that public 
policy Is the equilibrium reached in the struggle to accommodate 
conflicts of group Interest (3). 
In The Governmental Processo In 19519 Truman observed that: 
"Without some' working conception of the political role of 
interest groupsl their funationsg and the ways in which their 
powers are exercised, we shall not be able adequately to 
understand the nature of the political process ... The puzzle 
cannot be solved If some of the pieces are virtually Ignored. " 
Willettsv In quoting this passagev claims that It applies with equal 
force today (4). 
This emphasis on the role of groups Is the classical pluralist posi- 
tion. Kimber and Richardson, In presenting this In their Introduction 
to Pressure Groups In Britain, are bound to concede that It Is, at 
least for the momenty out of academic favour. They note that Crick is 
critical of the emphasis on politics as a process, and that for many 
it is too simplistic a viewt taking no account of other factors such 
as reaSonp logic or - dare one say It - principles. Although for 
Kimber and Richardsong many such criticisms seem to be founded on 
value judgements which question the desirability of politics based on 
imight Is right'. They temper the group theorists' claimg that the 
constant and shifting struggle between competing groups In society is 
the central feature of the political system, by suggesting that 
although there may be more to It than this, the political process can- 
not be understood without giving serious attention to the role of 
pressure groups (5). 
Pluralism Is considered furtherv later on In this chapter. Of impor- 
tance here Is the point that Political scientistsq and those of a 
pluralistic disposition In particularl ascribe a major role to 
pressure groups In the political process. 
Some pressure group analysts go further than this. Wootton's analysis 
of pressure politics In' Britain starts by considering the role of 
groups In British society - all groupsg Including the subclass of 
pressure group. He quotes Sir Ernest Barker's reference to England as 
a "paradise of groups. " He then claims that pressure groups are, like 
other groups or civil associationsp an Integral part of the fabric of 
society. In this respect he suggests that "pressure groups are essen- 
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tially the civil associations out to achieve some of their objectives 
by political means" (61 Wootton's emphasis). 
Placing pressure groups within the context of all groups In society 
Indicates the diversity of pressure groups, as well as their Impor- 
tance. The Directory of Pressure Groups and Representative 
Associations 11 organisations "that exist to promote the Interests 
of a particular group of people or to gain acceptance for a particular 
point of view, " under seventeen major categories. Seeml ngly every 
aspect of society Is represented by some group, be It the National 
Council for Civil Liberties (alms: to defend and extend civil liber- 
ties within the United Kingdom) or the British Goat Society (aims: to 
circulate knowledge and general Information about goats). This list 
of six hundred groups must only be considered a starting point. 
Excluded are those for whom promotional or representational work is 
not their primary concern; and the many groups which quickly form 
because of a specific Issue (such as the referendum on British mem- 
bership of the EEC) and just as quickly disappear, one could not 
expect to be Included, nor the multitude of local groups (7). 
It Is apparent from the above discussion that problems of definition 
are likely to abound. Groups have been shown to be a pervasive and 
central feature of Bri ti sh soci ety and poll ti cs. Yet whi le thl sIsa 
reasonable claim for the class of phenomena known as pressure groupso 
it is less meaningful to suggest this applies equally to all pressure 
groups. As can be seen from the above two examplesq different types 
of pressure group exist. Not only Is there a great diversity In terms 
of the subject of their concern, but also In the ways they exhibit 
that concern. 
Before examining these definitional problems furtherg It-is useful to 
consider political participation and the role of pressure groups. 
This, considered In the next sectionj while providing additional and 
less abstract evidence of the Importance of pressure groupsp will also 
point to the types of pressure group of most relevance to this study. 
6.1.2 Political Participation and Pressure Groups 
Poll ti cal parti cl pati on In Bri tal n amounts 9 for the most part 9 to the 
grand act of casting a vote every five years or so. A gesture which 
may be particularly futile In all but marginal constituencies within 
an electoral system that lacks proportional representation. The vast 
majority of the population seems untroubled by political concerns or, 
at least, unable to directly participate in the decisions on such mat- 
ters other than In the use of the ultimate sanction at the ballot-box. 
As Coxall reports on political participation In Britain: 
"For most peopleg voting In elections Is the sum total of their 
participation In politics. About. three-quarters of the elec- 
torate (76 percent In 1979) votes In general elections and about 40 percent In local elections ... Only a small zi norl ty of the 
population have a greater Political Involvement: a mere 5 per 
cent of the electorate are Individual members of political par- 
ties and an even smaller proportion are party 'activists'" (8). 
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Yet this need not be considered as depressing as some commentators 
clal m. As Coxall goes on to noteg most people believe - Including 
politicians - that elections make the government pay attention to 
public opinion. Moreoverp the British 
, political system as a parliamentary democracy (as opposed to a direct or populist demoracy) 
provides essentially for Indirect participation, notably through one's 
representative In parliament. 
While such mechanisms for participation, both directly and Indirectly, 
might exist, they do not dispel the Impression of mass political 
apathy. Howeverv In contrast to this, and somewhat refreshing, Is the 
growth of pressure groups; a phenomenon welcomed by academics, other 
commentators and even party politicians such as Tony Benn. 
In recent years Involvement In Political parties has declined. Coxall 
and others suggest many people have joined pressure groups Instead, 
with the 1960's and 1970's witnessing what he describes as "an 
explosion of pressure group activity. " This Is significant In that, 
as he continues "for social reformers, protesters and for those who 
simply wanted to protect their own Interestst pressure groups had 
become a genuine and attractive alternative to political parties" (9). 
Finer, using an electrical engineering analogy, has appropriately 
described pressure groups as "an auxiliary circuit of representation" 
(10). 
There arep of coursel some who express doubts about this type of poll- 
ti cal acti vi ty. Though as Wallaces historical analysis shows, it 
goes back at least as far as the eighteenth century (11), and as the 
previous section demonstrated, pressure groups are an Integral part of 
British society. What Is new however, is the growth In the number of 
pressure groups and pressure group activity In recent years. And as 
will be seen, It Is a certain type of group which has grown In numbers 
and activity, with significant consequences for political par- 
ticipation. It Is these groups In particular which are most relevant 
to this study. 
The Increase In the number of pressure groups would be difficult to 
quantify. Many groups are either too Informal, too ephemeralv or too 
local to come to sufficient prominence for measurement. Howeverg many 
writers In the area have commented on the Increase in pressure group 
activity. Marsh observes that the last twenty years have seen "a 
rapid expansion" In the number of groups, particularly those that he 
terms videologicalt groups. Referring to the first edition of the 
directory of pressure groups mentioned earlierp he notes that half of 
those organisations which gave a date of formation were formed after 
1960. Moreoverl given the concern of this section with political par- 
ticipationg he comments: "most of these new Ideological groups are 
liberal, reformist and radical - that Ist they advocate legislative 
change-in a liberal direction. There are of course exceptionsp for 
example the anti-abortion groups, but the overall pattern Is clear. " 
He suggests that the directory would Indicate that no new 'economic' 
Interest group was formed In the last twenty years which was not a 
merger of existing groups (12). 
Pym has suggested that pressure groups have at least something to do 
with the changes of the late 1960's (including the legislation on 
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aborti on and di vorce) that caused journali sts to wri te of BrI tal rf as 
the permissive societyq even If the extent of that Influence Is dif- 
ficult to estimate (13). While Wallace observes: "the emergence of 
new organisations alongside the established pressure groups of British 
politics has served to Involve a great many new people In political 
activity at a time when activity through parties has been declining, 
and as such has contributed In Itself to the democratic process" (14). 
Writers on pressure groups in the United States have also observed an 
Increase In pressure group activity. Milton Kotler writes of the 
power of organised citizen actiong observing that the contributions 
received by pressure groups exceeds the legitimate support enjoyed by 
the national political parties (15). Whereas Berryo although not 
willing to attribute the disaffection from party politics to the 
growth of pressure groups, does observe that they represent consti- 
tuencies that have been "chronically unrepresented or under- 
represented In American politics. " He suggests that "in an Increasing 
number of Issue areas, public Interest groups have become part of the 
political enviromentl and thus part of the equation that explains 
public policy outcomes" (16). 
Writers in the management area have also commented on an Increase In 
pressure group actIvItyq such as Sadler (17); and the European 
Societal Strategy Projectv under Ansoffq predicted further Increases 
(18). Although this latter group, If the observations by Kenny are 
anything to go by, would seem to be less enthusiastic about the rise 
of pressure groups. Contrary to most writers In business and society 
(admittedlyp It would seemy better Informed)f he suggests pressure 
groups are a threat to democracy rather than a vital stimulant and 
part to It (19). 
Toffler attributes the widespread disaffection from political parties 
and Ideologies, and the rise of "single-issue" groups devoted to spe- 
cial Interests or. commitments - abortion, nuclear war, feminism, 
racismo homosexual rights - to demassification. Thi sIsa rejecti on 
of mass soci ety (20). Nal sbi tt also comments on the rl se of groups 
and attributes It to similar causes In his work on megatrends (21). 
While at a more mundane and local level, the British government has 
recently extended the political curbs on the armed forces to Include 
pressure groupsy because "Ministers and senior officials are 
understood to be concerned about the growth of groups such as CND and 
Greenpeace, or even animal welfare organisationsg which do not fit 
neatly Into the description "political organisation or party" on which 
they have traditionally relied when defining limits to the activities 
of Crown servants and armed forces personnel" (22). 
Finally, pressure group activists have also documented the Increase In 
pressure group activity and the Importance of this for political par- 
ticipation. Des Wilson, reputedly Britain's best-knownt most 
experienced and effective campaigner, former Director of Shelter and 
involved with other prominent pressure groups (including CLEAR, 
Friends of the Earth and the 1984 Committee for Freedom of 
Information), has referred to the "mushrooming" of pressure group 
activities In the 1960's and subsequently, suggesting that the role of 
pressure groups Is to tguard the guardst (23). 
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The growth of direct political Involvement through pressure group 
activity is generally welcomed by those favouring pluralism. However, 
before considering the Implications of this growth in terms of 
pressure group Influence In the marketplace, It Is necessary to con- 
sider what Is meant by the term pressure group and the types of 
pressure group that exist. 
Pressure group terminology Is examined In the next section together 
with the targets of pressureq for the terminology employed In the 
literature makes a somewhat suspect assumption on this. Part 6.2 then 
considers a typology or pressure groups, Identifying the type of group 
most relevant to this study. 
6.1.3 Pressure Group Terminology and Targets 
Despite an established and long-standing role for pressure groupst the 
term pressure group carries unfortunate associations. It Is popularly 
used In an emotional and derogatory way that denies the role of such 
groups. It Is all but a term of abuse for the Ill-Informed - Kenny's 
denigration of pressure groups, referred to aboveg Is an apt illustra- 
tion of this. 
Woottong In noting the tendency of the term to raise hackles, refers 
to an Instance where a leading TUC official objected to the TUC being 
referred to as a pressure group (24). Other writers In the area make 
similar observations, and Roberts attributes the "unsavoury overtones" 
associated with the term to the lurid exposures of the concealed 
Influence of pressure groups on political decisions. Yet, he goes on 
to suggest "in attempting to describe and analyse the workings of the 
British political processp It Is Impossible to Ignore the extent to 
which It relies on non-party groups, and It Is almost equally dif- 
ficult to avoid employment of the terms lobby, pressure-group and 
interest" (25). 
The term and notion of a pressure group Is particularly emotive and 
threatening to those of an Individualist (rather than collectivist) 
disposition. Such a response Is In fear of an organised group within 
society furthering Its Interests against the 'general will'. As 
Mackenzie notes In reference to Bentley, the term pressure is linked 
to power "repugnant to most people, If only because they believe that 
'power' Is always exercised by someone else, and never by themselves" 
(26). This view Is expressed either In rejection or Ignorance of 
pluralistic models of politics, In the belief that politics Is or 
should be conducted by reason alone. As was observed in section 
6.1.1, critics of pluralistic models object that such models do not 
allow much scope for reason playing a part In decision-making, but few 
would actually dispute the part played by Interests or groups. Those 
opposed to pressure groups In fear of their subversion of the 'general 
will, (whatever that may be), must accept that such groups will exist 
and have Influencep although such fears are accounted for In plura- 
lism. Moreoverv as the typology of pressure groups will reveal, many 
such critics are likely to belong to at least one pressure group. As 
Rose notesq approximately half the electorate belong to one or more 
organisatlons which sometimes seek to Influence British government 
(27). 
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Hencel although pressure groups are a central feature of the political 
4 
process and many of the population are members of pressure groups, 
they are viewed with suspicion. This writer would also suggest that 
some of the more recent antipathy towards the term and notion of 
pressure groups Is related to, as Marsh has observed (and was noted In 
the previous section)t the rise of 'ideological' groups of a liberal 
and radical disposition. Current popular usage of the term pressure 
group Is more usually In reference to (and derision of) the 'woolly 
hat brigade' at Greenham, Common, than the sober-suited gentlemen of 
the Confederation of British Industry. In a similar veing Mrs 
Whitehouse has criticised the Influence of pressure groups, not 
reallsing that her organisationg the National Viewers and Listeners, 
Associationg Is Itself a pressure group. 
The discussion of the scope and Importance of pressure groups Indica- 
tes the difficulty In providing a comprehensive definition that goes 
beyond the somewhat loose definitions taken from Wootton and Shipley 
and employed up to this point. Both authors do provide tighter 
defiriltionsl but not definitions that prove satisfactory for this 
study. However, If only to add temporary clarity, It Is worth giving 
Shipley's tighter definition here: "A pressure group ... Is an asso- 
ciation of Individuals joined together by a common Interest, beliefl 
activity or purpose that seeks to achieve its objectives, further its 
Interests and enhance Its status In relation to other groups, by 
gaining the approval and co-operation of authority in the form of 
favourable policiesp legislation and conditions" (28). 
Yet the foregoing discussion has also revealed a multiplicity of terms 
used to describe such associations: pressure group, Interest group, 
lobbyg and public-interest group. Roberts distinguishes between lobby 
and pressure group by suggesting that the former Is organised and 
operated solely for the purposes of political influence on a specific 
matter, whereas a pressure group has political functions alongside its 
other functl ons. This distinction Is Imprecise and the terms are 
often used Interchangeably. Professor Finer, An his highly regarded 
but now dated work on pressure groups (Anonymous Emplre)9 expresses a 
preference for the term lobby because It does not Imply that some 
sanction will be applied if a demand is refused and because most 
groups, In contrasty simply make requests. Yet as others have noted, 
pressure can involve more than just the use of sanctions. 
The term Interest group suggests economic Interests to an undue 
extent. While the term public-interest group Implies the group Is 
representative of the public as a whole, but as Weldenbaum and others 
have notedg this may be far from accurate (29). It also excludes 
groups based on economic Intersts. So the term employed here, and 
most widely used In the British context, is therefore pressure group; 
a term Indicative of the role of the group (30). Lobby will be used 
as In Marsh to refer to a coalition of Interests (including pressure 
groups), whereas pressure group refers to a specific formal 
orgardsatlon. 
The term lobby Is also particularly Inappropriate herep In reference 
to an organisation, because of its association with group attempts to 
I nfluence government. For the most partl the concern here is with 
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attempts to Influence corporate behaviour. This points to a major 
weakness in much of the pressure group literature. While power In 
society may ultimately rest with government, It Is in the first 
Instance highly dispersed, and notably In the hands of business, as 
the previous two chapters demonstrated. Yet the notion that power 
exists outside governmentg and In corporations In particularg does not 
seem to have been appreciated by many political writers In this area 
(31). Consequently, the target for pressure group activity Is in 
almost every case assumed to be government. 
So Wootton defines pressure groups as "those (not counting political 
parties) that Influence or attempt to Influence the public authorl- 
tiesp mainly the central government" (32). Of course, the failing of 
such a definition - and It Is not unique to Wootton (33) - Is the 
assumption that such groups seek only to Influence public authorities. 
As the evidence presented later shows, there are many groups that try 
to Influence corporate behaviour and this Is Increasingly the case. 
Such an omission cannot be simply attributed to the recent growth In 
pressure group activity. Trade unions as pressure groups have long 
sought to Influence business (employers), indeed It is their primary 
role. Yet this Is seemingly not within the scope of definitions of 
pressure group activity (34). Moreoverg while many pressure groups 
will wish to see their alms translated Into action by governmentg they 
may still have aims which require influencing corporate behaviour or 
find It expedient to have corporations as a target In the short-tem. 
Corporations may also be targets for pressure-group activity for 
publicity purposesp within a long-term aim of Influencing government 
through the motivation of public opinion. 
One notable exception to this failing In the literature Is Kimber and 
Richardson. In their Introductiong they emphasise that not all 
pressure group activity Is directed towards influencing goverment 
policy. They cite, In Illustrationg the campaign waged by the parents 
of Thalidomide children directed primarily at the drug's manufacturers 
and the activities of Friends of the Earth over mining In Snowdonia 
directed at the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation (35). It Is also 
Interesting to note that Nader, In the Foreword to Wilson's guide to 
pressure group activityp refers to action directed at corporate as 
well as governmental Institutions, and parties (36). Thi s reflects 
what seems to be a greater American awareness of power in society. 
Pressure group activity seemsp at least for the moment, not only more 
prevalent In the United States, but also directed at a greater variety 
of targets than In Britain, as Vogel's work indicates (37). 
Pressure group targets are considered further In 6.3. Howeverl as 
yety the definitional problems surrounding pressure groups have not 
been resolved. They can only be adequately dealt with, as far as this 
study Is concerned, by considering a typology of pressure groups. 
This Is the subject of Part 6.2. 
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6.2 A Typology of Pressure Groups 
6.2.1 Sectional and Promotional Pressure Groups 
The question 'What Is a pressure group? f cannot be simply answered. A 
single definition Is Inadequate. The question can best be approached 
by considering the various types of groups -a taxonomy. This chapter 
may then focus on the characteristics of the particular types of 
pressure group relevant to the study. 
Mackenzie observes that groups can be Identified by the type of 
interest at stake, the type of body whose decision Is Influenced (the 
pressure group target), the Internal structure of the organisation, 
and the methods It uses (38). Howeverp the dominant criterion used Is 
the type of Interest at stake. This Is perhaps because all the other 
criteria seem to stem from this. 
Coxall distinguishes between two types of pressure group: the 'leading 
Interest' or tsectionalt groups, and the 'promotionaltp 'cause' or 
lattitudet groups. This distinction is found throughout the litera- 
ture In the former groups "membership Is based on the performance of 
a speclic economic role: for exampleg work as a miner or a company 
director. Sectional groups 'proteett the Interests of their members. " 
Whereasp promotional groups "are held together by a shared attitude; 
they seek to promote a particular cause; Shelter and the Child Poverty 
Action Group are good examples" (39). As Kimber and Richardson put 
it: "Sectional pressure groups seek to protect the Interests of a 
particular section of socletyq while promotional pressure groups seek 
to promote causes arising from a given set of attitudes" (40, their 
emphasis). 
This distinctiong while found throughout the literature, Is not always 
made employing the same terms. In his historical analysis of pressure 
groupsy Wallace distinguishes between those moved by self-interest and 
those moved by I deall sm. He refersl In Illustration, to the issues 
and groups organised over free trade and the right to combine In trade 
unions, as a nineteenth century example of the former category. 
Groups organised for the abolition of the slave trade Is an eighteenth 
century example of the latter category. Such examples both support 
his claim about the long-standing nature of pressure group activity 
(he suggests many pressure group causes and methods would be familiar 
to a nineteenth century activist, only the context of group activity 
has changed)v and this typological distinction In particular (41). 
In Pressure Politics (a 1983 publication claimed to be the first full 
analysis for over a decade of the Influence and Importance of pressure 
groups In British politics), Marsh Identifies similar historical ori- 
gins and distinctions to pressure groups, although he employs a con- 
tinuum of pressure group types from the powerful 'economic' groups 
such as the British Medical Association (BMA) and the National Farmers 
Uniony to the single-issue 'ideological' groupsp such as the abortion 
lobby. - He writes "Economic Interest groups protect and promote the 
specific economic Interests of their membersp while Ideological groups 
promote or defend legislative or administrative change for ideological 
reasons rather than to forward their memberst particular financial 
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Interests. " (Note again the restriction of pressure group activity to 
the Influencing of public authorities. ) 
Of course, the typology falls down In the Implication that groups such 
as the BHA are not In some sense Ideological, but the notion of a con- 
tinuum Is useful even If one has to accept that the term economic or 
Ideological only refers to the group's primary characteristic. It 
does at least avoid the artificial boundaries one has with discrete 
categories (42). 
Marsh's typology differs little from the promotional/sectional 
distinction found elsewhere. But there are weaknesses to this. 
Recognising the inadequacy of this two-fold classification, RT 
Mckensle suggests three categories: sectional groups, promotional 
groupsg and all other groups (43). A rather more helpful contribution 
is that by Willetts. He examines the role of pressure groups In the 
global systemg suggesting they have a significant Impact trans- 
nationally as well as nationally (44). In so doing, he offers a typo- 
logy which employs the promotional/sectional distinctiong but 
Identifies different types of group within each category. There are 
eight Ideal types (in the Weberian sense), three sectional groups: 
Sectional economic groupsq Including companiesq financial Insti- 
tutions and trade unions. 
2. Professional associationsl including the professional bodies of 
doctors, nursesq teachers, etc. (but not the CBI or TUC, who are 
Included in the former category). 
Recreational clubsj Includingo for examplej the Boy Scouts World 
Bureau and the World Association of Girl Guides. 
There are then five types of promotional pressure groups: 
4. Welfare agencies, including charities (45)p trusts, and 
foundations. 
Religious organisations. 
Communal groups, those that arise within a distinct segment of 
society, from the Welsh Language Society to women's groups. 
Political parties, which he admits are normally considered 
di sti nct from pressure groups (because they do not seek to 
control goverment by contesting elections (46))p but Includes 
because In practice the distinction belles the behaviour of such 
groups, Many groups claim to be political parties but have 
little chance of achieving office and essentially employ pressure 
group tactIcsj for example, the National Front. 
Speci fl c-I ssue promoti onal groups "the groups whi ch most readl ly 
spring to mind when the term tpressure groupt 13 usedj" such as 
the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (47). 
While this Indicates the pervasiveness and diversity of pressure group 
activityp It Is perhaps a little broad. In essencep Willetts Includes 
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all civil associations. Many would reject this because of the Inclu- 
sion of groups whose prime purpose Is not political Influence and 
. who 
may only on occasion, If everp have such a purpose. Howeverp all 
these groups could Indulge In pressure group activity and such an all- 
embracing typology no doubt provides support for his thesis about the 
transnational Impact of pressure groups. Willetts concedes overlap 
between his categories butp for the most part, It Is the groups within 
his last category that are of relevance here. His comments on such 
groups are worth noting: 
By the nature of their workv specific-issue groups are likely to 
be challenging orthodoxy. Often they are either raising new 
Issues, which have not before appeared on the political agenda, 
or are trying to change the way existing issues are handled. 
Thus they usually concentrate on Influencing public opinion and 
the media and so they become household names" (48). 
Agalng there Is perhaps an undue, If only Implicitp emphasis on the 
public authorities as the ultimate target of pressure group activity. 
But the part played by public opinion In the achievement of pressure 
group alms Is widely acknowledged and will be considered further In 
6-3. 
Howeverv Willetts' tyPologY9 although more comprehensive than others 
considered (perhaps too comprehensive), Is not particularly robust. 
Groups differ In the extent to which they are 'political', In par- 
ti cular. Some may only rarely, If at all, exert pressure and be 
pressure groups In that sense. This Is not clear from Willetts' typo- 
logy and definitional problems remain. The National Council for Civil 
Liberties and the British Goat Society, to refer to the earlier 
examplesq would come under category eight but they are substantially 
different. It Is such promotional groups as Identified by this cate- 
gory which are of most Interest here. Woottonts typology Is required 
to resolve this Issue of degree of political speciallsation. This is 
examined In the next section. 
6.2.2 Wootton's Typology 
This typology Is less Inexact than that abovep recognising that the 
political Involvement of some groups may be greater than that Of 
others. Wootton starts with the distinction between 'interest' and 
'ideal groupsq which he attributes to Harwood Childs of PrIncetont and 
dates back to 1935. He then observes that Potter's late 1950s deve- 
lopment of this Is the most Influential classification in Britain. 
Th1sq again, Is the promotional/sectional distinction: "sectional 
groups (whom one stands for), and programmatic or promotional groups 
(what one stands for) .. congruent not only with Childs' 
(distinction) ... but with the one drawn by the groups themselves bet- 
ween organizations of and organisations for" (49, Wootton's emphasis). 
But the groups wl thl n each of these categorl es may not only di ff er In 
terms of political Involvement (he contrastsq In Illustration, the 
National Farmers Union and the Tomato and Cucumber Growers 
Association)v but also some ostensibly promotional groups may have a 
distinctly sectional character. These are elsewhere referred to as 
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Figure 6.1 ., Wootton's Typology of Pressure Groups 
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lanchoredlp for although they may present themselves as promotional 
groupsq they are grounded In and financed by sectional ones. Some 
groups are more discreet (misleading) about their anchorage than 
othersp a prominent example being the Genetic Study Unitq found to be 
closely tied, to many people's surprise, to London Rubber Industries. 
Wootton's typology takes account of this. 
His typology Is expressed as a two by two matrix, as shown In Figure 
6.1. One dimension accounts for the political Involvement of the 
groupp the degree of political specialisation. The other dimension 
accounts for whether the group Is 'of' and 'for', or simply 'for?, 
which Is the degree of openness of membership. Examples of each cate- 
gory and a title for each category are shown In Figure 6.1. 
Anchored groups are Included with the parent group. So Transport 
2000, for example, would be Included with the NatJonal Union of 
RaIlwaymen (NUR) "on the assumption that those who pay the piper call 
the tune. " Also worth noting Is the Inclusion of the Wing Airport 
Resistance Association (WARA) and the Welsh Language Society under 
cell two. Although this cell In Its closed membership dimension 
approximates to the sectional group classification, these groups 
become Included contrary to other analystsq because with distinctive 
local rootsl and In defence of their territory they will be more like 
? off than 'for? groups (50). 
Wootton refers to the groups In the bottom row as 'self-created', as 
opposed to the top row of 'given' groups. And, in confirmation of 
Marsh and Wallacep cited earlier, he suggests only cell three Is a 
recent developmentp with the other types of groups existing at least 
as early as the end of the eighteenth century (51). He suggests cell 
three groups have arisen from the perceived solidary (intrinsic rather 
than Instrumental) benefits. 
Wootton's typology resolves the definitional problems which plagued 
much of the earlier discussion of pressure groups. It has been noted 
that the promotional or Ideological type of group Is of most concern 
here (thoughg as will later be seen, sectional groups also become 
Involved In Influencing purchase behaviour In the marketplace)v and 
within Wootton's typology9 It Is particularly the groups that come 
under cell four. These groups he terms propagational. Having con- 
sidered pressure groups In general, It Is appropriate to consider the 
characteristics of the type of group relevant to this study, given 
that adequate distinctions can now be made. This Is the subject of 
the next. and last section In 6.2. 
6.2.3 Promotional Pressure Groups 
While sectional pressure groups will be seen to be of some relevance 
to the. studyp they do not warrant a detailed analysis. Of greater 
concern are the promotional pressure groups. Wootton's typology forms 
the basi s for the study , but as an academl c schema ,It does not say a 
great deal about the groups' characteristics. Rather than refer to 
his discussion of groups In Illustration of his typologyv a rounder 
picture can be gained of the groups of Interest here by considering 
Wilson's description of what he terms "our kind of group" (52). 
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Further detail on the characteristics of promotional pressure groups, 
and to a lesser extent, sectional pressure groups, will emerge 
throughout the remainder of the chapter. 
Wilson makes It clear that Pressure Is a thow to do It' book. It Is 
In this sense, In stark contrast to the academic material considered 
so far (53). But given his pedigree as a campaigner for nearly twenty 
years, and the nature of promotional pressure groups as a grass-roots 
phenomenon and therefore accessible to the populace at largey this 
work Is appropriate for Inclusion here. It Is also well-written and 
while avoiding the excessive use of jargon In some of the academic 
analysesp confi rms many of the points they make. 
Wilson writes about and for promotional pressure groups. There are 
the groups which, as Willetts noted and was referred to above, spring 
most readily to mind when the term pressure group Is used. They are 
the groups to which one Is making reference when the term pressure 
group is used In everyday language. They are the groups which have 
become Increasingly more numerous, more prominent and perhaps even 
more influential over the past twenty years. They are the groups 
which provide scope for political participation and to which an 
Increasing number of the population are turning for this reason. And 
finallyq they are the groups which tend to be lambasted by the popular 
press because of their liberal and sometimes radical position andy as 
this writer earlier suggested, figure largely In the current emotive 
response to the term pressure group because of this. It Is perhaps 
because many of these groups are on the fringes of respectability that 
they are given less attention In the academic literature than the sec- 
tional groups. Although It seems more likely that this Is due to the 
shortage of work on pressure groups In general In recent years (recall 
the claim made for Marsh's book earlier) - the period of ascendancy 
for promotional groups - and the greater Influence of sectional groups 
(54). 
Wilson makes the distinction beween sectional and promotional groups, 
using these terms and others. His preference seems to- be for the 
terms which Indicate the former groups as 'bad' and the latter groups 
as 'good'. Although he Is In keeping with Mackenzie in the use of the 
distinction 'selfish' and 'do-gooders' (55). This is indicative of 
what might be termed the caring characteristic of promotional groups. 
As Wilson puts it: 
"Because when we talk of pressure groups we mean our ki nd, we 
speak of pressure groups approvingly and positively ... 
Wo-we'verg 
we are only one kind of pressure group and often we are the least 
effective. For It Is not only the poor who have pressure groups 
- so do -the rich; not only the environmentalists and conser- 
vationists - so do the polluters and the squanderers of 
resources; not only the civil libertarians - so do the forces of 
authoritarianism. Thus ... there are two kinds of pressure 
groups - those whose motivation Is a concern for the health and 
wellbeing of the community, and who usually campaign to change or 
improve priorities or policiest and those with vested Anterestsp 
whose cause Is usually maintenance of the status-quot or 
furtherance of policies beneficial to themp Irrespective of the 
implications for the community (56, Wilson's emphasis). 
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This position, Identifying the sectional groups as 'self-regarding' 
and the promotional groups as 'other-regarding' (57), although not 
usually expressed In such forthright termsp does find support within 
the academic literature. Howeverg one must be wary of the claim of 
such groups - when self-appointed - to represent the community. In 
particularg there Is the criticism of the middle-class bias of promo- 
tional groups. One must consider whether their campaigns to change 
priorities or policies are a reflection of community concerng or class 
Interests and priorities. For example, conservation of green-belt 
areas may be at the loss of low-densi ty housing; or the costs of the 
prevention of environmental pollution such as acid rain from coal- 
burning power stationsp may In being passed on to all consumers have 
to be borne by those who would, voluntarily, have chosen to spend 
their money In other ways (58). 
Wilson's preferred term for his kind of pressure group Is fcommunity/ 
cause' pressure group. Within thisp he Identifies three categories: 
Single-Issue pressure groupst having one objective or seeking to 
further one particular cause. For example, CLEARt Its sole aim 
Is to reduce and If possible eliminate lead pollution. 
2. Issue s-I n-context pressure groups, pursuing a number of objec- 
tives or Issues but ýdthln an overall context. For example , Friends of the Earth. 
Practice-based pressure groups, these may be either of the above 
categories but, In additiong have aid or direct service In their 
make-up. For example, aI charl ty-cum-pres sure group' such as 
Shelter, which provides direct assistance to the homeless in 
addition to campaigning (59). 
This does not prove to be a robust classification, but It does indi- 
cate tendencies and Is useful for this reason as will be seen. 
In the earlier quote, Wilson makes the point about the limited effec- 
tiveness of promotional pressure groups. Later, he writes of the 
distinction between the 'Davids' and the 'Gollathst: 
"The advantage, In terms of moneyp economic and relative 
strengthy Is heavily weighted to the powerful pressure groups* 
As a resultj the pressure groups for whom this book Is Intended 
-those of and for the communi ty - are more often than not the 'Davids' involved In an unequal fight with Industrial or govern- 
mental 'Gollaths'" (60). 
It Is this limited effectiveness of promotional groups, and their part 
In political participationt which makes the consumer boycott tactic 
particularly worthy of study. It As argued In this study and 
elsewhereq that greater use could be made of thl s tactl a, and ItAs 
especially appropriate for promotional groups with their limited 
resources. Gi ven more such resources , promoti onal pressure groups 
could be more effecti ve and contri bute to poll ti cal parti cl pati on In 
the way Wilson suggests In the quote given In the Preview to this 
chapter (61). 
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Part 6.39 In looking at the avenues of pressure, will consider promo- 
tional pressure group effectiveness In more detail. 
210 
6.3 The Avenues of Pressure 
6.3.1 'Insider' and 'Outsider' Status 
The avenues available to pressure groups by which they may attempt to 
exert influence will vary according to the type of group. Group stra- 
tegies and tactics will then vary in accord with this. As Roberts puts 
It: "leaders of groups act on the basis of a 'target structurely Ie., 
an appreciation of the most suitable parts of the political system on 
which to exert Influence or 'pressuret" (62). 
Of particular Importance Is whether the group has 'insider' or 
'outsider' status. PyM suggests this Is the most Important dividing 
line between groups. She distinguishes between In-groups and out- 
groups as follows: 
"Out-groups are out because they propagandise for unpopular 
causes or minority Interests, or because they are judged unrepre- 
sentative of those they claim to speak for. In-groups, that Is 
to say those readily and regularly admitted to consultations with 
government departments, may derive their legitimacy from their 
Indispensability to the economy, because they speak for accep- 
table causes like animal or child welfare or because, like church 
groups, they have become over the years simply part of the 
British way of life" (63). 
As a general rulep sectional groups have Insider status, while promo- 
tional groups have outsider status. This difference In access to 
decision-makers Is no doubt what prompts Wilson - as a spokesperson for outsider groups - to distinguish between the two types by saying 
that "the 'outsiders' threaten 'the system' Itself, whereas the 
'insiders' are more likely to wish to strengthen the status-quo. " He 
goes on to refer to Benewick's three tworlds' of pressure groups, 
where each 'world' has a different degree of access (64). It Is more 
complex than this however. 
Coxall refers to groups which are legitimisedl that Is recognised by 
goverment as having the right to be consulted. The basi s of thi s 
recognition, he suggests, Is the representativeness of the group and 
the cases of rival groups claiming to speak for the same Interest. 
But in exchange for recognition, restraint and moderation is expected 
of the group. A rare exception to this being the National Union of 
Students, a group maintaining an aggressive and critical stance but 
still seen as legitimised. The benefits of recognition for the group 
are the opportunities to Influence policy or, at leastt gain advance 
Information about governments' Intentions. The goverment benefits 
from getting advice and informationg acquiescence In, or even assent 
to, their proposalso and possibly assistance In the administration of 
policy (65). 
Finer has suggested three principal avenues of pressureq approached by 
groups In sequence. These are the executive, parliament and public 
opinion. The sequence, It is suggested, Is reversed for promotional 
groups. This Is due to the Insider/outsider status differences of 
sectional as against promotional groupsl discussed above. Indeedv one 
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can rationallse such a sequence by presuming that while recognition 
for sectional groups is almost always automatically conferred because 
of the resources available to them (as examined In Part 6.4), 
promotional roups are required to demonstrate the need for recognition 
of their case by first mobilising public and then parliamentary opi- 
nion. According to such a modell promotional pressure groups thereby 
become legitimised and acquire Insider status, and therefore potential 
Influence with the executive. Sectional groups, on the other hand, 
need not necessarily lose their Insider status when they turn from the 
executivep to parliament and then public opinion. While thisis a 
possibilityp the move may only be as a means of demonstrating support 
for their position In their dealings with the executive or perhaps 
done In concert with the executiveg as critics of corporatism would 
presumep so as to maintain a show of democracy. 
Yet againg howeverv the reality of pressure group activity Is probably 
more complex than thisp despite the face validity of such a model. 
Kimber and Richardson, having described Finer's model, contend that 
pressure group activity Is generally much more complicated than this 
and that such a straightforward scheme only applies In some cases, 
with many groups trying to use several avenues simultaneously (66). 
The model Is based quite safely though, on the inevitable differences 
In status of pressure groups, and particularly promotional groups as 
compared with sectional groups. It can perhaps be most appropriately 
seen as a distinction between ease of access for any particular group, 
of different avenues of pressure. This may In turn Influence the 
emphasis rather than the sequence of pressure group activity. 
Yet, as the next section suggestsl there may be another avenue of 
pressure worth considering. 
6.3.2 Corporations as an Avenue of Pressure 
Coxall observesq reaffirming the quote at the beginning of the last 
section from Roberts: "if they are to succeedg pressure groups must 
clearly understand how power Is distributed In society" (67). 
Somewhat disconcertingg is that having made this remarkv Coxall then 
refers solely to pressure group attempts to Influence government. 
Business powerv both Independent of and In relation to government 
(68), goes unrecognised. Even Kimber and Richardsong although as pre- 
viously notedv having recognised that business may be a target for 
pressure group activityv fail to provide any explanation or justifica- 
tion for such a target. Business power Independent of government was 
adequately demonstrated In the previous two chapters. Hence, It Is 
proposed here that there are four principal avenues of pressure: the 
executivev the legislature (parliament), public opinion and cor- 
poratiqns (69). 
Corporations are an avenue of pressure In the sense that action 
Involving corporations may spur them In to acting In support of 
legislative demands by lobbying on behalf of the groupq or by lobbying 
on the group's behalf as a complement to the group's own lobbying 
activities. So the groups employ the Insider status of business (see 8.1.4 and the discussion of American civil rights and anti-war pro- 
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testsy for example). Alternatively, of courseq corporations arp a 
target of pressure group activity not so as to reallse any Indirect 
Influence with the executive (as an ultimate target), but simply to 
achieve changes In corporate behaviour. That Ist the corporation Is 
both the avenue and ultimate target of pressure group activity. 
Having the corporation as an avenue for pressure group activity Is due 
not only to Its Independent power and its potential Influence, but 
also to the limited access available for most promotional groups to 
other avenues. Marsh observes that the late 1960ts and early 1970's 
saw a formallsation of Interest group representation with a distinct 
move away from the use of parliamentt and parties In particular, as 
the channel of access to government. Thist he suggests (and Is sup- 
ported by Des Wilson In this), Is due to disappointment with the 
Labour Party. This period of rapid growth In the number of promo- 
tional pressure groups seemst at least in partp attributable to the 
failings of the Labour Party to Implement policies promised on various 
'causest. (Although pressure groups try to avoid being too closely 
linked with any particular partyl so that they may try to have 
dealings with whichever party Is In governmentq the tendency Is to 
have closer links with the Labour Party because of the greater com- 
patibility on the whole of promotional pressure group causes and 
Labour Party policy (70). ) While it may be Incorrect to suggest 
access was limited, It seems reasonable to claim that Influence was 
limited. But If radical policies cannot be achieved through parties 
directlyv can they be achieved via pressure groups? 
The problem Is that radical groups are unlikely to be afforded Insider 
status. Moreover, they may not even want Ity In fear of being co- 
opted orp as Marsh puts It "concerned about the possible emasculation 
of their radicalism If they become too closely Involved with 
government. " He suggests this leaves little alternative but to try 
and Influence publicq or rather elite opiniong "a strategy which In 
most cases had limited effect" (71). 
This discussion of the avenues of pressure seems depressing from the 
promotional pressure group perspective. Of the three principal ave- 
nues of pressure traditionally Identified, they seem for the most 
part v to be able only to rely on publi a opi nI on. Whi le government 
action may be Influenced by public opiniono this Is not always the 
case, as shown In the abolition of capital punishment and the lifting 
of restrictions on homosexual relations - both without the support at 
least Initially of the majority of the public (72) - and, more 
recentlyp the siting of cruise missiles In this country (discussed in 
Part Three of the thesis). The Identification of corporations as a 
fourth principal avenue of pressure may be a cause for some optimism. 
it could be that the Increasing emphasis on pressure group activity 
directed at corporations reflects both a recognition of their power 
but also the access difficulties with the other avenues. 
The limited Influence of promotional pressure groups Is a function of 
their resources. This Is the subject of Part 6.4. 
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6.4 Pressure Group Resources 
6.4.1 Commltmentq Cohesion and Strategic Location 
The executive Is the ultimate target of pressure group activity In 
most analyses of pressure group behaviour. It Is there that the most 
Important decisions are takeng and although some pressure groups have 
achieved their alms through parliament directly, as In the use of pri- 
vate members' bills, this Is often subject to the assistance or at 
least passive approval of the executive (known as 'withinput'), as Illustrated by the 1967 legislation on abortion and homosexual rela- 
ti ons (73) - The avenues of parliament and public opinion are pri- 
marily employed to bring pressure to bear on the executive indirectly. 
Access to these avenues of pressure depends upon pressure group 
resources* 
Rose Identifies three major resources of pressure groups: commitment, 
organi sati onal cohesi on 9 and strategi a locati on. Commitment of mem- 
bers is one of a pressure groupts most important resources because the 
greater It Is "the more confident a groupts leaders can be that they 
speak with a united mmbership behind them and that any bargain reached 
ýdth government will be accepted by the group Itself. " Cohesion is 
important because the "more durablel the more frequento the more 
numerousp and the more Intense the contacts among Individualsp the 
easier they are to organise for cohesive political action. " The cohe- 
sive groups are preferred by Whitehall for this reason. 
Commitment and cohesion can be Influenced by the group's efforts. 
Strategic locationg howeverp depends on the group's activities. "An 
organisation occupies a strong strategic position If it commands 
resources - energyt money or food - that are Indispensable to the con- 
duct of a society. " Various factors affect the degree of strength of 
the group's position, notably whether It Is a monopoly in the provi- 
sion of a service (contrastj for example, the railway workers and the 
power workers)y and whether it provides a professional service with 
professional norms which may Inhibit exploitation of its monopoly 
positiont as with doctorsp nurses and teachers. (Though professional 
groups can at least claim a monopoly of knowledge on matters of their 
professional concerng knowing more than generalist policitians and 
civil servants) (74). 
Rose suggests the resources of money, votes and publicity "are of 
relatively limited Importance In England, " an assertion which Is cer- 
tainly contentiousp If not naive. He accepts that money can ensure 
that an organisation exists and is necessary to employ experts to pre- 
sent the group's ease with technical Issuesp but argues that money does not buy favours from parties or MP's "It is given openly In 
recognition of mutual Interests. " This Is a reasonable position on 
first Inspectiong but questionable when examined more closely. Putting aside the Issue of monetary Influence of parties and MP's (if 
the relationship between the Labour Party and the trade union movement Isn't sufficient In Itself to dismiss such an argument), Rose quite 
simply understates the Importance of money for effective pressure 
group organisationg research and activities. This Is particularly the 
case with promotional pressure groups as Wilsonp and others have 
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argued (75). Of coursev the welfare activities of the practice-based 
pressure groups are entirely dependent on Income, but as the anti- 
nuclear power lobby has foundl advancing a particular argument may 
also depend on financial resourcesl especially at public Inquiries 
(76). 
As for votes 9 Marsh and Chambers show that , at least for the anti - 
abortion lobby, while publishing a list of the past voting records on 
the Issue of MP's standing for re-election had a minor effect on elec- 
tion voting patterns at mostq It did at least politicise MP's on the 
issue and possibly Incline wavering 14P's to abstain or vote for 
amending legislation on the Issue when elected (77). However, It Is 
Rose's dismissal of publicity which Is most suspect (and, of course, 
money plays a part In this). Promotional pressure groups, as shown, 
have frequently little option but to attempt to Influence public opl- 
nion, for which publicity Is required. The section 6.4-39 which exa- 
mines the role of public opinion, cites case studies of pressure group 
activity where publicity was shown to be vital to pressure group suc- 
cess. 
Before considering In more detail public opinion as an avenue of 
pressurey It Is useful to look further at pressure group resources. 
In particularp It Is worth considering the disparity between sectional 
groups and promotional groups. This lends weight to the discussion 
about the Importance of public opinion and the potential importance of 
corporations as an avenue of pressureq and Is the subject of the next 
section. 
6.4.2 Sectional and Promotional Groups Compared 
Pressure group commitment and cohesiong as resources over which the 
group may have some Influence, are worth considering together. There 
Is a substantial body of literature exploring the benefits of pressure 
group membership. Olsong In what Is commonly regarded as a seminal 
work9 questions why people join pressure groups when there are costs 
associated with membership but the benefits are collective and will be 
received by the Individual, as a member or otherwise. He argues that 
the logic of collective action Is such that, 
ff... unless the number of Individuals In a group Is quite small, 
or unless there Is coercion or some other special device to make 
Individuals act In their common Interestv ratIonalL_ self- 
interested Individuals will not act to achieve their common or 
group Interests. In other words9 even If all of the individuals 
In a large group are rational and self-interested, and would gain 
if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common Interest or 
objective, they will still not voluntarily act to achieve that 
common or group Interest" (789 Olson's emphasis). 
Thisp of coursel contradicts the conventional wisdom that groups of 
Individuals with common Interests usually attempt to further those 
common Interests. As Olson showst this argument Is based on the 
assumption that Individuals In groups act out of self-Interset, but Is 
flawed in presuming that groups will act In their self-interest as a 
consequence. Such a presumption Is dubious because all the Indivi- 
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duals In a group would gain If the group objective were achieved, 
regardless of the Input by any specific Individual. Hence "The notion 
that groups of Individuals will act to achieve their common or group 
Interestsp far from being a logical Implication of the assumption 
that the Individuals In a group will rationally further their 
Individual Interestsv Is In fact Inconsistent with that assumption" 
(79). 
Obviously groups do act to further group Interests. Olson's explana- 
tion for this behaviour Is that the motivation lies not In the 
recognition of group Interestsq but In the selective Incentives also 
offered by groups. However "The only organizations that have 
"selective Incentives" available are those that (1) have the authority 
and capacity to be coercive, or (2) have a source of positive Induce- 
ments that they can offer the Individuals In a latent group" (80). 
Such Incentives are available to pressure groups such as unions, the 
large economic groups. Indeed, understanding of Olson's argument 
reveals the Importance to unions of closed shop agreements and the 
extent of the threat to union power posed by current moves to end such 
agreements (Olson suggests some form of compulsory membership Is 
Indispensable to union survival in most cases). 
Few such Incentives are available to what Olson terms the 'forgotten 
groups' **. 
the unorgani zed group - the group that has no lobby and 
ta es no acti on. Groups of thi s ki nd fI t the mai n argument of 
thi s book best of all. They Illustrate its central point: that 
large or latent groups have no tendency voluntarily to act to 
further their common Interests" (81). 
Such groups, he claims, are amongst the largest groups in the nation 
and with the most vital common Interests , while exerting no pressure. 
He cites In Illustration taxpayers, consumers and the "multitudes with 
an Interest In peace. " The weakness of consumers In this respect is 
particularly Important within the context of this thesis and Is 
explored In detail later. Suffice to note here, Olson's general 
observation on these groups: "Only when groups are smallp or when they 
are fortunate enough to have an Independent source of selective Incen- 
tIvesy will they organize or act to achieve their objectives" (82). 
While It Is apparent that not all promotional groups are 'forgotten 
groups1p there Is a great disparity between sectional and promotional 
groups In terms of the selective Incentives - which Olson claims are 
essential for survival - available to them. Pressure group resources 
of commitment and cohesion are therefore Influenced by such incen- 
tives. On the basis of this analysis, the commitment and cohesion in 
promoti. onal pressure groups must rely on three factors: solidary 
Incentivesq small group size and altruism. 
Solidary Incentives are the benefits derived by individual members as 
an Intrinsic rather than Instrumental function of membership, for 
exampleg regular association with others sharing similar attitudes. 
As Forbes notes In reference to Moeq Olson restricted his assessment 
of benefits solely to economic returns (83). 
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Olson recogni ses that small groups may act voluntarl ly In support of 
group interests, although he suggests such action will be sub-optimal. 
Of course, small groups by virtue of their size are likely to be less 
Influentialp If only because they are seen as unrepresentative. 
Howeverv organisations may be structured In a way that exploits small 
group benefitsp by having relatively autonomous tiers. So this may be 
why CNDI for example, Is organised on a local, area and national 
basis. Similarly FOE Ltd. Is successful In having local groups that 
are relatively autonomous provided they adhere to a few basic prin- 
ciples, as well as a national organisation (84). 
Olson's argument refers only to the action of individuals acting out 
of self-Interestq altruism may be a powerful motivator for promotional 
groups. As Colby observes In a recent paperg many public Interest 
groups are similar to social movements, which suggests a modification 
of Olson's argument because of the role of altruism with, for exampleg 
staff who "may well "work cheap" because of their own belief in the 
cause. " Colby suggests purposive and solidary incentives, the use of 
material Incentives to support lobbying as a by-product of other acti- 
vitiesl and the role of organisational entrepreneurs supported by new 
technology (especially computerlsed mailing lists) have contributed to 
the effectiveness of public-interest groups, In modification of 
Olson's argument (85). Yet it must be concluded that in generalp 
collective action by promotional pressure groups Is Influenced by this 
restriction on the resources of commitment and cohesion. 
When organised and with a membership willing to act on behalf of group 
Interestsp promotional pressure groups then face the problem of their 
weak strategic location. What sanctions can promotional pressure 
groups employ In support of their demands? Sectional groups use their 
structural position In the economyl promotional groups can use only 
certain types of direct action (or the threat of It) If their argument 
is Insufficient. 
Typicallyp such actions are designed to appeal to public opinion via 
meetings, rallies, -marches or demonstrations. Though there are types 
of direct action which are Intended to be, at least in part, a solu- 
tion to the demands of the group. The release of animals Involved in 
laboratory experiments Is a good case In point. 
Consumer boycotts are another type of di rect acti on seeki ng a more 
Immediate solution as well as possible publicity benefits. Here 
howeverg there Is potentially an attempt to utillse the structural 
position In the economy of the groupts members and supporters. This, 
when considered alongside the earlier argumens about consumer 
sovereigntyg Is Indicative of the latent promise of consumer boycotts 
for promotional pressure groups. In contrast with the acts of animal 
rights and anti-vivisectionist groups which have been violent and 
patently Illegal, boycotts are a form of Non Violent Direct Action 
(NVDA) which may be technically Illegal -(although they need not beg as 
discussed later) but are unlikely to result In prosecution because of 
the Interests of the companies Involved. 
In sum thenj promotional pressure groups are at a cUsadvantage vis-a- 
vis sectional groups In terms of resources. Commitment and cohesion 
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will be difficult to reallse and maintain without selective Incen- 
tives. More Importantly, given an organised group that Is Committed 
and cohesivey the weak strategic location of the promotional group is 
likely to mean that with failure of their argument to convince the 
powers that be, there are then few effective sanctions at their 
disposal for more forceful persuasion. Despite Rose's claims to the 
contraryq publicity (and, therefore, money) Is seen as vital to promo- 
tional pressure groups - surely Rose was thinking only of sectional 
groups. Publicity cang by influencing public opirdong strengthen a 
group's argument. It Is, moreoverg both necessary for and an aim of 
direct action. 
The next section considers the role of 
This concludes part 6.4. It Is then 
pressure group strategies and tactics. 
public opinion in more detail. 
possible to look at promotional 
6.4.3 The Role of Publi c Opi ni on 
In fairness to Rose, his argument about publicity should be given in 
more detal 1. The use of publi cl ty by some pressure groups and the 
value of the medi aIn thi sIs recogni. sed here: 
"Pressure groups wi th a weak strategi a posi ti on and few other 
organizational resources may turn to the media. Media publicity 
gives the appearance of mass support by the multiplying effect of 
mass circulation. The simplest and cheapest publicity device Is 
to Issue a press release or write a letter to The Times signed by 
prominent persons, for names make news*" 
Howeverv he continues: "But any publicity, even free publicity, is of 
11 ttle aval 19 1n so far as ItIsa si gn that the group In questi on Is 
unable to advance its claims through quiet negotiations In Whitehall" 
(86). Does this mean that groups without Insider status are then 
without Influence org for that matterv deserve to be without 
Influence? 
Roseq of courseq assumes that the Pressure group seeks only some 
action by government (subsumed from the dominant Idea within politics 
about the location of power in society), and that pressure group 
action cannot In itself produce a direct solution (a possibility 
discussed later In relation to direct action). Essentially his claim 
Isa varl ati on on the supposed trul sm, that once an I ssue Is on the 
streets it Is lost. Shipley, In expressing the same supposed truism, 
makes an Important qualification in reference to attempts to appeal to 
public opinion: "The less sympathy a group has In Whitehall, the more 
11 kely ItIs to embark upon a mass campal gn ... When an Interest with 
established access to official circles sets Itself on such a coursep 
it is usually a sign that the normal channels have failed" (87). This 
suggests that while such a claim may be true for established pressure 
groups normally afforded Insider status, it does not necessarily hold 
for the outsider groups. 
One must ask what alternati ve there Is for the outsi der group other 
than to attempt to influence public opinion. To gain access to the 
executive or even the legislature, It must demonstrate public support. 
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Thl sIs parti cularly true of promotional groups because their repre- 
sentati veness cannot be demonstrated by referring to a clearly I den- 
ti fi able membershl p (as recognised In Woottonts typology). Thel r 
supporters are drawn from the publi a at large 9 publi a support 13 
necessary to endorse the group's demands. Direct action Is the only 
other alternative but this is even more of a last resortp as Is later 
shown. 
Public opinion, as Roberts eloquently puts Itt creates "a climate of 
possibility" (88). Even If It does not provide the group with an input 
on deal sion-making, It can at least put the Issue on the political 
agendav as Ward claims for the anti-nuclear lobby (89). Many writers 
In the area emphasise the Importance of expert pressure group use of 
the medl a. Wallace writes, echoing Rose: "Politicians ... easily 
mistake Press agitation for aroused public opinion" (90). Wilson wri- 
tes extensi vely on the use of the medl a and hi s CLEAR case study pro- 
vI des a good example of pressure group use of the medi a and publi a 
opinion to achieve Its alms, by prompting appropriate government 
action (91). 
There are drawbacks to attempts to mobillse public opinion In support 
of the pressure group. Coxall identifies two forms of public cam- 
pal gn. Firstlyp there are long-term educational and propaganda cam- 
paigns Intended to produce significant shifts in public opinion. 
Secondlyp there are short campaigns designed to mobillse public opi- 
nion against a specific threat and, If possible, avert It. In the 
former casep there is the distinct likelihood of counter-groups being 
formed to oppose the campaign. With short campaigns, a hostile public 
reaction might ensue because most people's minds are already made up. 
These problems are In addition to any that may result from upsetting a 
relationship the group may have with government, as a consequence of 
going public (92). 
Public opinion also tends to be conservative, which severely restricts 
the possibilities for mobillsing mass public support for the radical 
pressure group. Indeedq this provides such groups with a major Incen- 
tive to use direct action (discussed further In 6-5). Coxall suggests 
attempting to Influence Informed rather than mass opinionp a strategy 
found effective by the Abortion Law Reform Association and Homosexual 
Law Reform Society (93). In a similar vein, Klein identifies the 
paradox that "it Is precisely those who want the greatest social 
changes who should be most elitist In their approach. " Though general 
public opinion might be more effective for some pressure groups, as he 
continues: "Populism could be an effective ally of a right-wing 
radicalism: this would exploit public opinion on such Issues as 
immigration and hanging and flogging" (94). 
All of -this discussion, of courseq assumes public opinion does In fact 
I nfluence government poll cy. . Returni ng agal n to the I 3sue of capi tal 
punishment serves as a reminder that this Is not always the case (95). 
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6.5 Promotional Pressure 
In Their Success 
tegles and Tactics and the Factors 
6.5.1 Appropriate Srategies and Tactics for Promotional Pressure 
Groups 
The previous parts to this chapter have Identified the characteristics 
of promotional pressure groups (the type of pressure group of most 
relevance to thi s study) 9 and the avenues of pressure and pressure 
group resources. On the basis of thisq certain strategies and tactics 
are Indicated for promotional pressure groupsp which will be reviewed 
here. The apparent weakness of promotional pressure groups has 
somewhat called In to question the earlier claims about the role of 
such groups In the political process and the likelihood of the growth 
in these groups increasing political participation. While few would 
suggest that promotional groups are entirely without Influencep It Is 
accepted that their Influence Is, In general, far less than that of 
the sectional groups. This has been shown to be attributable to their 
lack of resources andp for most promotional groups, their outsider 
status. Because of this, promotional pressure groups have to adopt 
particular strategies and tactics both within the conventional politi- 
cal process and outside It. Corporations may then become a target of 
promotional pressure group activity as these groups seek ways to 
enhance their position, as well as being a target because of perceived 
abuse of corporate power. 
It Is worth repeati ng the observati on earli er that much of the 
pressure group literature concentrates solely on pressure group 
influence of public authorities (and for the most part, sectional 
group influence). Hence, this part will Initially consider the stra- 
tegies and tactics for promotional pressure groups seeking only to 
Influence public authoritiesq turning later to the Influence of cor- 
porations. In keeping with the earlier discussion and much of the 
literaturev this analysis will consider the pressure group role within 
a pluralistic model of the political process, although as 6.7 shows, 
there are other models. 
Colman suggests the Individualistic conception of democracyl as 
espoused by Rousseau and most philosophers of the classical liberal 
traditiong gave way to pluralism with the Increasing scale and 
complexity of the governmental process following the industrial revo- 
lution. He refers to Wolff's description of the modern 'vector-suml 
conception of democracy: 
ff. "* which views the goverment as a pivotal point of forces 
exerted on It by pressure groups throughout the nation, Its func- 
tion being to resolve these conflicting forces Into a single 
balanced policy. As the relative weights of the various groups 
changel the fulcrum of goverment swings about, In sympathy with 
the drift of public opinion. Instead of being jostled by a 
bewildering array of Inarticulate private citizens, the govern- 
ment can weigh up the various Interests of a manageable and 
clearly distinguishable set of organized pressure groupsy in 
which all significant interests In the nation are representedv 
and dispense politicalý social and economic goodies to each In 
rough proportion to Its relative size and Intensityff (96). 
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Thl s does not occur for a number of reasons. As Colman observes, and 
perhaps most Importantly, governments are motivated by principles as 
well as Interests. For some Issuesq such as capital punishment, 
principles may be Indivisibleg denying scope for give-and-take. A 
pressure group faced with principled government policy on the Issue at 
hand and seeking to change that policyg can either Induce the govern- 
ment to modify the principles which guide the existing policy or 
modify the policy In spite of the principles, In the Interests of 
expediency. The former course is open to any pressure group, 
Involving persuasive attitude change directed at the decision-makeis 
or the publi a at large. However ,ItIs the latter course whi ch Is 
more frequently successful , but which Is only available to groups 
possessing some measure of power over the government through, for 
example, their control over resources which the government depends 
upon. This Involves an exercise in bargaining. While these are Ideal 
types, contrastj for example, the National Union of Mineworkersq the 
Provisional IRA or the British Medical Association, with Friends of 
the Earth or the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (97). 
While Colman Is guilty of generalisation and over-simplification - the 
earli er di scussi on has shown the pi cture to be far more complex than 
he suggests - and many would dispute the notion of a government trying 
desperately to adhere to principles in the face of coercion, his 
description of pressure group influence on policy seems basically 
accurate. In other wordsp to summarise the earlier discussion in this 
chapter and Colman's observations above, promotional pressure groupso 
because of their weak strategic location, must rely on persuasive 
attitude change. Promotional pressure group strategy is based on the 
need to change public and informed opinion. But Colman is not very 
optimistic about such an approach: 
"Successful attempts by pressure groups to change government 
policy by mere persuasiong either directly or through mobilisa- 
Mon of mass supportp are comparatively rare see Pressure groups 
which command the necessary resources to engage the government In 
genuine bargaining are, on the other handv much better placed to 
Influence decisionsp and not Infrequently achieve their goals 
relatively quickly and easily" (98). 
The bulk of hI s paper Is a- revi ew of atti tude change research 
(considering source, messagep audience and channel variables) and 
bargal ni ng strategy. Although relevant to pressure group tactics, 
this cannot be dealt with In any detail here. Colman concludes by 
declaring the Importance of persuasive appeals: 
"Pressure groups whi ch do not command the necessary resources to 
bargain directly, which Is the case with most promotional or 
cause groupsq are ... bound to restrict their efforts to attempts 
at persuasi on ... they cannot bargain, because the government 
does not depend upon them In any concrete sense. The success of 
their campaigns therefore rests solely on the effectiveness of 
their persuasive appeals" (99). 
This Is correct Insofar as It refers to groups working only within the 
conventional political process. Promotional groups dot though, work 
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outside it, employing direct action. While direct action (including 
boycotts) may be Intended to gain publicity and Influence opiniong it 
may also be Intended to seek a more Immediate solution on the issue. 
Howeverg before considering direct action of this sortq It Is useful 
to look at the types of strategies and tactics available to promo- 
tional pressure groups seeking to change public or Informed opinion. 
This Is the subject of the next two sections. 
6.5.2 Mobillsation of Legitimacy for the Cause 
WI lletts suggests pressure groups are formed and then work through a 
process of changing perceptionsp socialisation, and recruitment (100). 
Thei r abi 11 ty to apply pressure Is through the "mobt 11 sati on of legi - 
timacy for their cause. " As he observes: 
"Winning support by changing people's perceptions of the Issues 
Is done by presenting arguments and Information. An argument 
that there must be sanctions against South Africa because the 
regime Is oppressive, or that nuclear power cannot be used 
because It is dangerousl depends upon convincing people that 
South Africa Is oppressive or nuclear power Is dangerous. Both 
topics may seem very remote from the everyday lives of those who 
are not immediately Involved" (101). 
If promotional groups are to rely on their argument they require'sound 
Information. So Wilson counsels: "Whatever you do, don't economise on 
research" (102). Because of the Importance of source credibility In 
Influencing opinion and the likelihood of a pressure group being con- 
sidered blasedp reliable Information Is vital. As Willetts notes: 
"Governments can give false Information to the public or to 
pressure groups without necessarily damaging their overall credi- 
bility. Thus, contrary to popular assumptions, pressure group 
activists should often be regarded as being more reliable In pre- 
senting Information ... Processing of information Is always a 
major activity of pressure groups and often It is overwhelmingly 
the most Important activity" (103). 
Goverment dependence on information for Its decisions may even mean 
that the pressure group acquires Insider statusq or is at least con- 
sulted by govermentq once It has established a reputation for 
reliability. It becomesq In Mackenzie's words, of "administrative 
necessity. " He suggests the appeal to reason Is the most effective of 
all techniquesq but it Is necessary to ensure the Information "is what 
the best people believe to be best. " Civil servants may, as he notes, 
be generalistsv but they can at least assess the reliability of Infor- 
mation (104). 
Pressure groups will then be concerned not only with Influencing 
public opinion, but also elite opinion. They compete for the public's 
attention through the media, by publishing literaturej and by setting 
out their case at meetingsq conferences and demonstrations. Their 
Information Is of two sorts: that for mass communication - press con- 
ferences and releasesp advertisingg newspapersy magazines, pamphlets 
and through spokespersons and Interviews on radio and television; and 
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that for specl all st requi rements - research documents 9 background 
Information, briefing materlalsq technical journals and giving advice 
(105). The former Is Intended to Influence public opinion, possibly 
targetted on opinion leaders In society given the two-step model of 
the flow of Information (106)v while the latter Is aimed at Informed 
and Influential opinion, principally government, though some may use- 
fully reach opinion leaders In the public at large. 
Willetts Is careful not to attribute too great a part to pressure 
groups In changes In public opinion and consequent changes In govern- 
ment plicy: "... we must be careful not to attribute too much 
Influence directly to the pressure groups. They do help to mould 
attitudes within societyg but at the same time they are a reflection 
of soci ety. If a cause Is totally at varl ance wi th the preval 11 ng 
social normsp It would be unlikely that any group could be formed or 
that It could obtain much publicity. " Hencep public support Is vital 
for the group to become organised. He doesq howevert continue by 
recognising the role of public opinion In Influencing goverment and 
other targets: "If9 nevertheless, a group Is formed which cannot evoke 
a response In the wider societyg even If by pressure group standrads 
it achieves a large membership, then governments and other targets 
will usually be able to afford to Ignore It" (107). Presumably theng 
governments cannot afford to ignore widespread public support for 
pressure groups. 
It is worth noting at this point that the size of a pressure group's 
membership Is not Indicative of the group's representativeness or sup- 
port. This of course relates to the comment above about the pressure 
group as a reflection of society. While with sectional groupsp the 
membership comprises for the most part the bulk of the group's suppor- 
ters, this Is unlikely to be the case with promotional groups. This 
is conveyed In the preferred American term for promotional groups: 
public Interest groups. By definitiong promotional groups do not 
represent a definable social or economic Interest (ignoring the issue 
of middle-class blas)q theoretically - recalling Wootton's openness of 
membership criterion - the whole population could join them. Most 
promotional groups will claim to speak for the Interests of society at 
larget even If their opponents dispute such a claim they will at least 
acknowledge that the extent of the group's support goes beyond the 
fee-paying membership. This point Is made throughout the literaturev 
with Willettsq for example, noting that the Influence of the 
Anti-Apartheid Movement In Britain Is out of all proportion to its 
tiny membership of 2,500. The group's newspaper has a print run of 
7,000 copies and 44 per cent of the public In May 1961 thought Britain 
should oppose apartheid In the United Natlonsq while 50 per cent In 
1970 thought Britain should not supply arms to South Africa (108). A 
similar disparity will later be shown to exist between the size of 
CND's membership and public support. 
Wilson- rather neatly describes "our Idnd" of pressure groups as 
"advocates In the court of public opinion" (109). This captures the 
view of promotional pressure groups as representatives of the publicP 
but also, In order to be both effective and truly representative In 
this rolev the requirement to gain popular support. 
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Wilson describes at lengtho from A to Zj a great number of tactics of 
pressurej too numerous for mention here (110). Other (academic) wri- 
ters tend to refer to tactics only in passing - always assuming the 
reference to promotional groups Is more than a passing one. The case 
studies used by Woottonj Frost, Marsh and others all Identify tactics 
but do not attempt to evaluate and compare, or even classify. Perhaps 
thIsq and the lack of literature on promotional groups In generalp is 
Indicative of the Ineffectiveness of such tactics. The difference 
between American and British politics has entailed the use of predomi- 
nantly British sources In this chapter on pressure groups; it Is 
perhaps because of the greater effectiveness of pressure group tactics 
In America that an American source must now be employed to present a 
reasonable categorisation of pressure group strategies and tactics. 
6.5.3 Berry's Categorisation of Strategies and Tactics 
The more open American political process presents, It Is argued, 
greater opportunity for pressure group Influence. It Is not possible 
to consider this Issue here, but it Is widely accepted that the 
British political process is relatively closed with much criticism of 
the Inadequacy of disclosure In this country (111). Shipley suggests 
Interest groups In Britain havel In comparison with the United Statest 
"cultivated closerv more effective contacts with government 
departments. " (This, as later discussedp Is sometimes viewed as 
corporatist. ) The closer relationship between pressure groups and the 
executive Is counter-balanced in the United States by pressure group 
Influence with the legislature: "individual Congressmen are more 
susceptible to the rival demands of pressure groups than the British 
Member of Parliament who Is protected by a more tightly drawn party 
organisation and the traditions of parliamentary privilege" (112). 
Elsewherej It Is suggested that "because of the different constitu- 
tional system, pressure groups concentrate their efforts as much on 
the legislature (Congress) as on the executive (the White House) ... 
becausel In the US, Individual congressmen have more power than Indi- 
vidual MPts do In Britain" (113). (A number of writers in the area 
have referred to a diminishing role for Parliament (114). ) 
These dI f ferences between the Uni ted States and Bri tal n both pol nt to 
a greater Influence for promotional pressure groups and a greater 
effectiveness of promotional group tactics In the United States, but 
also the difficulties likely to be encountered by an outsider, promo- 
tional group In Britain. Yet the strategies and tactics employed by 
American and British groups would not seem to differ greatly. Indeedq 
as Marsh observes, many British promotional groups are Influenced in 
their strategies and tactics by the experiences of their American and 
continental counterparts (115). 
Berry defines strategy as "broad plans of attackp or general 
approaches to lobbyingg" and tactics as "the specific actions taken to 
advocate certain policy positions" (116). His categorisation of 
pressure group strategies and tactics Is based on Interview research 
with staff lobbyists in 83 public Interest groupso which he claims to 
be "an extremely high percentage - surely above 80% - of the true 
number of public Interest groups that existed at the time of the 
Interviewing (September 1972 to June 1973)" (117). 
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He Identifies three categories of tactics. Firstly, those techniques 
that are characterised by direct communication between lobbyists and 
goverment officialsp such as personal presentations. Secondly, 
methods by which groups lobby through their constituents, such as 
political protests (demons trati ons 9 picketing, sit-ins) and letter 
writing. Finallyq trying to change governmental policy by Influencing 
elections or altering public opiniong the techniques of Indirect 
lobbyingg such as releasing research results and public relations. 
Table 6.1 shows Berry's assessment of the various tactics he 
considered. 
It Is not clear as to how this list was compiled, but Berry does 
accept that it is Incompletet referring to shareholders' actions and 
whistle-blowing. This perhaps reflects his emphasis on pressure group 
attempts to Influence the public authorities rather than corporationsp 
the prime purpose of shareholder actions as he acknowledges. He makes 
no reference to consumer boycotts. His categorisation isp however, a 
reasonable attempt given the difficulties In classifying the great 
variety of pressure group tactics, and his emphasis on Influencing the 
public authorities. 
He suggests the large support for personal presentation (over half the 
sample viewing It as "very effective" or "effective") Is In keeping 
with earlier studies by Milbrath and others, which show personal con- 
tact to be the most highly regarded tactic. But It would seem likely 
that not only should lobbyists views of tactic effectiveness be judged 
with cautiong as Berry later concedes, but also the notion of taking 
any tactic in Isolation from the rest Is suspect because any outcome 
will be the consequence of the totality of pressure - that Is, all the 
tactics employed - and moreoverg Is unlikely to be solely attributable 
to the pressure group's activities. As Berry notes In his conclusion 
(but nott unfortunatelyp In qualification of his claims about tactic 
effectiveness) "the problems of distinguishing the influence of inter- 
est groups upon policy makers, as distinct from other Influences such 
as the pressp general public opinion, and other political elitesp 
remain rather substantial" (119). Perhaps British analysts of 
pressure groups have been wise In avoiding evaluations of pressure 
group tactiesl His study should be seen to be primarily of value in 
I ts attempt to categorl se pressure group tacti cs rather than assess 
their effectiveness. 
This comment also applies to pressure group strategiesl although it 
seems likely that groups have less discretion on their choice of stra- 
tegy and oftenj Indeed, employ more than one of the four strategies 
Berry Identifies. These are: the use of the law, embarrassment and 
confrontatlong Informationg and constituency influence and pressure. 
They are given In Berryts decision-making framework, Figure 6.2. This 
he describes as "a simplification of an extremely complex decision- 
making. processg" and Is largely self-explanatory. 
His determinants of strategy - goals and capabilitiesg and structure 
of the environment - are in keeping with British writers In the area 
who refer to orgardsational and environmental determinants of stra- 
tegy. Some refer only to environmental considerationsl largely in 
recognition of the great . constraints faced by promotional groupsl as 
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Willetts writes: "The choice of what strategy to adopt Is made pragma- 
tically on an estimate of what Is more likely to be successful" (121). 
others acknowledge organisational as well as environmental con- 
siderations (122)9 Including Berry. He even questions whether 
pressure groups assess different possible strategies and their sub- 
sequent effect: "To themp admitting their Ineffectiveness was not an 
acknowledgement of their organisations' failuresp but a reaffirmation 
of their commitment to the cause" (123). He suggests the most Impor- 
tant decision on a given Issue Is not the selection of strategy or 
choice of' tactics, but the decision to become active on the Issue In 
the first place: "Because the decision to use a specific strategy Is 
strongly Influenced by organisational characteristics and situational 
varlablesq the most critical step a lobby takes Is when It moves to 
take on a new Issue and commit significant organisational resources to 
such efforts" (124). 
So, to return to the earlier emphasis on the mobilisation of legiti- 
macy and to conclude this sectiong pressure group strategies and tac- 
tics are a consequence of the type of group and the circumstances In 
which It finds Itself; whichl for promotional groups and particularly 
In Britain, entails a dependence on influencing public opinion. 
Without Insider status and with a greater emphasis on the executive 
rather than the legislature In the political processp they are obliged 
to adopt the strategies and tactics that will affect public opinion on 
the Issue. For some types of group thl s may mean di rect acti on and 
possibly violence; or accepting that they may never reallse influence. 
Berry does not pay great attention to the Insider/outsider status 
Issuep perhaps because It is of less significance within the American 
system. Howeverp Its Importance for British groups is apparent from 
his discussion of the four types of pressure group strategy. Without 
considering them In detail (for, as with tacticsv space does not 
permit)p some of his comments are worth noting (125). 
Those groups employing legal strategies see the law "as a way to work 
within the system without having to "stoop to politics". " Many of 
these groups have "great faith In the fairness of the law. " For 
others though law tends to be a back-up strategy, It will not always 
be appropri ate. It receives little attention in Britain, probably 
because there Is considerably less scope for the use of legal reme- 
diesq and for cost reasons. 
The strategy of constituency Influence and pressurej although employed 
In Britain, does assume parliamentary power, Its focus being on the 
legislature. Thisp as earlier noted, is also less applicable and use- 
ful In the British system. Berry notes that orgnalsations charac- 
terl sed by this strategy may come closest to fitting the Image of a 
Npressure" group: "This Is much more a strategy of persuading than 
Informing. The "pressure" aspect of this strategy Is more evident 
because the groups' sanctions are more conspicuous. Most of the lob- 
bies that rely on this strategy are primarily concerned with the 
Congress. " 
This strategy Is used In Britain and has proved effective In achieving 
legislation on 'consciencet issues via private members' bills. It 
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doesp howevert suffer from the diminished role of Parliament and @the 
strength and Importance of party allegiances. Although Marsh Iden- 
tifies recent attempts by pressure groups to use this strategy with 
the Labour Party and to try and "piggy-back" on the economic power of 
the trade unions, this represents a move back after a period of 
disillusionment following the noticeable failure of earlier attempts 
to use this strategy (such as Labour's Infamous about-turn on promises 
to CND made at the Party Conference In 1960). Marsh suggests this may 
be associated with the recent leftward move of the Labour Party, which 
would seem further Indication of the likelihood of such a strategy 
proving again Inadequate on the election of a Labour goverment (126). 
Howevery as with other strategies and tactics as will later be seen, 
such a strategy may be effective If the promotional pressure group can 
reallse effective sanctions. 
Berry's information strategy he recognises to be one appropriate to 
groups withl or aspiring top Insider status: 
"It Is much more an "I nsi de" strategy - one that depends on the 
goodwill of officials and their staffs. Sympathetic people In 
government are expected to fight for the "right" policies In a 
conflictualp but reasonable political arena ... This strategy of 
Information places groups In less of a permanent adversary posi- 
tion. Although they have not been coopted by the policy makers 
with which they dealq they have established themselves as eager 
participants In cooperative activity with staff and officials. " 
Many groups would, as earlier notedq be less confident of not being 
coopted than Berry suggests. Interestingly thought and perhaps this 
Is an Indication of the more substantial promotional pressure group 
resources and Influence in America, Berry later suggests the govern- 
ment agency rather than the pressure group may become coopted (127). 
Hence for British outsider groupsl the greatest hope lies in the 
embarrassment and confrontation strategy. While such a strategy still 
requires the effective-use of Information by the pressure group, it Is 
used as a weapon against the public authorities rather than as a tool 
employed In cooperation with government. It is premised on the belief 
that "sufficient exposure of bad policy will act to stimulate 
governmental officials to change such policy ... if a minimum of 
publicity can reveal what people In government are doing, those same 
people will find themselves under a new set of circumstances for 
future actions In that their behaviour wi 11 be critically 
scrutinised. " The group works to sustal n controversy on the I ssue 
making the official or department respond to the groupts charges, 
which In turn gives the group greater legitimacy, as Wilson also notes 
(128). Berry attributes this strategyq Indirectlyl to outsider 
status:. 
"Groups Imbued with this strategy have a rather hostilep 
untrusting view of government. Of the variables previously 
discussedq the one that Is probably most Important In pushing a 
group toward this strategy Is the perceived receptivity of 
targets. Groups adopting this strategy have long accepted that 
they are not going to be Institutionalized Into the policy-making 
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process. Ratherp they must force people In government to listen 
to them through protests, news leaksp whistle-blowingy and other 
similar tactics. " 
Additionally, of courset the force of public opinion. However, It is 
this strategy of embarrassment and confrontation and these tactics 
that force goverment to listen, which are also employed against cor- 
porations. They have within their perceived role as private Institu- 
tIonsq no recognised obligation to listen to pressure groups and are 
unlikely to be receptive targets of pressure group criticism. These 
tactics are considered In the next section. 
6.5.4 Protest Tactics and the Corporation 
The notion of corporations as 'private governments', referred to In 
section 4.4.29 might In Itself suggest a comparability between 
pressure group attempts to Influence the corporation with attempts to 
Influence government. Regardless of whether the corporation Is viewed 
as a political Institution In this way, the limited access to cor- 
porate decision-making for the promotional pressure group at least 
suggests that It Is reasonable to view the promotional group's posi- 
tion vis-a-vis the corporation as comparable to that of the outsider 
group vis-a-vis government. Given the paucity of literature on 
pressure group activities directed against corporations (129)9 this 
perspective can provide some useful Insights. Moreover, not only will 
the corporation be a target for pressure group activity because of 
perceived abuse of corporate powert but also to strike Indirectly at 
government. As seen earlierg the limited opportunities available to 
many promotional groups oblige them to consider any possible target 
(130). 
The visibility of corporations and their concern for the corporate 
Image suggests they are particularly susceptible to protest tactics, 
especially corporations In consumer markets (contrast, for example, 
'RTZ's limited concern over criticism of their Involvement in Namibia 
with that expressed by Barclays). While the use of information and 
particularly the release of research results will play an essential 
part, protest tactics will often be employed to draw attention to 
alleged corporate misdemeanours. 
Before considering protest tactics in detail (131), it Is Important to 
recognise that there is a distinction, which is rarely made In the 
literature and Is not always clearl between protest tactics and direct 
action. Direct action Is discussed In Part 6.6. For this section It 
will be sufficient to observe that direct action Is the pressure group 
actually doing something to solve the problem directly. Although 
direct action has this speciallsed meaningg It Is used In some of the 
literature to refer to protest tactics, such as demonstrationsp which 
are for publicity purposes. Of course somet If not all direct action, 
is Intended to be partly for publicity purposes, hence the confusion. 
The pressure group Itself may be uncertaing divided, or not have given 
any thought to the purpose of a particular action. Consumer boycotts 
are a case In point. They may be a protest tactic used solely for 
publicity purposesq a direct actiong or both. In this section, the 
concern Is only with actions Intended for publicity purposes within a 
strategy of changing public and/or informed opinion. 
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The Intention of protest tactics to obtain publicity, demands that 
they should be of Interest to the media. Such tactics willp as 
earlier notedl Indicate that the normal channels, If ever available to 
the group, have failed. They must then maximise the publicity in a 
way that enhances the group by demonstrating and Increasing public 
support. With good tactics "the argument Is In the action" (132), 
such as demonstrations outside a London shop selling furs, by pro- 
testers dressed In safari suits holding a sign saying 'help exter- 
minate species - shop here'. 
Such action should be good-humoured, or public opinion may be 
allenatedg and by being original both In Itself and In conveying the 
message of the group, will capture media attention. As Shipley writes 
"To find Its way Into the mass media a story must have Impact: the 
dramatiop unusual or controversial will catch the eyes of news editor 
and reader alike. In this competitive world pressure through 
publicity Is subject to commercial rather than strictly moral 
criteria" (133). The need for Innovation and originality becomes ever 
greater the more protest actions there are. Berry's comment that 
demonstrations generally decrease In newsworthiness the more they 
occur (134), seems applicable to all protest tactics. Des Wilson, In 
his work with Shelter In particular, has shown himself to be 
remarkably adept at producing Interesting events, and conveys the 
importance of this and the ways In which such an effect can be 
achieved throughout his book. 
Meetingso ralliesp marches and demonstrations are direct methods of 
appealing to public opinion If the more passive methods referred to 
earlierg such as press releases, advertisingg and so ong prove Inef- 
fective. Etzionly In his study of demonstrations, suggests they are a 
legitimate form of political expression. His conclusion that they are 
necessary because other avenues of pressure are closed is in keeping 
with the argument presented here and probably applies to all, protest 
tactics: 
"They are not to replace existing democratic Instruments but to 
complement them ... demonstration's democratize In that they 
Increase the equality of Political opportunity by providing a 
tool with a built In advantýge for th for whom the other tools 
of democracy are somewhat unwieldy andl not Infrequently, relati- 
vely Inaccessible" (1359 Etzioni's emphasis). 
For protest tactics not only appeal to public opinion but also provide 
political leverage. As Berry writesl the strategy behind demonstra- 
tions Is threefold: to expand public awareness of an issue through 
press coverageg to make government officials more sensitive and cogni- 
zant of a particular point of view on an Issueg and finally by press 
coverage "strengthen the group's hand and give It more leverage In the 
political process" (136). Elsewherep Michael Lipsky has referred to 
protest as a political resource along the same lines as Etzioni: 
"protest Is correctly conceived as a strategy utillsed by relatively 
powerless groups In order to Increase their bargaining ability" (137). 
And commenting on the tactics of Saul Alinskyj Bailey writes "To com- 
pensate for the absence of power resources that depend upon either 
wealth or special accessp protest Is used, " and subsequently, In 
explanation: 
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"In order to negotiate with established Institutions for 
Increases In political and economic allocationsv a group needs 
power resources. The resource most readily available to com- 
munity organisations Is the threat of protest activity" (138). 
Alinsky's tactics are principally direct action and this point about 
leverage applies even more forcefully to direct action, as 6.6 shows, 
and particularly with direct action Involving corporations. 
Political leverage achieved by protest tactics Is far more likely if 
there Is violence Involved. As Etzioni recognises and Hain noted In 
Stop the Seventies Tourg both media and political attention Increases 
ýdth violence. Governments at least take note If there is 'fighting 
In the streets'. Fortunatelyp many groups are Ideologically opposed 
to the use of violence and employ non-violent direct action (NVDA)p as 
discussed In Chapter Seven. (Boycotts are a type of NVDA. ) However, 
the temptation to use violence must be great because of its leverage 
valuet even though It may alienate public opinion. VI olence and 
Etzioni's study will be considered further In 6.6. 
Political leverage may result without violence, possibly because the 
authorities fear that demonstrations may become violent. The Stop the 
Seventies Tour (STST) group while adhering to NVDA could not prevent 
violence being used by rugby stewards In coordination with the police 
(139). The authorities may even deliberately provoke violence, not to 
provide the group with Political leverage but to deny it popular sup- 
port (140). There Is then the threat of vi olence even wi th a non- 
violent groupp because of violence from Its opponents or, of coursep 
minority elements within the group or troublemakers. This threat will 
provide some political leverage, but also the level of support for the 
action will be Indicative Itself of popular support and to some extent 
the representativeness of the group. Though mass demonstrations are 
unlikely to result In a group achieving Insider status. 
So, In conclusion to Part 6.5, It can be seen that the factors In the 
success of pressure groups and the circumstances faced by promotional 
groupsg point them towards certain strategies and tactics. As the 
latter discussion Indicatesp this may mean direct action and even 
violence If their attempts to change public and/or Informed opinion - 
the only strategy likely to have any chance of success for most pro- 
motional groups - are unsuccessful. As the next section shows, this 
would seem to also apply to actions against corporations. While the 
lack of opportunity to influence government may make corporations a 
target for pressure groups so as to strike Indirectly at government. 
Howeverg before turning to direct action, It Is worth concluding with 
some promotional pressure group strengths9 In contrast with the 
weaknesses considered so far. 
Willettsp In his analysis of the Impact of promotional pressure groups 
on global politICS9 recognises these groups are "typically 
understaffedg overworked, short of finance and faced with more 
questions they would like to tackle than they can cope with" (141). 
But he does go on to acknowledge some strengths. There Is the Intense 
personal commitment on the part of their membersl producing a dedica- 
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Mon to hard work and a loyalty of Individuals to the cause which will 
usually be much stronger than that to political parties or govern- 
ments. There Is the fact that their leaders become specialists, 
putting them In a stronger position than governments. ThIrdlyq their 
lack of a well-structured bureaucracy means that they can In times of 
emergency or crisis respond with speed and flexibility. 
Yet even these strengths can be weaknesses In certain circumstances. 
The dependence on personal commitment and specialist skills means that 
the group may be less effective In some localities If the organIser 
there Is weak; and groups bound by commitment rather than economic 
Interest are dependent upon consensus, unable to enforce decisionsp 
and so divisions within groups and the formation of splinter groups 
often occur (142). 
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6.6 Direct Action 
6.6.1 Direct Action or Publicity Stunts? 
If the only avenue of pressure available to a pressure group is (cam- 
paigning to change and mobillse) public opinion, and that has proved 
either unsuccessful or been achieved and Ignored, then the pressure 
group may turn to direct action. For radical groups, popular support 
may be particularly difficult to obtain In view of the conservative 
tendencies of the majority. Popular support on an Issue Is likely 
also to be difficult to sustain for any length of time and governments 
wi 11 of ten tend to wal t for It to wane so that the I ssue ef f ecti vely 
goes away. In these cl rcumstances , dI rect acti on seems the only 
possible route for the pressure group. It may also appeal for ideolo- 
gical reasons. 
Direct action Is not a term used Unambiguously In the literature. 
Benewick and Smithp In a study entirely concerned with the rela- 
t1onship between direct action and democratic politics, refrain from 
offering or (as they put It) Imposing any definition of direct action. 
They dog howeverg give credence to direct action, and In a way that 
provides some Indication as to the meaning of the term: 
"Direct action Is a traditional and legitimate form of political 
behaviour In a democratic State. Ruling groups have rarely 
released or shared their power with others voluntarily. 
Institutional changes have seldom occurred In the absence of 
pressure. New policies and programmes have been Introduced fre- 
quently by means outside the conventional boundaries of 
Parli amentary poll ti cs. As new demands and needs arl se , thel r 
advocates have resorted to direct action in order to achieve 
recognitionp participation and acceptance In the political 
system. When more established groups perceive the system as 
unresponsive or Ineffective, they may well adopt more militant 
tactics to articulate their grievances ... ItIs of ten through forms of direct action that the moral basis of politics Is kept 
before the government and the public" (143). 
Direct action refers to actions outside and probably in conflict With 
conventional democratic processes. All pressure groups will attempt 
to act directly on the established authorities, but as Drewry 
observes: 
such groups have already won the rightl to a varying extentp 
to be ranked alongside parties as respectable representative 
Institutions: conflict between pressure groups and parties tends 
to be confined to matters of demareationg or to Involve narrow 
Issues of administration or substantive policy. The phrase 
'direct action' connotes something much more positive and much 
less constitutionally conventional than lobbying or negotiation 
ý *0 Direct action Is used when negotiations have failed or where 
he use of conventional methods seems pointless: it entails to a 
varying degreet a rejection of the efficacy or even the morality 
of the 'usual channelst" (144). 
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He Is, at least, able to offer a flexible (broad) definition of direct 
action: "various forms of activityp violent or non-violentl which 
signify a rejection of established Political methods or Institutions" 
(145). Significantly, he goes on to exclude many forms of demonstra- 
tions and rallies as but an extension of the lobbying process rather 
than a rejection of such processes. Mass demonstrations are, he 
suggestsl Intended by definition to demonstrate that a particular 
point of view enjoys wide support. They have therefore become an 
accepted form of political activity, rather than a form of di rect 
action. 
There Is then a distinction between direct action and publicity 
stunts. However, as the previous section Indicated, much direct 
action Is for publicity purposes. A good case In point is the return 
of non-returnable bottles to Schweppes, dumped In a colossal pile out- 
side the Scheweppes office by supporters of Friends of the Earth 
(FOE). Wilson describes this as a classic piece of direct action, but 
notes that It was also an effective media event. It did, of courseý 
involve a corporation as a target. Direct action and corporations is 
the subject of the next section. 
6.6.2 Direct Action and the Corporation 
The corporation can become the target of direct action because of some 
perceived corporate misdemeanour (and plenty of examples of such 
actions are considered later Involving boycotts); because it Is 
tangentially involved In some activity, but the real target Is govern- 
mentv which although seen as being responsible cannot be reached 
directly; and, finally, because the corporation is a handy target. As 
will be shown later, the choice of the corporation and any specific 
corporation may be entirely arbitrary, or simply on the basis of pro- 
minence, susceptibility and accessibilityp rather than any perceived 
assessment of corporate 'guilt'. 
Thi s secti on wi 11 . consi der the reasons for di rect acti on and the 
Increasing preference for Its usev with the likelihood that Cor- 
porations will be subject to direct action ever more frequently in the 
future. Some recent examples of direct action Involving corporations 
are gi ven. However, the discussion of direct action will be kept 
brief because It Is the non-violent form of direct action which Is of 
more Importance to this study and Is considered In the next chapter. 
Etzioni's study of demonstrationst referred to earlierp Is par- 
ticularly concerned with the part played by violence. He suggests 
that violence has often proved necessary to achieve certain social 
changes because of the recognition that such changes were required If 
peace and stability were to be maintained. Demonstrations are often a 
prelude to violence and are In this sense a useful warning mechanism. 
As Etzioni concludes: 
"Ultlmatelyv a society which falls to respond effectively to Its 
members, especially when the neglect of the needs of some of them 
has been accumulating and has been repeatedly called to Its 
attentiong will have little choice except between anarchy and 
tyranny. Demonstrations are a useful though potentially volatile 
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warni ng mechani sm. Muffling thel r sound wi 11 not prevent the 
explosion" (146). 
It Is, for most groupsl this Intransigence of the authorities to a 
pressure group's case which prompts demonstrations, direct action, and 
possibly violent direct action. With most groupsq direct action Is 
viewed as a last resort. 
FOE, for example, are reluctant to use direct action and have 
refrained so far, on the nuclear power Issue. Ward Identifies a 
threefold strategy at work: to bring Issues directly to the attention 
of the public by the activities of local groups and the publication of 
high quality publicity material; to Influence the public through well- 
organised media events; and finally, by direct access In lobbying 
parliament and giving testimony to Royal Commissions and public 
Inquiries. It Is this faith In being 'incorporated' that has mili- 
tated against the use of direct action. Although, admittedly, there 
have not been the opportunities available recently In the way that 
there has been In the United States and the continent. This reluc- 
tance to use direct action has led to many activists forming local 
anti-nuclear groups and affiliating to the Anti-Nuclear Campaign. And 
while Ward suggests FOE's activities have put the Issue of nuclear 
power firmly on the political agenda, FOE have never really obtained 
Insider statusq but acted as a "legitimating gloss on corporatist 
politics" (147). 
Ward's case study was written In 1983. In late 1983 and early 1984, 
Greenveacev who see Involvement in public Inquiries as largely futile, 
successfully employed direct action against the nuclear power 
Industry. While attempting to 'cap' a pipe discharging radioactive 
material from Sellafield (Windscale) into the sea, they came across an 
extremely high level of dischargep well In excess of the level per- 
mitted by the government and which Greenpeace were (illegally) trying 
to prevent. There was a government Investigation of this accident 
which blamed the Sellafield managementp making 23 recommendations for 
improvements. The outcome, In addition to the mobilisation of public 
opiniong was promises by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. to reorganise Its 
managementp discipline some employees, spend an extra 912 million to 
improve safetyt and accelerate plans to reduce radioactive discharges 
I nto the sea. Greenpeace observed that this accident may not have 
been the first and still sought an end to all radioactive discharges. 
They could at least claim a partial success and the likelihood of a 
complete success In the near future Is considerably enhanced. 
Greenpeace had used the conventional channels to no avail. Obliged to 
use direct actiong they were relatively successful (148). Similar 
successes have been achieved by Greenpeaceq using direct action, over 
the dumping of hazardous chemicals at sea and whaling. 
Marsh suggests there are "certain signs that direct action may 
Increase. " Although direct action is alien to the British traditiong 
he notes that the Influence of American and continental experiences Is 
prompting many British promotional groups In that directiong par- 
ticularly as somev such as FOE, are American off-shoots (149). 
Promotional groups may find governments Intransigent and unresponsive. 
There may also be little governments can do, particularly as regards 
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multi-national companiesp or at least little they would wish to. do, 
because of thel r fear of of f endi ng them Thi sis parti cularly true of 
governments in the Third World (150). Promotional groups must then 
act directly against the cause of their complaint. This will often be 
business. 
Another Interesting Instance of direct action against a corporation Is 
the (falsely) claimed poisoning of Mars chocolate bars by the Animal 
Liberation Front, over the alleged Involvement of Mars In experiments 
on animals. This supports the claim about how Intransigentl unrespon- 
sive, or Ineffective government behaviour on an Issue may push the 
group Into direct action, and how corporations may Increasingly come 
under attack. The year 1984 witnessed a number of direct actions 
against firms by this groupq justified In this way: "The traditional 
animal welfare movement has been around for decades, and It has not 
been very effective. It Is only through direct action that people can 
see something has been achieved. " The group also recognises ethical 
purchase behaviour as "Notes slipped Into the wrappers said the Front 
did not wish to harm human life, but people eating "cruelty-based 
products" should be responsible for their own actions" (151). It 
seemsq howeverp that they would wish to deny people the right to 
choose in their purchase behaviour. 
DI rect acti on and the corporatl on wi 11 be further consi dered In the 
next chapter. This chapter concludes with a brief examination of 
pressure groups and pluralism and the role of direct action In this. 
237 
6.7 Promotional Pressure Groups and the Potential for Pluralism 
6.7.1 Pluralism and Corporatism 
Both, pluralism and corporatism were defined and previously discussed 
In Chapter Three. These concepts have also been referred to 
throughout this chapter. Discussion of pressure groups cannot be 
meaningful without reference to these terms as they Indicate forms of 
policy decision-making and the role of pressure groups within them. 
It Is beyond the scope of thl s study to provi de a full treatment of 
pluralism and corporatism and consequent roles for pressure groups. 
Howeverp some useful observations can and should be made. 
Making very simple generalisations, pluralism Is usually preferred to 
corporatism because with the latter there are only a limited number of 
groups Involved In decision-making (a tri-partite model of labourt 
employers and state, Is typically offered), and because the links bet- 
ween these groups and the state are very close, decision-making is 
effectively closed. Many portrayals of corporatism envisage a one- 
party state. Howeverv corporatism as discussed In the literature Is 
rarely In reference to a political philosophy but Is close to a dam- 
nation of policy decision-makingg In Its reference to the system of 
government within Italy In the late 1920's. 
Both plurall sm and , corporati sm can most usef ully be seen as I deal 
types. Decision-making In practice may be characterised by pluralist 
or corporatist tendencies. It follows. that the former Is viewed more 
favourably than the latterv as a more open and participative form. 
Britain Is not widely viewed as a corporatist state, but elements of 
corporatism can be Identified. This, of course, Is unlikely to be In 
the Interests of promotional pressure groups. Ward, for example, 
refers to the closed relationship and limited participation In 
decision-making In the nuclear power industry as 'micro-corporatism'. 
Decisions on nuclear power are, to all Intents and purposes, made 
solely between the CEGBq governmentq and GEC: "nuclear power policy Is 
formed within a micro-corporatist context In which one fraction of 
capital and certain elements within the state Interact to their mutual 
advantage" (152). 
The conclusions that follow from this study point to certain obser- 
vations on pluralism and corporatism as discussed In Chapter Twelve. 
While the nextp and finalg section to this chapter considers the role 
of direct action In pluralism. 
6.7.2 Pluralism Through Direct Action? 
If public policy Is to be the equilibrium reached In the struggle to 
accommodate conflicts of group Interest, how may promotional pressure 
groups play a part? Their limited resources and consequent limited 
Influence would seem to militate against the pluralistic Ideal. There 
are many Interests which, because of their weak strategic location or 
because they are not organised, have no opportunity for participation 
In the political process. 
Interests which are not organised must, It would seem, rely on their 
particular concerns being recognised and accommodated by the 
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authorities. For organised Interestsq however, a number Of solutions 
seem to present themselves on the basis of the analysis here. if 
these Interests are organised as a promotional pressure group they 
will find It unlikely that they are able to influence the authorities 
directly, by Involvement In decision-making. Even If they desi re 
Insider status and achieve It, only rarely do such groups have much 
Influence. They lack the sanctions by which they can make demands In 
the way that Is available to the sectional groups. They must then 
rely on the mobilisation of legitimacy for their cause by gaining 
popular supportq and/or the support of influential people. 
Alternativelyp or additionally if possible, they must attempt to 
improve their strategic location so that their demands may be backed 
by sanctions or coercion. 
The strategies and tactics for Influencing public and elite opinion 
have been discussed. They Include the consumer boycott as a protest 
tactic. This approach may be unsuccessfulp however. Groups are then 
placed In the position of waiting for a more amenable administration - 
perhaps Indefinitely - or using direct action. 
Direct action Is a last resort for a number of reasons. It may 
alienate some of the popular support for the group and probably any 
support that may exi st wl thl n government. It may be I llegal and 
violent. As a form of coercion It may offend some groups' preferences 
for what they view as democratic procedures; although one might 
question whether coercion by a promotional group Is any different to 
the coercion previously exerted by a variety of sectional groups from 
the National Union of Mineworkers to the British Medical Association. 
More coercive tactics may also entail loss of control for the group's 
leadership as action In support of the cause gets out of hand. Hence, 
there are risks associated with direct action. 
Direct action may be preferred by some groups for Ideological reasons. 
The acti vi ti es of the Irl sh Republi can Amy (IRA) are an extreme 
exampleg In their rejection of the legitimacy of British rule. 
The Imbalance In the pluralistic model In favour of sectional groups 
mayp potentially, be redressed by direct action. All the possible 
forms and the desirability of this cannot be explored here. Howeverg 
one particular form Is consideredv with good reason to assume It may 
be desirable. This Is non-violent direct action In consumer boycotts, 
assumed to be desirable because of the employment of consumer 
sovereignty. That Isp such a tactic of direct action Is legitimated 
by the role of consumer sovereignty as the rationale for capitalism 
(as discussed In Chapter Three). If consumer sovereignty provides the 
customer with a 'purchase votelp then It may appropriately be used as 
a form of political participation. 
The outcome of thl s form of ethical purchase behaviour may provi de 
political participation In three ways. Firstly, as a form of direct 
actiong the boycott may by putting pressure on the firm, stop a cor- 
porate digression. Secondly, and particularly If the firm has little 
control over the digression, It can put pressure on government via the 
fj mv to meet the groups' demands. It will provide political leverage 
for the group, perhaps even enhancing the strategic location of the 
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group by giving It some degree of economic power. Thirdly, as a pro- 
test tactict It can at least mobillse and express public opinion, 
which may also provide political leverage and even Insider status and 
Influence. 
Corporations may then become Involved In pressure group activity both 
because of their perceived abuses of power, but also because they 
represent a convenient target which can be employed to put pressure on 
government. The previous chapters have shown that further social 
control of business may be approached by the market, Indicating a role 
In the marketing system for pressure groups. This chapterg In addi- 
tion to examining the nature of pressure groups, has shown that promo- 
tional groups may not only wish to employ the market to correct 
corporate digressionsp but also to Improve their weak strategic loca- 
tion in their dealings with government. In other words, by using the 
boycott provide sanctions which may support their demands and possibly 
even coercion to force them In extreme cases. Some pressure groups 
would not even differentiate between the government and some cor- 
porations. In such Instances, the distinction above Is artificial. 
The 'mill tary-industrial-complexl and the close relationship between 
the governmentl the CEGB and the nuclear power equipment manufacturers 
are cases In point. 
Promotional groups are rarely the sole cause of changes in public 
policy or corporate behaviour. Public policy changes are usually the 
result of a number of Influencesq possibly including promotional 
pressure groups. Of those promotional groups that can claim to be 
succeessfulp few can seriously 'suggest they have done more than put 
the Issue on the political agenda. Influencing corporate behaviourp 
while also the result of a number of forces, may be easier and perhaps 
more approprI ate. The Amerl can corporate accountabi li ty movement 9 
dissatisfied with goverment efforts, attacked corporations directlyp 
Including the use of direct action. Pressure groups In this country 
may do likewise. The Increased use of direct action w1119 In Itself, 
mean corporations are more likely to be the targets of pressure group 
activity. 
Do boycotts represent a form of direct action likely to be successful? 
Chapter Three would suggest, In their basis In consumer sovereignty, 
that they are a legitimate tactic. The next chapter considers 
boycotts as a tactic In detail. 
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Previ ew 
'himsa ... Is not merely a negative state of harmlessness but iý*I's 
a positive state of love, of doing good even to the evil- 
doer. But it does not mean helping the evil-doer to continue the 
wrong or tolerating It by passive acquiescence. On the contraryp 
lovev the active state of ahimsal requires you to resist the 
wrong-doer by dissociating yourself from him even though It may 
offend him or Injure him physically. 
Mahatma K Gandhi (1) 
This great reform, as you can seep can be achieved without 
shedding a drop of bloodp without violence, without breaking any 
law - Englishq human or divine. But Ifa man does take a farm 
from whi ch a poor tenant has been evi cted ,I conjure you to do him no bodily harm ... Act toward him as the Queen of England to 
you ... She would not regard you nor your wife nor your children 
as her equals. Now Imititate the Queen of Englando and don't 
speak to a landgrabber nor a landgrabber's wife nor to a 
landgrabber's children ... If a landgrabber comes to town and 
wants to sell anything, don't do him any bodily harm ... If you 
see a landgrabber going to a shop to buy bready or clothing, or 
even whiskey9 go you to the shopkeeper at oncep don't threaten 
him ... Just say to him that under British law he has the 
undoubted right to sell his goods to anyoneg but that there is no 
British law to compel you to buy another penny's worth from himp 
and that you will never do It as long as you live. 
James Redpath, In 1880 (2) 
Chapters Three 9 Four and Fi ve have put forward the case for ethl cal 
purchase behaviour: Its apparent basis in consumer sovereignty (at 
least Insofar as the concept is employed In marketing) and its actual 
and potential role as a mechanism for the social control of business. 
An Information role was Identified for pressure groups. The previous 
chapter examined pressure groupso showing that no only may ethical 
purchase behaviour require pressure groupsl but also that pressure 
groups may need ethical purchase behaviour. Promoti onal pressure 
groups are in need of effective tactIcs9 one possible tactic which 
they could usefully use may be the consumer boycott. This chapter 
examines the boycott tactiog Including the consumer boycott, the most 
manifest form of ethical purchase behaviour and the form of principal 
concern to this studyp and a tactic which may enhance the strategic 
location of promotional pressure groups. 
Ahimsa Is the term Gandhi employed to describe non-violent direct 
action.. In keeping with thisy Gandhi organised consumer boycotts of 
salt and British cloth. For Gandhi, this philosophy of non-violence 
was a way of lifeg and It later brought him Into conflict with those 
who thought of it simply as a strategy. NVDA has proved effective 
both when used within a non-violent philosophy and simply as a stra- tegy alone. It Is adopted by promotional pressure groups for Ideolo- 
gical reasonsp but probably also because It Is the more acceptable 
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form of direct action. It would seem likely that If direct action is 
to Increase, as the previous chapter suggestedg then NVDA may become 
commonplace. 
Consumer boycottsp a non-cooperation tacticq are the form of NVDA con- 
sidered In this study. The term boycott originates In the ostracism 
of an Irish land agent, Captain Boycott. It was first wri tten by 
Redpathq who describes the tactic above. As this quote showsp the 
term boycott refers to more than not buying from an unfavourably 
viewed seller. Various types of boycott are Identified here, 
Including the form of International economic sanctions such as the 
Arab boycott. 
This examination of the boycott tactic Is not restricted entirely to 
the consumer boycott, as the consumer boycott needs to be seen within 
the context of all boycott tactIcsq the tactics of non-cooperation, 
and KVDA. Other types of boycott also suggest Implications for the 
use of the consumer boycott and management response. The Arab boycott 
is a case in point; It is also useful In Illustrating ethical purchase 
behaviour and the complexity of managerial decision-making on social 
responsibility Issues. Chapter Eight continues this examination of 
the boycott tacticl restricted to the consumer boycott alone. 
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7.1 Non-Violent Direct Action 
7.1.1 NVDA and Boycotts of Business 
The above quote about ahimsa reveals the underlying philosophical 
basl s to NVDA. This Is important because, as was noted In the pre- 
vious chapter, direct action can appeal for Ideological reasons and 
the use of NVDA and boycotts In particular can reflect this. The 
IRA's use of violent direct action Is at least In part Ideological, 
for its justification Is that It Is fighting a war, with the British 
troops In Northern Ireland seen as an army of occupation. Similarlyg 
the use of NVDA by other pressure groups Is Ideologicalp In the rejec- 
tion of the legitimacy of violence. In some casesp consumer boycotts 
Involve not only the avoidance of certain products but also the 
welcoming of othersq In the embracing of a more appropriate subculture 
or 'alternative' society. 
However, before considering this philosophical basis to NVDA, It Is 
worth summarlsing the main points about direct action as a pressure 
group strategy and as they relate to boycotts of business, as Indi- 
cated In the pressure group literature and discussed In the last 
chapter. Firstlyp and most importantlyp direct action Is a last 
resort for the majority of pressure groups. It would be incorrect and 
misleading to suggest the following discussion of NVDA as a philo- 
sophyp represents the outlook of all or even most pressure groups. 
Yet It Is becoming Increasingly prevalent among promotional groups 
faced with Intransigent and unresponsive authorities. 
The second point Is that direct action Is likely to Increase as more 
groups find their demands not being met or Ignored, In addition to 
those groups employing direct action for Ideological reasons. Those 
groups In the former category are likely to prefer NVDA because the 
weapons used by a group to advance Its cause must be appropriate to 
the character of Its calms. An obvious example Is CND. As a pacifist 
organisationp It could not possibly endorse violent direct action. So 
NVDA is likely to become more commonplace. 
A further point Is that corporations will be Increasingly Involved. 
They are attractive targets either as contributors to the wrong which 
the group Is striving to right, or perhaps even as valuable potential 
allies to be won overp particularly given their Insider status. 
Finallyq direct action may be symbolic, designed to gain public atten- 
tion (but possibly losing public sympathy) and demonstrate strength of 
feeli ng or breadth of support. In so doingg the group has the sense 
of being active and morale Is raised and maintained. Alternativelyp 
or additionallvp direct action may be designed to achieve concrete 
results In Itself. The actions by Greenpeace referred to In the last 
chapter. and the advocacy of squatting by groups for the homeless are 
typical examples of direct action with both symbolic and concrete 
Intentions. The symbolic forms of direct action, howeverl may be more 
accurately described as publicity stunts or protest tactics. 
Demonstrations and perhaps even strikes are a recognised part of the 
political process and should not perhaps be described as direct 
actiong as the earlier discussion of definitions Indicated (3). 
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However, the distinction can be difficult to make. If It must be 
made , acti ons whi ch are symboll a alone cannot really count as di rect 
action, though many sources would reject this exclusion. 
In sum thenj promotional pressure groups often find themseles obliged 
to turn to direct action In the last resort, because of their relative 
powerlessness. Corporations are likely to become Increasingly 
Involved andq given the probable preference for non-violent direct 
actiong this Involvement could well feature consumer boycotts. 
This chapter examines the boycott tactic Including boycotts of busi- 
nessp an examination which continues In Chapter Eight, the concluding 
chapter to Part Two. Firstlyq however, It Is necessary to look at 
non-violent direct action as the Incorporating philosophy and strategy 
for boycotts. 
7.1.2 The Philosophy of NVDA 
This section briefly considers the philosophy of non-violent direct 
action, or ratherp the various perspectives on non-violent direct 
acti on. The use of NVDA may be principled, but the principles 
Involved may differ with different peopleg and Its use may even be 
purely pragmatic. 
Non-violent direct action provides groups with a particular form of 
power. It gives the group and Its supporters moral superiority. This 
Is where the distinction between violent direct action and non-violent 
direct action becomes most apparent. (Though this may be more often 
In theory than In practice, and not always In the public's perception 
of events. ) Violent direct action employs violence. However, NVDA 
Involves more than the refusal to employ violence. A non-violent 
action requires the participants to neither use violence Initially nor 
respond with it when provoked, or even when It Is used by the authori- 
ties. Moreoverp the participants must not retreat in the face of 
violence as this would show that violence always succeeds. In so 
doingp as Gandhi foundp the non-violent protester achieves moral 
superiority over the opponent (4). This Is described by Richard Gregg 
as moral jiu-jitsu: 
"The nonviolence and good will of the victim act In the same way 
that the lack of physical opposition by the user of physical jiu- 
jitsu doesq causing the attacker to lose his moral balance. He 
suddenly and unexpectedly loses the moral support which the usual 
violent resistance of most victims would render him. He plunges 
forwardq as It werep Into a new world of values. He feels Inse- 
cure because of the novelty of the situation and his Ignorance of 
how to handle It ... The user of nonviolent resistancep knowing 
what he Is doing and having, a more creative purposev keeps his 
moral balance. He uses the leverage of a superior wisdom to sub- 
due the rough direct force of his opponent" (5). 
The successes of the American civil rights movement under Martin 
Luther King are generally attributed to his adherence to the principle 
of non-violence. He wrote "I had come to see early that the Christian 
doctrine of love operating through the Gandhian method of nonviolence 
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was one of the most potent weapons aval lable to the Negro An hi s 
struggle for freedom" (6). Yet this should not give the Impression 
that Gandhi's use of non-violence was entirely pragmatic. For Gandhi, 
ends and means were coincident. His use of non-violence was both 
because he reallsed It was an effective conflict techniquep and also 
because of his preference for It as a way of life, rooted In his moral 
and religious beliefs. 
Gandhi Is phi losophy and hi s use of NVDA Is deserl bed In detal 11n Joan 
Bondurant's Conquest of Violence (7). It cannot be considered here, 
although AtIs worth noti ng In support of the above comment that she 
suggests the method of satyagraha, the name Gandhi used to describe 
his actionsg Is the key to understanding his political thought. Her 
work Is a widely acknowledged classic on NVDA, but is only part of an 
extensive literature. Blumberg provides an annotated bibliography (8) 
and Sharp's bibliographyg for his three-volume work The Politics of 
Nonviolent Actiong runs to over five hundred references (9). This 
treatise on NVDA, published In 1973, Is probably still "... the most 
comprehensive attempt thus far to examine the nature of non-violent 
struggle as a social and political technique, Including Its view of 
power, Its specific methods of action, Its dynamics In conflict and 
the conditions for success or fallure In Its use" (10). The politics 
of NVDA can only be considered In summary here, but they should be 
seen as the essential back-drop to boycotts. Appropriately then, 
Sharp's study will form the basis for this overview of NVDA. 
In an earlier paper (11)v Sharp Identified six types of principled 
nonviolence, belief systems which Involve the rejection of violence on 
principle: 
Non-resistance: used by groups concerned with being true to their 
beliefs and maintaining their own Integrity while refusing to 
resist any attack. 
2. Active reconciliation: used In the belief that active good will 
and reconciliation can bring about social change. 
Moral resistance: used by those that feel evil should be resisted 
but only by peaceful and moral means. 
Selective nonviolence: used by groups who refuse to participate 
In Darticular violent conflicts, usually international wars. 
Satyagraha: developed by Gandhi, who sought truth through love 
and ri ght acti on whi le reconstructi ng soal ety and combatti ng 
political evils. 
Nonvi olent revoluti on: a bell ef held by those who feel that only 
a. revoluti on carri ed on by nonvi olent p cooperati ve 9 and egall - tarl an methods can solve the major social problems of the world. 
This Indicates three Important points about NVDA (which are also shown 
to be relevant In the analysis of the CND case to follow). Firstlyp 
not all those that reject violence on principle will use non-violent 
direct actl on. Sharp suggests Gandhi discarded the term passive 
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resistance In preference for satyagrahaq because It Implied weakness 
and I nacti on. Secondly, of those that do use non-violent direct 
actiong they will have different Ideas as to the types of action that 
are acceptable - Thirdly, and somewhat indirectlyp It also follows 
that some who use NVDA may not be opposed to violence on principlep 
but may simply view it as an effective strategy, or the only one 
appropriate. This latter point Is developed by Judith Stlehm In 
'Nonviolence Is TwoV (12). She distinguishes between 'conscientious 
nonviolence' and 'pragmatic nonviolencetv although she misses the 
other two points by trying to unduly simplify the quite complex posi- 
tions which may be adopted. 
The three points can be Illustrated by reference to the use of NVDA In 
this country by groups campaigning against nuclear arms In the late 
1950's and early 19601s. The mass civil disobedience actions at this 
time - which Included the prohibited demonstration In Trafalgar Square 
in September 1961 where more than thirteen hundred people were 
arrested - had their origins In a group called the Peace Pledge Union. 
This group did not support direct action; which Is Illustrative of the 
first point. Howeverg some of the members of the Peace Pledge Union 
did support direct action and their Direct Action Committee (DAC) con- 
ceived the first Aldermaston March In 1958. According to Cadogan, but 
In conflict with some sources, the DAC then became the Committee of 
100, which was committed to direct action (13). 
The second point is illustrated by Cadogan's observations on the deba- 
tes that took place about whether certain actions were non-violent. 
Could one, for example, use wire-cutters to get through barbed wire? 
(14). Regarding both points, what one has In essence Is a group of 
people who may be loosely described as paclflstý some of whom do not 
feel they can justify direct action at a119 and some of whom question 
the extents at which direct action remains non-violent in principle. 
Finallyp there are thoseq Including Bertrand Russell who was highly 
prominent In the Committee, who see NVDA as simply an extremely effec- 
tive strategyp justified by extenuating circumstances (the Bay of Pigs 
Incidentp the building of the Berlin Wallp the Cuban missile crisis 
and so on). As Cadogan writes "To Russell, It was a tactleg a device 
to secure necessary Instant publicity and support in a dire emergency. 
Neverthelessp the general policy of the DAC prevailed on 
demonstrations" (15). So NVDA can be employed without adherence to 
any philosophical underpinningg simply as an effective strategy; 
although the 'rules' of non-violent action are necessary for It to 
suitably function (16). 
Hence NVDA may be used as a strategy by pressure groups but may or may 
not be based on a principled rejection of violence, for which there 
are a number of different perspectivesq such as In the philosophy of 
Gandhi. 
* 
As earlier noted, Sharp's study will provide the basis for 
the overview here of the use of NVDA. This Is the subject of the next 
section as the thrust within Sharp's study Is toward non-violent 
acti on as a strategy. He does not attempt to convert the reader to a 
new faitho or to describe some non-violent philosophy. He Is con- 
cerned with the effectiveness of NVDA In an attempt to find alter- 
natives to violence. 
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7.1.3 NVDA as a Strategy 
Before reviewing Sharp's studyt some points of clarification must be 
made. Firstlyp about civil disobedienceg as this form of action has 
now been discussed. The term non-violent direct action Is popularly 
used to describe civil disobedience (17). Indeedv the terms are often 
used interchangeably and one even finds that groups such as CND are 
uncertain about their meaning. However, civil disobedience need not 
necessarily be non-violent. Daniel Bell feels It Is more accurately 
described as uncivil disobedience and whether such actions are non- 
violent depends partly on onets definition of violence (as earlier 
considered In note 14). Moreover, NVDA, as this chapter showsq encom- 
passes more than civil disobedience. 
One also finds the terms non-violent direct action and non-cooperation 
used Interchangeably (18). Here the tactics of non-cooperation 
(I ncludi ng boycotts) are vI ewed as one form of NVDA. This Is in 
keeping with Sharp's analysis. 
Sharp suggests certain forms of civil disobedience may be NVDAq but he 
notes "Nonvi olent acti on Is just what It says: acti on whi ch Is non- 
violentp not Inaction" (19, Sharpts emphasis). However, actions are 
not simply violent or non-violentv there is An effect a continuum of 
violence (20). The point Is Important because consumer boycotts are 
to be justified because they are non-violent. Howeverg as a coercive 
actiong they are most accurately seen as being on a point well 
towards, but not atq the non-violent extreme of this continuum. 
If boycott actions are to be viewed preferentially for this reason, 
they can be seen to compare quite favourably with civil disobedience. 
Again, Etzioni's study is worth referring to (although he does not 
seem to be acquainted with the literature on non-violent action). He 
suggests civil disobedience actions command an Interstitial position 
between violence and non-violence. He only finds (non-violent) civil 
disobedience acceptable under certain conditions: "... when due pro- 
cess has been exhaustedp when democracy Is only operative "on paperg" 
and when the laws which are challenged are themselves undemocratic" 
(21). Boycotts are then presumably acceptable under less extreme 
conditions. His position on civil disobedience Is similar to that 
adopted by others on NVDA9 and will be considered further for this 
reason after the overview of Sharp's study. 
The origins of Sharp's study lie In the view that alternatives to 
violence In meeting tyrannyv aggression, Injustice and oppression are 
needed. But Sharp recognises that the mere advocacy of non-violent 
alternatives will not be sufficient unless such alternatives are 
accurately perceived as being at least as effective as violence. 
"Thereforev a very careful examination of the nature, capacities and 
requirements of nonviolent struggle was necessaryl which needed to be 
as objective as possible" (22). 
Non-vI olent alternati ves to V1 olence need not be greatly di f ferent 
from violence In the way In which they operate. Professor Schelling 
comments: 
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"Political violence, like political nonviolenceg usually has as 
Its purpose making somebody do something or not do something or 
stop doing something. The aim Is to Influence behaviour. 
Violent action tries to do It mainly by intimidating people ... 
The violence does not directly make people behave or perform or 
participate; It can only make It hurt If they don't" (23). 
He continues by pointing out that non-violent actions work In a simi- 
lar way: 
"The violent actions and the nonviolent are different methods of 
trying to make It unrewarding for people to do certain things, 
and safe or rewarding to do other things" (24). 
Consequentlyq as he continues "Both can be misused, mishandledg or 
misapplied. Both can be used for evil or misguided purposes. " The 
application and motives of either method may be Incorrect or 'bad'. 
And such an observation Is obviously true of the particular form of 
non-violent action of concern here; boycotts, and all types of ethical 
purchase behaviourg may be for 'good' or 'bad' motives. The user's 
Intention Is based on his or her perception of 'good' and 'bad' and 
may even be deliberately evil. As Vogel notes, one must be careful 
how one uses the term social responsibility in relation to boycottsq 
"In America, a number of boycotts have come from the right, not the 
left" (25). 
Referring to consumer boycotts as a specific form of non-violent 
action and In comparison with other forms, one Is obliged to recognise 
the coercive element In boycotts. They have, In this regardp much In 
common with violent actionsq and far more than petitionsg marches or 
even the hunger strike (26). Although, of course, they may be coer- 
cive In Intent, but only symbolic, If that, In effect. As will be 
seeng few boycotts have resulted In severe economic loss. 
The Politics of Nonviolent Action comes In three volumes. The first, 
Power and Strugglep examines political power and the characteristics 
and achievements of nonviolent struggle. Sharp shows that the assump- 
tion that power derives from violence and can be controlled only by 
greater violence Is misplaced. He suggests power Is derived from 
sources In the society which may be restricted or severed by 
withdrawal of cooperation by the populace. Nonviolent action Is based 
on this Insight. As Sharp puts It: 
It Is not true that violence is the only effective means of 
action In crucial conflict situations. Throughout historyv under 
a variety of political systems, people In every part of the world 
have waged conflict and wielded undeniable power by using a very 
different technique of struggle ... Although It has been known by 
a varl ety of names ,I ts basi s has always been the same: the 
belief that the exercise of power depends on the consent of the 
ruled who, by withdrawing that consent, can control and even 
destroy the power of their opponent" (27). 
Hencep he goes on to define non-violent action as "a technique used to 
controlq combat and destroy the opponent's Power by non-violent means 
of wielding power. " 
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Sharp Identifies a long history of non-violent actiong from ancient 
Rome to the civil rights struggles In the United States. It has , 
howeverv remained largely unknown because of historians' concern for 
other matters. He specifIcallv refers to non-violent action by 
working people In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to 
improve conditions and gain greater powerv using as later discussed, 
the strke In conjunction with the consumer boycott. So, while he 
describes Gandhi as "the outstanding strategist of nonviolent action. " 
he recognises that non-violent action In various forms has been used 
by many others at many di f ferent times and not just by Gandhi , to whom 
the notion of non-violent action Is so often attributed. Underlying 
and therefore uniting all these various actions Is a particular 
perspective on power: "... Implicitly or explicitly, all non-violent 
struggle has a basi a assumpti on In common and thl sIsI ts vi ew of the 
nature of power and how to deal with It" (28). 
Sharp argues that obedi ence Is at the heart of poll tl cal power , 
Involving an element of reciprocity and mutual dependence. Whi le 
there Is no single self-sufficient explanation for obedience to 
rulers, he does Identify seven prominent reasons: 
1. Habi t. 
2. Fear of sanctions. 
Moral obli gati on (arl si ng f rom four consi derati ons: the common 
good of societyp suprahuman factors - such as the Divine Right of 
Kings, legitimacy of the command, and conformity of the command 
to accepted norms). 
Self-interest. 
.; 
Ical Identification with the ruler. Psycholog 
Zones of Indifference. 
The absence of self-confidence among subjects. 
Obedi ence Is then essenti ally voluntary as It rests on a combi nati on 
of a fear of sanctions and free consent, the latter largely arising 
"from a more or less nonrational acceptance of the standards and ways 
of onets societyp or from a more or less rational consideration of the 
merits of the regime and the reasons for obeying It" (29). 
Accordinglyl if power rests on obediencep which Is a consequence of 
both coercion and consent, that consent may be withdrawn If the legi- 
timacy of the ruler Is called Into question and his or her power posi- 
tion threatened. This logic was employed by the American corporate 
acountability movement In regard to the power of corporations and Is 
evident. in the consent creed (earlier discussed). 
This understanding of the potentially fragile nature of power led to 
Gandhi arguing the need for a Psychological change away from passive 
submission to self-respect and couragel recognition by the subject 
that his assistance makes the regime possible, and the building of a 
determination to withdraw cooperation and obedience. Gandhi said his 
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speeches "are Intended to create 'disaffection' as such, that people 
might consider It a shame to assist or cooperate with a government 
that had forfeited all title to respect or support" (30). 
Sharp shows that the use of non-violent action has brought ordinary 
people higher wages, a breakdown In social barriersv changes In 
goverment policies, frustrated Invaders, paralysed an empire and 
dissolved dictatorships. 
in his second volumep Sharp examines 198 specific methods of non- 
violent action. These are considered In 7.2. However, before doing 
so, It Is worth providing some further Indication of the relevance of 
this both to contemporary Britain and corporations In particulart in 
case It Is uncertain as to how this fits Into the argument beyond pro- 
viding background to the use of boycotts. 
Firstlyp to recapp It has been argued that the use of direct action is 
likely to Increase In this country. There are a number of reasons for 
thisp but principally It Is attributed to the growing acceptance of 
its use - particularly given the examples set by pressure groups over- 
seas - In the face of Intransigent and unresponsive authorities. The 
likely prospect of a third term of Tory goverment lends further 
weight to this prediction (for reasons given in Chapter Six). 
Increases In direct action are likely to have a disproportionate 
effect on the corporation. Many Issues of concern to pressure groups 
Involve businessp and as groups attempt to solve the problem directly 
they will by-pass government and turn on the perceived perpetrator of 
the wrong. Corporations may also represent an easier targetv or, 
given the argument about corporations as a 'private governmentlp a 
more appropriate target. 
The form of direct action employed by the pressure group must be 
appropriate to Its alms and Ideology. For many promotional pressure 
groupsl this Is likely to mean a preferene for non-violent direct 
action. So the likelihood Is that NVDA will be Increasingly used In 
this country and will, with growing frequency, Involve business. 
Secondlyq It Is useful to consider a recent survey on direct action 
and the Involvement of corporations. This Is the subject of the next 
and last section to 7.1. 
7.1.4 Direct Action and the Corporation 
The likelihood of direct action being Increasingly used In this 
country, Involving the corporation with ever growing frequencyt may be 
Illustrated by reference to a recent survey. Boyle reports a Gallup 
opinion surveyp specially commissioned for the BBC programme 'Inquiry 
- Protest and the Suburban Guerilla'. This found surprisingly high 
proportions prepared to break the law on Issues where national 
Interest could take precedence over their local needs. 55 per cent 
said they would be prepared to contemplate breaking the law to stop a 
motorway near their homes; 67 per cent regarded lawbreaking as a 
potentially legitimate tactic to stop a nuclear power station. These 
figures were presented within the context of a programme showing that 
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direct action tactics were no longer the prerogative of minority and 
unrepresentative pressure groups, but were also appropriate to: 
middle-class folk who had already climbed the ladder of pro- 
test, found the system wantingg and were prepared to countenance 
hard-line direct action If all else failed. It was the Improba- 
bility of the people Involved that gave the programme Its title 
and provided the common thread. Here were, and arep magistrates, 
medics, top management men - Telegraph: -reading Conservative 
voters who never had cause to distrust democracy beforey now 
learning the tactics of the pressure groups and rejecting the 
consultation processes they had blithely accepted for years" 
(31). 
These people had found, as has been earlier noted with regard to many 
promotional pressure groupsl that "it Isn't any use complaining in the 
conventional way If no one's prepared to listen. " The people and 
groups the programme referred to all fit Into Wootton's Irepresenta- 
tivet category of pressure groupsl those that are loft and 'for', with 
a closed membership and high political speciallsation. They are the 
people who are concerned about motorways being built near their homesp 
such as the people of Saltairej or those that live near the Archway 
Road - the last public Inquiry for which ended with the resignation of 
the inquiry Inspectorp Sir Michael GIddIngs9 following disruptive and 
abusive tactics from protesters and even threats of violence. They 
also Include people living near Stansted airportg which for more than 
twenty years has been seen as the potential third London airportt 
despite a public Inquiry and a Royal Commission suggesting otherwise. 
The conclusion Is that In these matters the public Inquiry system Is 
inadequate. It was described by one previous Inspector as "a 
charadev" because "Inquiries have become a means of allowing the 
Dublic to let off steam after a decision affecting them has been made" 
(32). Accordinglyq Sir John Garlick, a former Cabinet Office 
permanent secretaryp commented "We must change the system quickly so 
that people do not. have to take the law Into their own hands" (33). 
Thisp of course, not only points to the growing acceptance of direct 
actionp but also to the much wider Issues of political participationp 
disclosure and the role of pressure groupsp considered in the last 
chapter. The Sizewell public Inquiry (into the building of a 
pressurised water nuclear reactor), the longest and most expensive 
(E25m. ) public Inquiry to date, Is seemingly another exercise In 
giving the public the opportunity to let off steam after a decision 
has been made (34). Or, to put it more eruditelyg the provision of a 
pluralist gloss to corporatist politics. Commenting on the Inquiry 
Garlick said: 
"Pressure groups are getting more vocal and sophisticated. 
Indi vi duals are gettl ng more and 
* 
more concerned about the way 
projects and public policies are being steam-rollered forward 
without there being adequate provision for the public and spe- 
cialist bodies to put their point of view. 
People must f eel that thel r VI ew Is bet ng const dered Ina proper 
and fair national forum. This does not happen now" (35). 
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One must accept that thl s type of televi si on programme contal ns an 
element of sensationalism. However 9 the facts of events that have 
occurred at publi cI nqui ri es (di rect acti on) , the opi ni on survey fi n- 
dings, and the views of former senior officials, should not be lightly 
di smi ssed. 
Moreoverv corporations are Involved to various degrees from being a 
potential target when constructing motorways, to an active party 
lobbying for Its own Interests in conflict with local Interestsp such 
as the British Airports Authority at Stansted and the CEGB (et al) at 
Si zewell. To suggest that these latter two corporations are special 
cases because of their public ownership would be a poor argument, If 
only because under the current government they are potential can- 
didates for privatisation. 
Yet the progamme also referred to privately owned corporations such as 
Conoco. Oil companies are hoping to drill In the Home Counties. This 
has led to the formation of a group called Save Our Surrey (SOS), who, 
until prevented by the Independent Broadcasting Authorityp had an 
antl-advertisement featuring Conoco on the local radio station. This 
was at least partly Intended to be pressure group Influence on 
purchase behaviour. One protester commented "I used to think Friends 
of the Earth were a bunch of long-haired layabouts ... until I disco- 
vered Conocol" (36). 
So there seems to be some degree of popular support for di rect acti -on 
and the corporation IS most definitely Involved. Part 7.2, which 
followsq considers the methods of non-violent direct action and par- 
ticularly the tactics of non-cooperation - Including various types of 
boycott action. 
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7.2 NVDA Non-Cooperation Tactics 
7.2.1 Sharp's Schema and the Consumer Boycott 
Sharp I denti fi es three forms of non-vi olent acti on: acts of omi, ssi on , 
acts of commissionp and a combination. The term Is generic "covering 
dozens of specific methods of protestp non-cooperation and Interven- 
tiong In all of which the actionists conduct the action by doing - or 
refusing to do - certain things without using physical violence" (37). 
There are then three broad classes of methods: 
1. Symbolic actions 
2. Withdrawal of cooperation 
Di rect I nterventi on 
Symbolic actions Sharp refers to as the methods of nonviolent protest 
and persuasion. He identifies ten different categories Including for- 
mal statements such as public speeches or petitions, pressures on 
Individuals as In fraternisation or vigils, and processions such as 
marches or parades. Direct Intervention actions he terms nonviolent 
intervention. Five categories are Identified Including psychological 
Intervention such as the hunger strike or nonviolent harassmentq phy- 
sical Intervention as in the sit-in or pray-in, and economic Interven- 
tion such as In the use of alternative economic Institutions or 
alternative transportation systems. 
Boycotts are classified under the second class of methods, withdrawal 
of cooperati on. Three sub-classes 'are subsumed under thi s class, 
which Sharp refers to as noncooperation: social noncooperation, eco- 
nomic noncooperation and political noncooperation. 
There are three categories of social noncooperation. The first Is 
ostracism of persons and Includes the social boycottv "a refusal to 
continue usual social relations with a person or group of persons, " 
which he notes Is referred to In modern England as being 'sent to 
Coventry' (38). The second category Is noncooperation with social 
eventsp customs and Institutions. This Includes the suspension of 
social and sports activities and the withdrawal from social Institu- 
tions. The final category of social noncooperation is withdrawal from 
the social systemo as In total personal noncooperation. 
There are six categories Of Political noncooperation: the rejection of 
authorityp as In literature and speeches advocating resistance; 
citizens' noncooperation with governmentp as In the boycott of elec- tions or the refusal of assistance to enforcement agents; citizens' 
alternatives to obedience, such as reluctant and slow compliance or 
civil disobedience of 'illegitimate' laws; action by government per- 
sonnelp as In selective refusal of assistance by government aides or 
mutinv; domestic governmental action, such as quasi-legal evasions and delays; andp finally, International governmental actiong such as 
severance of diplomatic relations or expulsion from International 
organisations. 
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Table 7.1 : Sharp's Categories of Economic Boycotts 
1. Action by cons=ers: 
- consumers' boycott 
- nonconsumption of boycotted goods 
- policy of austerity 
- rent witholding 
- refusal to rent 
- national consumers' boycott 
- international consumers' boycott 
2. Action by workers and producers: 
workmen's boycott 
producers' boycott 
Action by middlemen: 
- suppliers' and handlers' boycott 
Action by owners and management: 
traders' boycott 
refusal to let or sell property 
lookout 
refusal of industrial assistance 
merchants' 'general strike' 
Action by holders of financial resources: 
- withdrawal of bank deposits 
- refusal to pay fees, dues and assessments 
- refusal to pay debts or interest 
- severance of funds and credit 
- revenue refusal 
- refusal of a government's money 
Action by governments: 
- domestic embargo 
- blacklisting of traders 
- international sellers' embargo 
- international buyers' embargo 
- international trade embargo 
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The methods of economic noncooperation Sharp divides Into economic 
boycotts and strikes. He Identifies seven categories of strike: sym- 
bolic strikesq agricultural strikesq strikes by special groups, the 
ordinary industrial strikeg restricted strikesq multi-industry stri- 
kesq and the combination of strikes and economic closures. A full 
list of the categories and types of economic boycotts Identified by 
Sharp Is gi ven In Table 7.1. This categorisation Is referred to 
throughout the remainder of this chapter and elsewhere. 
Boweverg Sharp's categorisation of economic boycotts Is not In Itself 
adequate for direct application to this study. He Includes actions 
which are beyond the scope of the Investigation and Interest herep 
such as the actions by governments. The concern here Is restricted to 
actions by Individual or organisational customers, not countries via 
their governments. Although such actions may beg arguablyp ethical 
purchase behaviour. The distinction that Is made Is between all eco- 
nomic boycotts - "the refusal to continue or to undertake certain eco- 
nomic relationshipsv especially the buying, sellingg or handling of 
goods and services" (39) - and the consumer boycottp defined as the 
organised exercising of consumer sovereignty by abstaining from 
purchase of an offering In order to exert Influence on a matter of 
concern to the customer and over the Institution making the offering. 
The distinction Is partly the result of the difference In perspec- 
tI ves. Sharp's concern Is with all non-violent actiont particularly 
in this casep that involving the withdrawal of cooperation in economic 
relationships. The concern here Is wl th a specl fl c form of non- 
violent action because It Is a type of ethical purchase behaviour and 
Is therefore based in consumer sovereignty. As Chapter One notedq 
this research Is ultimately an investigation of the extent of consumer 
sovereignty. 
All forms of consumer boycott would seem to be Included In Sharp's 
schema. It may then be suggested that the consumer boycott is one 
type of economic boycott. However, It Is not then possible to say 
that It Is comparable to a specific category identified by Sharp. It 
is more than his category 19 action by consumers. It As, because of 
this difference In perspectiveg all actions Identified in Sharp's 
schema where the participant Is employing his or her power in the 
marketplace as a customer, that Ist using consumer sovereignty (40). 
Sharp's categories are not only too widely drawn for this study, but 
they are also too specific to be rigidly applied. Thl s cri ti ci sm 
seems to apply throughout his analysis. In his attempts to classify 
non-violent actions Sharp makes divisions that are not particularly 
fixed. For examplej Is It possible or even necessary to distinguish 
between agricultural strikes and strikes by special groups? If the 
latter category Includes the craft strike and the professional strike, 
why can It not Include the peasant strike or the farm workers' strike? 
Many of his categories overlapq or could be Inappropriate. 
But Sharp's analysis Is obviously a sound starting-point. What Is 
required to Improve his classification are more suitable criteria for 
maki ng di stl nati ons. Thl s study suggests that as far as economi c 
boycotts are concerned, a more appropriate criterion would be consumer 
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sovereigntyg for a particular sub-set of economic boycotts. Rather 
than the mere descriptive criteria employed by Sharpq the Improved 
classification would then be using something closer to explanatory 
cri terl a. In other wordsl different actions would be distinguished 
less on the basis of a prima facie difference In eventsp and more on 
the basis of the reasoning behind particular types of actions. This 
would then move the schema from the realms of mere taxonomy to theory 
(in accordance with the positivist notion of social science). A likely 
consequence of this would be fewer distinctions (divisions) as the 
schema becomes more robust and more capable of generalisation. 
In fairness to Sharp, it should be noted that he does acknowledge the 
weaknesses of his classification. He claims his schema Is useful for 
understanding non-violent action as well as recognising that different 
types exist; It also provides a checklist of the main methods thus far 
practiced. (This list Is not exhaustive howeverp as new methods may 
be developed or some may have been missed. ) He does advise caution In 
attempting to use the classification too rIgIdlyq suggesting It should 
be seen as "generally valid" - though this author does not agree with 
his suggestion that a more complicated classification system needs to 
be developed. As Indicated above, It is not Increased complexity that 
is requiredg but more appropriate criteria for the distinctions made 
(41). 
The distinction between the various types of boycott will become more 
apparent in the remainder of this chaptery both In reference to 
Sharp's analysis and others. 
To conclude part 7.2 and this brief examination of NVDA it Is worth 
considering how NVDA may workv In the British context in particular, 
and the possible role of the consumer boycott In this. Thi sIs the 
subject of the next section. 
7.2.2 NVDA In Britain and a Role For The Consumer Boycott 
The third volume to Sharp's work Is the Dynamics of Nonviolent Action. 
This cannot be considered In any detail here, but the basic points can 
be made. These points have Implications for all tactics of non- 
cooperation and boycotts In particular, and as Sharp notes 
"Overwhelminglyp the methods of nonviolent action Involve non- 
cooperation with the opponent" (42). Although this claim may be 
somewhat suspect when many seemingly noncooperation actions would be 
more accurately described as symbolic acts, when the outcome rather 
than Intent Is taken Into account. 
Sharp emphasises the Importance of preparation for non-violent actiong 
and the likelihood that the challenge will be repressed but that with 
solidarity and discipline (particularly In ensuring that actions 
remain 
, 
non-violent In the face of violence) a form of Jul-jitsu may 
operateg as earlier noted. He Identifies three mechanisms by which 
non-violent action produces victory: by conversion, which he suggests 
is the least likely; by accommodationj where concessions are granted 
but the opponent Is neither converted to the activists' point-of-view 
nor coerced Into action; andq thirdly, by nonviolent coercion. 
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Sharp's analysis concludes with the claim that non-violent action can 
contribute to long-term social change by redistributing power. Power 
becomes diffused as non-violent action Involves a decentralisation of 
power. This political Ideal permeates Sharp's analysis but not, It 
seems, to Its detriment. (It Is hoped that such an observation Is 
true of this study and the expressed concern for the slightly less 
ambitious Ideal of greater political participation. Of coursel this 
Ideal Is not altogether unrelated to that expressed by Sharpq except 
this author has greater faith In the more conventional methods of 
political activityg for this country and most others In the West at 
least. This view may also be more realistic, as Chapter Eight and 
Twelve bears witness. ) 
The classic non-violent action results from severe oppressiong often 
stemming from the participants being unable to do anything else, as 
Gandhi recognised In India and South Africa. In such circumstances 
the requirement Is as Lakey suggests: "The task of the nonviolent cam- 
paignersq theng Is to get the opponent to see them as human beings" 
(43). Yet how relevant are such classic actions to contemporary 
Britain? As the case study revealsq the government may attempt to 
portray CND as 'crackpots', but they are still viewed - perhaps even 
by the government - as human beings. Blacks are relatively disadvan- 
taged In this countryp but - with the possible exception of a small 
extremist minority - they are still viewed as human beings and could 
not be reasonably described as heavily oppressed. 
At the outset of this discussion of NVDA It was noted that Its use may 
be for conscl ence or pragmati a reasons. It seems that another di cho- 
tomy Is also necessary, based on the context of the action. 
Circumstances of severe oppression may dictate the use of NVDA. In 
such cases It may be possible to organJse mass actionsp producing the 
classic or 'grand' non-violent campaign - such as Gandhi's salt- 
satyagraha (44). But there are few causes In this country, for the 
moment at leastp that seem to either warrant such action - It Is, 
after allq a last resort - or would command mass support. One may 
askp for example, what happened to the mass civil disobedience that 
was promised on the arrival of cruise missiles? CND has one of the 
largest membershipst If not the largest membership (1109000 (45)) of 
any pressure group In this country, If they cannot fulfil such a pro- 
mise over what they claim to be a life and death Issuet who can? 
(This point will be pursued further in the case study analysis. ) 
The dichotomy suggested would distinguish between actions resulting 
from severe oppression and those that are more likely to be the 
actions of the promotional pressure group In this country, attempting 
to get the authorities (including corporations) to listeng by 
employing their last resort strategy. In the latter case 9 acti on Is likely to be by a committed fewq the Inner core of the pressure group 
membership and those some may term fanatics. In the former case, the 
action Is more likely to Involve far greater numbers - the Montgomery 
bus boycott In the 1950's and the more recent Ciskei bus boycott In 
South Africa are good cases In point (both summarised In Appendix A). 
The dichotomy can then be one of scale. This and the earlier distinc- 
tion suggest a grid for Identifying NVDA actionsp shown In Figure 7.2 
Key Dimensions In Classifying Non-Violent Direct Action. 
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The vertical dimension employs the terms conscientious non-violence 
and pragmatic non-violence as used by Judith Stiehm, but recognises In 
having a continuumt the point made at the outset that different people 
may have different Ideas about the extent to which actions remain non- 
violent (46). 
Conscientious non-violence 
(as a philosophy) 
Small-scale 
(a committed few) 
Large-scale 
(mass actions) 
Figure 7.2 : Key Dlmenslons In Classifying Non-Violent Direct Action 
The horizontal dimension refers to the support for the action. This 
Is less straightforward than the vertical dimension as In application 
It assumes support will vary with the Importance of the Issue or the 
oppression associated with It. Thi s need not always be the case - 
Moreoverg Gandhi has suggested that It Is quality not quantity In non- 
violent action that Is Important. 
So the gri d must only be seen as I ndi cati ve of general tendenci es and 
useful for distinguishing between different non-violent actions. In 
particularl and notably as far as this study Is concerned, It provides 
a basis for differentiating between the classic non-violent actions 
organised by Gandhi or those over civil rights In the United Statesy 
and the more limited actions In this country of late. Yet In so 
doing, It Is still recognised that one Is a part of the other. 
Having made this distinction, It Is useful to Illustrate it by con- 
sidering the more typical non-violent action in this country. In so 
doingg It Is worth noting the observation In the last chapter and 
repeated earlier In this chapter, that direct action may Involve a 
symbolic element. It was suggested that direct actions might not be 
accurately so described If they were simply symbolic acts. Yet If one 
recognises that most non-violent actions In this country would be 
classified in the area towards the bottom left-hand corner of the grid 
- as small-scale pragmatic non-violence - one also acknowledges that 
they are largely symbolic. This Is not claimed for all non-violent 
actions that have taken place In this country to dateg nor will Jtq as 
a generalisationg necessarily apply to all future non-violent actions, 
even those In the near future (47). The pointp howeverg is Important 
for the assessment of consumer boycotts and will be considered further 
In Part Three; for are boycottst as non-violent actions, to be judged 
by their economic effect when they are principally symbolic acts? 
Pragmatic non-violence 
(as a strategy) 
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Wilson Is not an advocate of conscientious non-violence. He does , 
howeverg suggest that no cause justifies the use of violence. in 
Britain. He therefore supports the use of pragmatic non-violence. ' In 
so doing, he offers six guidelines for direct action: 
If possible It should be relevant to the Injustice so that a 
clear message emerges from the action; 
It should have Imagination and humour; 
It should enlist the sympathy of people, not alienate them; 
It should be non-violent; 
It should be seen to be an expression of genuine Injusticeq and 
not the first but rather the last resort; 
Wherever possible It should be within the spirit of the law (48). 
This captures the flavour of most NVDA by pressure groups in this 
country. Importantly, as will be seen In relation to boycotts, he 
also notes In support of these points that "Direct action can ... be 
justified In many circumstances although It becomes less effective the 
more It Is employed and the earlier It is employed. " And, furtherp 
that "Direct actiong to be defensiblet should always relate to the 
cause Itself, and wherever possible, the only victims of It should be 
the perpetrators of the Injustice. " 
The Stansted protesters referred to In the last section are intending 
to use civil disobedience within the. law. They have In mi nd such 
actions as lying down In front of buildozers. This Is comparable to 
the frequent actions organised by groups such as Friends of the Earth 
to protect conservation areas (49). 
The principal point made In 'Protest and the Suburban Guerilla' was 
that some of the more unlikely people are now becoming Involved In 
such actions. This applies too to many of the current supporters of 
CND. This group Is now prepared to use tactics that involve breaking 
the law. In June 1984, for the first time In a CND demonstrationy 
there were (two thousand) people breaking the law. This, the 
programme suggestedq was a product of the example set by Greenpeace 
and the Greenham Common protests. One CND demonstrator commented 
"I've tried everything else - done all the democratic things. " 
Yet for all the talk of guerilla action and law-breaking, It Is unli- 
kely that this Is an indication of a growing radicalisation of the 
masses - not even the middle class masses. 
Law-breaki ng Is arguably morally justi fl able when the law IsI wrong 19 
Illegitimate, or In extremis. As Wilson notes, the "police themselves 
tend to Interpret the law differently on different occasions .. at 
their bestv they seek to act "within the spirit of the law"" (50t 
Wilson's emphasis). This, he argues, should be the position adopted 
by pressure groups. In Illustrationp he suggests that If protesters 
were to breach the law of trespass as In the above example of the 
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defence 
* 
of a Site of Special Scientific Interest (as well as presu- 
mably causing an obstruction)p this would be within the spirit of the 
law as It would be to prevent the breach of what Is perceived to be a 
more serious law. 
The actions by the suffragette movement were similar In this respect. 
The law was breached to change the law. This example also shows that 
derision may well have to be suffered by those In the vanguard of 
soci al change. When (I f) hi storl ans document the acti ons at the 
Greenham Common peace camps, will the participants be derided In the 
manner of the popular press today, or will they acquire the respec- 
tability now afforded to the suffragettes? 
Boycotts as a pressure group tacti a can be I llegal. Yet , as wi th the 
sort of acti ons descri bed above I they are mi nor breaches of the law. 
One might perhaps compare them to the breaches of Sunday trading laws. 
Laidlerg In a study of the boycott In labour struggles, argued the law 
was wrong (in the US, In 1913) In making boycotts Illegal (51). 
Protesters against nuclear arms might argue that because the Issue Is 
so vital to human survival, their minor breaches of the law are justi- 
fiably In extremis. Finally, and perhaps most convincingp Is the 
claim that the law Is Illegitimate In certain circumstances. And this 
Is why the case for NVDA must rest on such acti ons bel ng a last 
resort. 
This argument is not sophisticated, but it does seem acceptable. 
Returning to Etzloni, the most sensible position seems to be as he 
advocatesp recognising and tolerating protest - Including that which 
may be In mi nor breach of the law - as an Important form of poll ti cal 
expression. His position on civil disobedience Is close to that pro- 
posed by Wilson and others on the most extreme forms of NVDA, and Is 
worth mentioning. 
EtzJonI argues for the restoration of civil disobedience to a spec3al 
status. He writes: 
"Civil disobedience Includes activities ranging from those which 
are completely non-violent (e. g., lunch counter sit-ins) to 
various degrees of obstruction, up to and Including the violation 
of the rights of others (e. g., to free passage Into a classroom). 
By definitiong civil disobedience does not entail the use of 
force or intimidation against others; also by definitiony such 
violent acts are not legal, at least according to local ordinan- 
ces. Civil disobedience thus falls clearly between peaceful 
demonstrations and violent acts, and both Its value and dangers 
emanate from this special Interstitial position" (52, Etzioni's 
emphasis). 
He claims that even the proponents of civil disobedience acknowledge 
that It Isa measure of last resort. Four circumstances are Iden- 
tified where Its use may be justifiable: when the law that Is 
challenged Is clearly Illegitimate; when the Injustice resulting from 
Its enforcement Is grave; when other forms of political expression 
areq In effectq not available (e. g., an effective right to vote); and 
when the failure of the authorities to respond Is deep and prolonged. 
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In keeping with Wilson on all direct actionp he recognises the danger 
that civil disobedience may be used too earlyp too often or In too 
extreme a form. This not only weakens Its effectivenessp but also 
blurs the distinction between peaceful and violent protest. CI vi 1 
disobediencet he arguesp "ought to be restored to the status of an 
exceptionalp extremet moral aett when all else falls. w This requires 
"legitimate and effective tools of peaceful political expression for 
all, not just an occasional election" (53). 
On this basis, Etzionl defends peaceful demonstrations as a legitimate 
poll tl cal act. It also seems a sound basi s for defending consumer 
boycotts and - bearing In mind that NVDA Is more than just civil diso- 
bedl ence - many other non-vi olent dl rect actl ons. As Etzi oni puts At 
"When people have institutionallsed channels to express themselves and 
channels which are effective, why should they take to the streets? " 
(54). Could consumer boycotts not work in a similar way for 
expressing concern about corporate misdemeanours? 
Having examined boycotts as non-violent direct action, and what Is 
meant by this, it Is now appropriate to consider further various types 
of boycott. The remainder of this chapter considers the origin of the 
term boycotty the different types of boycott, the boycott In labour 
struggles (including the consumer boycott), the boycott as an Inter- 
national economic sanction and how the boycott can affect business. 
Chapter Eight continues with boycotts of businessp focusing on the 
consumer boycott. The role for the consumer boycott as Identified In 
the latter part of this section is considered further in that chapter. 
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7.3 Various Types of Boycott 
7.3.1 Captain Charles Cunningham Boycott 
The discussion of Sharp's work has revealed a great variety of 
boycottsp from social ostracism to consumer boycotts. Some are worth 
mentioning if only to show why they are excluded from this study in 
any detail. 
The tem boycott is attri buted by the Oxford Engli sh DI ctl onary to 
Captal nCC Boycott. Laidlerl and Nelson and Prittleg explain the 
origins of the tem (55). 
The word Is the surname of a notoriously severe rent collector of the 
Earl of Erneq Captain Charles Cunningham Boycott, of County Mayo, 
Ireland. The Irish peasantry had long been suffering from the 
excesses of the British landlord class. Lands had been confiscatedq 
homes of the peasants destroyed, starvation wages paid. The famine of 
1878 encouraged an increase in the number of evictionsp for ever more 
trivial reasons. To oppose this move to clear the estatesq the Land 
League was formed to represent the peasants. The situation demanded 
direct action. 
In the summer of 18809 Boycott sent his tenants to the fields to cut 
oats. However, Instead of offering the regular wage of 62 and 37 
cents a day for men and women respectively, he offered only 32 and 24 
cents. His tenants refused to work. The Boycott family and servants 
attempted to harvest the crop but gave up after a few hours. The 
tenants finally returned to work after pleas from Mrs Boycott, but on 
rent day they were served with eviction papers. The outraged workers 
held a meeting and secured pledges from those present, including the 
servants, herders and driversp to cease all relations with Boycott and 
his family. 
Boycott requested assistancep and a relief expedition of seven regi- 
ments and fifty hired men was rushed to the estate. The crops were 
gathered, but at a cost well In excess of their value. The term 
boycott was thought up three days after the decree of social ostra- 
cism, by James Redpath, an American journalistp and Father O'Malleyj 
an Irish priest. It was first used publicly by Redpath in August 
1880, in the village of Deenane. (Redpath's explanation of the device 
was quoted in the Preview to this chapter. ) 
On this occasion at leastj the boycott proved successful. No one 
would work for Boycottl speak to him, or supply him with goods or 
services; ultimately he was driven out of his home, and out of 
Ireland. More importantlyq the boycott action made many people In 
England and Ireland aware of grave injustices. 
Howeverg this was not the first use of the boycott tactic, even If It 
was the first so named. -As Chapter Eight shows, there Is a historical 
precedent for boycotts dating back well before 1880. But, as Vogel 
cialmsp the boycott has to date been most prominent in the labour 
struggles of this century- (56). This use Is the subject of 7.4. The 
next sectiong prior to thatp considers the various types of boycottP 
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suggesting a continuum of boycottingp which Is Illustrated by the 
above case and those cases of the boycott In labour struggles which 
follow. 
7.3.2 A Continuum of Boycotting 
The boycott of Captain CC Boycott Involved the ceasing of all rela- 
tions with Boycott and his family. It Included the social boycott and 
various types of economic boycott as Identified by Sharp (see 7.2-1). 
Howeverp the use of the boycott need not be so bluntj It may be more 
selective. While all the possible and various types of boycott were 
employed against Boycott, It Is more usual to find a more restricted 
application of boycotts. So Woottong In this regard, Identifies a 
continuum of boycotting, from the most limited application to the most 
extensive (57). 
Wootton defines the boycott as "abstaining from usingg buying from, 
selling to or otherwise dealing with a person or Institution In order to exert Influence. " Hi s emphasi sIs on the use of the boycott by 
sectl onal groups. At one extreme he has poll ti cal stri kes , at the other, withdrawal of participation from voluntary schemes. He writes "Along the continuum many degrees of boycott might be distinguished, 
but In our period it seems useful to separate out three main types. " 
These are the refusal to carry out part of an agreed service, such as 
the 1970 refusal by doctors to sign medical certificates In protest 
against the Government's refusal to refer their pay award to the 
Prices and Incomes Board, which might be read as a partial political 
stri ke. Secondly, the boycott of a total Institutiony such as the 
trade union boycott of the National Industrial Relations Court. And 
thirdlyp to decline to continue cooperating In an Important public 
pollcyp such as the CBI ceasing Its voluntary operation of an early 
warning system on price Increases (giving 28 days' notice) In protest 
at a bill to create a Commission for Industry and Manpower. 
Wootton Is not clear about the basi s on whi ch hi s conti nuum operates 9 whether It be the degree of ostracism Involved (a boycott of a total 
Institution ort sayp one scheme operated by an Institution) or the 
seriousness of the action - Its effect and acceptability. It's 
possible that he views these two possible bases as being the same, though a little thought shows they are not (factors other than the degree of ostracism also influence effect and acceptability, such as the structural position of the group In the economy). Howeverv he 
usefully Illustrates how boycotts may differ and as far as this study is concernedv It seems sufficient to view the continuum of boycotting 
as being based on the degree of ostracism Involved. Or to put It 
another way, the extent of non-cooperation (Wootton suggests non- 
cooperation Is "the polite name for a boycottp" although Sharp's 
schema would Indicate otherwise. ) 
This uncertainty about the basis for Wootton's continuum Is evident In his consideration of the acceptability of pressure group methods. There are four methods he has reservations about: surreptitious 
approacheso as employedq for example, In the setting-up of commercial 
television; the use of public relationsp as used by the aircraft industry; the political strike, and the boycott. Howeverp he accepts 
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the boycott In most cases: "there As nothi ng to be sal dIn ml ti gati on 
of surreptitious approaches or, in normal timesq of the political 
stri ke. Accordinglyp those forms of boycott that approximate to the 
political strike must also be regarded as reprehensible ... Otherwise 
the right to boycott a public Institution, less startling If called a 
right to refrain from participationg probably has to be conceded. " 
Presumablyq he would Include consumer boycotts as exercising an accep- 
table right to refrain from participation, providing further support 
to the argument expressed In 7.2.2 on the legitimacy of consumer 
boycotts. 
This shows how boycott action extends beyond Sharp's categories of 
economic boycotts. A continuum can usefully be conceived along which 
various types of boycott may be found which represent greater or 
lesser non-cooperation. Other types of boycott are considered In the 
remainder of this chapter. The next part examines the boycott as 
employed In labour struggles. 
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7.4 Boycottsln Labour Struggles 
7.4.1 The Foms Taken 
The boycott was of major Importance In organising labourp In the 
United States at least. Historians writing of this period attribute a 
centralp If not determiningg role to boycotts In the labour struggles 
for uni oni sati on. The basi sf or much of thel r accounts of the part 
played by boycotts lies In the analyses of two contemporary writers: 
Laidlerp whose Boycotts and the Labor Struggle was first published in 
1913; and Wolmang whose The Boycott In American Trade Unions was 
published In 1916. Their studies will be used directly here In a 
brief consideration of the role of the boycott In labour struggles and 
also In the next chapter as their examination of the mechanism of the. 
boycott does not seem to have greatly suffered over time. 
There Is an appealing logic to the use of consumer boycotts In labour 
strugglesp neatly expressed by Laidler: 
"Labor on the economic field has thus far used effectively two 
main weapons ... The first Is the strike, with Its universal con- 
comitant, picketing; the second, the boycott. The strike alms to 
gain better conditions for labor by depriving the 'unfair' 
employer of the labor power necessary to produce goods; the 
boycottp on the other handp seeks these same ends by depriving 
the employer of the market for those goods which labor has 
created" (58). 
Lai dler argues that the boycott Isa natural and necessary partner to 
the stri ke. Howeverp before examining the role of the boycott In 
unionisationg it is Important to clarify the meaning denoted by the 
term boycott. Woottong as noted aboveg observes that where sectional 
pressure groups such as solicitors or teachers refer to a policy of 
non-cooperationg they are simply using the polite name for a boycott. 
He also refers to the political strike as being at one end of the con- 
tinuum of boycottingg and given his definition of boycott, It would 
follow that Industrial action such as strikes or working to rule are 
types of boycott. What then does Laidler mean when distinguishingg as 
aboveg between strikes and boycotts? Of course, the concern In this 
study Is solely with the 'not buying from' types of boycottsg by 
customers (recall the definition of consumer boycott In 7.2.1). This 
too Is LaIdler's main concerng as the above quote would Indicatep 
although he Is insufficiently explicit In this respect. 
Laidler defines boycotting as "an organised effort to withdraw and 
Induce others to withdraw from social or business relations with 
another" (59). The basis for his subsequent classification of types 
of boycott Is notp however, the source of power which the type of 
boycott seeks to employ - as In this studyt In the reference to con- 
sumer sovereignty - but the group In society using the boycott. (A 
similar criticism applies to Sharp, as earlier noted. ) So Lai dler 
Identifies the consumers' boycott "used chiefly as a protest against 
the high cost of living; " the employers' boycott "an organised effort 
of employers of labor and monled interests generallyt to Induce others 
of their class to cease business relations with those who, In their 
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opinion, are too active In the cause of labor; " a variety of the 
employers' boycott known as the blacklist "an agreement of employers 
to refuse employment to certain workmen obnoxious to them, generally 
on account of their activities In behalf of labor; " the trade boycott, 
where manufacturers who supply companies not part of the trade asso- 
ciation are boycotted; the political boycott "Involving the refusal to 
vote for those officials disapproved by labor; " andp finally, the 
International boycott "in which one nation has boycotted the com- 
modities of another. " LaIdler also has a 'catch-all' category of 
other forms of boycottp such as boycotts by farmers or slave-trade 
abolitionists (60). 
Havi ng consi dered these varl ous foms of boycott , Lai dler turns hi s 
attention to the boycott used by labour: 
"A-boycott In labor disputes may be defined as a combination of 
workmen to cease all dealings with anotherv an employer orp at 
timest a fellow workerp and usually, also to Induce or coerce 
third parties to cease such dealings, the purpose being to per- 
suade or force such others to comply wi th some demand or to 
punish him for non-compliance In the past" (61). 
Such a definitiono of course, encompasses strike actiong whereas 
LaIdler seeks to distinguish between strikes and boycotts (further 
Indication of how the reference to consumer sovereignty provides a 
more powerful and explanatory discriminator between different types of 
boycotts). The distinction centres upon whether labour withdraws Its 
cooperation from an employerg and perhaps encourages others to do 
likewisev within product markets or labour markets. For the most 
part, Laidler concentrates on the boycott as employed In product 
markets, as the opening quote to this section on the logic of such 
action would Indicate. 
Wolman acknowledges and more satisfactorily resolves this problem of 
definition. He defines the boycott as "a combination formed for the 
purpose of restricting the markets of an Individual or group of 
Individuals. " Howeverp he goes on to exclude strikes and similar 
actions on the basis of the chronological priority of the terms 
already used to describe these actionsg in spite of the demands of 
logic to Include all such actions under the term boycott. Hence "the 
term boycott will be used to describe the efforts of labor com- 
binations to restrict the markets of employers In the purchase and 
sale of economic goodsp whether these goods be raw materialsy 
materials In a partial state of completion, or finished products about 
to be sold to be ultimate consumer. " In other wordsp he restricts the 
term to actions Involving product markets rather than labour markets" 
(62). 
(Attempts to restrict employers' purchases of goods Is In the form of 
a boycott on materialsq Involving a disapproval of certain Implements 
and materials with which men work. These boycotts stem from a desire 
to work (when work Is threatened by prison-made goodsq new technology 
or foreign products) or sympathy for fellow workers. They may be 
backwardq forward, lateral or transportation boycotts. tMaterial 
boycotts' are dealt with by Wolman in Chapter Three. In the following 
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chapter he deals with attempts to restrict employerst sales - in the 
'commodities boycott'. This form of product market boycott Is of most 
relevance herep but the discussion following applies to both material 
and commodity boycotts. ) 
Different types of boycott are Identified as having been used In 
labour struggles, even when the term boycott Is restricted to product 
markets. For the most partg these terms and their meanings are still 
current and can usefully be considered here. Both Laidler and Wolman 
refer to primary, secondaryg tertiary and compound boycotts. 
Laidler defines the primary boycott as "a simple combination of per- 
sons to suspend dealings with a party obnoxious to them, Involving no 
attempt to persuade or coerce third parties to suspend dealings also" 
(63). Simply stated, this Is where the employees of a firm abstain 
from purchasing the firm's productsv probably In conjunction with 
strike actiong but with no attempt to persuade others to do likewise. 
He suggests that this form Is Ineffective and consequently rare. 
Howeverg his exclusion of attempts to Influence third parties would 
probably have belied practice, although as will later be seen such 
boycotts would not be Illegal whereas those Involving attempts to 
Influence third parties could be. This may explain his definition. 
It doesq howeverg differ In this respect from Wolman's definition: 
"the action Is directly against the offending employer, the members of 
the organisation simply withholding their patronage ... and Inducing 
their fellows to do the same" (64). While this definition may Include 
legal and Illegal actions (the legality of boycotts Is a complex 
Issue)9 It would seem to better reflect practice and current usage. 
Secondary boycotts Involve attempts to get wider supportg defined as 
"a combination of workmen to Induce or persuade third parties to cease 
business relations with those against whom there is a grievance" (659 
Laidler's emphasis). They become compound boycotts when coercive and 
Intimidating measures are usedg Involving either threats of pecuniary 
Injury or actual physical force and violence (66). 
Laidler Identifies three Important points of attack against a 
boycotted employer In the use of the secondary and compound boycott. 
Firstlyp by Inducing or coercing his employees to quit working for 
himp perhaps using picketing. Secondlyp to induce or coerce suppliers 
to stop providing supplies to the employer (and, as examples show, 
this may involve threatened or actual strike action at the suppliers). 
ThIrdlyp "the most Important method of injury is the Inducing or 
coercing of customers to withdraw their patronage from the obnoxious 
concern" (67). This may Include suppliers of the Initial target for 
attack, as well as the Initial target; as Is made clear In Wolman's 
definition. 
Wolman'defines secondary boycotts as "a combination to withdraw patro- 
nage from a person In order to force that person In turn to wl thdraw 
hi s patronage from that I ndl vI dual or fi rm wl th whom the uni on was 
primarl ly at odds" (68). They Involve Injury to those not directly 
Involved In the dispute. He does not use the term compound boycott to 
refer to Instances where Pecuniary or physical Injury is threatened, 
as Laidlerl suggesting the terms secondary boycott and compound 
277 
boycott are synonymous. This again would seem to reflect practice, as 
a boycott without the threat of pecuniary or physical Injury seems a 
rather abstract notion. Although againg Laidler's distinction seems 
geared towards accommodating different legal consequences of boycott 
action. Wolman suggests "it Is perhaps better to use the expression 
compound boycott to describe boycotts against all persons not Involved 
In the orIF; Inal disputeg whether these boycotts be secondaryl tertiary 
or even of a higher orderp whereas the primary boycott denotes that 
simple form In which the boycott Is Imposed directly upon the 
offending employer" (69). This reflects current usagev as B-1.3 indi- 
cates, excepting the preference for the terms primary and secondaryp 
rather than primary and compound. 
Tertiary boycotts are somewhat loosely defined by Laidler as being the 
most Indirect formp and "may be instituted against those citizens who 
continue to purchase from stores selling "unfair" supplies" (70). 
Essentially, as the previous quote from Wolman Indicates, they are 
still further removed from the firm with which the union has a 
grievance. For reasons of simplicity and In keeping with current 
usageg It is preferable to Include tertiary boycotts and those of a 
higher order under the term secondary boycott. 
Boycotts can be negative or positive. Negative boycotts Involve 
purchasing from recommended sources: "The primary purpose of negative 
boycotts Is to secure for "fair" firms the patronage of labor and Its 
friends. Indirectlyp they divert trade from "unfair" employers. " This 
Involves the union label, placed on goods "as a guarantee to the trade 
unionists and to the public generally that the goods are produced 
under conditions favourable to the unions, " exemplified in the 
California grape boycott case considered in Part Three. 'White' or 
'fairt lists are also used (71). Wolman refers to negative boycotts 
as Indirect boycotts. 
The positive boycott Involves the 'unfair' or the 'We Don't Patronisel 
list. The listsp Laidler notes, were published In trade union jour- 
nals under these captions, or posted at trade union headquarters. He 
suggests they became of little Importance after 190B (and two impor- 
tant court rulings on boycott legality), but they are still employed 
today In boycott actions such as the Arab boycott (72) and the boycott 
of goods and services from companies associated with South Africa. 
This form of boycott Laidler describes as "the boycott properg" 
Involving primaryg secondary, tertiary and compound boycotts as 
defined. Wolman uses the term direct boycott. 
The next section considers the Importance of these boycotts in 
unionisation. 
7.4.2 Boycott Effectiveness In Labour Struggles 
Wolman claims the boycott to be "the most effective weapon of 
uni oni sm" (73) LaIdler also has a high regard for the boYcOttg 
arguing for Its legalisation'so that It might redress the Imbalance of 
power between employers and employees. He writes that, In such a way 
"I ts future role Is desti ned to be a potent one" (74). Yet In spi te 
of thi s, trade uni on hi storl ans make 11 ttle menti on of I ts use other 
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than during the period examined by Wolman and Laidler of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. This apparent demise of the 
consumer boycott would seem to go unexplained by the historians (75). 
Reference Is made to the Impact of legislation, but Wolman had Indi- 
cated that legislation would simply Involve the use of the boycott In 
secret and Illegally. 
Yet It Is possible to speculate with some certainty on the decline In 
Importance of the boycottv on the basis of Wolman and Laidler's analy- 
ses. For It seems that once organisedv labour no longer required or 
was able to use the consumer boycott. However, according to Wolman 
and Laidlerg It was In this organisation of labour (in the United 
States) that the boycott played such a vital role. 
The detail of the use of the boycott at this time and the many cases 
recounted by Wolman and Laidler Illustrating Its effectiveness cannot 
be considered here. The classification system described In the last 
section and the principles emerging from their analysis on the use of 
the boycottg willp howeverl be Included in Chapter Eight. In this 
sectiong some attempt will be made to briefly convey the Importance 
and effectiveness of the (consumer) boycott In unionisation. 
Both writers point to the historical precedent for boycott action 
(considered In 8.1-1). The adoption of the boycott by unions stemmed 
from the difficulties experienced In controlling labour supply when 
labour was unorgardsed. As Wolman writes: "The essence of trade union 
success Is Its ability to control the labor supply In particular 
trades" (76). Where this was not possibleg the unions sought an 
alternative way of exerting pressure on employers, and thereby 
achieving organisation: 
"Control of the labor supply in an Industryp however, presupposes 
the power of union officials to organtse the majority of the 
workmen In that Industryq and this organisation Is not always 
possible. When, thereforel the ordinary methods of organisation 
have failed, 'or are at the outset seen to be Inoperativeg the 
union must devise a supplementary resource. This resource has 
been, In this countryq the boycott of the products of unfair 
firms" (77). 
There was also the problem of the employment during a strike of non- 
unionised labour as strike-breakers. Laidler observes that certain 
conditions were necessary for a strike to be effective: "If labor Is 
thoroughly organised, if every man In a certain trade or Industry 
stands staunchly with his fellows In a labor struggle; If the army of 
the unemployed refuses to "scabt" and Ifq finallyp the workers' econo- 
mic power to resist proves as great as that of the employer ... " (78). However, 
"The unionist of the eighties In'-the United States discovered 
that these conditions but rarely existed ... In many Instances a threat to strike failed greatly to disturb the employerp 
bellevingg as he did, that his one problem, In case of such a 
strike, was to obtain other workersp and that the condition of 
the labor market made that problem a comparatively simple one ... 
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The workers therefore came to reall se that they had utterly 
neglected to use their power as consumersq In their struggles for 
Improved conditions" (79). 
There Is of course a logic to such reasoning as Indicated In the quote 
at the outset of the previous section and reaffirmed by Laidler here: 
"Labor has a two-fold relationship with the employing class. It 
supplies that class wi th the labor power necessary to produce 
commodities. It also furni shes j to a consi derable extent Ia 
market for the commodities produced. In both relati onshl ps It 
can so conduct Itself as vitally to affect the profits" (80). 
Both LaIdler and Wolman recognise that the Importance of the boycott 
lay In the difficulties In using strike action. Wolman suggests two 
conditions under which the boycott Is likely to emerge: where organi- 
sation of the labour force Is impossiblej and where organisation Is 
fraught with such difficulties as to make It unlikely. In the first 
case he refers to boycotts upon prison products, and in the latter to 
the difficulties faced where employers used espionage to detect those 
employees recruited to the union and dismiss themy and where workersv 
particularly women and childrenv are indifferent or opposed to organi- 
sation. He goes on to Identify specific reasons for the appearance 
and use of the boycott around 1880: the solidarity given to the trade 
union movement by the Knights of Labor, little recognition of the 
advantages of organisation and therefore limited support for strike 
actionv Insufficient funds to provide strike benefit and transport 
scabs away from the seat of strikesv and, finally, the ease of 
employing scab labour due to the growing concentration of the popula- 
tion In the cities. Consequently: 
"Appearingg thereforep In 1879 and 1880 as a compact labor orga- 
nisationp composed In the main of workmen Ignorant of the dif- 
ficulties and necessities of organisation; not oversupplied with 
funds; finding it necessary to employ spectacular and effectiveg 
but cheap methods of aggression; controllingg howeverl a not 
Insignificant purchasing power, the Knights of Labor Immediately 
seized In 1880 upon the boycott as a unique and logical sources 
of strength" (81). 
Thereing however, lies the causes, It would seemp for the demise of 
the boycott; changes In the conditions described above - largely 
brought about through the effective use of the boycott - meant strike 
action or the threat of It could be used effectively. Many examples 
of the use of the boycott In both Wolman and LaIdler Illustrate the 
extent of its effectiveness. For examplep during the boycott of DE 
Loewe and Company by the United Hatters' Union, sales fell for the 
year by $160VOOO - $17090001 from $4009000 in the previous yeart a 
drop of 40 per cent (82). 
Not surprisinglyv boycotts were roundly condemned by the employers. 
They were described as blackmail and contrary to the American tradi- 
tion of free trade - despite their use against Britain In the War of 
American Independencep and their use In one form or another by 
employers against employees. Eventuallyp the assistance of the courts 
was sought to outlaw boycotts. 
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Prominent In this action was the American Anti-Boycott Association. 
Both LaIdler and Wolman suggest that the 1908 decisions against. the 
Danbury Hatters and In the Bucks Stove casep represent a turning 
point. Public opposition was also growing. Laidlerg writing prior to 
impending legislation on the legality of boycotts argued In favour of 
legallsation. Wolmant writing after legislation was passed severely 
restricting boycottsp suggested they would continuet but "no longer be 
employed with Impunity" (83). Defending boycotts, he suggests they 
are "an Indispensable resource of labor organisations" and goes on to 
refer In example to the Brewery Workmen's Uniong where "the boycott 
laid the foundations for what was later to develop Into one of the 
strongest labor organisations In this country. " Yet recounting these 
successest he suggests "Nor Is It correct to assume that the need for 
the boycott as an organising agency has now passed ... there still 
remains whole sections of Industries and Individual establishments 
which It will be Impossible to organise without the employment by the 
laborers of their combined purchasing power. " He goes on to refer to 
a specific Industryp reiterating his argument about the need for the 
boycott because of the problems In strike action: "... because of the 
lack of adequate defense funds and because of the ease with which 
strikers may be replaced, a strike Is out of the question. 
Accordingly, a refusal to buy and a request to the friends of labor 
that they too shall refuse to buy are forced upon the uni on by the 
exigencies of the situation" (84). 
Yet it seems he was wrong. Was there sufficient Incentive for unions 
to risk litigation - with consequences for Individual members - when 
their own Industry was organised? Was the boycott necessary when 
labour reached a certain degree (critical mass) of organisation? 
LaIdler notes the following reply by a, union official to his question- 
naire survey on the use of the boycott: 
"We dontt have to boycott any more. We control the skilled 
workers. Employers desiring skill must employ our members" (85). 
Ando despite his plea for the legalisation of boycottsq he unwittingly 
anticipated their demise as a union resourcev writing at one point: 
"the thorough organisation of labor often renders boycotting 
unnecessary" (86). 
The boycott was of the utmost Importance in organising labour. Once 
that task had been largely achieved, It declined In Importance. As 
Wolman remarks on more than one occasiong the use of the boycott was 
determined to a great extent by circumstances at the time, so "a popu- 
lar form of pressure in one period of Industry becomes obsolete in the 
succeeding period" (87). 
This part has shown the Importance of the boycottq and In particular 
the consumer boycott, In unionisation. It has demonstrated various 
types of boycott as employed by labour and also their effectiveness. 
Part 7.5 considers another type of boycottl the boycott as an Inter- 
national economic sanction, The Importance of the boycott In unioni- 
sation and the way by which It proved so effective are considered 
further In Chapter Eight. 
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7.5 Boycotts as International Economic Sanctions 
7.5.1 An Alternative to War 
The enthusi asm f or the boycott evi dent In the wrl ti ngs of Lai dler and 
Wolman can also be found In writings of the same period about the eco- 
noml a boycott as a sanction used by governments. Just as Lai dler and 
Wolman wrote of Its potential In furthering labour's struggles, others 
advocated Its use In preventing or replacing war. 
Table 7.1, showing Sharp's categories of economic boycottsp Included 
action by governments: domestic embargo, blacklisting of traders, 
International sellers' embargov International buyers' embargo and 
International trade embargo. All these, as actions by governments and 
not Individual consumersp are outside the scope of this study. 
Domestic embargo and the blacklisting of traders seem comparatively 
rare, Sharp's examples are drawn from Nazi Germany and from the United 
States during World War 11 (88). But the International trade embargo (which Includes, quite obviously, the buyers' and sellers' embargoesp 
making such differentiation unnecessary) Is more common. As noted in 
7.4.19 LaIdler Identified international boycotts9 but their use goes 
back a lot further. For this reasong they merit brief consideration 
here. Furthermore, as will become apparento they are arguably ethical 
purchase behaviour by governments, or, at leastq politically motivated 
purchase behaviour. 
There are two further reasons for the Inclusion of international eco- 
nomic sanctions here. Firstlyq there are observations regarding the 
use of such sanctions which are common to consumer boycotts and 
boycotts In labour strugglesq which point to general factors in 
boycott effectivenessl perhaps even principles or rules regarding the 
use of the boycott. Secondly, references to the boycott In the 
literature are predominantly concerned with the boycott as an inter- 
national economic sanction. It Is to such actions that the term eco- 
nomic boycott is usually applied, within the literature and abstracts 
(one reason for the preference here for the term consumer boycott to 
refer to the principal phenomenon studied). A large proportion of 
this material is devoted to the Arab boycott, which Is therefore con- 
sidered separately In part 7.6. (Economic sanctions against South Africa are considered in the case study on Barclays and South Africa. ) 
World War 1, It will be recalled, was the war to end wars. Its 
horrors led to a renunciation of war: 
"The tbalance of powerlp that fundamental concept of European diplomacy, was called by President Wilson 'the great gamep now forever discreditedt. Men spoke now of a 'Concert of Powerst and 
a tLeague of Nations'. The limitation of armaments and the destruction Of militarism were everywhere declared to be the aim" (89). 
How could such a concert ensure peace wi thout recourse to mi 11 tary 
action? The need for a coercive measure was not di smi ased. Instead, 
an economi a rather than a mi 11 tary weapon was to be employed If found 
necessary. This was expressed In the Covenant of the League of 
282 
Nations, which, at the Insistence of President Woodrow Wilsong formed 
part of the peace treaty agreed at the end of the war (90). The si x- 
teenth artl cle of the Covenant contal ns the provi si ons that If any 
member of the League resorts to war In di sregard of the Covenant It 
shall: 
be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other 
members of the Leagueq which hereby undertake Immediately to sub- 
ject it to the severance of all trade and financial relationsq 
the prohibition of all Intercourse between their nationals and 
the nationals of the covenant -bre AS, ng stateg and the prvention 
of all financial, commercial, or personal Intercourse between the 
nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any 
other state ... " (91). 
In short ,a boycott. In explanati on of thl s Presi dent Wi lson sal dIn 
1919: 
"If any member of the League breaks or ignores these promises 
with regard to arbitration and discussion, what happens? War? 
No, not war but something ... more tremendous than war ... Apply 
this economicy peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be 
no need for force ... The boycott Is what Is substituted for war" 
(92). 
Such a remedy was not new to Amerl can presi dents 9 even If the term 
was. In 1793, Jefferson wrote that "nations may be brought to'do 
justice by appeals to their Interests as well as by appeals to amsp" 
which would "relieve us too from the risks and horrors of cutting 
throats" (93). The use of the boycott In thl s way Is nei ther recent 
nor redundant 9 but It seems that the greatest fal th In such a weapon 
was held during the period following World War I. This Is revealed In 
the writings of the time. John Foster Dulles, who became an American 
Secretary of Statep wrote In 1932 In Boycotts and Peace: 
"The great advantage of economic sanctions Is that on the one 
hand they can be very potent , whi le on the other hand , they do 
not Involve that resort to force which Is repugnant to our objec- 
tive of peace" (94). 
While Remerv In A Study of Chinese Boycottsv justified his 1933 analy- 
sIs by saying "in a world which has renounced war, It may be worth 
while to examine the efforts of the Chinese In the field of non- 
violent coercion" (95). This study Is the subject of the following 
section. 
7.5.2 The Chinese Boycotts 
Remer's. study Is worthy of consideration for reasons other than 
historical Interest, despite Its age. It reveals not only the contem- 
porary view of the great potential for peace through the use of the 
boycottp but also certain elements In Its use which are relevant to 
current use of the boycott as an International economic sanction and 
In the form of the consumer boycott. 
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Rather than define boycotts, he refers to the Chinese 1931 boycott of 
Japan: "The Chinese saIdq in effectq we will not buy Japanese goods 
until the Japanese do what we want them to do, or betterp until they 
stop doing certain things which we do not want them to do, " a simple 
statement In which "the nature of the boycott Is revealed more clearly 
than It would be In any attempted definition. " Remer then elaborates 
on what Is Involved: 
"Such boycotts Involve concerted action, the effect of which Is 
to reach across an International boundary line. This action Is 
In the economic field and always Involves a refusal to buy the 
goods of the boycotted country. Boycotting may go beyond the 
economic field but action In this field is essential ... the 
boycott Is always a means to an end and never an end In Itself. 
It Is a means of carrying on a di spute and the Immedi ate purpose 
is to Inflict Injury, to subject the boycotted country to Incon- 
venience and loss" (96). 
Three end results sought are Identified: publicityl punishment and a 
policy change within the boycotted country. The boycott is viewed as 
a weapon and assessed In this sense. In this assessment, the Impor- 
tant distinction Is made - which applies to all economic boycotts - 
between success and effectiveness : "for It Is plain that a boycott 
may be effective In cutting off trade without being successful In 
bringing about the desired change In policy" (97). He continues by 
suggesting a boycott is not likely to be successful unless it Is 
effectiveg although this must surely be less Important where the end 
result sought Is only publicity. (This Issue of success and effec- 
tiveness Is considered later In this part and elsewhere. ) 
His study examines Chinese boycotts between 1905 and 1932. Howeverg 
it Is Important to note that these Chinese boycotts were not directly 
comparable to the boycotts envisaged by the Leagueg as he notes, nor 
are they Identical to the International economic sanctions employed 
today. The essential diffference Is that the Chinese boycotts were 
not the formal or official acts of the Chinese state. They are for 
this reason closer to consumer boycotts than International economic 
sanctionsp as will become apparent. 
Remer I denti fI es four di f ferences. Firstlyt In contrast with the 
League boycottv one state alone (China) Is boycotting one other. 
Secondly, the boycott Is not the Chinese state In action: "It does not 
operate to prevent ships from clearing with cargoes for the boycotted 
state. ' Goods from the boycotted state are not, by the existence of 
the boycott, prevented from being landed or refused passage through 
the customhouses of China. " In this wayp Pemer suggests the Chinese 
boycotts weret In contrast with the legally enforced boycotts of the 
Leagueg more appropriately described as boycotts and "A League boycott 
may jt* herefore, be called the application of economic sanctions and 
the very use of the term boycott may be called Into question. " 
Thirdlyp Chinese boycotts were determined without consultation as a 
unilateral and possibly spontaneous action. Finallyt whereas League 
boycotts Involved one step In a contemplated seriest within what would 
now be described as an escalation of measuresq the Chinese boycott was 
a measure by Itself. Interestinglyg he notes here that "the boycott 
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Is now accepted by many Chinese as 
which they cannot effectively take 
measures as may be taken" (98). 
a substitute for military measures 
or as a supplement to such military 
What form then di d the Chinese boycotts take? It would appear from 
Remer's analysis that they Involved an almost spontaneous reaction by 
many of the Chinese people against the goods of countries which 
aggrieved China. So, for example, the 1905 boycott against the United 
States followed American restrictions on Chinese Immigrationg and the 
1931 boycott against Japan followed Japanese policies In Manchuria. 
Although in a sense spontaneous, they were not without organisation, 
yet this did not come from the government, at least In any official 
capacity. Their origing organisation and possibly effectiveness have 
cultural explanations. 
Passive resistance had long been practised by the Chinese against 
their governments and officials. Philosophically it was justified by 
the argument that the perceived failure of the Emperor allowed such 
action ýbecause 
It showed that his 'Mandate from Heaven' had been 
withdrawn. The effectiveness of this type of popular action In an 
autocracy was enhanced by the structure of Chinese societyq which per- 
mitted groupsq notably the guild and the family, power to discipline 
those offending group loyalties. This tradition of passive resistance 
and the structure of Chinese society provide the cultural precedents 
for the Chinese boycotts: 
"In short# many features of Chinese life and many characteristics 
of the poll ti cal , socl al and economi a organi zati on of Chi na 
explal n the faci li ty wl th whi ch the Chi nese turn to thl s weapon. 
The Western student fl nds the roots of the boycott so deep In 
Chinese history and so far spread In the Chinese community that 
he Is likely to refer to Its use as "Instinctive" and as arising 
from the very nature of the Chinese. " 
Remer suggests that the rise of Chinese nationalism in the early twen- 
tieth century led to the Increasing use of passive resistance on 
International Issuesq In boycotts of foreign goods. Howeverg only the 
International dimension to the use of the boycott was new "The boycott 
Isa means of carryl ng on a di spute ,a weapon ,a techni que 9 whi ch has 
a long history In China. " Chinese nationalism fulfilled two con- 
ditions necessary for boycotts to extend beyond domestic Issues: "The 
feeling of solidarity which lies behind the boycott had to spread 
beyond familyp villagev guild,, or association, to the whole Chinese 
community and the feeling that resistance was necessary had to spread 
from the desire to resist a group of foreign merchants or a particular 
governing body to a desire to resist a whole nation" (99). 
Despite the remoteness of Chinese boycotts over fifty years agog three 
important points can be made of relevance to current use of the 
boycott. Firstlyl there Is the historical precedent for consumer 
boycottsv discussed further In 8.1.1. Secondly, and more importantly 
perhaps, the requirement for organisation and solidarity is 
demonstratedo providing further support to the evidence provided in 
the discussion of the use of the boycott In labour struggles. In the 
current situationg It must be considered whether pressure groups can 
285 
provide the necessary level of organisation and solidarity. Thirdly, 
and this point Is relatedl there is the Issue of whether boycotts are 
culturally appropriate to Western society. Indeedq Remer makes the 
Interesting point that passive resistance is more clearly charac- 
teristic of Eastern peoples than those In the West: "Whatever be the 
explanationg whether It lies In the recognition of 3ome degree of 
helplessness or In religion and philosophic outlookp Eastern peoples 
seem to have greater experience with passive resistance than Western 
peoples and a greater skill In Its use" (100). 
Western disadvantages arising from little experience and (presumably 
as a consequence) little skill in the use of passive resistancep may 
perhaps be remedied by greater use of these techniques. Yet If they 
are highly culturally specific then It Is possible that they may never 
become significant in the West. Alternatively, If the use of passive 
resistance In the East has more to do with pragmatic rather than 
cultural reasons, It may be that the West can adopt such techniques 
under similar circumstances and with success In their use learn how 
they can become most effective. In whi ch case ,It may be presumed that for passive resistance to become a major force In the Westp a 
great cultural change Is required (if possible), or there must be cir- 
cumstances warranting use of these techniques which would be exte- 
nuatingg with massive deprivation (as explained In 7.2.2). 
It is probable that both cultural and pragmatic factors Interact to 
stimulate passive resistance. Howeverg Remer's analysis would seem to 
emphasise the Importance of pragmatic factors In the use of the 
boycottq as a substitute for violence and military action (101). In 
other words9 because of limited military resourcest the Chinese could 
only respond In this way. This, of course, would be in contrast to 
the League boycotts and the current use of economic sanctionsp which 
are actions by the powerful against the weak; as Galtung writes 
"economic sanctions as a source of power tend to preserve existing 
power structures" (102). 
Remer suggests both League boycotts and Chinese boycotts would be best 
described under the general category of non-violent coercion. This 
recognises that they are NVDA as earlier described and discussed. The 
Issues of cultural specificity and whether passive resistance Is a technique for the weak or the strong 0f not both) , does then of course apply to boycotts as much as any other form of NVDA. 
Remer's study of Chinese boycotts Is Instructive in many ways relevant 
to this study. Further detail would be inappropriate as consideration 
must be FA ven to more recent analyses of I nternati onal economi a sanc- 
tionsg but It Is worth mentioning that the methods used in the enfor- 
cement of the boycott have a remarkable similarity to those used In 
labour struggles and current consumer boycotts. Remer observes that 
the early boycotts were enforced by the ordinary group methods fami- 
liar In China with the addition of some coercion from aroused public 
opinion. Howeverg over time other methods were adopted: advertising 
and propaganda for the boycott by burning 'inferior' or 'enemy' goods9 
picketingg postersy public demonstrations and speechesq and extra- legal fines on merchants dealing In boycotted goods which resulted In 
them being paraded through the streets and even placed In cages In the 
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street. In some cases 9 and thl sIs good I llustrati on of the strength 
of cultural factors - If contradicting the claim of similarity -. the 
death penalty was Inflicted. Yet these punishments were Imposed by 
organisations separate from the government and without formally dele- 
gated power from the government (103). 
Remer notes that the boycott could be an expensive weaponp entailing 
deprivation for the boycotter as well as the boycotted. Yet as more 
recent analyses also Indicateg there were benefits for domestic 
Industries attempting to provide substitutes for boycotted goods. 
Indeedl there As the suggestion that Chinese boycotts were In part 
encouraged for protectionist reasons. Although, of courseq the idea 
of the boycotter providing substitute goods through alternative Insti- 
tutions is emphasised In the writings on NVDA and particularly in 
Gandhi's philosophyg with his notion of transformation. Thi s Is 
exemplified In the salt satyagraha where alternative production faci- 
lities were established In disregard of the British legally prescribed 
monopoly (104). 
Remer's conclusions on the boycott are that It can be both effective, 
In securing a restriction on trade (although this Is not always Imme- 
diately obvious from trade statistics), and successful, In producing 
poli cy changes. He anticipated Increasing use, although he 
acknowledged di sadvantages. He suggests the weapon Isa blundering 
and awkward oney it leaves the Initiative with the opposition, It Is 
slowv It Is costly and It is uneconomic, as losses fall on many who 
are not Involved In the dispute. One contemporary commentator 
described It as "a double-edged knife which Injured Chinese even more 
than Americans and other countries qui-ýte*as much, " In reference to the 
1905 boycott against America (105). Yet not only can It be successful 
because of Its economic effectiveness, but also because of Its psycho- 
logical or emotional effect (106). It is also an effective form of 
publicity "It brings to the attention of the world the acts of which 
the boycotters complain and the policy behind the acts against which 
the boycott Is ultimately directed. " Moreoverl by employing passive 
resistancep the nation "is likely to secureq in addition to publicity, 
the sympathy of the rest of the world" (107). In the introduction it 
Is asked whether the boycott Is an effective weapon of retaliation or 
merely a theatrical sword. It seems that It may be both. 
Fifty years laterg this conclusion seems equally valid In the 
assessment of the current use of International economic sanctions. 
More recent examples and analyses are considered In the next section. 
Again there are observations which seem applicable to consumer 
boycottsy perhaps pointing to boycott principles. 
7.5.3 More Recent Examples 
Examples of the current use of International economic sanctions as 
boycotts are hardly requiredg Its current use being quite extensive: 
Russia boycotted, by the United States In particular, over the Inva- 
sion of Afghanistan; the boycott of Rhodesia over UDI (Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence); the oil and arms embargo against South 
Africa; to name but a few recent examples. Others are Identified by 
Roberts (108). 
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Roberts suggests the view of the boycott as an effective alternative 
to war stems from Its effectiveness within states, In consumer and 
other boycotts. However, he finds only limited evidence of the econo- 
mic effectiveness of International boycotts: "Despite such hopesp the 
record of International economic boycotts Is not particularly 
Impressive. " He attributes the failure of sanctions to the fact that 
foreign trade was not affected as much as might be expectedl to the 
support given by non-boycotting statesq and to the growth of soli- 
darity within the receiver state. On this latter pointp he Identifies 
a similarity with "that other presumed ultimate weapon of 20th century 
International relations - strategic bombing: " 
"Both economic sanctions and strategic bombing are charac- 
terl sti cally the weapons of the larger and ri cher states. Both 
are seen as Instruments of producing, change by remote control, 
and at minimum cost to the sender. Both have tended - not 
always 9 but more of ten than not - to make ci ti zens In the 
receiver country more dependent on their own goverment than they 
were before. And both have been much less successful than was 
widely expected. " 
Yet the use of economic sanctions continues. ThIsp Roberts suggests, 
Is not only because they are not entirely Ineffectivep but also 
because they have an expressive function. They convince the aggrieved 
state that it's 'not taking things lying down'. 
This motive Is criticised by Dekker as an Irrational moralistic atti- 
tude. Finding that the boycott and embargo Is unsuccessful In most 
casesq Dekker suggests success Is probable only with an unstable 
regime and when the action Is sudden and drastic (109). 
Howeverg not all analyses are so sceptical of the economic effec- 
tiveness of previous or future economic boycotts. Losman j on the 
basis of an analysis of boycotts against Cuba, Israel and Rhodesiaq 
concludes that boycotts may be economically effective but are unlikely 
to be successful. He, like Remerg makes the Important distinction 
between success and effectiveness: 
"A successful boycott Is one which results In the acceptance by 
the 'target state' of the conditions specified or implied by 
those applying the sanctions ... Effectiveness thus measures the degree of economic damage felt by the target state ... boycotts 
can be highly effectivel yet still fail In terms of their basic 
political objectives. In short, effectiveness Is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for success" (110). 
Again like Remer, Losman Insists that economic effectiveness Is essen- 
tl al for poll ti cal success. Losman I dentl fi es four types of economl c 
effect. Direct costs "entail additional financial or real outlays 
immediately and directly related to the Imposition of sanctions. " For 
example, Increased transport costs through having to trade with a more 
distant suppliers or the loss of traditional export revenues. 
Indirect costs are "due to the many domestic dislocations and slow- 
downs outside the foreign trade sector Itself which result from a 
disruption of normal external relations. " For examples costs Of 
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storage for export goods unsoldt or the Impact on domestic Industries 
of using possibly Inferior and/or different spare parts and materials. 
Capital effectst a special kind of Indirect costv result when large 
parts of 
- 
the country's capital stock are either produced abroad and 
require Imported spare parts or depend upon speciallsed Imports of 
materials. A disruption of Imports thereby renders such assets worth- 
less. Finallyt there Is the economic effect of foregone potential. 
This Is the loss of probable future earnings, as In the disappearance 
of the Cuban tourist industryg geared to Americansg following the 
American boycott. 
Vulnerability to boycotts, he suggestsp Is especially high If trade is 
concentrated with particular partners, If a countryts imports are of 
great technical Imortance in the economy, as when there are no 
domestic sources of power, or Its exports are concentrated In com- 
moditlest such as Cuban dependence on the export of sugar. Sanctions 
will also be more costly If there are many boycotting states and if 
they are geographically close. 
Losman refers to a "realignment of resources" following economic sanc- 
tions. This Includes the establishment of new trading relations, new 
patterns of production and, as Remer notes, perhaps even the unin- 
tended benefit of Involuntary protection for Infant Industries. 
Howeverv this realignment Is probably only applicable to lengthy or 
what might be termed permanent boycotts, such as the three Losman ana- 
lyses. He, alsot points to the cost of boycotting for the sender, 
though he Identifies circumstances where this will be minimal. 
His conclusions on the Cuban boycott are that the cost of sanctions 
was great (for example, export earningst 60 per cent of which was with 
the United Statest fell from $625m. In 1959 to $167m. In 1961)9 but 
Cuba was rescued by the Sovietst with much of the cost being borne by 
Cubats communist allies. The United States general economy was unaf- 
fected. Yet while the boycott was economically effective$ Losman does 
not feel It was politically successful: "if It was Castro's 
'communism' which led to the American embargo, today he Is very much 
more a communist and a part of the communist bloc than he was before. " 
On the Arab boycott of Israel 9 Losman concludes that It has been most 
effective in the area of foregone potentlalv particularly In denying 
Israel the role of trading centre for the Middle East, which 
Palestine's pivotal location would have Ideally suited. The Arab sta- 
tes have suffered through applying the boycott, which explains its 
uneven enforcement. The effects of blacklisting (discussed In detail 
In 7.6) are, he claImsj completely indeterminable. Yet what Is the 
outcome of the boycott? As Losman writes "In Israelq the population 
stands resolute In Its determination to succeedv regardless of 
sanction-imposed difficulties. " Presumablyl the boycott gives the 
Arab states some sense of actually doing somethingp however futile It 
might seem. 
Finallyl on the Rhodesia boycott, events following the publication of 
his paper have to some extent weakened Losman's argument. His conclu- 
sion was that there was little internal political pressure upon the 
Smith regime to capitulate. The costs of economic sanctions were at 
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first quite heavyp particularly with the loss of export revenue from 
tobacco salesp but over time the state adapted and, In effectp the 
economy suffered "a 'one-shot' slow-down. " Because the brunt was 
borne by tobacco farmersp staunch supporters of UDI, by the African 
population employed In the tobacco Industry, and by business profits, 
political pressure was minimal. Losman saw little prospect for reso- 
lution of the Rhodesia situation: "sanctions and their associated dif- 
ficulties have tended to reduce the Influence of racial moderates and 
those most loyal to the Crowng at the same time encouraging a con- 
solidation of opinion against externally-imposed solutions. " 
In all three cases, Losman thought It unlikely that success would 
materiallse despite economic effectiveness. Yet he di d introduce a 
caveat which was quite sensible In view of the Rhodesian sanctions 
subsequently proving not entirely unsuccessful: 
"None of the three cases studied have so far achieved their poli- 
tical ends and it Is highly unlikely that they will. if 
agreements are reachedv the more probable causes will not be eco- 
nomic but changed political bases for compromise or the Imminence 
of military, rather than strictly economial warfare. " 
In other words9 boycotts In themselves are Inadequate. Galtung would 
largely support Losman's analysis, but see It as Incomplete. HA s 
sophisticated and detailed analysisq which concentrates on the 
Rhodesia boycotty Is still generally negative about the likelihood of 
success with economic boycotts, but Identifies the conditions under 
which the boycott can be both effective and successful and recognises 
that success may be In terms other than the defeat of the regime of 
the boycotted state. 
Galtung defines International economic sanctions as "actions Initiated 
by one or more International actors (the "senders") against one or 
more others (the "receivers") with either or both of two purposes: to 
punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or to make 
the receivers comply with certain norms the senders deem Important" 
(111). So, In contrast with Losmanp Galtung recognises that the 
rationale behind economic sanctions may Involve an attempt to punish 
as well as to coerce. This, of coursey Is closer to Remerts analysist 
and Galtung comes closer stillp as will be seen. 
The view that puni shment is a necessary condi ti on for compliance Is 
naive to Galtungq yet he acknowledges the prevalence of a punishment 
oriented attitude. The use of negative sanctions In politics has much 
to do with a desire for retribution, along the lines of "If compliance 
Is not obtainedg there Is at least the gratification that derives from 
knowing (or believing) that the sinner gets his due. " Howeverp 
Galtung's analysis concentrates on the use of sanctions as a way of 
making other International actors comply. 
Seven dimensions for classifying sanctions are Identified. The con- 
cern here Is with those that are negative (punishment for deviancel 
rather than positiveg reward for compliance)l collective (hitting the 
nation as a whole rather than responsible Individuals), external (from 
outside)p . and economic 
(rather than diplomatic or communiction 
sanctions). He suggests the *theory' of economic sanctions Is simple: 
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The Input-output matrix of the economy of the receiving nation Is 
inspected. The Impact of parti al or total boycott of selected 
Imports or exports Is calculated. As a matter of rational poli- 
tics, maximum effect with minimum boycott Is looked for ... The 
Ideal case would be that of a system In which total boycott of 
one product alone would be sufficient, and oil Is often held to 
be this product. " 
Galtung I denti fi es el ght I deal condi ti ons ,If the goal Is to damage 
the economic system of the receiving nation without similarly damaging 
the sender. These conditions Include Imports having a high loading on 
Important sectors of the economy of the receiverg no Internal substi- 
tute and no external substitute (through a change In trade partners). 
These conditions are exemplified in the case of a small economic 
satellite of a major economic powerp such as the situation of Cuba 
with respect to the United States prior to the boycott. The crucial 
concept Is vulnerability and, In turnp concentration. The greater the 
concentration of trade the greater the vulnerability. Hence the 
greater the likelihood of effectiveness. It Is on thi s basi s that 
Galtung concludes that economic sanctions as a source of power tend to 
preserve existing power structuresp as big powers are very different 
from smaller powers In external vulnerability. 
Three counterstrategies are left for the receiver: to train Itself In 
sacrifice by doing without certain commoditiesp and preferably even 
liking It; to restructure the national economy so as to absorb the 
shock of the boycottl by producing locally the Imported commodities 
denied itq etc; and to organise changes of trade with or via third 
partiesq org If the boycott Is truly universal, to engage in 
smuggling. Thl s seems to be all the recel ver can do I and where the 
I deal condi ti ons are met and parti cularly If the boycott Is exten- 
sively supported (but "the world has yet to see a universal boycott")p 
the situation seems bleak. Yet desite this survival has been shown to 
be possible. 
Galtung suggests that the SI tuati on faced by the reicei ver Is less 
bleak than It mi ght appear. He I denti fi es a nai ve theory of the pro- 
cess by which the boycott Is Intended to work. This postulates a goal 
of poll ti cal di sl ntegrati on of the enemy so that compli ance Is 
achlevedo a goal reallsed by value deprivation. Howeverv in economic 
warfare as in military warfare, deprivation Is not necessarily 
directly proportional to politial disintegration. Indeedp the theory 
is naive because value deprivation can Initially lead to political 
Integration and only later - perhaps much later or even never - to 
political disintegration. This Is because of adaptation: "that which 
seems unacceptable at the beginning of the conflict becomes acceptable 
as one gets used to life under hardship. " 
The case of Rhodesia Illustrates this well. Political disintegration 
did not prove to be a consequence of value deprivationg and It was 
also counteracted. Adaptation proved to be self-reinforcingg pro- 
viding unintended benefits; sacrifice became desirable In the form of 
conspicuous sacrifice; while smuggling Introduced an element of exci- 
tement Into life. In such ways were economic effects minimised. 
While the moral criticism Implied in sanctions was dealt with by acts 
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of transposition. For examplev Prime Minister Wilson became viewed as 
a communist, while jokes served to ridicule the sanctions. Government 
action Included partial censorship to promote pluralistic Ignorance, 
as well as attempts to minimise economic effects and demonstrate the 
legitimacy of Its position. 
Galtung's conclusion Is that what works at the individual level does 
not necessarily work at the level of Interaction between nations. Yet 
this does not preclude success. Adaptation may not 3urvive Into the 
long term and the threat of boycott may often be sufficient. The 
point Is that success depends on more than whether the sanctions were 
universal and therefore economically effective. Moreover, there Is 
the punishment aspect: "the value of at least doing something. " 
Galtungq after recognising the ways In which states minimise their 
vulnerability to boycottsq wonders If other types of sanctions such as 
positiveg collectivel external sanctions, might be more appropriate. 
Tie seemsq howeverp somewhat optimistic In thinking they might be 
applied, given his Identification of the dominance of a punishment 
oriented attitude in world politics. 
Perhaps punishment Is the most realitic of alms for economic boycotts. 
Or, In keeping with Remerp punishment and publicity. Such actions are 
not entirely futile. As Galtung writes: 
"If the sanctions do not serve Instrumental purposes they can at 
least have expressive functions. Thus, as a highly dramatic (and 
costly) way of reinforcing International morality, economic sanc- 
tions may be useful 
If the senders themselves are deprived, this purpose may be even 
better served: "we believe that this purpose is served still better if 
the senders deprive themselves of as much or even more value as the 
receivers are deprived of. " 
In looking at International economic sanctions one cang given the 
above conclusionsy see evidence of ethical purchase behaviour. The 
Chinese boycotts, although considered under the heading of inter- 
national economic sanationsp seem to have had a lot more In common 
with consumer boycotts. They also have Important Implications for 
consumer boycotts - Finally, the notion of boycotts as way of rein- 
forcing moralityp of having an expressive function, has been Intro- 
duced. This approach Is particularly attributable to Galtung, but the 
other analyses considered above have also contributed to the view that 
consumer boycotts cannot be assessed In terms of economic effec- 
tiveness alone. 
It now seems Important that In analysing consumer boycotts there 
should be the distinction made between success and effectiveness; bet- 
ween goals seeking compliance and those seeking only punishment and/or 
publicity; and between economic effect and psychological or emotional 
ef feet. In the latter case ,It mi ght well be that one can equate the 
tburt' felt by Japan at being boycotted, as Identified by Remerp with 
the reaction of business to boycotts. This may In turn be as Impor- 
tant a factor In success as economic effectiveness. 
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7.6 The Arab Boycott 
7.6.1 History and Background 
S 
S 
The Arab boycott Is, as 7.5 Indicatedg the use of the boycott as an 
International economic sanction. Separate consideration of It here Is 
justified by Its predominance In the literature andq more Importantly, 
because of Its central feature of boycotts of business. It Is pro- 
bably the most significant boycott currently affecting business, as 
both the content and quantity of the literature and the survey 
questionnaire findings (see Chapter Nine) Indicate. The Arab boycott 
also offers some support for the concept of ethical purchase beha- 
viour, In Its apparent futility and the nature of its administration, 
and also In the response It has engendered from Jewish organisations 
and others. Moreover, It Is Interesting to consider the Issues of 
social responsibility in business raised by company compliance with 
boycott demandsp and also the way-in which companies responded to the 
boycott as a possible general Indicator of management response to 
boycott action. 
Much of the following Is based on the comprehensive analysis of Nelson 
and PrI tti e, The Economi c War Agal nst the Jews. Thi s study documents 
the historyp background and events of the boycott in great detail, 
only an outline of which can be considered here. It mustj howeverp be 
said, that this Is written from the Jewish perspectiveg and while the 
writers may be duly Incensedl their analysis suffers from a lack of 
balance and what seems in places to be a largely emotive response. 
Hotaling Is less guilty In this respect and his study will also be 
used In an attempt to redress any Imbalance. 
An Important point of difference between Hotaling and Nelson and 
Prittleg Is whether the boycott is anti-Jewish or anti-Zionist, 
whether It Is an action against all Jews or simply against the State 
of Israel. This difference has a bearing on where an attempt to 
recount the history of the boycott should commences Nelson and 
Prittie are convinced It is anti-Jewish. Having referred to four 
attempts by the Arabs to defeat Israel on the battlefield, they write: 
"Economic warfare Is an essential component of total war; anti- Semitism Is the Ideological concomitant of the Arabs' total war 
against the Jewish state. Anti-Semitism Imbues this economic war 
with hatreds which have hstoric roots within the Arab world; It Is an endemic feature of the boycottl despite the Arab claim that 
they have a quarrel only with "Zionistsp" not with Jews" (112). 
They claim a tradition of anti-Semitism In the Arab world, referring 
to the Koran, a long-perpetuated myth of ritual murder by Jews as 
described In the Protocolsj Arab support for Nazi anti-Semitism, and 
the persecution of Jews before and after the State of Israel was 
established In 1948 (113). They note that the boycott of Israel began 
as a boycott of Jewish settlers In British-ruled Palestinev and that 
the Arab League boycott dates to before 1948 (114). On this basis, 
notwithsanding the anti-Jewish element to many actions perpetrated because of the boycott, they claim it to be anti-Jewish. 
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Hotaling seems undecided. He notes that ItIsa common assumpti on 
frequently reported without qualification In leading American newspa- 
pers such as the New York Times or The Wall Street Journalq that the 
Arab League's boycott regulations include specific anti-Jewish prohl- 
bi ti ons. He suggests there Is little documentary evidence of such 
official prohibitions and notes that Mahgoubt the Boycott Office's 
Commissioner-General, points out that Jewish-owned firms operate in 
Arab lands and Insists the boycott Is not anti-Jewish but 
anti-Zionist. Yet "the assumption to the contrary by many foreignersp 
and probably by a great many Arabs, no doubt encourages anti-Jewish 
discrimination In Middle East trade" (115). The end result9 Intended 
or otherwise, would seem to be antl-Jewish, as will become apparent. 
Nelson and Prittle note that the Fifth Arab Congress called for all 
Arabs to boycott Jewish businesses in 1922. (It Is perhaps on the 
basis of this that Winchester, In a recent article in The Sunday 
Times, claims incorrectly that the Arab boycott "was founded in the 
1920's" (116). ) Similar calls went out in 19299 1931 and 1933. But 
"the forerunner of today's Arab Trade Boycott of the State of Israel, 
as well as the economic war against the Jews and all non-Jews who sup- 
port Israel's right to e3dst" was the 1936 boycott of all Jewish pro- ducts proclaimed by Haj Amin al-Husseinly the Grand Mufti and 
spiritual leader of all Moslems. They sugest this boycott may well 
have been copied from the contemporary Nazi model (117). 
Hotaling suggests the precedent for the Arab boycott was a League of 
Nations boycott (of the type discussed In 7.5) against Italy in the 
1930's. Bothy however, confirm that the Arab boycott, as It Is 
currently knowng was set up by the League of Arab States in 1945. The 
Boycott Committee declared "Products of Palestinian Jews are to be 
considered undesirable In Arab countries. They should be prohibited 
and refused as long as their production In Palestine might lead to the 
reallsation of Zionist political aims" (118). Boycott offices were 
established in League members' capitals with a central office 
established In 1946 In Cairo, which moved to Damascus where it is 
currently based In 1949. 
In that yearg following the proclamation of the State of Israel on May 14 1948, the Arabs closed their frontiers wi th Israel and declared themselves to be Ina permanent state of war wi th that nati on. Whi le 
this prevented Israel from becoming a Middle East entrepot and created 
enormous difficultieso it was a partial blessing: "Total blockade of 
land frontiers forced Israel to build up the most complete social and 
economic fabric of any small nation In history - Indeed, to begin the fulfilment of the Jewish dream ... " (119). Part of this blockade involved the closure of the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping, ultimately 
resulting In the 1956 Suez crisis. 
It seems that In the early years the boycott was designed to enforce 
the blockade, a source In Hotaling suggests It was originally envi- 
saged as a simple operation to prevent smugglingy noting that until 1951 the League's boycott programme was headed by an Egyptian coast 
guard officer. In the early 19509sq however, the boycott became more 
sophIsticatedv more organised and less haphazard. Around 1951v the 
Central Office for the Boycott of Israel began developing the boycott 
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regulations and the questionnaires intended to Implement It. In 1952 
the boycott was extended to foreign companies doing business in 
Israel. Over the next few years the task was clarified: "to monitor 
International trade and Implement a primary boycott of Israel and a 
secondary boycott of foreign firms assisting Israel. It developed a 
tertiary boycott requiring foreign firms not to deal with other firms 
already on the blacklist. The tertiary boycott would also apply 
against businessmen and other Individuals considered to be Zionists" 
(120). 
During this period up to the mid-1950's, the Arab states were relati- 
vely weak. But over the following twenty yearst particularly with 
Soviet supportq there was greater aggressiveness. Initially, Hotaling 
writes "the secondary boycott took a small but telling toll of foreign 
firms. " Twenty-two American companies were Included in a 1957 list 
published In Business International. He suggests that at that time 
"fear of the boycott seemed as powerful a weapon sometimes as the 
boycott Itself, " citing the refusal In 1956 by Brown and Williamson to 
take orders from Israeli Importers. The blacklist grewp with Business 
International claiming there were 53 American companies on the list in 
1960,134 In 19629 and by 1970 there were 11500 American companies 
(including Sears Roebuckp Coca-Cola, Ford, Xerox and many other major 
companies) according to a list revealed five years later by a Senate 
committee (121). 
The boycott resulted In discrimination against Jews In employment. 
The American Amy Corps of Engineers admitted that on the Dhahran 
Airfield project In the early 1950's and on subsequent projects, 
American Jews had been barred. While In Britain, In the 1960's, the 
Jewish peer Lord Mancroft was forced to resign from the board of 
directors of Norwich Union because of company fears that the Arabs 
might blacklist shipping companies Insured through them. 
However, undoubtedly, If not inevitably, It was oil and the recogni- 
tion of the power that It provided, that gave the boycott signifi- 
cance. Support for Israel by the West during the 1973 Yom Kippur War 
led to an oil embargo. Despite Arab fears of retaliation by the West 
there was disarrayp and the relative unity of OPEC enabled the Arabs 
to demand massive Increases in oil revenues. This oil wealth provided 
great purchasing power which, together with fears of further disrup- 
tion in oil suppliesq gave potency to the boycott. The "paper tigerg" 
as It had been previously regarded, had acquired teeth (122). 
There Is some debate as to whether this Increased purchasing power 
improved the efficacy of the boycott. Some of the additional revenue 
was Invested overseas but much was needed for extensive development 
within the Arab states. Hotaling suggests that while some argued that 
Increased trade and Industrial development would force the boycotters 
to open up Arab markets to blacklisted firms, others argued that the 
oil wealth was behind the boycott "prompting multinational giants to 
collaborate with the boycotters by following their rules" (123). 
Nelson and PrIttle have no doubt the latter applied In the majority of 
cases: 
"That goal - Israel's destruction - remains the central and ulti- 
mate aim of the economic war. That has been Intensified 
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Immeasurably since 1973v when the Arabs began wielding their "oil 
weapon" against the world" (124). 
Congressman Jonathan Bingham, who sponsored anti-boycott legislation, 
reports In the Introduction to The Economic War Against the Jewsq that 
in 1974 there were 785 business transactions Involving the demand for 
boycott compliance by American fi Ms. By September of 1975 there were 
7,545 such transactions. Over the next six months there were 25,000 
such transactionsg with acquiescence by the American firms In 90 per 
cent of cases. "A minor nuisance had become a stink In the nostrils 
of democracy. " 
Figures for the number of firms on the blacklist vary because of the 
secrecy surrounding It. Reuters reported from Cairo at the end of 
1975 that there were lOpOOO American and European companies 
blacklisted. In early 19769 Pethot Information offered for sale a 
consolidated list of 59000 companies In 88 countries, Including 1,400 
In the United States. Nelson an 
*d 
Prittle guess that there were 3,000 
American and British firms on the list In 1976-1977 (125). 
Hotaling claims the list he appends Is probably very close to the list 
held In the Boycott Office at the time. He shows 5,000 firms 
blacklisted Internationally In 1977t the US list the most extensive of 
all. The exact figure Is unimportantg an Idea as to the magnitude is 
all that Is required. More recent newspaper reports (126) and the 
response to the survey questionnaire suggest the effects of the 
boycott remain at this level. This Is despite anti-boycott legisla- 
tion In America and France. 
Havi ng const dered the hi, story and background of the boycott ItIs now 
possi ble to look at how It works. Thi s is the subject of the next 
secti on. 
7.6.2 The Administration of the Boycott 
The boycott operates from a central office In Damascus, Syria, and 
from branch offices within the other Arab states. An Important point, 
which also distinguishes the Arab boycott from most other Inter- 
national economic sanctions, Is that It Is not centrally legislated 
(unlike a United Nations embargo for example). The Boycott Office 
recommends companies for listing or delisting on the basis of reports 
from commissioners In the branch officesl from diplomats in Arab 
embassies, bi-national business organisations such as the 
Arab-American chambers of commerce and even private Individuals or 
governments passing on Information about others. (Winchester 
illustrates this latter source In referring to Shell, who have not 
done business with Israel for nearly thirty yearsq backing out of a 
deal to supply a firm In Tel Aviv following a threat from the com- 
peting. supplier that the Arab world would learn of the deal (127). ) 
The Boycott Office also uses the mediat Including Lloyds Register to 
monitor ship movements (ships are also blacklisted)l and the Inquiries 
from companies and their responses to warnings from the Boycott 
Office. 
Havi ng made these recommendatl ons 9 the Boycott Of fi ce does not have the power to enforce them. (Pressure has been appli ed where thought 
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necessaryv as when Egypt considered allowing Ford to build a diesel 
assembly plant In 1975. ) The Individual sovereign member government 
of the League decides whether or not to boycott a company by law. 
Some governments simply review the blacklist Issued by the central 
office and virtually rubber-stamp It. Others make changesp and some 
wl 11 even look the other way and trade wi th a company they have 
blacklisted. On the whole, however "with the exception of the Mahgreb 
countries of North Africa, where enforcement of the boycott frequently 
has been laxy the Arab League states have heeded the call to unity and 
generally adopted the Boycott Office's recommendations" (128). The 
boycott commissioners meet twice a year to review the blacklist. 
The operation of the primary boycott Is quite straightforward. The 
secondary and tertiary boycotts are more complicated because they 
function In a more convoluted fashion. As found in the boycotts In 
labour strugglesq the further removed the boycott Is from the 
grievance the more difficult It Is to control and enforce. It also 
appears less legitimate. Consequently, critics of the Arab boycott 
such as Nelson and Prittle accept the primary boycott against Israel - 
Arab states should be able to choose their trading partners - but view 
the secondary boycotts and particularly the tertiary boycotts as 
Insidious. Yet despite the difficulties in Imposing higher order 
boycotts experienced elsewhereq the Arabs seem remarkably successful. 
This success, as will be seen, seems to stem from their oil wealth 
derived purchasing power. But It must In part be due to effective 
organJsation. 
Ef f ecti ve organi sati on Is di f fj cult to recogni se from the blackli st 
A tself . As reprinted In Hotaling, It Is messy, It contains duplica- 
tions, misspellings and various other errors. It Includes multi- 
nati onal conglomerates alongside obscure merchants, social 
organJsations and private Individuals. Inclusion and deletion seem to 
be arbitrary processes. Yet all this, while possibly reflecting the 
Inefficiencies of administration In lesser developed countries, may be 
tactically advantageous. The Boycott Office Is disorganised, and of 
course it Is difficult to be certain of the relationships between 
firms. Yet as Hotaling writes: 
"The boycotters veil of confusing propaganda Is In the best 
Middle Eastern tradition of confusing the enemy even when you're 
confused yourself. It was explained further by Mahgoub ... "When- 
you are Ina war you don It tell the enemy about the si ze of your 
forces and how to deploy them"" (129). 
At the same timeg Mahgoub also explained why the list was not 
published. This wasp he suggestedv due to frequent changes In the 
list, attempts by con men to offer to get firms off the listq and 
because It made It possible for Israeli sympathizers to move against 
those not on the list. Of coursep secrecy - as suggested In Wolmants 
analysis of the boycott In labour struggle - may be tactically advan- 
tageousq and following US anti-boycott legislation the Arabs promised 
secrecy to protect those complying with the boycott (130). Meanwhilet 
In explanation of the contradictionsg anomallesl muddles and mistakes 
In the application of the boycott, and In confirmation of the Arab 
view of the boycott as a warp Adrian Khashoggip the Arab financierl 
has said: 
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"When you are at warg when you are In the middle of a battlet you 
don't see right, you don't see left. This Is a confused period. 
And how can the boycott office In Damascus really decide who Is 
what? " (131). 
Decl dI ng who Is what ,Is made consl derably easi e by the assi stance 
given by firms Involved in the Middle East. Three basic documents are 
required of a company under threat by the Arabs before It will be 
allowed to trade with the Arab world. Firstly, an affidavit signed by 
a company officer proclaiming that the company is not contravening the 
general principles or specific rules and regulations of the boycott 
offices. It must be authenticated by an Arab consulatev diplomatic 
missiong or Arab chamber of commerce. Secondly, the standard boycott 
office questionnaire, containing detailed questions about the firm's 
business and a warning that no Arab country or company will be per- 
mitted to trade with It If the firm violates boycott provisions. 
Sometimes a further questionnaire accompanies this relating specifi- 
cally to the firm In question. Finally, there Is the negative cer- 
tificate of origing certifying that goods shipped are not of Israeli 
origin and do not contain Israeli materials (132). 
In a rare concession to the Arab caseg Nelson and Prittle quote an 
extract from a letter by Mahgoub sent to a company which Imports 
women's wear from Israel. The Arab case and their demands are essen- 
tially as follows: 
"We believe that It Is of mutual Interest to both of us to draw 
your attention to the fact that the Arab countries are still in a 
state of war wi th Israel which usurped a dear part of the Arab 
homelandq dispersed its Inhabitants, deprived them of their pro- 
perties and possessions and failed to comply with any of the 
resolutions of the United Nations. Therefore, as a measure of 
self-defense and with the view of safe-guarding the rights and 
vital Interests of the Arabs of Palestine, the Arab countries 
strictly adhere to a set of boycott rules directed at Israel. 
In bri ef , these rules prohl bi t Arabs from enterl ng I nto any sort 
of dealngs with Israeli natural or artificial persons. They also 
prohibit dealings with foreign natural or artificial persons who 
contribute to the promotion of Israel's economy or war potential 
through any of the deeds defined by the Boycott Law and 
Regulations" (133). 
Questions were also asked about the firm's activities In Israel. It 
should be noted that the boycott does not prohibit the sale of goods 
to Israelp as Is commonly assumed. Winchester writes that the boycott 
"seeks to minimise trade with Israel by asking any fl rm that trades in 
Arabia to declare full details of Its busines with Israel. If the 
trade Is significant, or If- there are "known Zionists" on the firm's 
boardp then the Arabs will not, In theory, do business" (134). This 
Is only loosely speaking correct, and the Implication that Shell would 
be In breach of the boycott provi sl ons by selli ng to Tel Avj vIs cer- 
tainly not. A recent editorial In, The Guardian seems more accurate: 
"Arab states ýd 11 trade wi th whom they wi sh to trade and there 
can be no principled objection to their refusal to trade with 
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Israel. The boycottv howeverl extends to third party suppliers 
and takes the form of a requirement that the companies concePned 
shall not have Investments or partnership agreements In Israel 
and shall not use Israeli components In their exports. Occasion- 
ally the more Intrusive question Is asked about whether the 
foreign company has "Zionists" on Its board" (135). 
This Is closer to the purpose of the boycott as revealed In the 
questionnaire, the letter by Hahgoub above and also a statement by him 
to a Beirut newspaper: "When a company undertakes any action which may 
strengthen the Israeli economyp or develop Israeli Industry, or In any 
way increase Israel's military efficiency; or If a company Is headed 
by a person known for hi s support of ZI oni sm and hi s acti vI ti es 
against Arab Interestsp or If a board of directors of a company Inclu- 
des such a person or personsp that company becomes eligible for Inclu- 
sion In the Arab boycott list" (136). At one point Hotaling suggests 
that permitting the sale of goods to Israel was both to drain Israel's 
currency reserves and to allow certain key International service 
Industriesp such as hotelsp to establish bases in Arab states when 
they might In preference choose Israel (137). 
Nelson and Prittle also recognise that the boycott provisions do not 
preclude the sale of goods to Israel (138), but they baulk at attempts 
to extend the boycott beyond military goods. Referring to the letter 
abovev they note "it has nothing to do with goods of strategic mili- 
tary or economic value; It deals with woments wear, and is motivated 
by the thought that all Israeli exports strengthen Israel's economy 
and ought to be stopped" (139). Of course, their analysis Is correct, 
but why should the boycott be restricted to military goods If the goal 
is as they recognise, the destruction-ot Israel? 
In additionp the boycott provisions do not apply to Arab governments, 
who are exempt from the boycott. Some companies are only partially 
boycotted. While on occasion, If the need Is sufficienty the 
blacklist would be Ignored. 
Enforcing secondary and tertiary boycotts demands strict policing or 
powerful disincentives to discourage breach of the boycott provisions. 
so powerful are the disincentives In this case that companies go out 
of their way to ensure that they remain 'clean'. Hotaling refers to a 
policy of self -regulati ong noting that the conglomerate Incheape and 
Co. has a total embargo on Israeli or Israeli -connected companies. 
Nelson and Prittle describe this as a voluntary boycott; not even 
waiting to be pressured by the Arabsv companies decline to do business 
with Israel: "They anticipate Arab objections and act without having 
received letters or questionnaires from Damascus or elsewhere; before 
they even make contact with potential Arab customers and clientsp they 
make sure they are "clean" by Arab standards" (140). 
British companies are particularly guilty of this it seems. They are 
described as 'the willing victims'. Arab boycott offices didn't need 
to tighten their regulations "British businessmen were ready to con- 
form voluntarily with the Arab boycottp In spontaneous surrender. " 
Companies such as Plesseyq Gulf Ollp Thomas Cookq CostaJn and Fairey 
Aviationg are reported to have taken various actions to remain 
299 
suitably 'clean'. Barclays and GECp howeverp refused to cOmPlY with 
boycott demands. 
Britain, of course, has long been involved In the Middle East. It 
bears a great deal of the responsibility for the troubles there and 
sponsored the formation of the Arab League. It was for many years 
Israelts second trading partnerg after the United States (141). 
Winchester reports that Britain's share of Israelts Import market Is 
currently 6 per cent, whereas It was 85 per cent thi rty years ago. 
This Is attributed to the boycott (142). And British complicity with 
the boycott Is not restricted to companies, for the Foreign Office 
continues to authenticate negative certificates of origin (143). 
These actions of the British government and those of Britishy American 
and other compant es q and the organi sati on of the Arab boycott 9 have Implications for consumer boycottsp ethical purchase behaviour and 
social responsibility in business. Having outlined the history, 
background and administration of the boycott, these Implications can 
now be, considered. They are the subject of the next two sections. 
7.6.3 The Arab Boycott as Ethical Purchase Behaviour 
The Arab boycott p although not a consumer boycott as defi ned here , does have a number of Implications for the arguments proposed 
regarding consumer boycotts and also ethical purchase behaviour and 
social responsibility In business. 
The use of the boycott In this way by the Arabs Is arguably ethical 
purchase behaviour. Many of its characteristics point to thist but 
the vagueness and Ideological approach to Its administration and, 
perhaps above all, Its apparent futility, are the strongest Indica- 
tors. One might not support the Arabs' cause or admire their methods, 
but their purchase behaviour when guided by the boycott has to be 
recognised as being strongly Influenced by ethical rather than commer- 
cial considerations. Of course, there have been occasions where the 
boycott provisions have been Ignored for commercial reasons, but they 
are exceptions rather than the rule. Also, one could argueg the 
willingness to comply of the firms Involved has reduced the sacrifice 
requiredt but there are still around 5,000 firms whose products in 
most cases the Arabs choose to deny themselves. One might say that 
given their oil wealth, It Is easy for the Arabs to refuse to deal 
with what they view as tainted firmsp just as It was earlier argued that social responsibility In business Is easier when profits are high 
and very difficult when 'one's back Is against the wall'. This is 
probably truet yet It does not make their purchase behaviour any the less ethicalp It is that their ethical concerns In purchase behaviour 
are more easily accommodated. 
Nelson and PrIttlep although acknowledging Its ambiguities, refer to 
the boycott as "Ideologically doctrinaire" (144). Yet while they 
emphasise the use of the boycott is an economic weapon, Its ethical 
dimensions seem to escape them. Although they Identify some of the 
more Ideological actions Inspired by the boycott, such as the boycotting of films with 'Zionist' elements (actors, charactersp sYm- bols, etc. ) or maps and books referring to Israelq they prefer to 
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ridicule rather than consider the 
Arabs try not to recogni se Israel 
their purchase behaviour. 
meani ng of thl s behavi our. The 
In many ways , one such way IsIn 
The futi 11 ty of thl s must be apparent. Losman 9 as noted In the pre- 
vious sectiong refers to the determination of the people of Israel to 
succeed. As Importantp howeverp must be the support Israel receives 
from other countriesp particularly the United States. The destruction 
of Israel, which Is after all the goal of the boycott, would be poli- 
tically unacceptable to the West. The actions of the Arabs are there- 
fore In ethical condemnation. But to what end? 
Although Britain's trade w1th Israel has fallen quite considerably, 
Israel's trade with the rest of the world has never stopped growing 
and Israel claims "the world's record in economic growth" (145). 
Losman's balance sheet approachg assessing the economic effect of 
boycottsp suggested that foregone potential was the most serious eco- 
nomic impact of the boycott. He also pointed to the suffering the 
Arabs had to tolerate in applying the boycott. However, his analysis 
was published in 1972, prior to the Arabs' realisation of the poten- 
tial of oil sanctions. Even then, he did not dismiss the Indirect 
costs of the boycott that result from the blacklisting. 
As almost no part of Palestine's capital stock was produced In Arab 
countries there had been no capital effectsp although Losman forgets 
or Ignores possible capital effets resulting from spare parts having 
been unobtainable from blacklisted firms. He identified direct costs 
In increased transport charges and adverse movements In the terms of 
trade. He also suggested the loss of trade with the Arab states 
-particularly of relatively cheap foodstuffs and raw materials - was 
greater than often Imagined. The Middle East as a whole had supplied 
20 per cent of Palestine's Imports and took 12 per cent of its 
exports, proportions that rose considerably during the artificial con- 
ditions of the second World War and Immediately prior to the Imposi- 
tion of the Arab League boycott. Yet although there were direct costs 
thesev he suggestsq together with capital effectsl may be dismissed. 
Indirect costs are more difficult to estimate. Losman suggests that 
the Indirect costs to Israel were few and limited In duration, with 
the exception of the Haifa refinery operating at far below capacity. 
The costs of blacklisting he chooses to consider separatelyp though 
within his schemap they can surely be considered as Indirect costs. 
He suggests the Influence of the blacklisting In denying Israel 
Investment funds and vital goods Is Impossible to quantify. His sur- 
vey of firms blacklisted found that half had experienced no loss of 
salest generally because they had no dealings with Arab states. Yet 
this means that half had suffered some loss of sales, which is a large 
proportiong although Losman doesn't put It this way. He comments "Of 
those experiencing lossesp the degree of ham varied; 3ome firms con- 
tinued their Israeli trade despite substantial losses (of either Arab 
customersy org occasionallyl non-Arab customers via a secondary 
boycott). " However, this only considers those firms that chose not to 
comply with the boycott. There are those that do comply. of these, 
Losman comments: 
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"Since few firms which do capitulate to the boycott publicize the 
fact - Insteadp giving other reasons for ceasing Israeli connec- 
ti ons -ItIsa moot questi on exactly how many fI ms have been 
discouraged. Further, to measure the economic Impact one would 
also have to know what volume of trade could ordinarily have been 
expected and to what degree It was preferable to the substitutes 
obtained. There Is no doubt that blacklisting has been success- 
ful In many Instancesp although to what extent Is completely 
Indeterminable" (146). 
Although not quantifiable the effects are to some extent determinable, 
as the evidence presented In the last section shows. Much evidence of 
the effects came to light with the demands for and achievement of 
anti-boycott legislation. Losman was writing prior to the oil embargo 
and the evidence suggests an Increase In boycott effectiveness 
following this. In shortp the blacklist must entail losses to Israeli 
trade. Yet the costs of the boycott are also borne by othersq as In 
other International economic sanctions. In this case business bears a 
lotq if not most of the costs. 
No doubt this serves to discredit Israel, or at least provide a plat- 
form for Arab grievances. In this way the boycott has an expressive 
function, as with other International economic sanctions. But in Its 
economic effectiveness it also seems an effective punishment of Israel 
and those viewed as Its supporters. Yet this apparent effectiveness 
does not seem to give ri se to success. The goal of the boycott seems 
impossible to achieve regardless of boycott effectiveness. 
If thi s futi 11 ty of the Arab boycott and I ts other characteri sti as 
seem an Inadequate basis for claiming ethical purchase behaviourt one 
need only turn to the response to the boycott by Jewish organisations 
and their supporters for a more convincing example. The anti-Jewish 
aspects to the boycott particularly Incensed Jewish feeling In the 
United States and In Europe. Attempts to fight the boycott were pri- 
marily aimed at securing anti-boycott legislation. This Is documented 
In both Hotaling and Nelson and PrIttie. Other actions were also Ini- 
tiatedo no doubt with legislation as their long-term aim, these 
Included counterboycotts and shareholder actions. Often, howeverv 
organised counterboycotts were unnecessary, as many consumers 
responded spontaneously In immediate rejection of the offerings of 
firms complying with the boycott. 
So strong was the feeling that what for the Arabs was a blacklistq 
became for many a white list, a "roll of honorg" with one American 
Jewish group "urging Jews to buy the products and patronize the ser- 
vices of companies blacklisted by the Arabs" (147). They created a 
'negative' or 'indirect' boycott. 
Counterboycotts were organised. The decision by Brown and Williamsong 
a subsidiary of British American Tobaccop not to sell Its cigarettes 
to Israel led to the following widely distributed announcement: 
"If you smoke Viceroyq Raleigh ... and other products of the 
British American Tobacco Companyq YOU ARE SUPPORTING THE ARAB 
CAUSE ... The British American Tobacco Company, owners of Brown 
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and Williamson Tobacco Companyp has knuckled under to Arab 
pressure ... Don't give them your supportIl" 
Individual Jews switched brands and the company's cigarettes were not 
distributed at community dinners and similar functions. Loss of sales 
resulted In a fall from fifth to tenth place In market share. This 
and being publicly pilloried resulted In a change of policy: "Today it 
sells to both Israel and the Arab states. " 
Similar action was taken against Coca-Cola for their reluctance to 
Invest In Israel. Five million dollars worth of sales were lost 
within a week. Coca-Cola conceded, a plant was built outside Tel Aviv 
and Coca-Cola was blacklisted by the Arabs. Public protest was con- 
sidered a more Important factor In this than the effects of the 
counterboycott. 
"The counterboycott, comments Uval Elizur, "is not the onlyq or 
even the most effective weapon to be used by friends of Israel. 
A display of public protest-hurting the company's reputation and 
pressing It to prove its Integrity - achieves more. "" 
Of coursep concern for the company's reputation is not unrelated to 
sales. The distinction between boycott effects and corporate Image 
effectsp If one need and can be made, Is simply the short term against 
the long term. 
The action di d not deny cola to the Arabs. Pepsi-Cola carefully 
avoided Israely allegedly because of Insufficient demand. This too 
resulted In consumer action (148). 
One particularly active group was. the American Jewish Congress (AJC). 
They organised a shareholder action reported by Hotaling and Nelson 
and Prittleg and considered In detail by Vogel because "it represented 
the largest shareholder campaign ever mounted. More Importantly$ It 
represented the first time that a mainstream liberal groupq whose 
Interest in business did not originate In the social movements of the 
sixties, attempted to use the proxy mechanism" (149). The precedents 
for the AJC's action were established by the Project on Corporate 
Responsibilltv and the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, 
as reported In Vogel. The proxy proposalst submitted to approximately 
150 corporationsg requested the firm report to their shareholders 
their participation and policy toward the Arab boycott. Maslowq the 
campaign's directorg wrote: 
"It Is commonplace that business corporations ... have become 
enormously powerful Institutions In our society, exercising a 
pervasive Influence on our way of life beyond the Immediate con- 
cerns of their shareholders, employees and consumers ... The Impact of their activities ... Inevitably give rise to moral and 
ethical Issues concerning which shareholders have a legitimate 
concern. " 
Thl s, of course Iis fundamental to the posi ti on advocated here on the 
social responsibility of business. 
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The AJC action was primarily Intended "to help place the Issue on the 
agenda of the governmental process. " Given the earlier discussion on 
the likely achievements of pressure groups this seems a realistic 
objecti ve. The action succeeded in securing public attention and 
Interestj as a consci ousness-ral sing exercise, and also was directly 
successful In getting companies to change their policies. Probably 
most Important though wasp as Maslow commented, that "the millions of 
shares that were voted In support of our resolution helped create the 
national climate that resulted In overwhelming support In the House 
and Senate for strong anti-boycott legislation. " 
Examining the AJC action which, as shown, was stated In terms of cor- 
porate responsibility and accountability, leads directly into the 
social responsibility Implications of the boycott. These are examined 
In the following section. 
7.6.4 Corporate Social Responsibility and the Arab Boycott 
What, one must ask, should a company do that wishes to trade In the 
Middle East and be a good corporate citizen? 
Ignoring the role of 'baksheesh' In the Middle East and how a company 
should deal with that, one can take as a starting point the position 
that a good corporate citizen at home can be a good corporate citizen 
overseas by employing Identical standards of behaviour (150). So the 
firm would not therefore discriminate between Arab and Israeli busi- 
ness in fear of being blacklistedp purely commercial criteria would 
prevail. 
A company less willing or - to be generous - less able to conform to this standard, must then choose between staying clean (and avoiding 
any dealings with Israel, tZionistst or whatever) and taking some 
rjsksq with or without subterfuge. In other words, either avoiding 
the risk of being blacklisted altogether through voluntary boycottv or 
taking some risk and attempting to minimise It by various and possibly 
devious means. 
Should the company then be approached by the Boycott Of fi ce 9 as a result of some misdemeanour coming to Its attention, it must decide 
whether or not to comply. The good corporate eltizeng on the basis of 
the standard established above, will not comply, perhaps throwing the 
boycott questionnaire Into the wastepaper basket, or by writing back 
stating Its position. Alternativelyp the company can comply, either 
by demonstrating that It Is clean or lfý for example, it only sells to 
Israel, that It has not breached the boycott provisions. It may even 
cease trading with Israel In order to keep within the boycott provi- 
sionsp as companies are allowed between three and six months to sever 
such ties. For the more pragmatic company the decision may amount to 
a cost! -. benefit analysis of its Arab and Israeli business. 
Examples of these various options appear throughout Nelson and 
Prittle. A further consi derati on Is the legall ty of the company 
action. Howeverp before Introducing this additional complexity, 
examples will be considered that Ignore this, which is relatively easy because Nelson and Prittie was only published shortly after specific 
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anti-boycott legislation was Introduced. Though It should be noted 
that In the United States at leastv many acts of compliance with"the 
boycott could be Interpreted as conspiracies In restraint of trade and 
in breach of the Sherman anti-trust legislation referred to earlier 
(151). 
Nelson and PrIttle point out on a number of occasions that where Arab 
need for a particular product or service is great the boycott provi- 
sions and blacklist will be Ignored. In such a case, It Is easy for a 
company to be a good corporate citizen. So American Express, for 
exampler had closed Its operation In Israel apparently because of the 
boycoti. Partly due to pressure from the Anti-Defamation League of 
BInal BIrIth (ADL)p It reopened Its Israeli offices despite Arab 
threats. The company suggested this was because "one's reputation In 
business still counts. " The outcome? "Today, the company enjoys good 
relations with all parties, an Indication again that the Arabs won't 
actually blacklist a company which Ignores the regulations If they 
want what It offers" (152). 
There was a risk attached to this move no doubtp perhaps American 
Express would have preferred to have remained cleano but succumbed to 
pressure and fears for the corporate Image. More principledp but 
perhaps less riskyy was the action by Hilton Hotels. Threatened with 
loss of business from the Arab world (secondary boycott) and from 
American businessmen with whom the Arabs deal (tertiary boycott), 
Hilton went ahead with plans to build a hotel In Tel Aviv. Conrad 
Hilton responded to this threat with a "polite yet masterly" letter 
noting "what the Committee proposes Is absolutely counter to the prin- 
ciples we live by and which we hold most dear. " Againp Arab threats 
proved empty, Including the threat to seize the Nile Hilton In Cairo 
(153). An excellent example of the good corporate citizen, though one 
might be tempted to view the risks attached to such a principled posi- 
tion as being minimal given the Arab need for Hilton's services. 
Somej however, have suffered from adopting such an approach. GEC9 for 
examplep claimed to have lost twenty million pounds worth of business 
In 1975v for "regarding It wrong to cut off profitable and. legal trade 
with any customer" (154). Ford is another company that has suffered, 
because as Henry Ford II said In 1973, "We are more than willing to do 
business with any country, but we are unwilling to refrain from doing 
business with one country as a prerequisite to doing business with 
others" (155). 
Less honourable Is the case of BrI ti sh Leyland. It tri ed to conti nue 
dealing with Israel and deal with the Arabs by trying to deny the 
former (156). Othersq such as Buloval have tried to buy themselves 
off the blacklist (157). While others Still have tried to get round 
the boycott, as In the case of Red Foxj who supplied goods to the 
Arabs under a different name (158), or by licensing a blacklisted firm 
which would then sublicense the Israelis (159). The majority It would 
seem, however, comply with the boycott provIsIons9 either voluntarily 
or on request. Winchester recently observed that *British managers 
tend to appease the Arabs - with the result that Israel loses business 
with Britain. " He Identified Shell and a number of other companies as 
having complied with the boycott, commenting that "The list of firms 
falling victim to the system Is endless" (160). 
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So the answer to the questi on posed above 9 about how the good cor- 
porate citizen should respond to the Arab boycottq would seem to be 
that It should Ignore the boycott altogether, viewing It as unfair and 
unreasonable (if only in commercial terms) discrimination. It should 
also express this position If called upon by the Boycott Office to 
explain Its Israeli connections. Indeed, to follow the line of argu- 
ment earlier given on social responsibility In businesso one might 
expect the good corporate citizen to lobby for legislation or an 
Industry-wide agreement prohibiting compliance with the boycott. 
Yet few companies seem able or willing to adopt this position. One 
must then Inquire as to the basis on which they defend their 
compliance with the boycott. This Is easily Identified. It is a 
recognised position on a companyts social responsibilities, If not the 
predominant or, at leastp traditional position. It Is based on the 
argumentp thoroughly explored earlier In Part Two, that a company's 
sole social responsibility Is to make a profit. As Nelson and Prittie 
put It9 "commercial considerations" are paramount. 
In analysing the Arab boycott the concern must be with the majority of 
compard es , whose acti vi ti es are less clear-cut than the pri nel pled 
exceptions referred to above. For the majority it Isq in social 
responsibility terms, a more murky world. These are the companies 
which might usefully be described as more pragmatic. Their decisions 
might seem clear-cut when considered in the light of their relatively 
straightforward cost-benefit analyses, they areq howeverp when the 
strict -economic parameters have been removedq complex If not 
exceedingly muddy. 
If this behaviour Is the norm, It should at least be acknowledged that 
It results from a feeling of being unable to afford less than pragma- 
tic behaviour or perhapsg as Friedman would argue, not knowing nor 
having a mandate for other forms of behaviour. Of course, if this Is 
the normp one must also expect managers to feel bound to work within 
It. Yet should commercial considerations alone be allowed to prevail? 
On this particular issue Nelson and Prittle argue that the consequence 
Is an anti-Semitic revivalp for "Anti-Zionism has been a convenience 
to bigotst for It permits anti-Semites to pose as anti-Israeli, while 
denying any anti-Jewish bias. In much the same wayq the Arab economic 
war against the Jews allows the "outside" world to pursue anti-Israeli 
and even anti-Jewish policiesp while pleading that no anti-Semitism Is 
Intendedv or that business considerationsy remaining paramount, compel 
them to cooperate in this war against the Jews" (161). 
It Is Interesting to note that despite Nelson and Prittle's evident 
venom toward the Arabsq their analysis shows the Arabs to be con- 
siderably more principled than many of their American and European 
trading partners. Yet as earlier acknowledgedq the Arabs do permit 
their business decisions to be Influenced by commercial criteria on 
occasionsg as Nelson and Prittle observe, and as Justin Kornberl a 
Jewish businessman and chairman of the Anti-Boycott Coordination 
Committee comments: "The plain fact Is that If an Arab wants to buy 
something badly enough, he'll buy It whether you trade with Israel or 
not" (162). Although, of course, this Is the view one would expect 
Kornberg and Nelson and Prittie to encourage. While this may be the 
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case, there are examples of companies trading with both Arabs and 
Israeli s. This Influence of commercial considerations In the Arabs, 
largely principled purchase behaviour Is explained In the argument 
proposed on the role of legitimacy In the marketing mix In the next 
chapter. 
The argument that commeral al consi derati ons should di ctate compli ance 
or otherwise with the boycott have been both suggested to government 
In attempts to fight anti-boycott legislation, and suggested by 
government. A representative from the US Commerce Department told 
Congress that "American firms should not be restricted In their 
freedom to make economic decisions based on their own business 
Interests" (163). While In Britain, In the House of Commons, a 
goverment spokesman said that the government deplored all trade 
boycotts other than those Internationally supported and sanctioned by 
the United Nations, but "How firms should act In any particular case 
Is a matter for the commercial judgement of the firm concerned" (164). 
it would appear that this continues to be the British goverment's 
position given the Foreign Office willingness to authenticate negative 
certificates of origing as earlier noted. Nelson and Prittle suggest 
this Is In part due to Britain's historic ties with and guilt feelings 
about the Arab world "But most operative, without doubt, Is Britain's 
unwillingness to take a moral stand even on a boycott the government 
said It "abhorredg" because of the desperate need to promote exports 
to the oil-rich Arab world. " Althoughq In a later statement of the 
government's position following US anti-boycott legislation, It was 
noted that "It Is Important to bear In mind that the United States Is 
far less dependent on exports" (165). 
It was earli er argued that one approach for the fi mInI dentl fyI ng a 
socially responsible position could be to follow the example of the 
goverment. Can this be advocated here given the British government's 
less than unequivocal stance on the boycott andq Indeed, Its actual 
complicity? 
The United States and France have anti-boycott legislation. The 
substantial lobbying by American Jewish organisations and their sup- 
porters, earlier referred tog was no doubt of Importance In the 
achieving of their goal, but It was also a consequence of the vagaries 
of American politics In a presidential election year. The history of 
this legislation cannot be considered here, though It Is well docu- 
mented by Hotaling and Nelson and Prittle. Neither can the complexi- 
ties of it be considered here (see Sethi, and others (166)). The 
result of the 1977 anti-boycott legislation and that which followed Is 
that compliance with the Arab boycott is In most cases Illegal, 
removing any need to test the anti-trust legislation which may well 
not have applied to overseas agreements. There are loopholes however 
(167), and, of course, companies can simply pay the fines and continue 
compliance. Winchester reports that a firm In New Jersy was fined 
$69,000 In 1984 for filling in a boycott questionnaire (168). He 
suggests this a "huge sum" but It may not have been In relation to the 
amount of business Involved. Though If fines are not a sufficient 
deterrent there Is an element of personal risk Involvedg with the 
possibility of Imprisonment for responsible officers of the company. 
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The discussion above of the options facing a firm trading In the 
Middle East are given an additional dimension by the anti-boycott 
legislation. The argument that local business standards should dic- 
tate behaviour Is weakened because the Impactq If only by virtue of 
the legislationg Is domestic as well as overseas. Many more Issues 
are raised as compliance with the boycott could now entail breaking 
the law. Does the good corporate citizen exploit loopholes, or make 
an assessment as to whether the benefits of compliance outweigh the 
potential costs of fines as well as other costs previously considered? 
Many other Issues of social responsibility In business are raised by 
the Arab boycott. The above discussion Is but an Indication of the 
complexity of the situation facing the manager when the rules of the 
game have changed from the simple formulation expressed in the com- 
petitive model of capitalism, with Its axiom of profit maximisation. 
7.6.5 Conclusions on the Arab Boycott 
To conclude on the Arab boycott, it seems that as an International 
economic sanction It Is effective. As Nelson and Prittle write 
"hardly anything today restricts trade as much as does the economic 
war the Arabs are wagingv nor are there worse examples of irregular 
(corporate) practices and Improper conduct" (169). It Is of Interest 
here because it demonstrates an effective boycott that Is primarily 
directed at business. 
Yet the boycott cannot be credited as successful. Nor is It 
necessari ly a peacef ul form of coercl on. Nelson and PrI tti e ref er to 
the paper by Roberts 9 earli er cl ted 9 and show that wl th the Arab 
boycott Roberts Is correct In suggesting "economic sanctions are not 
so much an alternative to war as a prelude or even accompaniment to 
It" (170). By example, they refer to the Suez crisis of 1956, as well 
as the various Arab-Israeli armed conflicts. The Middle East 
situation Is widely viewed as a potential cause of world warp a view 
which seems supported by the examination here of the background to the 
Arab boycott. 
Peace In the Middle East Is In the Interests of all. Nelson and 
Prittie suggest this will only come with the recognition of Israel. 
While this must be a long term goalq they do make more Immediately 
useful suggestionst Includingg of courseq strong anti-boycott legisla- 
tion. This, they suggest, should restore competition, despite the 
claim by "anti-Israeli forces" that such legislation would put those 
complying with It at a competitive disadvantage In relation to those 
that comply with the boycott. Referring to this legislation they 
argue "Business people need this kind of "shield" to protect themp and 
such shields should be Internationallsed" (171). This, of course, Is 
a familiar argument and was explored earlier in Part Two. (Suffice to 
note here as a reminder, Friedman would probably disagree with their 
argument. ) 
One could argue such legislation seeks to exclude ethical con- 
si derati ons from purchase behavi our -If that Is what they are Can 
competition ever be on the basis of commercial considerations alonev 
as Nelson and Prittle seem to advocate? Or will ethical con- 
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siderations always play a part and continued compliance with the 
boycott Is not merely the failure of the legislation but 'the market 
winning through In the end'? One might argueg following Friedman's 
lineq that the criteria which are important In a purchase decision 
remain despite legislationg If only In a covert form. 
While Nelson and Prittle would wish to deny ethical purchase behaviour 
to the Arabs, they advocate It In the fight against the boycott: 
"Public opinion could be mobilized far more than It Is today. 
Lists of foreign companies that comply with the boycott could be 
widely publicized; American workers and consumers couldv for 
exampleg be provided with periodic lists of Imported products 
whose foreign manufacturers comply with the boycott and thereby 
endanger American jobs" (172). 
Finallyp to conclude on the Implications of the Arab boycott for 
boycotts In generalp It can be seen that the boycott will not be used 
only by those advancing tgood' causes, that submission to boycott 
demands may involve a breach of corporate social responsibilities. It 
is, when discussed by those who disagree with the boycotters' demands, 
a weapon of blackmail. Where then does this leave the firm? It must 
respond to demands from many sources which will oftent as this case 
Illustrates, be In conflict with each other. Should the firm act in 
accord with a pluralistic model, balancing various Interests as If 
within a microcosm of the political process (at least as it Is per- 
ceived by pluralists)? The response of business does seem to support 
such a model where deel si ons of thi s sort are made on the basi s of 
which response will minimise damage to the corporate Image and trading 
I nterests of the fi rm. Even the so-called principled firms may 
respond In a principled fashion because that Is what Is demanded when 
an assessment Is made of the potential damage to corporate Image and 
it is recognised that part of that Image Is based on an expectation of 
principled action. And, of courset all such dubious decisions need to 
be kept as far away from public scrutiny as possible. Meanwhiley the 
pressure groups seek to expose the corporate action because that is In 
their Interests. 
The fl nal part to thl s chapter bri efly consi ders what has been 
observed so far about the boycott tacti c- as a form of non-violent 
direct actiong as a pressure group tactiel In labour struggles and as 
an international economic sanction - and how It affects business. 
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7.7 Buslness and the Boycott Tactic 
This chapter has deliberately avoided concentration on the consumer 
boycott. The boycott tactic has been examined within the context or 
non-violent direct action and the non-cooperation form of NVDA In par- 
ticular. Various types of boycott have been consideredp especially 
the economic boycotts such as International economic sanctions and the 
boycotts used In labour struggles (including the consumer boycott). 
This has provided more than background and an Introduction to the con- 
sumer boycott. It Indicates what may be general-principles applicable 
to all boycotts. 
The preceeding analysis or boycotts is taken further in Chapter 
Twelve. Some observations on business and the boycott tactic may use- 
fully be made here. 
The boycott tactic Is a form of direct action. Although a last 
resortv the use of direct action by pressure groups seems likely to 
Increase, especially NVDA. Corporations are likely to be Increasingly 
involved and even If the economic effects may be smallp because of the 
likelihood of mass actions being low In this country, the detriment to 
the corporate Image In symbolic direct action may be sufficient to 
obtain corporate compliance. The three end results sought In Inter- 
national economic sanationsg as Identified by Remer, probably apply 
equally to consumer boycotts: publicity, punishment and policy change. 
The distinction between success and effectiveness is also Important. 
Though effectivenessv because of corporate Image fearsq may not be a 
necessary criterion for success, as some have suggested of Inter- 
national economic sanctions. 
Publi cl ty as a result of the consumer boycott may be suf fi cl ent for 
success, as a powerful theatrical sword. The Arab boycott Illustrates 
this where companies choose not to comply with the boycott for fear of 
adverse publicity at home. If nothing else, the analysis of inter- 
national economic sanctions suggests that perhaps all boycotts may 
have a useful expressive function. This is somewhat similar to 
Etzioni's observationsg noted at the outset of this chapterv on 
demonstration democracy. 
Chapter Eight considers the consumer boycott In more detaill Including 
how It may work and the factors In Its effectiveness. This chapter is 
the concluding chapter to Part Two and so it completes the theoretical 
argument for ethical puýchase behaviour. A role for pressure groups 
In the marketing system Is Identified within a model that employs 
negative product augmentation and a legitimacy element In the 
marketing mixp to offer some explanation for ethical purchase beha- 
viour at the micro level. 
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Previ ew 
In the factory we make cosmetics. In the store we sell hope. 
Charles Revson (1) 
... every purchase of a product or service could 
become a 'vote' 
for a marginal change In the shape of societyq as well as for the 
product purchased. For example, Procter and Gamble and Unilever 
share the detergent market In this country, and to all Intents 
and purposesq despite differing advertisingg their products are 
the same. 
But the social Impacts of these two companies differ substan- 
tA ally. If they chosel or were compelled to broadcast those 
social Impacts, detergent buyers In their purchasing could vote 
for their preferred set of social Impacts ... 
Armed with social Impact datag adequately presented by fIrms9 the 
public at large could truly participate In shaping society by the 
exercise of purchase votes. 
Raymond E Thomas (2) 
This chapter continues the examination of the boycott tactlaq but 
focuses specifically on the consumer boycott. Various types of 
boycott can be ldentifiedg depending on the relationship of the seller 
to the perceived misdemeanour. These are acknowledged in the litera- 
ture. This Is sparse, but It reveals historical precedents for con- 
sumer boycotts In other cultures and also In labour struggles, 
especially over unionisation (as Indicated in Chapter Seven). 
Consumer boycotts can be Illegal, but as with strikes, the firm is 
unlikely to take action. 
The ascendancy of labour has diminished the importance of the consumer 
boycott In labour struggles In recent timesl although It is used in 
the Third World and was employed (highly successfully) over the 
recognition of the United Farm Workers In the early 1970's In the 
United States. More recentlyo the consumer boycott has been employed 
over civil rightsq the Vietnam War, and by the corporate accoun- 
tabIlItY movement. This latter use, of coursel returns the argument 
to the Issue of the social control of business. Ethical purchase 
behaviour, in boycottsq has then played a part In the social control 
of business. 
As yetv howeverg little attempt has been made to in some way explain 
ethical purchase behaviour at the micro level. Consumer sovereignty 
offers a justification for such behaviour but little In the way of 
explanation as to why any individual consumer would wish to so act. A 
proposition made here and explored In the empirical work Is that there 
Is negative product augmentation. Levitt has described how products 
may be augmented positivelyp referring to the quote by Revson above. 
It Is here suggested that products may also be augmented negatively. 
This may be seen In terms of a legitimacy element in the marketing 
MIX. 
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The quote above by Thomas calls for ethical purchase behaviour by 
suitably Informed consumers exercising their purchase votes. HI s 
argument Is for social Impact data to be presented by firms. This is 
viewed here as somewhat Utopian, largely because of the acknowledged 
problems In social audits and, as Beesley and Evans showq the dif- 
ficulties In making sensible comparisons between firms. Howeverp this 
data could be presented by concerned pressure groupsp In a way 
laudable to the advocates of pluralistic politics. This Is advanced 
here In the form of a model of pressure groups In the marketing 
system. Management responses in this are considered. 
This chapter 
some of the 
emerged. 
concludes Part Two of the thesi s by brI ef ly consi derl ng 
preliminary conclusions and propositions that have 
0 
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8.1 Consumer Boycotts of Business 
8.1.1 Historical Precedents for Consumer Boycotts 
Vogel writes "Allowing political or moral preferences to Influence 
one's purchase of products Is not, of course, an Idea that was 
Invented In the sixties. " Unwittingly he acknowledges ethical 
purchase behaviour. The concern here, however, Is to stick with con- 
sumer boycotts, a specific form of ethical purchase behaviour. This 
is also Vogel's interest In his examination of the types of pressures 
on business In citizen challenges to business authority. He continues 
"Consumer boycotts played an Important role In the American colonists, 
prerevolutionary struggle against England and have been used periodi- 
cally both by and against various economic and ethnic groups 
throughout American history" (3). He refers to a tradition of 
boycotting citing an article In 
, 
The New Republic, where the author 
comments "It has long-been fashionable to avoid purchasing products 
that appear on Idiosyncratically homemade blacklists" (4). 
Chapter Seven referred to LaIdler and Wolman's studies of consumer 
boycotts used by the American labour unions In the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Laidlerp although writing In 1913, refers 
to a lengthy past history to boycotts: 
"Although the word "boycott" Is of comparatively recent origin, 
the practice of boycotting, If we disassociate that term from any 
necessary connection with labour disputesp and define It for the 
time being as an organised effort to withdraw and Induce others 
to withdraw from social or business relations with anotherghas 
been resorted to since the dawn of history. The Jews shunned the 
Samaritans ... " (59 Laidler's emphasis). 
He later refers to Its use "on a large scale" In the Revolutionary War 
agaJ nst Bri tal n: "Followl ng the passage of the Stamp Act of March 
1765, the Bostong New York and Philadelphia merchants resolved to 
cease Importing British goods until this obnoxious measure should be 
repealed. Retail merchants refused to sell British goods, and custo- 
mers to buy them. " Other examples are referred to such as the boycott 
following the tax on teaq which of couse culminated in the Boston Tea 
Party. He suggests these historical precedents provided justification 
for Its use In labour disputes as they "Indicate Its thoroughly 
American character. " He concludes his review of the past history of 
boycotts by saying It has been "a potent weapon for many centuries In 
the hands of state and church, organisations of the agrarian popula- 
tIon and of political rebels, and, In fact, of all strata of the 
population" (6). 
Wolmang for his part, also refers to boycotting In the Revolutionary 
War and. earlier uses (citing Laidler). One particularly early use was 
the boycott Imposed In 1327 by the citizens of Canterburyq Englando on 
the monks of Christ's churchq involving an agreement not to "buyp sell 
or exchange drinks or victuals with the monastery" (quoting RT Ely at 
this point). He also notes tha 
,t 
boycotting of slave-made products was 
practiced by abolitionists. So consumer boycotts can hardly be 
described as a modern phenomenonl Most of Wolman's analysis of the 
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hi story of the boycott Is devoted to I ts pri or use In labour di sputes. 
He suggests one of the first Instances of a boycott on commodities 
"where the appeal was to the workman not as a producer but as a 
consumer, " was a boycott Imposed In 1833 In Baltimore on master hat- 
ters who'd cut the wages of their Journeymen (7). This may be a more 
appropriate historical precedent than some of the others mentioned If 
by consumer boycott one Is referring to a practice found in consumer 
societies, that Is, under capitalism as It is currently known. In 
other words9 given the definition In 7.2.1, which refers to the con- 
sumer boycott as the exercising of consumer soverelgntyl historical 
precedents for consumer boycotts should perhaps be restricted to those 
actions found within capitalist society. As noted In Chapter Threev 
capitalist socletyq and therefore some degree of consumer sovereigntyg 
Is only to be found after the sixteenth centuryp and Is probably most 
accurately seen as a nineteenth and twentieth century phenomenon. 
Early examples of boycotts are, howeverg Interesting. If they may not 
be correctly described as consumer boycottsp they are at least from 
the same class of action known as boycotts and have much In common. 
Wolman's section on the history of the boycott refers to many Instan- 
ces of consumer boycotts (8), and both the whole of Laidler and 
Wolman's works may be seen as accounts of historical precedents for 
current boycott actionsg given their age. More recent consumer 
boycotts Include those by the Nazi's against the Jews (9) and many 
more cited by Sharp (10) and Included In Appendix A. 
Butq putting aside the definitional Issue aboveg the consumer boycott 
Is not unique to Western society. If anything, It Is more appropriate 
to the Eastq as found In Chapter Seven when considering Remer's Study 
of Chinese Boycotts. The boycotts organised by Gandhi (describedp for 
example, by Joan Bondurant and by Sharp) are of course classic 
examples of consumer boycotts and obvious historical precedents. 
So to concludev one can then refer to a tradition of boycotting both 
as a form of ostracism as practiced In all societies since "the dawn 
of history, " and In the specific form of the consumer boycott in 
societies where there has been some degree of consumer sovereignty. 
Vogel suggests an Increase In the use of the boycott most recentlyp In 
the United States at least: 
over the last fifteen yearsl such consumer boycotts have 
become more frequentp better organized, and Identified with a 
much broader range of issues. Scarcely a month now passes 
without the public being asked to boycott a particular product or 
company In order to express disagreement with some decision of 
the private sector. These decisions Include bank lending practi- 
ces In declining neighborhoodsp popularly known as "redlining"; 
the employment practices of several local and national fi rms; the 
marketing of gold coins from South Africa; and the manufacture of 
various products held to be detrimental to the environment" (11). 
Yet despite this claim of a recent Increase In boycott activity and 
the many historical precedents referred to aboveg the literature on 
consumer boycotts Is sparse. This Is considered in the next section. 
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8.1.2 References to Consumer Boycotts In the Literature 
References to consumer boycotts In the literature of course inciude 
many sources already considered: Vogelq Sharpq Wolman, Laidler and so 
on. Brief consideration should, howeverl be given to some other sour- 
ces not yet mentioned. This will of necessity be brIefq not only 
because of space constraints but also because of the paucity of 
literature on this topic. The reasons for this will also be given 
some attention. 
Thl s sectl on can most usefully start by speculati ng as to where one 
might find literature on consumer boycotts. Despite their apparent 
prevalence over time and increased use most recentlyp they are only 
rarely shown as a topic In abstracts (12). Most references to con- 
sumer boycotts found by this author were the product of scanning the 
press (as referred to In Chapter Two) and what may best be described 
as serendipityg for systematic literature searches proved largely 
Ineffective. References to boycotts in the press, Including the more 
obscure publications such as Peace News and New Internationalist, are 
mainly about specific Instances of boycott action. This soure-e pro- 
duced by far the most references to boycotts, but as they are about 
Incidents rather than methods or explanations, they are considered 
separately in Appendix A. 
One might expect that the pressure group literature would prove a use- 
ful source of references on boycotts and offer some analysis In 
Itself. Thl s was not the case. Excludl ng publi cati ons by or for 
pressure groups such as those ref erred to above , the pressure group. 
literature offered little analysis of boycotts as a pressure group 
tactic and few specific references, This reflects the lack of 
material on promotional pressure groups in general and an emphasis on 
the role of such groups and their strategies. Sharp was cited butp as 
Chapter Six largely bears witness, the boycott tactic at best only 
received a mention In passing in the pressure group literature (13). 
This comment Is also true of the business and society literature. 
Vogel's works are on occasion cited and It is fair to say that his 
Lobbying the Corporation Is a fairly comprehensive catalogue of 
boycotts 1ý_the United States since the 19501s. Howeverv his concern 
(as 8.1.4 considers In more detail) Is not with the boycott as a tac- 
tic, how It may be employed and how management should respond, but as 
a signal and symptom of citizen discontent with business authority 
He does provide some useful references however. Business and societ; 
texts mention boycotts In passing In a similar way. They are of 
course almost entirely American (14)9 and yet despite this and Vogel's 
comment at the end of the last section on the prevalence of consumer 
boycotts, even the most recent editions have little to say about 
boycotts- One of the better texts In this respect Is Social Issues In 
Business by Luthansq Hodgetts and Thompson. They refer to the 
Polaroi'd case (see Appendix A) by way of example. Other texts which 
are entirely or largely case studies also Include boycott exampleso 
such as Hay et al (15). 
Luthans et al's comments on the boycott tactic, though briefq are 
worth mentioning here. They Include "product or service boycotts" 
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under the general heading of Individual social activism (the title of 
Chapter 15)9 giving little acknowledgement to the role of pressure 
groups. They do at least recognise that the boycott has been "suc- 
cessfully applied to a multitude of products, " referring to Cesar 
Chavez organised boycotts of celery, grapes and grapefruit to Improve 
conditions for migrant workers In California; boycotts of firms doing 
business In South Africap though acknowledging that they haven't 
changed apartheid policies; union organised boycotts of companies such 
as JP Stevensp Farah and Coors because of their anti-union stance; 
and late 1970's boycotts of. sugarg coffee and meats that led to a 
reduction In prices. They suggest In their third edition that "The 
key element In the boycott Is to have enough consumer support to 
reduce demand, thereby effectively threatening the company's profits. " 
They are more cautious In the fourth edition: "The key to a boycott Is 
to have enough consumer support to reduce demand" (16). It As far 
more complex than thisp however, as Chapters Six and Seven show and as 
8.1.5 and 8.1.6 conclude. 
The consumerl sm 11 terature I whi ch may be seen as Ina category by 
Itself or as a part of business and societyp also mentions boycotts. 
Nadel, for examplep refers to the American consumer boycotts over food 
price Increases (17). Consumer boycotts areq as In Vogel, cited 
largely In Illustration of consumer grievances. Some, however, advo- 
cate boycotts as a solution to some of the issues ral sed by con- 
sumerism. This study has been defined as being outside consumerismg 
as ethical purchase behaviour Is not Intended to redress the grievan- 
ces of the buyer but of some other party (see Chapter One). However, 
not all writers on consumerism take this approach and the arguments 
advocating consumer boycotts over consumerist Issues such as product 
defects are equally applicable to Issues further removed from the pro- 
duct9 such as Investment In South Africa. Sterng for examplej 
explores the possibilities for consumer protection via self-regulation 
by business. He argues that this is insufficient and that some enfor- 
cement power Is necessary. One measure suggested is to "permit 
collective action among firms to boycott any firm whose products con- 
form to neither the Industry standards nor the labeling requirement" 
(for providing sufficient Information for consumer choice)9 which 
would, as Chapter Seven Indicatedt be Illegal under American law. In 
this wayq he sees the tripod of government actionj the activities of 
consumer advocates and business self-regulation made more balanced by 
the latter being more effective (18). 
Boycotts are also advocated by Boxg In a paper questioning whether 
consumerism has any future in an environment characterised by deregu- 
lation. This Dutch writer suggests "consumer organisations - as they 
are doing already sometimes - might exert pressure on certain firms 
selectivelyg and keep them under pressure in order to come to a solu- 
tion for certain problems. " It is recognised, howeverl as noted in 
Chapter 
* 
Six, that consumers are not an organised group to the same 
extent as the unions sayq which makes boycotts more difficult to 
Institute. The overall line of Box's argument though Is that con- 
sumerism has a future with consumer pressure groups trying to 
Influence the market rather than seeking legal remedies: "consumer 
organisations could take stronger action as a market partyp that Is to 
say as an organisation of consumers In direct contact and negotiating 
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with their natural opponentq trade and Industry" (19). Thi s p, of 
course, Is analogous to the suggestion made at the end of 5.2.49 that 
the market could play a greater part In ensuring the social control of 
business. 
In The Consumer Interestq George Smith reviews the state of con- 
sumerism In Britain and In Europe. Referring to boycottsp he suggests 
they could be used more often and with greater effect. Indeedl he 
sees the choice for ' 
European consumer groups as being between using 
boycotts and government Influence to achieve their alms. He refers to 
a number of highly successful European boycotts to make his point. 
Some of these are worth mentioning here (although they are Included In 
Appendix A)p in particular, the boycotts organised by the French 
equivalent to the British Consumers Association ' 
(CA), the Union 
Federale de la Consommation (UFC), and those by the Swiss Federation 
lRomande des Consommateurs. 
The "dramati c results" achl eved by boycotts organi sed by these two 
organisations contrasts with the sluggish progress in implementing the 
Common Market's consumer programme and the failure of the consultation 
machinery to Improve matters. A UFC organised 1976 boycott of food 
with colourantsl caused colourant-free alternatives to be Introduced; 
a boycott of red wines contaminated with asbestos fibres from filtra- 
tion processes prompted four companies to sue the UFC for 9400pOOO, 
but they lost their case and were forced to promise not to use 
asbestos In future; and while Shell were more successful when their 
legal action forced the UFC to desist from calling for a boycott of 
their products following the Amoco Cadiz disasterv this was not 
, 
until 
after suffering sales cut by ten per cent. This latter example Is 
particularly Interesting because It Is closer to ethical purchase 
behaviour than those examples where the boycott Is over some Issue 
directly affecting the consumer in the consumption of the product. 
This also applies to the call for a boycott on aerosols (because they 
are hazardousp damaging to the environment and wasteful), which 
resulted in a ten per cent reduction In sales in France when they were 
rising elsewhere. More typical of the consumerist type of consumer 
boycott was the boycott of one brand of a company's tyres because they 
were four times more liable to blow-outs, and the 1980 boycott of veal 
In protest at the continued illegal use of hormones in fattening 
calvesp which caused sales to fall by fifty per cent within seven days 
and reduced the price of a fatted calf In Britain from 975 to 926 in a 
week. The outcome was the promise by the EEC Council of Ministers of 
a complete ban on the use of hormones by the end of 1980. 
The Swiss Federationts 1967 boycott of butter over successive govern- 
ment-sanctioned price Increases proved so successful that the price of 
butter four years later remained lower than In 1967. While Its 1977 
boycott of food products not listing Ingredients persuaded more food 
manufacturers to list Ingredients and speeded up legislation. Smith 
notesq however, that Its "boycotts of inflation (1971), polyphospates 
In cooked meats (1972) and high-priced meat (1975) have been less 
successful" (20). So, even If different boycotts are not being orga- 
nised every month, as Vogel suggests Is the case In the'United Statesq 
they are not uncommon In Europe. But how true Is this of Britain? 
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Smi th wri tes that the Fri ends of the Earth campal gn agal nst non- 
returnable bottles In the early 1970's "was the nearest UK consumer 
and allied organisations have come to organising an outright consumer 
boycott" (21). If the possible nuances of meaning Implied by the word 
outright are Ignored, Smith Is plainly wrong, or at least using the 
term consumer boycott In a way different to Its use here. There has 
been a UK consumer boycott of South African products since 1960 and 
the many calls for boycotts and boycotts organised that were noted 
when scanning the press, referred to In Appendix Ap cannot be par- 
ticular to the two year period surveyed. If one argues Friends of the 
Earth are a consumerist organisation but the Anti-Apartheid Movement 
Is noty what of the Infant Formula Action Coalition (INFACT) organised 
boycott of Nestle over the marketing of baby milk, on behalf of 
millions of Third World consumers? His examples of French consumer 
boycotts show that boycotts organised over environmental Issues 
qualify as consumer boycotts, even though they are not about what may 
be called narrowly defined consumerist Issues, those affecting the 
consumer in consumption. A consumer boycott would then seem even In 
his terms to be about boycotts by consumersp* rather than for con- 
sumers. It Is therefore somewhat surprising that he should ignore 
consumer boycotts overg for example, the political Issue of apartheid 
In South Africa. The most probable reason for this Is confusion over 
the extent of consumerism. Howeverg It must be acknowledged that 
boycotts do seem less common In Britain than In the United Statesp a 
point which will be considered further. 
Smith writes that "Although Ralph Nader established 'consumerism' as a 
household word, he widened the definition of consumer until It was 
synonymous with 'citizen'. He Is a moral crusader for the restoration 
of the participatory democracy ... In which powerv whether In business 
or governmentq Is decentrallsedv controlled and accountable" (22). It 
seems that, while offering this definitiong Smith has not fully 
embraced It himself and Is confused about the extent of consumerism. 
Ralph Nader Is also referred to In a comparison between the approach 
of the Consumers' Association and that of Nader's groups. Smith sees 
little to commend the CAl noting It has "settled for a relatively 
quiet life on the campaigning side" and "eschewed the aggressive tac- 
tics of Ralph Nader and some of their own counterparts In Europe. " 
Perhaps In this context Smith's observation on boycotts In Britain can 
be understood - as a reference to the fal lure of the CA to employ 
boycotts- He concludes "The CA Is now as much a part of the confor- 
mist British scene as the House of Lords, tea and the test match" 
(23). Yet pressure groups are In this country Increasingly turning to 
direct actiony as Chapter Six acknowledgedp the likelihood would seem 
to be that the use of the boycott will Increase. It was even recently 
suggested In the House of Commons as a means for securing compensation 
for British children from the Merrell drug companyp manufacturers of 
Debendox (24). 
Robin Wight's The Day the Pigs Refused to be Driven to Market Is a 
journalistic but Insightful account of some of the features of con- 
sumerlsm In the late sixties and early seventies. Indeed, a number of 
his theories are developed here: social responsibility as a con- 
sequence of consumer sovereignty, boycotts as an expression of con- 
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sumer sovereigntyg and political participation through democracy In 
the marketplace; though he does not express them In this way. Wight 
too Is critical of the Consumers' Association: "Its sedate middle- 
class activity seems really rather out of touch" (25). He findsp In 
contrast, much to commend the Japanese consumer groupq Shufuren, par- 
ticularly because or Its use of national boycotts which have "assailed 
everyone from rice growers charging excessive prices to canned food 
manufacturers whose labels conceal the truth" (26). Wightp againg Is 
another source Identifying boycotts, which are shown In Appendix A. 
In keeping with the other consumerist sources listed above his concern 
is to describe boycott Incidents (suggestingg like Vogel, that they 
are symptomatic or consumer dissatisfaction) and Implicitly advocates 
the use of the boycott. Some of his arguments are interestingg but as 
part or the boycott literatureq he offers little by way of explanation 
of methods and analysis. 
Interestingg but perhaps not surprising, Is the acknowledgement of a 
place for boycotts by the Austrian economist Mises, an acknowledgement 
wight might well endorse. This Is Interesting because It conflicts 
with Mses' emphasis on self-interest as the essential driving force 
for the efficient operation of the market. However, It is not 
surprising given his claims about the supremacy of the consumer and 
the freedom of the consumer to choose In a free market economy. So he 
writes "The consumers are free to boycott a purveyor provided they are 
ready to pay the costs" (27). 
Another equally Interesting contribution from economics on boycotts, 
Isa paper by Rea (28). He asks: under what cl rcumstances mi ght a 
group of consumers benefi t from a boycott? In hi s analysi s the 
distinction Is made between what he terms an economic boycottg where 
"the objective Is to lower the price paid for a product9" and a 
political boycott where "the objective Is to punish the producers or 
to force the producers into taking some action. " (Such Intentions, of 
course, are identical to those Identified by Galtung and others for 
international economic sanctions - see 7.5). Rea shows that In an 
economic boycott all consumers, those boycotting and those not 
boycottingg can benefit. The magnitude of the benefits depends on the 
elasticities of supply and demand, the length of the boycott, and the 
number of boycotters. 
His argument rests on seeing the boycotters as having formed a buying 
cartelv so they can act like a monopsonist and Increase their utility. 
He does recognise that overall there Is a net loss, with a net cost on 
society as a whole In the loss of consumer surplus by boycottersq the 
loss that occurs because non-boycotters are consuming goods which have 
a lower value to them than the original equilibrium price, and a loss 
of producers' surplus resulting from the transfer of resources to less 
productive uses. In other wordsp there are costs to society because 
the boycotters consume too littleg the nonboycotters consume too much 
and there are not enough resources devoted to the Industry. 
Additionallyg and this may be-a further cost though Rea doesn't see it 
as suchv there Is likely to be an Increase In the consumption of 
substitutes for the boycotted good. Their price will therefore rise, 
with a further loss of consumer surplus. (Rea assumes substitutes 
have a perfectly elastic supply. ) Rea notes that social pressure on 
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consumersq to enforce the cartel, Is crucial to boycott effectiveness. 
He suggests, In keeping with observations made in 3.3.1 Economics and 
the Real World, "The economist Is likely to ignore the social pressure 
that enforces the boycott. " 
While Rea's economic analysis Is restricted to what he terms the eco- 
nomic boycottp he does consider the Implications for the political 
boycott. The economic effects of a political boycott - Rea suggests 
an example of which would be a boycott in support of a strike or a 
boycott of the products of a* country whose policies are found 
disagreeable - would be the same as in the economic boycott. Howeverg 
In the political boycott the boycotters do not consume any of the 
boycotted good and the benefits of the lower price go to those not 
boycotting. Hence there is a greater loss of consumer surplus by the 
boycotters, only compensated for If the boycott Is successful - it 
alters the policy of the firmg industry or country being boycotted. 
Rea concludes "a boycott Is not folly for a group of consumers, but as 
is true of most political activitiest the fact that the benefits are a 
public good makes It folly from an individual's narrow point of view. " 
(Thisp of course, Is similar to the argument advanced in 6.4.2 In 
rejection of Olson's claim about the absence of suitable Incentives in 
some pressure groups. ) Rea also Identifies factors In boycott effec- 
tiveness. These are considered In 8.1.6. 
occasional references to boycotts are made In New Society (29), while 
the New Republic article referred to in the last sectiong which Iden- 
tifies a number of contemporary boycotts, also comes from a publica- 
tion of that Ilk (30). No doubt other similar publications carry the 
odd article on boycottsl but they could not be easily traced and do 
notp In any cas'e, offer much more than a description of boycott Inci- 
dents. More useful Is the article by Krieger In the Journal of Peace 
Research (31). This sort of publication, generally tending to be seen 
as outside mainstream academic publishing and ignored by abstracting 
services (though somecontain quite reasonable work)v may be a useful 
source of further articles on boycotts but It is difficult to say with 
any certainty because of the problems In tracing these publications. 
Krieger describes the failure of the Another Mother for Peace (AMP) 
consumer campaign and offers some sound analysis. The AMP campaign 
was a threatened consumer boycott of the consumer products of manufac- 
turers of war products. His analysis Is considered In 8.1.6 Factors In 
Boycott Effectiveness. 
The Krieger article was found via the pressure group literaturep It 
was cited by Berry (32). As noted abovep the pressure group litera- 
ture offered few references on boycotts. This was also the case with 
the two sources (other than LaIdler and Wolman) which examine boycotts 
In any detallo Vogel and Sharp. Vogell In his Bibliographical Noteg 
does Indeed observe that "there has been no comprehensive scholarly 
treatment of direct political challenges to the corporation" (33)9 
which Is further support for the claim here about the paucity of 
literature on consumer boycotts. He goes on to note that his study 
had to rely considerably on Information from activist organisations, 
and newspapers and magazines. Sharp proved useful In Identifying 
references on International economic sanctions, but not consumer 
boycotts. 
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It seems reasonable to conclude that the literature on consumer 
boycotts Is extremely limited. The next section considers types of 
consumer boycotts. This Is based largely on the categorisation used 
by Wolman and Laidler seventy years ago. As they are extensively 
cited by Sharpq their analysis seems to not only have withstood the 
passage of time but also not been supplanted by any more recent or 
superior analyses. 
8.1.3 Types of Cons=er Boycott and Boycott Legality 
The classification of consumer boycotts Is based on the relationship 
of the seller to the perceived misdemeanour. As discussed at length 
In 7.2.19 Sharp's categories of economic boycotts cannot be employed 
here In whole or In part. Butp as noted in 7.4.11 the terms employed 
by Laidler and Wolman can. The principal concern here Is with the 
distinction between primary and secondary boycotts, and direct and 
Indirect boycotts. Boycott legality Is considered here because lega- 
lity hinges on these distinctions. 
The discussion of the Arab boycott In Chapter Seven showed the distin- 
ction between primary and secondary boycotts as used by Wolman still 
holds. Sethi writes (34): 
"The primary boycott divides into two distinct constraints, a 
core primary boycott and an extended Primary boycott. The first 
requires all Arab states and their nationals to refuse to trade 
with Israel or its nationals ... The extended primary boycott 
goes beyond a ban on trade between the Arab nations and Israel to 
prohibit the Importation of Israeli goods Into Arab countries or 
the reexporting of Arab products Into Israel via a third 
country. " 
He continues by explaining the secondary and tertiary boycott. "At 
the secondary level, the Arab nations would refuse to do business with 
third parties that- were significantly or materially contributing to 
the economic and military well-being of Israel ... Implemented through 
a blacklist. " While the tertiary boycott means "Firms that utilise, 
directly or Indirectlyg servicesp materials or equipment of a 
blacklisted firm will themselves be blacklisted. " 
Similarlyg Nelson and Prittle write: 
"The first - or "primary" - boycott consists of the refusal by 
the Arabs to trade with Israel In any way ... 
The "secondary" boycott Is aimed at companies that Invest In or 
do business with Israel ... Even more Insidious is the "tertiary" 
boycott, which also operates In "third countries" and which can 
threaten firms trading with anyone 'who does business with Israel 
- even with companies that have "Zionists" (read "Jews") on their 
boards or In executive positions" (35). 
Examples then f ollow i4hi ch I llustrate these di sti ncti ons. The terms 
primary and secondary boycott are quite *, ddely used (in the limited 
literature available). Tertiary boycott Is more rarep probablyl as 
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the latter quote Indicatesy because In application the term Is more 
complex and potentially confusing: Is a boycott Of a firm which does 
busines with a firm with 'Zionistst on Its board a third level boycott 
as claimed, or a fourth level boycott? Againg when a firmis 
boycotted for dealing In a 'third country' with another firm which 
does business with Israel, is this not a higher level boycott than 
where the deal does not take place In a 'third countryt? And what If 
the firms Involved are remote, or less remotev subsidiaries? There 
can be no hard and fast rules on determining the level of the boycott 
beyond the tertiary boycott or third levelp and even this can be 
uncertain. It Is perhaps better to go with Wolmants analysis and 
distinguish only between primary and higher level boycots, whichp as 
In practicet may be uniformly described as secondary boycotts (see 
7.4.1). 
So, In consumer boycottsp a primary boycott would be of the firm 
causing offense - Involved In South Africal manufacturing napalm or 
whatevery while a secondary boycott would be of firms dealing with 
this firm - typically, this would be a retail outlet or a supplier. 
To some extent the discussion of higher level boycotts Is Irrelevant 
to consumer boycotts, because the firm identified at higher levels Is 
too far removed from the misdemeanour to be a legitimate target and 
therefore In practice such boycotts are rare anyway. Thl sIs less 
true of boycotts In labour strugglesl where firms are more readily 
perceived as being ttainted'; but Laidler and Wolman make a similar 
pointq as noted In 8.1-6. 
Sharp recognises primary and secondary boycotts but does not 
cUstinguJsh between them "because different criteria are used to 
distinguish the specific methods of economic boycotts" (36). He does, 
howeverg offer definitions: "The primary boycott Is the direct suspen- 
sion of dealings with the opponent or a refusal to buy, useq or handle 
his goods or services (sometimes accompanied by efforts to persuade 
others to do likewise). The secondary boycott Is the economic boycott 
of third parties In an effort to Induce them to join In the primary 
boycott against the opponent. " By way of example, he refers to a 
boycott by the International Association of Machinists who, In 1921 In 
the United States, boycotted not only the Duplex Printing Co. 0 with 
which it was In conflictj but also all those firms which continued to 
use the products made by that company. And when the Boston town 
meeting heard In May 1770 (prior to the American War of Independence) 
that traders in Newport, Rhode Island, were importing goods from both 
England and the East Indies, It voted to sever all commercial rela- 
tions with that town (37). 
A more recent example would be the California grape boycott. Not only 
were potential customers discouraged from buying Californian grapes, 
In support of the unionisation of farm workers, but also from shopping 
at stores selling this product. 
"In each of the ft ve boroughs 9 we organt sed nel ghborhood coali - 
Mons of churchq labor, liberal and student groups. Then we 
began picketing A& Pq the biggest chain In the city. For 
several months we had pi cket lines on about 25 to 30 stores and 
turned thousands of shoppers away eee In response to consumer 
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pressure, the store managers began to complain to their diviplon 
heads, and soon they took the grapes out of all of their stores, 
430 of them" (38). 
This Illustrates the primary and secondary boycott. It also indicates 
how secondary boycotts may be organised but remain legal. For most 
organi sers to have called f or a boycott of A&P would have been I lle- 
gal. Howeverg a de facto secondary boycott may be established simply 
by picketing the establishment and advancing the case for the primary 
boycott. By association (of the primary boycott with the picketed 
establishment) and/or Intimidationy customers of the store are 
discouraged (39). The California grape boycott Is Included as a case 
study In Chapter Ten. 
The issue of boycott legality and the California grape boycott Is con- 
sidered further In Chapters Ten and Eleven. Howevert other than in 
this case, It Is difficult to ascertain the legal position on consumer 
boycotts. Limited experience of boycotts In Britain means there Is 
very little to go on, although as the MAN-VW case shows In Chapter 
Teng legal counsel can advise on when boycotts are Illegal. In the 
United Statesp although there Is more experience of boycotts, there is 
still uncertainty as to the legal position. This Is due at least In 
part to the reluctance of companies to take legal action In fear of 
exacerbating the situation. 
It seems that other than In the California grape boycott, labour use 
of the consumer boycott Is now limited compared with Its extensive use 
In Laidler and Wolman's dayg when It was "the most effective weapon of 
unionism" and "There was no object so mean and no person so exalted as 
to escape Its power" (40). This Is attributed In Chapter Seven to the 
achievement of unionisatlon and the possibility therefore of effective 
strike action - making the boycott largely redundant. Howevert It Is, 
accordlnglyg not surprising to find that the consumer boycott Is quite 
widely used In labour disputes In the Third World. Yet despite this 
diminished use of the consumer boycott In labour disputes In the West, 
the literature on the legal aspects of Industrial conflicts does have 
something to offer on boycott legality. 
Generally speakingg primary boycotts are legalg whereas secondary 
boycotts are not. As Aaron writes: 
"In the United States the boycottv which has been an Important 
union weapon since the days of the Knights of Labor, has been 
accorded a wide variety of treatment by legislatures and the 
courts. At Common Lawl state and Federal courts applied the 
terms 'primary' and 'secondary' to boycotts. These two adjec- 
tives did not really describe the nature of the boycott, but were 
merely shorthand terms for legal conclusions: *primary' boycotts 
were lawful, 'secondary' boycotts were not" (41). 
The suggestion that the terms primary and secondary are not accurately 
descriptive Is misleadingg however Aaron does go on to explain that, 
as concluded abovep the term secondary tends to Incorporate all higher 
level boycotts: "The chief objection to the word tsecondary' was and 
is that It lumps Indiscriminately Into one category both employers who 
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are truly 'strangers' to the disputev or wholly neutral, and those who 
have a community of Interest with the struck employer and who mayl In 
factj be his 'allies'. " 
Caution must be exercised here In applying Aaron's Interpretation of 
the legal position. For unlike Wolman (to whom Aaron makes 
reference)q the distinction Is not clearly made between boycotts on 
materlalsp more usually referred to today as blacking, and the con- 
sumer boycott; though it Is probably safe to assume that the legal 
position Is the same In each case (42). It seems that the law seeks 
to protect neutral third partlesq though there may be some debate as 
to their actual neutrality. In the California grape boycott both the 
materials boycott and the consumer boycott were employed with great 
success* "A long and bitter dispute between the Farm Workers Union and 
CalifoQa grape growers was recently won by the union, largely as a 
result of the efficacy of its efforts to persuade both distributors 
and consumers not to handle or eat 'non-union' grapes" (43). 
Referring to the legality of the boycott outside the United States, 
Aaron notes that "Britain has no legislation outlawing boycotts as 
such. " However, In recent years "conduct that would be called a 
'secondary' boycott in the United States has been declared unlawful by 
the British courts on several different grounds: that no trade dispute 
existed; that the conduct constituted a 'direct' Inducement to breach 
a contract to the detriment of a third party; or that the conduct 
constituted an 'indirect' inducement by. 'illegal means', namely the 
breach of individual contracts of employment outside the context of a 
labor dispute. " He suggests the boycott is frequently used In Sweden, 
but hardly at all In France, not at all In Italy, and that In Germany 
"Boycotts of goods have 'practically disappeared' ... we are told by 
Rammp" because of the Impossibility of boycotting goods of an 
enterprise which does not produce an end product (44). These obser- 
vations should be seen as applying only to the use of the boycott in 
labour disputes. 
of course j outsi de labour di sputes 9 the cons=er boycott would be 
immune to labour relations legislation. Yet the general rule that 
primary boycotts are legalq secondary boycotts are not, still seems to 
apply - and againg It seems, on the basis that Is unfair to Involve 
neutral parties. In the United Statesq the Sherman anti-trust 
legislation could be employed, as In the Arab boycott (which Is also 
supplemented by specific legislation Intended to prevent compliance 
with the boycott) and discussed earlier (45). This legislation mightq 
howeverg mean that any attempt by a pressure group to call a boycott 
(where, unlike a union there is no contractual arrangement) would be 
illegal - primary or secondary. Thl s could well be the case in 
Britain toog as such a call might be construed as being In restraint 
of trade (46). 
A 1984 ' paper by Harper (47) and another fal rly recent paper by Harri s 
(48) suggest that the law In the United States at least, Is prepared 
to acknowledge a consumer right to boycott. Harris writes 
"Recognising that organised boycotts can bring about significant 
changes In governmental policiesl business practices and product 
pricingg consumers today are placing even greater reliance on this 
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economic weapon. Despite the widespread Incidence Of consumer 
boycotts, howeverp only a few federal courts have decided whether 
consumers' concerted refusals to buy particular Items or services 
violate the Sherman Act. " Her lengthy paper examines the Sherman Act, 
the First Amendment and consumer boycotts, and case law. She conclu- 
des that 91n the event of a court seeki ng to apply the Sherman Act tIt 
would be unli kely to fI nd a consumer boycott a vi olati on. The reasons 
given are worthy of brief consideration. 
Harris Identifies four factors precluding the application of the 
Sherman Act to consumer boycotts. Firstly, as the historical 
background to the Act shows, Congress Intended to reach only business 
combinations that restrain trade rather than to Impede consumers' 
activities. Secondly, application of the Act would Infringe 
consumers' rights under the First Amendment right of free speech: 
"Consumer boycotts are a form of expression, whether aimed at 
affecting the governmental process, changing the commercial practices 
of business entitiesp or lowering the prices of particular products. " 
Thirdlyp the Supreme Court has Interpreted and applied the Sherman Act 
almost exclusively to commercial purpose activities. Consumer 
boycotts do not conform with the standard cases alleging anti-trust 
violations because their non-commercial purpose differs completely 
from the usual profit-maximi sing goals found to motivate violations of 
the Act. Finallyp In the Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. 
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. case, the Supreme Court specifically iden- 
tified an exemption from the Sherman Act for at least some non- 
commercial purpose activities. Howevery Harris does comment that "The 
lack of a comprehensive Supreme Court opinion on consumer boycotts in 
an anti-trust context ... leaves this analysis In a less than conclu- 
sive state. " For this reason, she explores how a consumer boycott 
might fare under traditional anti-trust analysis. She concludes that 
a court would be unlikely to find a violation for two reasons. 
Firstlyp actual agreement among the boycotters to participate In the 
boycott dependent upon others' participation must be found, which 
would be difficult to establish In political and social boycotts where 
the boycotters' motives are personal and emotional. The participants' 
decision would likely also be viewed as Independent In an economic 
boycott, even though self-interest of the participants is Involved. 
Secondly, the Inapplicability of the Sherman Act to non-commercial 
purpose boycotts and the relaxation of the per se approach with this 
legislation. Hence a court should conclude "The activity under attack 
is not an unreasonable restraint of trade. " 
The politicall social and economic boycotts referred to above are 
three types of consumer boycott Identified by Harris. Her categorisa- 
tion defines political boycotts as those "ultimately aimed at the 
government to enact or change legislation or revise policies or 
practices. " She Includes the Boston Tea Party, the anti-Nazi boycott 
prior to World War Up the boycott of the racially segregated 
Montgomery bus line, and the boycott of states which had not ratified 
the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (see Appendix A for details on 
these examples and those that follow). Social boycotts are "aimed at 
changing commercial practices of business entities because of the 
social Impact of these practices. " She Includes here, the boycott of 
grapes and lettuce over unionisation, the Nestle boycott over the 
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marketing of baby milk to the Third World, and the boycott Of Coors 
beer bv civil rights and labour organisations over discrimination In 
hi rl ng practi ces. Economic boycotts are "aimed at reducing prices 
paid by consumersq" Including boycotts of meat, eggst bakery Items, 
and others. 
Howeverg her categorisation, although on the face of It soundt does 
not stand up to closer examination. The social and p0litical cate- 
gories are not distinct. Many consumer boycotts have social and poli- 
tical alms as she defines them. In the boycotts of firms involved In 
South Africap for examplep the Intention Is to change both commercial 
and government practices and policies. Even her so-called economic 
boycotts might be described as social or political. Yet a bigger cri- 
ticism would be not having Identified the distinction between primary 
and secondary boycotts. It Is uncertain as to whether her conclusions 
are aDplIcab le to both. Moreoverg the Involvement of pressure groups 
In consumer boycotts may Invalidate the argument that there Is no con- 
certed refusal to dealq It may be easier to establish an element of 
agreement In restraint of trade. Howeverg this article Is a useful 
contribution to the limited literature on boycotts. It Is valuable 
simply In Its Identification of boycott actions. 
Harper concludes the consumer right to boycott "is a right consistent 
with the best democratic promises of our society. " His paperp also 
quite lengthyp Is particularly worthy of consideration here; not only 
because It adds some clarity to the Issue of boycott legality (in the 
United States at least) but also because his argument has a number of 
similarities to that advanced In earlier chapters In Justification of 
ethical purchase behaviour and boycotts. He finds that consumer 
boycotts are appropriate to market society: 
"One juti fI cati on for such a ri ght comes f rom mi cro-economi a 
welfare theory: consumers' full sovereignty over their decisions 
will help create the particular mix of production and consumption 
that maximises welfare for a given distribution of wealth and 
Income. One of this theory's fundamental assumptions Is that 
consumers' reasons for preferring a product should be valued 
equally. Thus, the reason for a consumer's decision not to 
purchasep whether a distaste for the social or political prac- 
tices of the producer or an Inferior product, should be 
irrelevant. " 
He cites Pigou, Paretog Bator and Marshall In approbation. This argu- 
ment about boycotts as an expression of consumer sovereignty and 
therefore particularly apt In capitalist systems has been asserted 
throughout the previous chapters. This section will concentrate on 
his examination of boycott legality. 
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in NAACP vs. Claiborne Hardware 
Co. In'. 1981 "the Court had Indicated that legislatures, for rational 
economic policy reasonsl could make peaceful Consumer boycotts 
I llegal .N Howeverg In this case "the Court asserted a new consumer 
right to engage In concerted refusals to patronize even If such refu- 
sals are economically disruptive. " Although this assertiong while 
necessary to the Court's decision "did not rest squarely on any First 
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Amendment or other precedentv" Harper shows that "a consumer right. to 
boycott Is nonetheless appropriate for our socletyq a right In accord 
with our social and constitutional valuesp" and that this right 
"should be cast as a broad political right to influence social decl- 
si on maki ng. (He also considers the Implications for labour law 
doctrines. ) 
Harper examines the Claiborne casev showing that It denies states the 
right to prohibit certain boycotts and thus upheld the right of an 
Individual to agree not to patronize a business. This finding' 
resulted because the judge argued that the boycott deserved First 
Amendment protection because the boycottersp through economic disrup- 
tionp were petitioning the government for redress of grievances. 
Harper suggests that the First Amendment would be unlikely to uphold a 
right to boycott as a right to engage In expressive conduct (as pro- 
posed by Harris),, nor as a right of autonomyp nor as a right of asso- 
ciation* In each case, his principal reason for rejecting such 
arguments for a right to boycott Is the overriding factor of the 
state's Interest, especially In preventing economic disruption. Yet 
establishing the right to boycott as a right to petition the govern- 
ment protects the right to boycott because of Its economic effects not 
In spi te of them. Howeverp the Claiborne case and the Noerr case 
(referred to by Harris and above) are viewed as Insufficient protec- 
tion of the right to boycottq so Harper goes on to suggest the grounds 
for ensuring such a right and elaborates on and defines the right to 
boycott as a political actq In a far broader way than the Court had in 
mind In the Claiborne case. Limitations to the right are consideredv 
such as the exclusion of producer boycotts. Finally, Harper considers 
the implications of a consumer right to boycott for labour law, ulti- 
mately arguing against the statutory restrictions on boycotts 
(discussed above) In most cases. He does however accept the case for 
prohibiting secondary boycotts Involving neutral parties. 
So given the Claiborne decision and Harper's analysisq there does 
appear to be an emerging consumer right to boycott. The justification 
for such a right - In viewing the boycott as political action - seems 
appropriate to Britain as well as the United States. It Is probable 
thatp given the higher Incidence of boycotts In the United Statesp the 
right to boycott will become recognised In law there fairly shortly. 
That is less likely here. However, It Is worth noting that many com- 
panies might well choose not to seek legal redress In any case. The 
publicity surrounding an attempt to obtain an Injunction against 
boycott organisers and perhaps damagesq would likely ham the company 
more than other options. 
In this respeetp the consumer boycott Is comparable to the strike. 
Contrary to popular belief, there Is no right to strike In Britain. A 
strike Is 'lawful' If sufficient notice has been given by workers or 
their bargaining representative. Sufficient notice Is determined by 
the Individual's contract of employment. Howeverg If the worker sub- 
sequently returns to work he does so as a new employee, without any of 
the benefits he has accumulated In the course of his prior period of 
employment. Alternatively, If Insufficient notice has been giveng 
then strike action Is 'unlawful' and constitutes breach of contract. 
The employer may then terminate employment contracts or sue for dama- 
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ges. In either easel whether the strike Is 'lawful' or 'unlawful', 
the employer may refuse to take back workers who have been on strike 
because their contracts may be considered terminated. Such acti on 
though Is highly exceptional. It Is not In the employer's Interests 
to do thisq just as drawing attention to a consumer boycott In the 
courts Is likely not to be In the Interests of the boycotted firm 
(49). 
Finallvp should the consumer's right to boycott be deniedg there Is 
always the remedy of the Indirect rather than the direct boycott. 
This form (defined In 7.4.1) is exemplified by the use of the union 
labely where consumers choose goods produced by union labour In pre- 
ference to non-union labour and are able to do so because they find 
the union label on those goods. 
The next secti on returns the argument to the I ssue of the soal al 
control of business, by considering the use of the consumer boycott by 
the corporate accountability movement. 
8.1.4 The Corporate Accountability Movement and Boycotts 
In establishing the right to boycottq Harper acknowledges the social 
1mvact of business. He writes: 
boycotts as protected political acts should not be limited 
to those aimed at governmental decision making. Even boycotts 
aimed solely at private decision making should share the status 
of other political acts such as electoral votingg contributing 
monev and time to an election or referendum campaign, and liti- 
gating for social purposes. All of these political actions can 
be viewed broadly as means by which citizens can Influence Impor- 
tant social decision making" (50). 
He goes on to note that "casting the right to engage In concerted 
refusals to patronize as a right to attempt to affect social decisions 
clearly accords with the ends the Supreme Court has advanced in 
securing First Amendment rights; " and that "many Important decisions 
In our society are made through private economic decisions. " Thisp of 
courseq has been earlier argued In Chapter Four. It Is also the argu- 
ment of the corporate accountability movement. This movement seeks to 
make corporations more accountable for the social Impacts of their 
decisions. Harper obviously views the consumer boycott as an 
appropriate tactic for their efforts. This section will consider the 
use of the boycott In this way (51). 
Detail on specific boycotts cannot be Includedg though many are 
referred to In Appendix A. Insteadq the emphasis is on the alms and 
achievpMents of the movement. This is entirely based on Vogel's work 
and particularly Lobbying the Corporation - "the first to document 
thoroughly the origins and development of the movement" (52) -a 
comprehensive account and probably still the best source. 
The term "corporate accountability movement" Is used by Vogel to 
describe a collection of pressure groups seeking to increase corporate 
accountability- Perhaps the most Important feature of thel r ef forts 
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Is that they are trying to achieve their alms through private mecha- 
nisms, acting directly on the corporation rather than through govern- 
ment. Hence the sub-title to Vogel's book: Citizen Challenges to 
Business Authority. This, Vogel suggests, Is a new form of political 
expressiong a form which he has participated In - refusing to buy 
Saran Wrap and non-union grapes (see Appendix A) - and which he 
favours: "Debate over the social and moral Implications of corporate 
decisions Is too Important to be confined to the governmental process; 
It needs to be conducted In as many forums as possible" (53). Yet 
despite this professed bias his work Is balanced. He is prepared to 
acknowledge that the achievements of the movement are limited and that 
firms have to act within the constraint of long term profitability. 
The private mechanisms employed by the movement are consumer boycotts 
and activist shareholder actions (where concerned groups and indivi- 
duals buy shares In a business and use their votes at Annual General 
Meetings and other rights to press for changes)p coupled with efforts 
to increase corporate disclosure. Lobbying the Corporation Is In 
three parts. Firstlyp Vogel considers the politizing of the cor- 
poration as expressed In the works of Lathamp Berle and Meansp Dahl 
and others (mentioned In earlier chapters), interpreting the corporate 
accountability movement as an attempt to reallse In practice what they 
argue In theory: "that corporations wield the power of governments and 
should, thereforeq be treated like governments" (54). Secondlyp and 
this is the largest partp Is his case study and historical analysis 
(55). Here he looks at civil rights and anti-war protestsp the 
resurgence of shareholder participation In activist shareholder 
actions, efforts to Increase corporate disclosure to inform share- 
holders and the public In generalv and protest at corporate conduct 
abroad - in South Africap the marketing of baby milk to the Third 
Worldq and compliance with the Arab boycott. Finallyg Vogel concludes 
with an assessment of the movement's efforts and achievements. 
Vogel traces the origins of the corporate accountability movement back 
to the civil rights protests of the mid-fifties: "Both of the two cri- 
tical events that sparked the civil rights struggle involved the 
efforts of black citizens to pressure business - one public and one 
privately owned - to end their Policy of providing separate facilities 
for black and white consumers" (56). The black boycott of Montgomery 
city Line lasted a year and cost the bus company more than $79000 a 
day In lost revenue. The outcomej apart from the near bankruptcy of 
the bus companyp was an end to bus segregation In Montgomery and other 
southern cities. The protest also marked the national debut of the 
civil rights movement's most Influential national leaderg the Reverend 
Martin Luther King, Jr. (Public transport boycotts have featured 
stronglV In South Africaq where they have also been well supported 
-see the Ciskei bus boycott In Appendix A. ) When a nationwide boycott 
of Woolworths and Kress followed their refusal to desegregate lunch 
counters, this too resulted In a significant loss of turnover and 
contributed to desegregation. Whi le a consumer boycott of A&P 
stores under Operati on Breadbasket 9 protesting A& P's black 
employment recordq led to an agreement met by the company on black 
employment. Howeverg as Vogel notesq In these and oth'er civil rights 
protests Involving businessl there was not the anti-business flavour 
and demands for corporate accountability that characterised the later 
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protests against the Vietnam War: "business Policies were not alleged 
to be the cause of racial Inequalities, only an example of them ... At 
was the practices rather than the principles of corporate conduct that 
were at Issue" (57). 
The anti-war protests Involved a different and more critical percep- 
tion of business, such that "corporations were as responsible for the 
direction of US foreign Policy as was the US government - Indeed, 
perhaps more so" (58). Recognising that while only the government 
could end the warg it required the cooperation of American business to 
continue It, anti-war protesters demanded that corporations publicly 
refuse to supply military material to the Defense Department while 
their nation was at war. Two particularly prominent targets were Dow 
Chemicalp who manufactured napalmý and Honeywell, who manufactured 
anti-personnel weapons. Both particularly objectionable products and 
"whose usp personified the Immoral conduct and continuation of the war 
itself" (59). Boycotts and activist shareholder actions were employed 
against these companies and others. Companies Involved In the war 
were forced to take a stand on the morality of their actions. The 
executives of Honeywell were even accused of war crimes, on the basis 
of the principles applied at Nuremberg. At the 1973 Honeywell AGM, 
Bingerg Honeywell's Chairmang was asked "Would the company accept a 
contract to build gas ovens for extermination? " (60). A question he 
couldn't answerg but which Illustrates the issue of corporate social 
responsibility In a dramatic and profound way. 
Vogel then turns to the attempts by the Project on Corporate 
Responsibility to make General Motors more accountable for its 
actions: "If blacks could get the vote In the southq why shouldn't the 
constituencies of General Motors also be enfranchised? " (61). Here, 
then, and In other similar campaignsg the focus Is on corporations as 
private governments. The civil rights and anti-war protests Involved 
pressure groups trying to utillse - as suggested In Chapter Six - the 
position of businessv to ultimately put pressure on goverment. These 
later actionsp mostly between 1967 and 19779 were concerned solely 
with changing corporate practices and policies. The tactic employed 
In Camoalgn GM was activist shareholder action through public Interest 
proxy resolutions. This drew attention to the questionable legitimacy 
of GM's actionsp but the main impact was In reestablishing the role of 
the shareholderg reasserting "the prerogatives of ownership. " In this 
campaign and all the other public Interest proxy resolutions Vogel 
considersq the pressure groups were unsuccessful In getting their 
resolution adopted, they were insufficiently supported. They di dp 
howeverg get some response from corporations In a number of cases and 
considerably Increased awareness of the Issues. 
Seen togetherp these protests and the others documented by Vogel, 
constitute a movement for corporate accountabilityp an attemptý to 
restore social control of business given the corporation's 
"substantial Immunity from the constraints of both the market and the 
state" (62). In many of these protests the consumer boycott tactic 
was used. Consumers asserted their sovereignty and used the market to 
express their dissatisfaction with some perceived failing of a busi- 
ness - Its black employment recordq Its Investments In South Africaq 
its compliance with the Arab boycottp or whatever. Consumers In the 
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marketplace were demanding socially responsible behaviour from the 
businesses boycotted. 
Yet It has to be conceded that the achievements of the corporate 
accountability movement were limitedg even though their demands were 
modest: "it has not succeeded In becoming a popular political movement 
capable of mobilizing the Populace against the abuse of corporate 
power" (63); If only because "corporate accountability per se Is too 
abstract an Issue to capture the public's Imagination" (64). Its 
greatest achievement was In Increasing public awareness of the Issues 
and thereby Indirectly Influencing corporate behaviour. 
Of Importance here Is the recognition given to the boycott tactic, 
especially as It was employed In the social control of business. 
Recalling the distinction between success and effectiveness made In 
the last chapterg It Is found that Vogel's documentation of citizen 
protests against corporations Includes a number of effective and suc- 
cessful boycotts. Howeverg Vogel comments on the boycott: 
"With the exception of the early civil rights protests9 virtually 
the only consumer boycotts that have apparently received 
widespread Public support - and thus measurably affected company 
profits - have taken place as a supplement to union organizing 
drives. The successes of the United Farm Workers In organizing 
farm workers In Florida and California were largely made possible 
by one of the most extensiveg well-organizedv and lengthiest con- 
sumer boycotts In American history. A similar and equally suc- 
cessful nationwide consumer boycott was Instrumental In forcing 
Farah Manufacturing Company to recognise the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers Union" (65). 
Unfortunately he does not make the distinction between effectiveness 
and success. As Appendix A showsp and in contradiction of Losman's 
claim (in 7.5-3), a number of boycotts described by Vogel proved suc- 
cessfulp In realising the objectives of the pressure groupq without 
having mass support and being affective In terms of Influencing cor- 
porate profits. Boycotts can be successful without being effective. 
Greater effectiveness and Possibly thereforej greater likelihood of 
successp Is dependent upon pressure group support and capabilities, It 
would seem. Which Is whyq unlike Vogel and partly In response to his 
studyt an examination of the role of pressure groups was considered 
essential here. Vogel's Lobbying the Corporation and the corporate 
accountability movement provide examples of the u-se of the boycott as 
a mechanism for the social control of business. More use of boycotts 
In this way and Increased accountability thereby would seem to depend 
on whether pressure groups continue to grow In number and Influence. 
Whateverg the corporate accountability movement achieved some measure 
of success with the consumer boycottp and their boycotts and those 
over civil rights and the Vietnam war are prime examples of ethical 
purchase behaviour; though this Is not recognised by Vogelq not even 
to the degree expressed by Harper at the outset of this section. 
Factors In boycott effectiveness are considered In detail In 8.1.6. 
Before thisg howeverv the mechanism of the boycott Is examined, 
drawing on Vogel and other sources. 
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8.1.5 The Mechanism of the Boycott 
Although the literature on the use of the boycott Is sparse 01tIs 
possible to make some observations on the effective use of this tac- 
ti C. Wolman and LaIdler's studies of the boycott as used by early 
American trade unions are particularly useful In this respectp despite 
thel r age. These observati ons wi 11 be bul lt upon and confi med or 
dismissed following the case study analysis In Part Three. 
Wolman suggests there are "a few general, If obviousl principles In 
the theory and practice of the boycott" (66). Howeverp in practicev 
adhering to these principles could be difficult. Union control was 
weak and Inadequate because In contrast to his role as worker, the 
member of a union in his capacity as a consumer was difficult to 
reach. Consequently enforcing boycotts was by persuasive rather than 
coercive measures. Appealing for support rather than Insisting on It 
was the order of the day. For promotional pressure groups this would 
be even more likely as they do not have anything approaching the 
discipline commanded by unions or the possibility of resorting to 
powerful sanctions. Hence while there are certain principles for the 
effective use of the boycott, they do have to be tempered by the 
realisation that support and submission to control may be largely 
voluntary. 
As a consequence, Wolman suggests the decision to boycott was made by 
judging each case on Its merits. The use of the boycott became In 
this sense ad hoc. Once the decision to boycott had been made, each 
boycott generally followed a similar pattern. 
Howeverp prior to any decision to boycott, would be the threat of 
boycott. This Is Important. The union would claim that any boycott 
would have extensive support from that uniong associated unions and 
other 'friends of labor'. But, If only because such support could not 
be guaranteed (althoughv of course, the employer might also reallse 
this)t it was Important to only threaten the boycott first. With the 
impending boycottp the union could obtain Important concessions. As 
Wolman writes: "the effectiveness of the boycott consists In its 
potential rather than In Its actual accomplishments. The threat Is 
often more effective than the fact" (67). As the next section shows9 
a high frequency of boycotts reduces their effectivenessv providing 
further Incentive for emphasising the threat of boycott. 
The first stage In the boycott process Is therefore efforts at peace- 
ful adjustment. Should these then fail, the next stage is the 
Inauguration and endorsement of the boycott by the, union. The boycott 
can then be launchedy announcing the boycott to the purchasing public. 
Obviously notice of the boycott must be effective: 
"Inasmuch as the success or the fal lure of thl s devi ce depends 
upon the extent to whi ch It can earn the sympathy of consumers , the Importance of an effective boycott notice, cannot be 
overestimated" (68). 
The union then attempts to enlist as much support as possible, 
building the boycott until Its demands are met. Finallyp on agreement 
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and the ending of the boycottq the union may, 
In the case of a heaýlly 
supported actionj extensively publicise the termination of the 
boycott. Following the end of the boycott of the Bucks Stove and 
Range Company "so deep rooted had been the passions aroused by the 
struggle that several official statements by 
President Gompers 
notifying union members that the boycott had been raised and that 
the 
newly organised firm was deserving of their patronage had to be Issued 
for publication throughout the country before the boycott of the pro- 
ducts of the firm was brought to an actual close" (69). There Is of 
course good reason for thisq though not acknowledged by Wolman: the 
effect of the boycott on the jobs of the employees If the boycott Is 
not ended. The long term Impact of boycotts surely makes them less 
attractive than strike action because of this. 
On the basis of Wolman's studyp a five-stage process can be 
Identified: 
1. Attempts at peaceful adjustment. 
2. Inauguration and endorsement of the boycott. 
Effective notice of the boycott. 
Enlist support. 
5. Conclude boycott when agreement reached and publicise settlement. 
Attempts at peaceful adjustment and the importance Of employing the 
threat of boycotts has been discussed. The Inauguration and endor- 
sement of the boycott Is particularly appropriate to union actions 
because of the Importance of procedure. Howeverg this would also 
apply to a promotional pressure group that Is responsible to a larger 
groupq or where the group was part of an umbrella Organisation which 
might provide funding and support but would therefore require con- 
sultati on. In any group attempting this sort of actiong there Is at 
least the requirement for planning the Organisation of the boycott, 
which would be either at this stage or before the threat of boycott 
action had been made. 
An Important method for providing effective notice of boycotts at this 
time was the 'We Don't Patroniset and 'unfair' lists published in 
American labor journals. There- were drawbacks to this method, 
however. The problem of control earlier referred to applied not only 
to Individual workers but also to unions within federations. Lists 
were published monthly In the American Federationist, the journal of 
the American Federation of Labor (AFL)q and in the journals of 
national unions. Yet the AFL list alone has contained more than 125 
firms. - This In Itself Is too long, before any consideration Is given 
to other 11 sts - Too many boycotts at any one time dilutes their 
effect and too many boycotts per se reduces their Impact (as discussed 
In the next section). The undue frequency of boycotts made the proce- 
dures of the previous stage vital. These procedures attempted to 
minimise the number of boycotts at any one time and In total. 
The centrallsation of authority to boycott was also Important to con- 
tain the Incidence of boycotts so that it didn't unduly affect workers 
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not In dispute. It was found that while workers might 
be In dispute 
In one localityq their counterparts In the same firm elsewhere were 
satisfiedv which made a nationwide boycott of the firm unreasonable 
from their point of view. It was also found that boycotts might be 
called by one union In dispute with a firm when Its members consti- 
tuted a minority of the employeesq the rest of whom were not In 
dispute. Wing a boycott would seem unreasonable. 
'Unfairt lists were a way of the union providing notice and retaining 
some control. But notice of the boycott was also given In other ways. 
Word of mouth communicationg public addresses and discussion was 
importantg also notices In union officesp lettersp circulars$ parades 
and processions. During the boycott on a restaurant In San Francisco, 
a man was engaged to walk up and down outside the restaurant bearing a 
sandwich board advertising the boycott (70). 
The 1908 court decisions meant that boycotts had to be secret. It was 
found necessary to discontinue publication of 'unfair' lists. 'But 
Wolman notes that this did not mean the cessation of all public noti- 
ces of boycott: 
In February 19109 the journals of the Metal Polishers, which 
after the Bucks Stove Company Injunctions had stopped printing 
the unfair list, substituted a list of firms under the following 
cantlon: "Where our members have been or are now on strike and no 
adjustments have been made. " The list contained the names of 
eight fIrmsv one of which was the Bucks Stove and Range Company" 
(71). 
Companies would also produce booklets outlining their grievances. But 
LaIdler has doubts about this approach: 
"As a feeble substitute at the present timeg the labor periodi- 
cals now often call attention to and recite the facts of union 
strugglep leaving it to organised labor to "do the right thing"" 
(72). 
Despite these doubts held by Laidler, boycotting continuedp and "an 
official of the American Federation of Labor admitted in 1913 that the 
boycotting activity of American trade unions was just as great at that 
time as during the publication of unfair lists. " Although "there is 
little doubt that the average trade union member, Inspired on the one 
hand by af eell ng of awe for the power of the federal government and 
on the other by the fear of personal pecuniary loss, is now much less 
Inclined to sanction a boycotting policy in his union eee" Trade 
unions also lobbied for exemption from the Sherman Anti-Trust Actp 
another indicator of both their , concern and the success of the 
American Anti-Boycott Association (73). 
An alternative to the 'unfair' list which was safe from litigation, 
was the 'fairl list andt hence, the Indirect or negative boycott. 
This not only overcame legal objections but dealt with the problem of 
counter-boycottsp where those opposed to labour organisation "threw 
their custom to offset whatever might be lost through the observance 
of the boycott" (74). It also meant avoiding the requirement to find 
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a substitute commodity and Involved less hostilly. 
The Institutiorr of 
the Indirect boycott through the union label however was a more satis- 
f actory method. 'Fair' lists could show only passive supporters, 
those with whom the union did not currently have a grievance; there 
were entire Industries without organised labour for which no or few 
recommendations could be made; to avoid offense the 
list would have to 
be as exhaustive as possible and therefore Inevitably long and 
unwieldy; finally, there were problems In defining a fair firm 
(75). 
Once notice of the boycott had been giveng attempts were made to 
enlist the support of the customers of the firm. Thl s Involved 
district organisers of the AFL9 special agents of national unions, 
boycott committees of the central labour bodies and the boycott com- 
mittees of the local unions. The special agents would visit customers 
of the boycotted concern - perhaps retail outlets - and persuade them 
to put pressure on the firm to yield to the union demandsv or to stop 
buyl ng from the firm. However, they only stayed In a town for a short 
whi le 9 as thel r task was 
to organi se the boycott over a wl de area , 
whI le others dealt with detallsq notably the boycott committees. 
District organisers furthered boycotts In conjunction with their main 
and principal duties as union organisers. 
The methods used to announce the boycott would continue to be used 
throughout the dispute. Trade unionists would be asked to give funds 
In aid of the boycottq to send their delegates to dealers In the 
boycotted articles and to write letters of protest to the 'unfair' 
establishments. The effectiveness of the boycott depended on the 
unionts ability to force observance. So finesl In addition to publi- 
c1tyq would also be employed; althoughp of courseq non-observance was 
difficult to effectively detect and sanctiong In comparison with 
strike-breaking. 
Approaches to customers were sophisticatedg with the use of market 
segmentation: 
"The of fI cers of Ameri can trade uni ons by no means I gnore the 
futility of making an appeal to the general consumer In all cases 
of boycotts or commodities and permitting their activities to end 
there. On the contraryl they are fully alive to the fact that 
for manv commodities there are special groups of consumers whose 
cooperation and active support are essential to the success of a 
boycott. It Is not uncommong thereforeq to find that many 
unions, Instead of waging a general boycottq attempt first to 
enlist the support of such groups of consumers" (76). 
Particularly Important would be those supplied by the boycotted firMl 
that depended on public support In their trade, and feared a secondary 
boycott, especially if the boycotted firm was not dealing In finished 
products for the consumer market. This approach was highly successful 
for the print unions, for "No retailer Is willing ... to pay a high 
price for advertisements whose only result is to drive hundreds of 
customers from his store" (77). 
The above description of the mechanism of the boycott refers to 
actions conducted over seventy years ago. And yet 9 as* the case stu- 
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dies reveal, many of the points made apply to actions today and can be 
considered perhaps as principles of boycott action. The fl ve-stage 
process descri bed above can also be found, as well as the methods used 
to give effective notice of the boycott and enlist support. Indeed, 
Eemer even reports the use of the same methods In early twentieth cen- 
tury Chinese boycotts: postersq picketing and public demonstrations 
(see 7.5.2). 
More recent sources make similar observations to those above on the 
mechanism of the boycott. Thoughl as remarked In B. 1.29 few other 
sources offer any analysis. Yet the more frequently occuring descrip- 
tions of boycotts conform In methods and process, so It seems that 
Wolman Is correct In claiming there are general principles for 
boycotts. Principles that may be considered factors In boycott effec- 
tiveness are considered In the next section. The contributions from 
the more recent literature on the mechanism of the boycott - such that 
there are that actually add to Wolman and Laidler's analysis - are 
considered as follows. 
Harper's description of the background to the Claiborne case shows 
that boycotts In the late 1970's differ little from those organised by 
labour unions nearly a hundred years previous. Technology may mean 
they can be more effectively promoted: In the UFW organJsed boycott of 
Lucky Supermarkets over sales of non-union lettuceq, computers were 
employed (78). Howeverp for the most partf they are identical. So In 
the Claiborne case "leaders urged others to join the boycott through 
public advocacy and personal solicitationsp and they used written and 
oral statements to publicize the names of non-parti ci pants, " and 
"Protesters peacefully picketed targeted businesses" (79). The 
actions described by Vogel and those listed In Appendix A also con- 
formed to this approach (insofar as the sources provided sufficient 
description for this to be checked). Sharp provides only limited 
description of boycott Incidents with no analysis. 
Harrisq surprisinglyg offers some analysis of the mechanism of the 
boycott In considering boycott legality (80). She suggests consumer 
boycotts are composed of five distinct elements: 
Consumers discussing their dissatisfaction with the boycott 
target In private. 
2. Consumers reaching an agreement to withhold their patronage from 
the target. 
Consumers actually withholding their patronage. 
Consumers publicising their dissatisfaction with the target. 
Consumers publicising the boycott Itself and persuading others to 
join it. 
Her purpose Isq by considering each element, to consider boycotts as a 
form of expression and therefore protected by the First Amendment. 
This argument In defence of boycotts hasp as earlier notedp been 
rejected by Harper. He argues that-the right to freedom of expression 
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would be Insufficient where other forms of expression that are less 
economically disruptive could be employed. But Harris' list does pro- 
vide further confirmation of the current relevance of Laidler and 
Wolman's analysis. 
Laidler and 'Wolman's analysis also features prominently In the next 
section, Factors In Boycott Effectivenessq where the principles of 
boycott action considered are more directly relevant to boycott effec- 
tiveness. 
8.1.6 Factors In Boycott Effectiveness and Success 
Laidler explicitly Identifies factors In the effectiveness of boycotts 
as employed by the United States labour unions at the turn of the cen- 
tury (81). Wn, despite Its age, his analysis seems valid today. 
Sixteen "elements of success In boycotts" are Identified: 
1. Character of the market for the article. 
It Is Important that those likely to support the boycott are In 
the market for the boycotted article. In this caseq whether the 
market consisted primarily of unionists and sympathizers or of 
the employing class. "Breadq newspapers, hats9 eigarsp beer, 
stoves, shoes and other necessities and Inexpensive luxuries have 
been very frequently and effectively boycotted ... of the 196 
boycotts described In Bradstreet's ... 80% center around 
necessities. " Laidler notes that boycotts of bread and cigars 
were particularly successfulg whereas attempts to boycott com- 
modities sold primarily to the upper middle and employing classes 
were generally unsuccessful. Moreover, they might even be 
detrimental: "Dealers in such articles certify that they have 
oftentimes been benefited by the boycott, as their well-to-do 
patrons have come to their rescue and frequently increased their 
orders on account of union opposition. " 
2. Whether the articles boycotted are Purchased by men or by women. 
Lai dler wri tes: "It Is unusual for the women of the fami ly to 
feel the keenness of the trade union struggle, and to recognise 
the utility of Inconveniencing themselves In order that other 
workers might be assisted thereby. " Although he did acknowledge 
Increasing Interest. 
Strong organi sati on among the employees of purchasers If the 
boycotted article Is not sold directly to the mass of working 
people. 
Articles sold to employers such as*production materials or unfl- 
ni shed goods could not be subject to a consumer boycott by 
working people. Employing Wolman's distinction between com- 
modities boycotts and materials boycottsp referred to earlierg 
these articles would demand the latter type of action. Hence 
"the threat of the solidly organised brewery workers to strike, 
should their employers continue to purchase non-union barrels and 
boilers, has time and again forced the unionising of a shop. " 
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Frequency and regularity of consumption of boycotted arti ale. 
Laidler quotes the Bureau of Statistics of Labor In New York: "If 
it Is an article which enters Into daily consumptionp and Is of 
such a character that It can be made the subject of ordinary con- 
versation, It will soon force the employer to spend money In 
advertising Itt In order to counteract the silent Influence of 
the boycott. " 
Character of the population In the locality of the firm. 
Where boycotts were of a local nature and the boycotted fl m was 
An the surroundl ng nel ghbourhood 9 the boycott had a greater 
chance of success If the neighbourhood was working class. 
Strength and capi tal of the boycotted fl m and the nati onwi de 
character of Its sales. 
F1 rms wi th nati onwi de di stri buti on would requi re an extensi ve and 
costly campaign. Those with plenty of capital could more easily 
withstand the loss of sales entailed by boycotts. 
Extent to which the boycotted fi m IS a monopoly. 
Purchasers are loath to support a boycott when there Is no dupli- 
cate of the goods manufactured by the boycotted firmq especially 
If the I tem Isa necessl ty. 
Degree to whi ch the ef forts of the entl re labour body are con- 
centrated on one or more Important firms. 
Unions recognised that this was "one of the greatest elements In 
the success of a boycottp" and adopted a policy of concentration. 
Amount of favourable publicity. 
Although advertised In union journals, the public at large rarely 
heard of the existence of a boycott through the daily press 
unless something striking or unusual happened, as In the legal 
proceedings against the AFL In the Bucks Stove case. 
10. Character of the distinguishing mark on the goods. 
Without the union labell the task of identifying 'unfair' goods 
was particularly difficuitp and is cited as one reason for the 
failure of the miners to boycott coal. 
11. Cýaracter of the competition. 
Purchasers would be unlikely to boycott goods where the alter- 
native goods were undesirable, such as prison made goods. 
12. Directness of the boycotting attacks. 
The more remote the boycott from the gri evance I the weaker itIs 
likely to be: "At times citizens have been boycotted for 
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purchasing goods from stores whose owners rode In trolley 6ars 
during a car strike. Howeverp such boycotts soon subside. " 
13. Causes leading to the boveott. 
Soal ety at large wi 11 not support causes wi th Whi ch It has no 
sympathy. "Boycotts based upon the employment of non-uni on men 
rarely succeed, because society Is not prepared to assist either 
In driving men Into unions or out of employmentp" wrote the 
Commissioner of Labor In Illinois. However, all eight boycotts 
In that state against prison made goods were successful and 99% 
of those against the reduction of wages. Appeals to organised 
labour were simply made on the basis that the boycotted firm had 
been 'unfair' to labour, the causes of the boycotts were less 
Important. For this reason, the AFL placed greater emphasis on 
appealing to Its members than the general publieg unlike its 
forerunner the Knights of Labor. 
14. VI gor wl th whi ch the boycott Is pushed at the outset. 
The longer a boycott lasts the greater the likelihood of failure, 
as supporters lose enthusiasm for the boycott and the firm beco- 
mes more able to cope. Laidler suggests that vigor at the outset 
and the effectiveness of the methods employed during the first 
few weeks of the boycott "determine, to a very large extentp Its 
ultimate outcome ... a large proportion of those local boycotts 
which succeeded came to a termination within a few weeks. " 
15. The attitude of the law. 
Unionists were unlikely to be enthusiastic about supporting ille- 
gal boycotts If they might have to face civil or criminal 
proceedings. 
16. Thorough deliberation and discrimination by the organisation in 
using the boycott. 
Laidler argues that care in the use of the boycott would make It 
more powerful when resorted to. 
Wolman does not explicitly Identify factors In boycott effectivness; 
not, at least, In such a deliberate fashion as Laidler. However, many 
factors can be culled from his analysis. Not surprisingly, they are 
similar to those Identified by Laidler. 
Wolman observes that the boycott "exhibits its greatest effectiveness 
under two conditions: first, when a large Proportion of the product of 
the firm Is consumed by communities of laborers, and secondlyg where 
there are special groups of consumers who feel that labor can In turn 
bring to bear upon them effective pressure of a Political or economic 
nature" (82). The first condition Is the same as Laidler's character 
of the market for the article. Elsewherej Wolman writes NBoycotts on 
commodities are, In general, effective only when Imposed upon such 
goods as are consumed In large quantities by the working classes" 
(83)- 
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The second condition Is specific to the secondary boycott. Laidler's 
apparent uncertainty as to the distinction between primary and secon- 
dary boycottsp as earlier notedp results In a poor assessment of the 
differing factors In effectiveness In each case. Wolmang by more 
effectively distinguishing between primary and secondary (or compound) 
boycottsv has a number of Important points to make about boycott 
effectiveness that apply only to secondary boycotts (see B-1.3 for 
definitions). These points will become apparent as the various fac- 
tors In effectiveness are considered. As far as the nature of the 
boycotted commodity Is concernedl Wolman's second condition recognises 
the importance of the secondary boycott where the firm with whom the 
union Is In dispute does not deal In a commodity that can be effec- 
tively boycotted by labor because It Is not a consumer product. SO 
where a firm deals In materialsl unfinished goods or industrial pro- 
ducts9 and therefore the customers are other employersq or where the 
firm deals In consumer goods supplied to the employing classes, the 
primary boycott would be Ineffective, If not Impossible. Consequent- 
ly,, efforts might be usefully made to Institute a boycott of the goods 
of the customers of the firm with which the union is In dispute. 
'Wolman writes: 
"A boycott on commodities falls primarily upon the products of 
firms with whom some section of organised labor has had dif- 
fi culti es. In this form the boycott is simple. It does not, 
howeverg long retain Its original simPlicityp but soon acquires 
extensive ramifications. Persons who were not even remotely con- 
nected with the dispute at Its Inception are dragged In and 
become themselves subject to boycott" (84). 
As this quote also indicates, secondary boycotts may simply develop as 
a supplement to the primary boycott and not Just because of the dif- 
ficulty or Ineffectiveness of the primary boycott. As Wolman 
continues: 
"Thl s extenst on of a boycott upon an artl ale of consumpti on 
usually emerges In the form of a boycott on the business that 
sellsq among other things, the boycotted commodity. When a 
uniong for example, boycotts hats, It does not content Itself 
with refusing to buy of a haberdasher the commodity in question, 
but everything he sells becomes subject to boycott until he 
agrees to eliminate from his business the unfair product" (85). 
In illustration of thIsq Wolman refers to the 1901 action by the 
journeymen Bakers' and Confectioners' International Union which 
imposed a general boycott on all stores, restaurants and hotels that 
sold any of the products of the National Biscuit Companyt which had 
itself been previously boycotted. In this wayl the effectiveness of 
the boycott Is considerably enhanced: 
"Where the commodity boycotted Is a foodstuff or an article of 
cloihing that Is usually sold In conjunction with other articlesq 
as Is particularly the case with many commodities sold In the 
general merchandise stores of small towns, the boycott on a busi- 
ness Is a far-more effective weapon" (86). 
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Wolman suggests two reasons for thl s. Firstlyo that It Is easier to 
teach the consumer to boycott a person than to boycott a commodity. 
Secondlyp boycott of the business is more serious for the retailer 
than the boycotting of a single item. in the latter case, he may con- 
tinue to stock the boycotted commodity In anticipation of the end of 
the boycott without his active participationg whereas the boycott of 
his entire business would probably cause him to reject the funfairt 
item. 
The boycott mi ght be extended In a 
which the union Is in dispute is 
boycott. Wolman writes: 
varl ety of ways If the fl m wi th 
not Itself a suitable target for 
"Occasionally the members of firms whose products are not suscep- 
tible to the boycott are at the same time Interested In other- 
Industries whose products are easily boycotted ... a steel com- 
pany of Pittsburgh refused to endorse the scale of the 
Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers. - Inasmuch as 
the product of the company was such as not to enter I nto the 
budget of a laborer, It could not be effectively boycotted. A 
member of the firm of the steel company wasq however, at the same 
time the joint owner of a large coffee plant. A boycott was 
therefore ordered on the product of this associated firm" (89). 
Wolman's second condition for boycott effectiveness refers not only to 
economic pressure (via consumer boycotts) on groups of consumers Of 
the firm with which the union Is In dispute, but also political 
pressure. This presumably refers to the potential for strike action, 
or materials boycottst therefore Included In Laidler's third element, 
strong Organisation among the employees of purchasers if the boycotted 
article Is not sold directly to the mass of working people. 
Another example of a boycott extended to a business associated with 
the one with which the union was In disputeg was that against the 
Jamestown Street Railway Company of Jamestowng New York. Here there 
could be no effective boycott because no competitive route existed 
which passengers could have used In preference to the boycotted route. 
Howeverg patronage could be far more easily diverted from the amuse- 
ment park which was also owned by the owners of the railway company. 
This also Illustrates the need for a substitute commodity that can be 
bought by those boycotting an 'unfair' Item. LaIdler notes this above 
In reference to monopolies, and elsewhere (88), but Wolman's analysis 
is again superior. He writes that efforts were made to provide auxi- 
liaries to the boycott under the Knights of Labor, and an adequate 
substitute for It under the AFL. This Is because: 
0 .. the boycott Is in Itselfj In the last analysisp an 
1mcomplete weapon; to be completely effective It, must be equipped 
with a complementary mechanism' Dissatisfaction with one firm 
implies satisfaction with ano&r. Similarly, the boycott and 
the withdrawal of patronage from an unfair firm Implies the 
throwing of that patronage to a fair firm. Furthermore, when a 
boveott Is placed upon one commodity or business, It Is necessary 
for those managing the boycott to have at hand a competitor where 
or a substitute which they can recommend to their friends and 
sympathizers" (89). 
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He later confirms this noting "Trade unions have generally recognised 
the fact that boycotts cannot be Imposed upon commodities for which 
there Is no adequate substitute" (90). Howeverg there Is an Inherent 
danger In workers recommending a competitor's product as a substitute 
for the product they producep that the firm may not regain the busi- 
ness lost durl ng the boycott and thel r jobs wi 11 be at ri sk as a con- 
sequence. This was possibly not widely acknowledged or as Important 
In Wolman's dayp If only because the class war was preponderant and 
the divide between the classes so great that workers had a far greater 
sense of identification with their class than with their firm or even 
their Industry. Yet Wolman does record the experiences of the stone 
cuttersq who found to their cost that their materials boycott on stone 
cut by planers, In refusing to set such stone, led to the substitution 
for stone of other building materials such as concrete and terra 
cotta - 
Substl tute commodl ti es would also be less desi rable than the 
'obnoxious' or tunfairl 1temq as Wolman Indicates above and as in 
Laidler's eleventh element. Substitutes might not be Identifiable 
because the boycotted product Is patented with no suitable alternative 
aval lable. And as Wolman notes , there may be a- di f fi culty InI den- 
tj fyi ng substi tute commodi tI es when a monopoly Is speci fl cally created 
to defeat the boycottq In the formation of employers' associations 
(91). 
Support for the boycott is of course of principal Importance If the 
boycott Is to be successful. This underlies all of Laidler's ele- 
ments. Howeverg this factor In boycott effectivness can be more pre- 
cisely described as solidarityg in the use of the boycott by trade 
unions at least. LaIdler's eighth element touches upon this, but It 
is wolman that comes closest to Identifying this notion. He quotes 
Kirk: 
"A trade union In any locality may cease purchasing an article 
without appreciably reducing Its salej since the proportion of 
consumers belonging to any single union Is necessarily small; but 
an assembly of the KnI ghts of Labor Supported by a large part of 
the consumers In the vicinity wielded an Influence proportional 
to the purchasing power of all members Interested" (92). 
Yet solidarity Involves more than this. Wolman refers to the impor- 
tance of the boycott being highly locallsed, concentrated within a 
community: 
In order to act as an effective boycotting agencyt union 
labor must be not only numerousp but also highly locallsed. The 
presence In a city of many union members, scattered as Indivi- 
duals In different sections of the community and surrounded by 
people who have neither sympathy with nor understanding of 
labor's grievances, prevents that close personal contact and that 
easy exchange and discussion of Information - not to speak of the 
impossibility under such conditions of scrutinising the purchases 
of one's neighbor - which Is essential to the success of a 
boycott" (93). 
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This Is more than simply ensuring effective communication of the 
boycott and attempting to sanction behaviour that breaches It. There 
Is recognition of the boycott as a collective action and the Impor- 
tance of a supportive culture: "Where the laboring community Is a clo- 
sely knity Intimate assemblyl the boycott 
Is waged by collective 
efforts Impelled by a collective conscience ... 
" (94). 
An important factor In support for boycotts is the low cost to the 
participant, relative to other 
forms of action such as strikes (95). 
Extensive support may also be less Important In some secondary 
boycotts. As earlier notedv unionists were aware that some of a 
firmts customers were more Important than othersy and segmented the 
market accordingly 
(96). A strategy which also offered great cost 
effectiveness In the administration of the boycott. 
Lai dler refers to the directness or boycotts (element twelve) 9 and how 
boycotts remote from the grievance are likely to be less successful. 
This factor In effectivenss Is also considered by Wolmang particularly 
as it relates to his definition of secondary or compound boycotts and 
the issue of boycott legality. The extension of a boycott upon an 
article to any retailer selling that article say, has already been 
discussed In this section. What was not notedq howeverg was that the 
more boycotts are a result of this sort of extensiong the less effec- 
tive and less reasonable they seem to become. Boycotting a retailer 
who attemDtS to sell an 'unfair' item Is justified on the basis that 
his business Isp in effectj an agency of the boycotted firm and there- 
fore automatically included In the original action. Yet how far can 
boycotts be effectively and reasonably extended? Wolman reports that 
the stone cutters of Bedford, Indianag for example, boycotted the 
hotel at which scab stone cutters stayed and then threatened to 
boycott a theatrical performance because the actors stayed at the same 
hotel. He suggests: 
"In their extension of boycotts to groups forel gn to the orl gI nal 
di spute 9 the theory of trade uni ons seems to be: fi rst 9 that any 
one comi ng In contact In one capaci ty or another wi th a boycotted 
article countenances Its sale and exposes himself to a boycott 
andl secondly, that under conditions where the boycott cannot be 
effective upon one object It Is desirable to Shift the ban to a 
closely or distantly related object" (97). 
Yet the Injury Is still to what is arguably an Innocent third party. 
In such remote cases, Wolman finds the boycott Indefensible: 
"Since the boycott of the retailer Is Indi spensable to the waging 
of the original boycott, this simple form of the secondary 
boycott need not be distinguished In principle from the primary 
boycott. Wherep howeverl the union Imposes a secondary or ter- 
tiary boycott which Is not essential to-the original boycott ... 
the extension of the boycott IsI ndefensible In theory and 
practice" (98). 
This expresses both his view on boycott legality but also on effec- 
tivenesso for he quotes: "John Mitchell believes that "the further the 
boycott Is removed from the original offender the less effective it 
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becomesy" because such a boycott is less likely to receive public 
sympathy"-(99). 
There are two final factors for consideration, both Of Which are 
Included In Laidler's last elementg thorough deliberation and disc! rl- 
mination by the orgardsation In using the boycott. Firstly, there is 
the requirement for good organisation and controlq the Importance of 
which speaks for Itself 
(100). Secondlyl there Is the relationship 
between boycott effectiveness and the frequency of, its use. Wolman's 
historical study of the use of boycotts Identifies three phases, where 
changes In the control and frequency of boycotts notably effected Suc- 
cess (101)- He records that this factor was recognised by the AFL and 
attempts were made to Increase control. Yet this was not easily done: 
"Labor organisations have early learned-the wisdom of training 
the combined forces of their organisation upon a few firms 
instead of scattering their energies in the prosecution of num- 
bers of boycotts. Because this knowledge hasp however, not 
penetrated to the rank and file of the labor movement, It Is 
constantly found necessary to enact rules designed to limit the 
number of boycotts" (102). 
Essentially, boycott effectiveness is diminished because excessive 
frequency cU lutes efforts and lowers, Impact. - The ý point is emphasi sed 
by LaIdler on a number of occasionsp and he sees this point as "a 
vital truth" (103). 
Remer Is study of Chi nese boycotts also I dentl fi es factors, In boycott 
effectiveness. In keeping with LaIdler, and Wolmang he notes 
"boycotting Is more powerful against Identifiable goods than against 
such goods as easily lose their Identity .... against consumers' goods 
than against goods that enter Into Industrial processes e9e (and) ... 
against goods for which substitutes are produced within China than 
against other goods" (104). Remer also recognises the greater likeli- 
hood of failure the longer a boycott lasts (see Laidler's fourteenth 
factor In effectiveness) "a boycott brings results at once if it Is to 
bring them at all" (105). 
On the problem of I dentl fyI ng goods Remer . notes that ways round the 
boycott Included remarking and repackaging goods In nearby territories 
(allegedly done to Argenti ni an corned - beef In Brazi 1 duri ng the 
Falklands cri sl s) and smuggling. Yet Remer Is keen - to pol nt out (as 
earlier noted) that economic effect Is not the sole Intention nor the 
only consequence of boycott action. Boycotts can have a psychological 
impact on the boycotted party and can produce valuable publicity. So 
economic effectiveness may not be necessary -for boycotts to be suc- 
cessfulp as also observed In 8.1.4., 
The recent sources are slightly more forthcoming on-factors in boycott 
effectiveness than on the mechanism of the boycott. Asýearller noted, 
Luthans et al make the basi a Pol nt that "the . key to a, boycott Is to have enough consumer support to reduce demand" (106). Though this Is 
too simple a perspective. Effectiveness As likely ý, to Improve, the 
potential for successq but some,, boycotts -, may i never be successful 
however ef fecti ve. While In some cases effectiveness has not been 
necessary for success. Rea Is a little more sophisticated: 
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N... In practiceg the boycott will be effective only for certain 
kinds of goods. The consumers' cartel Is held together by social 
pressure. The Impact of the social pressure depends on four 
characteristics of the good: the visibility of Its purchasel the 
vi si bi 11 ty Of Its consumption, its durability, and Its 
perishability" (107). 
The Importance of social pressure is of course recognised by Laidler 
and Wolmang with Laidler noting In particular the success of 
boycotts 
of food. Rea suggests food Items lend themselves to boycott action 
because of their perishability and because they are purchased publi- 
callyq but have the drawback of not being consumed as publicly as 
clothing and durable goods. But with durable goods, such as cars, 
while the publicly consumed 
(conspicuous consumption) feature Is 
strong "the fact that a consumer buys a car every 2.1 years Instead of 
every 2 years is not readily observable. " So nondurable goods and 
servicesq consumed frequently, are more likely candidates. The 
perishability feature Is Important not only for frequency of purchase 
but also because goods purchased ' 
publicly but consumed privately - 
such as toothpaste - might be hoarded In anticipation of a boycott. 
Mail order presents a problem because It Is non-public purchasing and 
not amenable to picketing. 
Rea claims "One can predict that ýthe participation in a boycott will 
be greatest for goods which are purchased and consumed publicly, 
nondurable and perishable. " He suggests the services of restaurants, 
theatres and other forms of entertainment are an appropriate target 
because they are purchased and consumed publicly and are totally 
perishable. Such a boycott would not only be easier to enforce, but 
also likely to have a more substantial effect on the target as the 
nature of service products prevents them from being stored for future 
use. Yet it must be acknowledged that "The number of goods that lend 
themselves to an enforceable boycott Is limited because those goods 
which are most conspicuously consumed tend to be durable. " 
The New Republic article (108) is sceptical about whether consumer 
boycotts have a serious economic, effect but "They are nevertheless a 
nuisance. " It refers to Hunt Foods having to send Out "hundreds" of 
letters disassociating It from HýL Huntq with one executive estimating 
the company loses $1m. In sales a year, due to the erroneous asso- 
ciation of names. But this also Illustrates the problem of computing 
effectiveness - It Is unlikely to be disclosed In the annual report 
-and the 
difficulty of focusing on specific targets (as well as the 
Injustice that entirely neutral third Parties may accidentally 
suffer). Focusing on specific targets Is particularly difficult when 
there are many consumer boycotts. Sop after giving quite a lengthy 
list of contemporary boycotts, the, author concludes: 
"It Is hard to know whom to boycottq for how longg or to compute 
the effect. Therets nothing, avallable like the Dow Jones morning 
comment or the racing form. _Andý 
because there are so many 
disparate blacklists compiled for so many different reasons one 
needs an Investment letter or some other expert guidance -perhaps 
a Trip-tic like the AAA puts Out . -for 
drivers, showing the 
detours. " 
359 
In other wordsp It seems that at the time this article was written, 
there was the same problem faced by the early labour sympathisers: far 
too many boycotts. If only for this reason, a pressure group need 
view the tactic as a last resort. 
Computing effectiveness Is Important because of Its part In motivating 
and maintaining the boycotters. This Is noted by Laidler. Perceived 
consumer effectiveness Is also recognised as Important In one of the 
few sources that recognises some form of ethical purchase behaviour. 
Kinnear et al usedq In predicting whether their respondents were eco- 
logically concerned consumersl perceived consumer effectiveness: "a 
measure of the extent to which a respondent believes that an 1nd1v1_ 
dual consumer can be effective In Pollution abatement" (109). They 
suggest "The direct relationship between perceived consumer effec- 
tiveness and ecological concern Indicates that the consumer's lack of 
belief that he can be effective in the abatement of pollution Is 
Indeed an effective deterrent to his becoming personally concerned 
about ecological Issues In consumption. " This comment would seem to 
be applicable to all forms of ethical Purchase behaviourg including 
consumer boycotts. 
The Importance of picketing should not be understated. One of the 
rights Harper views as essential If the consumer's right to boycott Is 
to be upheldq Is the right to engage, in associated peaceful picketing., 
PIcketJng on private property would not be defended by the First 
Amendmentq but full protection should be afforded for picketing on 
public property "because public streets and ways traditionally have 
been considered among the most important of our public forums" (110). 
Harper recognises the significance of picketing for boycott 
effectiveness: "In the first place, boycott organisers have no alter- 
native means of communicationg such as newspaper or radio advertising, 
that are as cost effective as peaceful picketing In front or a 
business. " The use of consumer segmentation and recognising that con- 
sumers are more likely to be Interested Immediately prior to purchase 
means "the best time to communicate with potential consumers Is when a 
possible purchase Is Imminent. " While other sites and methods are far 
Inferior: "Although boycott organisers could communicate through 
leaflets without actually patrolling a business siteg off-site hand- 
billing is more easily Ignored and picketing may have a symbolic per- 
suasiveness for some consumers -that handbilling lacks. " There Is 
also 9 of course 9 
the coeral ve element - to pi cketl ng. Thisq suggests 
Harperp is insufficient for denying peaceful picketingg even though It 
may have an emotional and psychological element and may even amount to 
social ostracism. 
Kri eger 91n analysi ng the causes of - the ral lure or the Another Mother 
for Peace (AMP) consumer campaign suggests using only letter-writing 
was Insufficient (111). The letter-writing should have been a supple- 
ment to an actual boycott supported by organised picketing and 
widespread distribution of literature. The grape boycott Is the model 
of the type of action he envisages (see case study). Furtherg he 
suggests the AMP should have focused on one firmp rather than the 
eight corporations targettedq the firm utdch appeared to be most 
vulnerable to a consumer boycott. He suggests "If AMP could get just 
one. half of Its membership to seriously boycott one firm, this could 
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be a great enough cost to the fi M to brI ng about a change of poll Cy 
*so If the campaign were 
to prove successful against one large cor- 
poration, Its threat potential would Increase substantlallyg perhaps 
to the point of achieving policy change In other firms by negotiation 
rather than boycott" (Krieger's emphasis). His analysis confirms the 
earlier points about maximising Impact by concentration of efforts and 
the role of picketing. It also emphasi ses the use of the threat of 
boycott acti on. A new factor IsI ntroduced by relatt ng the con- 
centrati on of ef forts and the threateni ng of boycott actl on to 
recognise that success in previous boycotts is likely to make threats 
more effective. 
The converse also applies. If boycotts are not supported and are 
Ineffective and unsuccessful then subsequent threats of boycott action 
are unlikely to be effective. Not only Is the reputati on of the 
boycott tactic tarnishedg but also that of the organisation promoting 
the boycott - So George Smithp after having shown how some European 
consumers' organIsations achieved rapid and, good results with the 
boycottp warns "Boycotts are a high-risk strategy. When successful 
they can have quick and dramatic results. Failure can be costly In 
terms both of the expense of lost law suits, which could disable 
financially vulnerable Independent testing- bodiesp and loss of 
prestige. " In the case of these particular organisations Smith won- 
ders whether boycotts In the long term are more effective than quieter 
commi ttee work. He notes that the Consumers Association and the 
majorl tv of pri vate testl ng bodl es 9 as well as the EEC - consumers I 
organisationg BEUCv have preferred the latter route. Yet he sees a 
place for boycotts: "Boycotts, which dramatise what are often tech- 
nical mattersp can therefore, If Judi 61ouslyused, be seen as a useful 
support and complement to the day-to-day lobbying activities of BEUC. " 
For many promotional pressure groupsg which, arep as Chapter Six noted, 
often outsider groupsp committee work Is not an alternative. Boycotts 
would therefore seem to be highly ýappropriateg on the basis of Smith's 
analysis (112). Sharp and Vogel have nothing to add on boycott effec- 
tiveness. 
Sop to concludep it can be seen that there Is suPportp long- 
establishedy for a number of factors In boycott effectiveness, Of 
particular Importance are various characteristics of the product 
boycottedg the organisation and promotion of the boycott (including 
picketing), the frequency of boycott action, and the directness of the 
boycott - how remote it Is from the ý grievance.,, Support in various 
ways is vital for effectiveness but not In-Itself sufficient andv on 
occasiong extensive support may not even be necessary for success. 
Thl s secti on concludes part - 8.1 and the speci fl a analyst s of the 
boycott tacti a. 8.2 considers -why the Individual, consumer should con- 
template ethical purchase behaviour, how such behaviour may be Incor- 
porated within the marketing system and possible management responses. 
Boycotts are consi dered wi thl n thi s part - as but , one form of ethi cal 
purchase behaviour whi ch might be explal ned at the micro level 9 for the reasons given. 11 '', " 1- 
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8.2 Pressure Groups In the Marketing System : -A 
Model 
8.2.1 Negative Product Augmentation 
What Isa product? Twenty years ago Fi sk answered thl s questi on by 
defining a product as a cluster or "bundle of psychological 
satisfactions" (113). Howeverv this Is an observation long recognised 
In marketing thought. Bartels refers to the study of buying motives 
by psvcholog1sts at the turn of the century, the very beginning or 
what he considers to be marketing thought (114). A product then Is 
more than the physical and most Immediately tangible attributes of' an 
offeringg It Is also the intangible attributes. For the consumer, the 
product Is "a bundle of perceived benefits" (115). As Foxall puts It 
"a product Is not simply a physical entity but a bundle of attributes 
which promise certain satisfactionsg physicalg social, psychological, 
economict to the buyer ... " He suggests, that although only one ele- 
ment within the marketing mix "It Is of immense Importance In that It 
encapsulates the great majority of the benefits expected by the 
customer" (116). 
Foxall goes on to explain how the 
i 
various attributes of a product can 
be conceived as dimensions In multi dimensional space. If some of 
these attributes are absent - the salient attributes - then consumer 
perceptions of the product will alter. For examplel elsewhere Foxall 
refers to an experiment on blindfolded. beer drinkers which found that 
they were not capable of distinguishing brands of beer. Not surpri- 
singlyp given the conception of the product.,, as a package or bundle of 
attributes, It was found that "labels and their associations did 
Influence their evaluations" (117). So, as theseq and many other 
sources showp the product Is conceived within marketing as being a 
package of benefits or values; that are, intangible as well as 
tangible, soci al-psychologi cal and 
, 
physical, or expressive and 
Instrumental; and which the consumer expects to receive on purchase. 
Levitt goes so far as to say "People don't buy products; they buy the 
expectation of benefits. " His augmented ,p, 
roduct, concept Is the expli- 
cit recognition of the conception ofthe product described above. It 
is frequently cited and his articles des I cribing it are widely 
republished (118). He writes:, Iý 
"'Whether the product Is cold-rolled steel or hot cross buns, 
whether accountancy or delicacies, competitive effectiveness 
Increasingly demands that the ýsuccessful seller offer his 
prospect and his customer_more than. the generic product Itself. 
He must surround his generic product with a cluster of value 
satisfactions that differentiates his total, offering from his 
competitors'. He must provide a total . proposi tj on 9 the content 
of which exceeds what comes out at the end of-the assembly line. " 
Hence his reference to the quote' by Revson In the Preview to this 
chapter and his claim that despite factory sales Of oosmetics In 1968 
of $3bn. "In 1968 not a single - 
4erican woman bought a single penny's 
worth of cosmetics. " Those cosmetics were, via product augmentation, 
transformed Into something else:, " "H 
- 
ope" Is. the extra Plus - the spe- 
cial promise of customer-satisfying benefits - that gives cosmetics 
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their special appeal. It Is not with the generic product that Revlon 
addresses Itself to the consumerg but with the special promise of dif- 
ferentiating glamour ... What Is important Is not so much what Revlon 
puts Inside the compact as the Ideas put Inside the customer's head by 
luxurious packaging and Imaginative advertising. " Levi tt goes on to 
explain how such an approach also applies , 
to Industrial products such 
as pressure valves or polypropyleneq whereby product differentiation 
through augmentation can be equally Important, even If glamour Is not 
the added Ingredient (119). As Levitt -puts 
It "By augmenting his 
generic product with unsolicited ext , 
ras that produce extra customer 
benefits, the seller produces for, himself extra customers. " 
Levitt recognises that the marketing concept views the customer's 
purchasing activities as being problem-solving' activities. His argu- 
ment for product augmentation seeks to differentiate generic products 
by the provision of benefits or attributes that offer solutions to 
consumers' problems beyond those offered by the generic product alone. 
In this way9 the producer acquires a 'competitive plust - In other 
words, competitive advantage - in highly competitive markets. Yet 
although having written about this concept on a number of occasions 
and over a perl od of fA f teen years I Levi tt does not seem to have 
recogni sed that a producer can acqui r'e aI competi ti ve minus IIa com- 
petitive disadvantageg through the, provi-sion of attributes not sought 
by some customers. 
The concern here Is not wi th th ,e 
planned ''provision Of Unsolicited 
extras that do not provide customer boenefits but add t' 0 the cost, or 
detract from some other feature, of, the product. (Though this Is a 
valid criticismo which, to be fair to, Levitt', I -IS acknowledged 
In The 
n lation 'where he_writes 7Some customers may prefer lower 
prices to more augmentations'. _ ,,, 
Some cannot use certain offered 
augmentations" (120). 
) The 
,C, 
oncern here'is"with the unintended provi- 
sion of product attributesp orp at'leastg' where product attributes 
result that are not the consequence of, 
- a'deliberate attempt at product 
augmentation. 
Considerv for examplev the boycott of Saran Wrapq manufactured by Dow 
Chemicalp over Dow's Involvement In the Vietnam war An the 'supplyl ng 
of napalm to the US military. The boycott of this product (a cling 
film for wrapping food) was promoted -by, -'th ,e, 
organi sers di stri butt ng 
leaflets which Informed shoppers't "If You''buy Dow. products, you help 
kill. Do not buy Dow products, - , 
'buy substitutes as'long as Dow makes 
napalm" (1219 Vogel's emphasis) "' Sara n Wrap -was augmented in a way 
entirely unintended by Dow, I, t becaiej'for, ý some people. at leastj'asso- 
clated with charred infants 
(122). " 
_, 
While "the provision of this pro- 
duct attribute was not enti 
i 
rely unlntýnded, In the sense that Dow made 
the deel sl on to supply napalm despi. te, possi ble raml fl cati ons for thel r 
other product lines 
(if they,, wer_e_' `awalr6 Of 
, 
the" possi bi it ty of ethl cal 
purchase behaviour)p It was not a 
'dell berate 
-attempt 
to augment the 
product. Product augmentatl'ong however, w. as the'result. 
Management may have less di screti on or, control. over,, whether 
Ithi 
s form 
of product augmentation occurs. ', - Manufactu'rers,, of' In South goods 
Africaq that are South African companlesj can do nothing about -the orl gI n of thei r goods short of I 
enti, rely locatilng " ellseWhere. 
. 
However' 
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importers and retailers have more discretion In that they can choose 
not to deal In South African goods because of the way they arep for 
some consumersq augmented with the Imagery of brutal oppression and 
racial discrimination against the majority population In South Africa. 
The product Is a packageg as Levitt puts It above: "a total proposl- 
ti on p the content of whi ch exceeds what comes out at 
the end of the 
assembly line. " Extending this concept furtherg It Is possible to 
argue that the product. is augmented In various ways whether the seller 
wants it or not. The augmented product may be augmented to the disad- 
vantage of the seller. Levitt writes about how products may be dell- 
berately and positively augmented. It Is, proposed here that products 
may be unintentionally and negatively augmented. This is negative 
product augmentation. 
Negative product augmentation gives rise to a legitimacy element In 
the marketing mix. This Is the subject of the next section. 
8.2.2 The Legitimacy Element In the Marketing Mix 
This author has elsewhere written about the legitimacy concept as an 
element In the marketing mix (12ý). Essentially, this paper expresses 
two Ideas concerning the marketing mix. '' 'Firstly, the notion of legi- 
timacy as a fifth element In the marketing mix In addition to the four 
pis. It is argued thatq In certain circumstancesq purchase behaviour 
may be Influenced by the relative legitimacy of a company's offering 
to the market place. The would-be customer finds some component of 
the offering Inappropriate (illegitimate) because he or she thinks It 
socially undesirable. Secondly, ' that the , 
marketing mix should be 
defined from the customer's perspective, not the producer's. Adopting 
such a perspective would be In keeping 'with a consumer orientation 
rather than a producer orientationg reflects consumer practice, and 
would justify the Incorporation of legitimacy In the marketing mix 
even where managerial discretion on this element was limited or non- 
e-xistent. 
Legitimacy Is "the extent to which society has conferred approval on 
certain thought and behaviour, relative to other thought and 
behaviour. " The legitimacy concept -operating In purchase behaviour - 
and giving rise to ethical purchase , 
behaviour - can be'found where 
some prefer domestically produced goods. Many-private and fleet car 
buyers continue to buy only BrItIshi, for as British Leyland states In 
its advertising "British cars means British jobs", (124). Country of 
origin may affect the legitimacy element In other ways, - such as some 
failing within the country of, origin, apartheid In ''South Africa for 
exampleg or some action taken by the'-country of origin against the 
importing country. During the Fi, lkl. a'nds crisisi not only did sales of 
Argentinian goods suffer (particularly 
, 
'corned beef and wine) but also 
sales bf Kerrygold Irish butter because,, o_f Ireland's refusal-to sup- 
port the British government. 
It was argued that although In - 
these cases'leiltimaci'-relates only to 
the product element In the mixg In cases' such as'the' boycott of Nestle 
over their marketing of baby milk to the Third World'or- the, boycott of 
products advertised In a sexist wayl', ", oth, er elements are 'Involved, or 
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the cases cannot be explained by any or the four P's. Sol rather than 
view legitimacy as being part or the product element It Was suggested 
that it should be viewed as a separate element In addition to those 
traditionally Identified: pricev productv promotion and placet for 
legitimacy could feature In any of the four P's or even Independently, 
Moreover, as legitimacy was shown to have an Interrelationship with 
the other elements - an example was giv ' 
en where a legitimacy failing 
was countered by a lower price - there was further support for viewing 
It as a separate element. 
it was concluded that the legitimacy element Is related to the other 
elements In the marketing mixg but It-may be less flexiblev less under 
the control of the company. Arid while It does'lmpact upon short term 
decislon-makingg It Is more likely to play a bigger part in long term, 
strateglcp deal sl on-maki ng. This Is' becausel more often than not, the 
concern will be with a lack of legitimacy which can only be rectified 
In the long tem. 
This paper was written some time before the full conceptuallsation of 
the argument expressed here on ethical purchase behaviour. Indeed, 
before this term had been thought of. . 
The debate about whether or not 
to Include legitimacy as a separate element In the marketing mix 
alongside the four P'sq or any other number and type of elements In 
the marketing mix that have been Identified, 'seems 
on reflection Irre- 
levant and pedantic. It IS Sufficient, simply to recognise that there 
is a legitimacy element which may Influen 
- 
ce purchase behaviour. 
Furtherv the criticism of definitions of the'marketing mix for empha- 
s1sing the producer's concerns Is naive. , 
-Kotler's definition typifies 
this emphasis: "The set of controllable marketing variables that the 
firm blends to produce the response It wants - In the target market" 
(125). This definition Is now accepted as appropriateg for although 
it could be argued that the marketing mix is the total proposition 
presented to (and therefore as perceived by) the consumer, this does 
not assist practitioners. The marketi ng mi xIs the term used by 
marketi ng teachers to explal n to marketi ng practi ti'oners how they may 
go about (which variables they may employ In) attempting to meet con- 
sumer needs. Legitimacy - which will Inevitably be defined by the 
Individual consumer - Is one variable which practitioners may employ 
or have to take Into account. As the Marks and Spencer example shows, 
practitioners may be able to enhance the legitimacy of their offering 
(126). 
The four Pts model of the marketing mix could'hardly be described as 
robust. it Is difficult to say whe're''one' element ends and another 
starts, wbat activities or variables would be Included under one P 
rather than another. However, It Is a very simple and useful fra- 
mework for conveying an introduction to marketing practice and for 
teachl ng practi ti oners. It 'shouldn't. 'be forgotten that for many 
people marketing Is about doi , 
ng and* . sophisticated models of the 
marketing process would Just get -in the' wayp'even If they were more 
accurate. Within the four'Pls 
-model, and following the line of argu- 
ment expressed In the last negative product augmen- 
tationg legitimacy Is perhaps best 
' 
"seen'"as aI 'part 
-or, 
the product P. 
Levitt has no qualms about referrIn- 
, 
g.: to packaging as part of the 
augmented product9 In the case ofcosmet'ies., There should then be no 
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reason for not Including 
legitimacy as well. Interestinglyq In this 
regard, Baker refers to a paper 
by Stephenson entitled "What Is a 
product? " (127). This paper 
defined a product as "Everything the 
purchaser gets In exchange 
for his money. " This Includes "extras" 
that were listed which were associated with the Physical productq such 
as deliveriesq credit terms and reputation. 
But each or these 
"extras" might also be alternatively and respectively Oonsidered part 
of the place, price and promotion 
P's, rather than the product P. 
Againt debate about this Is trivial and unnecessary. It Is simply the 
consequence of the lack of sophistication of the four P's model. 
Suffice to say that from the consumerts perspectiveg negative product 
augmentation will result from perceived shortcomings 
in the legitimacy 
of the offering. From the producer's perspective, attempts 
to deal 
with this would Involve manipulation of the legitimacy variable In the 
marketing mix. If the 
4 P's model of the marketing mix Is favoured, 
then this variable may be considered to be part or the product P. 
This would also be more consistent with the consumer perception of 
negative product augmentation. 
As Levi tt wri tes ,a product Is "a 
synthesis of what the seller 
Intends and the buyer perceives" (128). 
One further and final conceptual contribution can be made here. It 
follows from the line of argument expressed In this and the previous 
section that the product 
Is not just a bundle of benefits, as the pro- 
duct attributes may be seen as disadvantages as well as advantages by 
the consumer. The product Is more accurately conceived as a package 
of benefits and costs. 
One cost may be a legitimacy shortcomingg as 
the quote from New Soclea 
(quoted earlier) aptly Illustrates: 
"Times are surely hard for the consumer with a conscience. That 
Chilean wine may have a military bouquet, but can we afford the 
alternative? " (129). 
The next secti on consi ders negati ve product augmentati on and legi ti - 
macy within a model of pressure group Influenced ethical purchase 
behaviour. 
8.2.3 The Model 
One can refer to a marketing systemp as 'Fisk z -and 
others have done 
(130)- This Is not currently fashionablep however; probably& because 
it is not very useful in teaching practitioners, but also because of 
its positivistic Implications and limited explanatory value. 
Accepting these drawbacks one can though refer to pressure groups in 
the marketing system. 
A svstem Is "any set of interacting variables". (131). One variable, 
it .Is. argued here 9 whi ch has a legitimate role' In 'the marketi ng 
system, is the activities of pressure groups. The claim that pressure 
groups have a part to play in the marketing system Is based on, the 
need for Information for consumer sovereigntyq the power of businesso 
and pluralistic Interpretations of pressure group activity. In other 
words q the arguments advanced, 
in earlier chapters. .A model can now be 
proposedq on the basis of the concepts proposed - 
In the, last two see- 
tions and the analysis of boycotts of business, whi . ch describes how 
pressure groups Influence purchase behaviour. 
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The model proposed Is a simple one. Efforts could be made to Incor- 
porate communi cati ons theory and the psychology 
'of I nfluence (132) p 
whi ch would make It to some extent explanatory. But that would go 
beyond the parameters established for this study and Is a direction 
for further research. The model prop , 
os 
, 
ed Is a description of the pro- 
cess which results In pressure group Influenced ethical purchase 
behaviour. 
A five-stage model Is proposed: 
Stage 1: Firm's marketing sYstem stable. '' Firm (Fl) Is matching Its 
resources with the wants Of -Its, 
'Customers. Promotional 
pressure group (P) As concerned about an Issue (X). 
Stage 2: Pressure group awareness of firmtS failing. P becomes aware 
of F11s undesirable (as Judged by the pressure group) Impact 
on X. 
Stage 3: Pressure group response. P aPProaches__. Fjq other organisa- 
tions (the media, government, departmentsp etc. ) and the 
customerp to seek an end to the Impact by Fl on X. 
Stage 4: Firm's marketing system becomes 'unstabl6. ' The firm's custo- 
mers become aware of the impact of F1 on X. This threatens 
the exchange process because' X becomes a part of the 
organisation's offering' to''the Customer through negative 
product augmentation. 
Stage 5: Ethical purchase behaviour.. Some F1 customers, spon- 
taneously or In response to a call for'a'boycott by P, take 
thei r custom to another firm (F2). ' F2j- without the legi- 
timacy shortcoming of Impact I on X, better matches Its 
resources with those customers' wants. 
Various other stages could follow, depending on management responsery. 
These are explored In the next sectI on. The model Is9 of course , 
. 91 MPJI stj C 
It does notj for exampleg account for the behaviour of 
customers concerned about X wtio, 
'remain 'with F1 but receive less 
utility as a consequence, or, those that 90 to other firms. It does 
also assume brand loyaltyg competitive, market. conditions and so on. 
Howeverp on the basis of this'and ', previous chapters, It Is thought 
likely to describe the general pattern of events. Its validity Is 
explored In Part Three. 
8. P-. 4 Management Response 
Management response to pressure groups In the marketing system can be 
considered In two ways. Firstlyp anticipatory management action, 
where management recognises that press .uI re 
I gro I ups, are a feature of the 
marketing environment and takes thl 
-sI Into r acco . unt In Its decision- 
making. Thl s suggests a pro , 
active role for management. Secondly, 
management acti on In respo , 
nse to 'a-'pressure. group action' I directed at 
the firm. This suggests a reactive role, for, - ma'nagem ent'#" although this 
may be Inevitable where pressure group Issues are fundamentally In 
conflict with some or all of the'firm's activities (and Possibly other 
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pressure groupsp such as on the 
Issues of contraception and abortion) 
or where the firm's proactive role was 
Insufficient or Inadequate. 
Most of the relevant literature falls Into the first category - how 
management can take preventative action. It need not be concerned 
solely with boycotts as the management task Is essentially the same 
regardless of the specific form of the potential environmental threat. 
Management has been urged to scan the environment (133), to recognise 
and accept the role of pressure groups (134), to match performance 
with public expectations (135)9 and even to communicate and cooperate 
with pressure groups (136). In other wordsl management seeks to main- 
tain the legitimacy of Its offering. It recognises there Is a legiti- 
macy element In the marketing mix and does all It can to avoid 
shortcomings and perhaps even tries to enhance its performance on this 
varl able. 
Ackerman's work, referred to earlierg is useful In a general way in 
offering guidance on management response to social demands. He 
describes the process whereby response to social demands can become 
lnstitutionallsedg necessary because "Edicts from on high and staff 
activity don't affect change; it has-to be Instutionallsed In the 
operating units" (137). There Is then an Important distinction bet- 
ween social responsibility decisions (presumably Possibly Including 
responses to pressure group demands) made at the corporate level and 
at the operating level. He argues for social responsiveness to be 
Included within the organisation's reward and punishment system (138). 
Againg this Is more concerned with preventative action rather than 
response to a specific demand. 
One paper which does consider management response 
pressure group demand regarding the firmts products 
'Vezerldis (139). They propose a six-stage model 
conf 11 ct: 
1. Peace - "the products are marketed regularly. " 
, -to a specific 
Is by Ford and 
of envi ronmental 
2. skirmish - "... little activity. An artl ale may appear In a 
scientific magazine or on the Inside pages of newspapers 
Conflict - escalation: "the Issue receives Increasing publicity 
,.. the controversy 
Is taken up by a social organisation which 
tarts to pressurise companies. " 
Three possible outcomes to the previous conflict: 
a. Company defeat - product completely withdrawn, voluntarily, 
under pressure, or as a result of legislation. 
b. Tactical withdrawal - company makes modifications or con- 
cessionsv voluntarily or by force of law. 
C Pressure defeat - pressure lifted because product shown to 
be harmlessp discredit or failure of a pressure groupp or 
external factors which mean that "the environmental costs of 
a product must be Incurred. " 
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5. Victorv from defeat - follows from 4b - "company takes advantage 
of the changes In Its products or methods which have been forced 
or have resulted ... "environmental safety" of the modified pro- 
duct becomes a positive feature of the company's marketing 
policy. " 
Pre-emptive strike - company learns Its lesson: "products are 
designed to alleviate or at least not to exacerbate environmental 
problems. " 
The last stage of course Is preventative actiong management seeking to 
maintain the legitimacy of the offering. The three possible outcomes 
suggested at the fourth stage are those that may follow on from the 
model proposed In Section 8.2-3. The firm may give In to pressure 
group demands by withdrawing the product or by making all necessary 
modifications (or, as a compromise, some modifications only). 
Alternatively, It may fight the pressure group. Put In terms appli- 
cable to pressure group demands not relating to the environmental 
threat of the firm's product, the company may give In to the pressure 
group and cease and/or remedy the perceived grievance, or It may fight 
and attempt to justify Its action (the grievance). 
Again, Part Three will assess the validity of these claims. The Ford 
and Vezeridis paper will be returned to In Chapter Eleven. 
8.3, the final part to this chaptert concludes Part Two by briefly 
stating some preliminary conclusions that have been derived from the 
argument expressed on ethical purchase behaviour, and some proposi- 
tions which are considered In Part Three and which guided the survey 
and case study work. 
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Some PrellmJnary Conclusions and Propositions 
B-3.1 The Societal Marketing Concept 
The application of the concept of legitimacy to marketing Is not 
without precedentp for Kotler writes of the Importance of legitimacy 
In describing the "higher purpose of marketing: " 
"Ultimatelyg the enlightened marketer Is really trying to contri- 
bute to the quall ty of 11 fe ... Profl ts wi 11 sti 11 be a major 
test of business success In serving society. However ... profits 
are really a by-product of doing business well and not the moral 
aim of business. Business, like other Institutions of society, 
prospers only by maintaining legitimacy In the eyes of consumers, 
employees and the general public. Legitimacy is grounded In the 
Institution's commitment to serve higher moral alms" (140). 
This perspective Is reflected in his societal marketing concept (141); 
wherein there are three underlying premises: 
Consumers' wants do not always coincide with their long-run 
Interests or society's long-run Interests. 
2. Consumers wi 11 1 nereasl ngly favour organi sati ons whi ch show a 
concern with meeting their wants, long-run interestsp and 
society's long-run Interests. 
The organisation's task Is to serve target markets In a way that 
produces not only want satisfaction but long-run Individual and 
social benefit as the key to attracting and holding customers. 
Kotler's societal marketing concept, particularly In the latter two 
underlying premisesq Implicitly recognises ethical purchase behaviour. 
He suggests consumers will be influenced In their purchase behaviour 
by social Issues. Yet Is all thl s talk of a hi gher purpose of 
marketing and a societal marketing concept simply empty rhetoric? 
The answer to this question on the basis of the argument presented 
here would seem to be 'no'. A case for ethical purchase behaviour has 
been presentedg based on the nature of consumer sovereignty, the 
requirement for social control of business via the marketplacep and 
the growing Influence but need for effective tactics of promotional 
pressure groups. The use of the consumer boycott tacti c91tIs 
arguedv represents an attempt to achieve ethical purchase and Instan- 
ces of this have already been considered. Further Instances are exa- 
mined In Part Three. 
So the fi rst and foremost conclusi on at thl s pol nt must be that there 
Isa 6ase for ethl cal purchase behaviour and some evidence of It. 
There are other preliminary conclusions. These can best be considered 
by taking each research question In turn. They are the subject there- 
fore of the next three sectl ons. Proposi ti ons to be explored In Part 
Three are also noted. 
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8.3.2 How May Pressure Groups Most Effectively Employ the Consumer 
Boycott Tactic and How Should Boycotted Businesses Respond? 
Guidelines for action by pressure groups In employing the consumer 
boycott and management In responding have already been suggested on 
the basis of the pressure group literature and descriptions of pre- 
vious boycotts. The validity of the description of the mechanism of 
the boycott In 8.1.59 together with the model In 8.2.3t will be 
assessed In Part Three. The factors In boycott effectiveness In 8.1.6 
are also assessed In Part Three as propositions. 
An Important conclusion at this point Is the recognition of the signi- 
ficance of popular supportj both In consumer boycotts and pressure 
group success as a whole. It is worth recalling the observation in 
Chapter Six that consumers are not an organised group In the way that 
workers are. Howevery pressure groups have been successful - Insofar 
as they've put Issues on the political agenda - without mass support. 
Mass support for direct action seems unlikely In this country but con- 
sumer boycottsv a form of direct action, can still be successful even 
If they are not extensively supported. 
A further preliminary conclusion must be that consumer boycotts are 
not widespreadq In this country at least. There may, as Appendix A 
suggests9 be many calls for boycotts. But It seems unlikely that 
there has been an effective consumer boycott, even If some have proved 
successful In achieving their alms. Consumer boycotts are more preva- 
lent In the United States. There they have also been effective and 
successful. However, the paucity of literature on consumer boycotts 
would seem In Itself to suggest that boycotts are not the effective 
Instrument of pressure they were when employed by the American labour 
unions. Perhaps they have a latent potential. This potential may, 
howeverg only be reallsed under conditions of great deprivation. It 
mightt as Chapter Seven suggested, be more likely In or more 
appropriate to Eastern cultures. 
This research question Is very much a practical one. The next 
question Is a little more conceptual. 
8.3.3 Can Consumer Sovereignty Ensure Social Responsibility In 
Business and In What Way? 
The answer to thl s questi on 11 es In the argument for ethl cal purchase 
behaviour. The proposed model describing pressure group Influence on 
purchase behaviour shows how pressure groups may enhance consumer 
sovereignty by providing Information on social responsibility Issues 
affecting businesses and of concern to some or all of their customers. 
Ethical purchase behaviour Is the term used to describe the response 
by customers who choose to express their concern in the market. The 
outcome may then be social responsibility in business. 
However, as the literature revealsq the term social responsibility In 
business means different things to different people. It Is perhaps 
best used to describe voluntary action by business, that Is self- 
regulation. The possibility of ethical purchase behaviour may of 
course prompt self-regulation by business. But It might be more 
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accurate to refer to ethical purchase behaviour as a mechanism for the 
social control of business. 
An Important preliminary conclusion was that society exerts control 
over business In three ways, In keeping with the three types of power: 
force, Inducement and manipulation. Social control of business Is 
achieved by legislation, the market and moral obligation. It seems 
that currently the market offers the most potential for Increasing 
social control over business. This lends further support to the 
notion of ethical purchase behaviour. It may then be a public policy 
objective. 
The most manifest form of ethical purchase behaviour Is In organised 
boycott action. This Is therefore the subject of Investigation In the 
case studies In Part Three. Because boycotts are Interpreted as ethi- 
cal purchase behaviour, the case study analysis considers their func- 
tion as social control mechanisms, in addition to the concerns 
referred to In the previous section. As noted, other forms of ethical 
purchase behaviour do occur but are less easy to empirically investi- 
gate. Ethical purchase behaviour need not necessarily be pressure 
group inspiredp It may, as the model suggests (8.2-3), be a spon- 
taneous consumer response, given Information on social responsibility 
Issues from other sources such as the media. Thl s form of ethi cal 
purchase behaviour Is more difficult to Investigate and is therefore 
not Included to any great extent In Part Three. 
The model and the noti ons of negati ve product augmentati on and the 
legitimacy concept as an element In the marketing mIxv may be con- 
sidered as propositions, which are explored In Part Three. 
Another Important conclusion at this point Is the recognition that, 
given the requirement for Information for consumer sovereignty, 
pressure groups have a legitimate role In the marketing system. 
Pressure groups In the marketing system can try to ensure social 
responsibility In business by making businesses as accountable to 
their markets on such Issues. This Information role for pressure 
groupsg enhancing consumer sovereignty In this way, Is a form of what 
Galbraith terms countervailing power. If the social control of busi- 
ness can be so reallsedl this may even reduce the requirement for 
legislative control and perhaps partly resolve the problem of private 
costs versus social costsp as the latter may become private costs If 
Incorporated into the legitimacy element of the offering. 
8.3.4 How Far Does Consumer Sovereignty Extend? 
This thesis Is about the decisions made in markets: whether decisions 
and what decisions are made by consumers. It Is a study of the degree 
and extent of consumer sovereignty. The degree of consumer 
soverel'gnty refers to how much authority buyers (consumers) have as 
opposed to sellers. The extent of consumer sovereignty refers to the 
domain of that authorItyt the Issues on which consumers may have 
Influence by virtue of their purchase behaviour. Ethl cal purchase 
behavlourt exemplified In consumer boycotts, suggests an extension of 
consumer sovereignty beyond Its mere technical meaning In economics to 
a more literal meaning. Part Three provides a limited assessment of 
the extent of consumer sovereignty. 
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The argument for ethical purchase behaviour assumes the competitive 
model of capitalism. The argument therefore becomes somewhat nor- 
mative as the competitive model of capitalism Is Ideologically 
founded. Consumer sovereignty requires choice as well as Information, 
so it may be less prevalent than the dominant Ideology of the com- 
petitive model of capitalism suggests and Is commonly 3UPposed. 
Consumer sovereignty Is the rationale for eapitalismv the political- 
economic system In the West. The legitimacy of such a system then 
rests on whether and what decisions are made In markets. The argument 
for ethical purchase behaviour becomes an argument for capitalism. An 
Important conclusion Is simply the recognition of the significance of 
asking this question about the extent of consumer sovereignty. 
Of courseq not all political decisions can or should be made in 
markets. But some could. Ethical purchase behaviour offers the 
potential for greater political participation. 
Writers In the business and society literature refer to a politicising 
of the corporation. This suggests the corporation has only recently 
acquired political significance. This Is misleading. The corporation 
has long had political significance because of Its structural position 
In the economy and power. It Is only recently that there has been 
public recognition of this. Ethical purchase behaviour Is an 
expression of this recognition. It Is also therefore a political act. 
These Ideas are considered further In Chapter Twelvet following the 
discussion of the survey research and case studies In Part Three. 
Part Two has provided an argumento integrated and concluded In this 
chapter. Part Three provides some further evidence to support the 
argument. 
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SUMMARY TO PART TWO 
Part Two has presented the theoretical argument for ethical purchase 
behaviour. 
Chapter Three ,in explori ng the nature of capi tali sm and consumer 
sovereignty from an economic and political perspective, provides a 
philosophical basis for ethical purchase behavi our. Consumer 
sovereignty is shown to be the rationale for capitalismq its 
expression in ethical purchase behaviour is therefore appropriate to 
market societies. Yet consumer sovereignty may in practice be 
limited, which raises doubts about the competitive model of capita- 
lism, the marketing concept, and the likelihood of ethical purchase 
behaviour. 
Poli ti cal-economi c systems are di sti ngui shed by thei r dependence on 
the market mechanism. In market societies decision-making is 
decentralised and power can be said to lie with consumers in the form 
of consumer sovereignty. By looking at the origins of capitalism it 
can be seen that market society brings with it the benefits of 
material progress and freedom. Economic and political freedom is said 
to accrue, though this depends on an Interpretation in accordance with 
the ohilosophy of individualism. This philosophy forms the basis for 
the competitive model of capitalism, first advanced by the classical 
economists, and subsequently by business and the neo-classical econo- 
mists. 
The materi al progress under capi tali sm is not di sputed , but the com- 
1)etitive model of capitalism, although constituting the dominant 
ideology, is not always preferred or considered to be accurate. Marx, 
Keynes, Schmitter and others have offered different interpretations, 
particularly the crisis, compromise and corporatist models of capita- 
lism. The freedom of individualism mayp for exampleg result in 
alienation. 
Economic systems may be assessed by the criteria of efficiency, 
freedom, equity and altruism. The competitive model of capitalism, 
although impaired by market imperfections such as externalities and 
imperfect informationg does rate highly on the criterion of effi- 
ciency. Within acceptance of the philosophy of individualism it also 
rates highly on the criterion of freedom. It Is on the cri teri a of 
equity and altruism, which almost seem in conflict with efficiency and 
freedom, that it may be most criticised, especially in an affluent 
society. Accordinglyq the suggestion that 'the market will answer all 
things', is disputed. Capitalism may have brought material progress 
but this may no longer be the most important social goal. There is 
also Increasing concern over the associated social costs 
(externalities). Yet, it is argued here, consumer sovereignty may be 
employed to address these failings. 
Critics of the competitive model of capitalism have differed preferen- 
ces or priorities to its adherentsp but they also highlight its inac- 
curacies, particularly the notion of consumer sovereignty. 
Galbraith's Revised Sequencep for exampleg refers to a producer 
sovereignty. In mixed markets it is more accurate to refer to degrees 
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of consumer sovereignty dependent, most notably, on choice through 
competition, informationg actions by the state, and individual wealth. 
So two forms of consumer sovereignty emerge, an absolute form as found 
in the competitive model of capitalism, and a more restricted form 
where consumer sovereignty is viewed as a technical term to refer to 
degrees of consumer authority. 
The marketing discipline subscribes to the competitive model of capi- 
tali sm. Consumer sovereignty may even be a paradigm for marketing. 
Yet as a feature of perfect competition it is theoretically irrecon- 
cilable with marketing strategies. Perfect competition does not exist 
in the 'real' world and, If it did, there couldn't be marketing stra- 
tegies. The centrality of consumer sovereignty to marketing points to 
the ideological nature of marketing thought. Marketing's response to 
consumerism is one illustration of this. 
So ChaDter Three shows that, while ethical purchase behaviour as an 
expression of consumer sovereignty Is in keeping with the competitive 
model of capitalism and marketing, it may be restricted by the limited 
degree of consumer sovereignty. Moreover , how does soci ety control 
business is not through the market? 
Chapters Four and Five consider the social control of business. The 
limits to society's control over business by the market were indicated 
above. Ethical purchase behaviour, especially in consumer boycottsg 
is an attempt at the social control of business via the market. It 
may result from externalities or a difference in priorities - equity 
or altruism preferred to efficiency. Whatever, social goals other 
than material progress are sought. 
Chapter Four examines the social role of business - what society might 
expect from business and, in corporate social responsibility, what it 
receives. Business and society is the discipline concerned with 
business' social role. Its analysis of the relationship between busi- 
ness and society, however, provides few certain answers; the issue is 
complicated, particularly by the different ideological positions that 
may be brought to Its analysis. Yet by approaching the issue in terms 
of the social control of businessq a meaningful focus may be adopted 
which brings clarity and reduces ideological bias. 
Business digressions, such as ITT's involvement in an attempted coup 
in Chile, emphasise the need for social control of business. They 
reveal corporate power without accountability. Yet all corporate 
actions may be so criticised, for the exercise of power by business 
lacks legitimacy. Claims to property rights are no longer sufficient 
given the separation of ownership and control. Though the extent of 
corporate power is considerableg business essentially Identifies the 
issues for which it is responsible and the priorities to be attached 
to them. This exercise of power is defended by reference to corporate 
social responsibility - to the self-regulation of business. 
Corporate social responsibility has become something of a shibboleth; 
all firms practice corporate social responsibility. Beyond the rhe- 
toric however, if firms have a social roleg then clearly they have 
responsibilities. In which casep how may these responsibilities be 
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defined or identified? How does management determine their relative 
priority? How far does corporate social responsibility extend? And 
how does management actually act in practice? 
Corporate responsibilities may be identified by looking at the social 
costs created by the firm, externalities for which It could assume 
responsibility as it has caused them. But social costs are not always 
immediately apparent or readily acknowledged. Responsi bi li ti es may 
also be identified by examining the impact of the firm's activities on 
its stakeholders. But this method also is problematical. The firm 
may not be aware of all its stakeholders and some, such as the share- 
holders and the community, mav be in conflict. Business is therefore 
still left with determining priorities even when it has identified its 
responsibilities. 
Related to the priorities problem, is the question of the extent of 
corporate social responsibility: How far should business go in helping 
to resolve the problems of our society? Four positions are identified 
in a model proposed here, which combines corporate goals and 
responsibilities: profit maximisation and social Irresponsibility; 
profit maximisation tempered by the 'moral minimum' through 
self -regulation; profit as a necessary but not sufficient goal, with 
affirmative action extending beyond self -regulation; and, finallyg 
going beyond this to include the championing of political and moral 
causes unrelated to the corporation's business activities, as long as 
profi tabi li ty permi ts. Many, however, would argue against social 
responsibility of any form beyond profit maximisation. Yet such a 
position, the 'Friedman misconception', is founded in the competitive 
model of capitalism with all its flaws, and, in particular, Ignores 
the reality of managerial discretion on social Issues. 
Management practi es and perspecti ves on soci al responsi bi li ty may be 
considered in terms of managerial creeds or ideologies. One may 
distinguish between profit maximising management2 trusteeship manage- 
ment, and "quality of life" management; of which the second type is 
said to be predominant. The third type, equating to the fourth posi- 
tion in the model on the extent of corporate responsibility, might be 
becoming more popular. Similarly, one may refer to classical, mana- 
gerial, and consent creeds, or to the classical ideology and the 
modern socioeconomic managerial ideology. The creeds to which mana- 
gers adhere will determine their response on social issues. While 
there may be a trend towards adopting greater responsibilitiesq it is 
thought likely that the majority of managers are still only at the 
second position in the model, of profit maximisation tempered by the 
'moral minimum' through self-regulation. 
Busi ness practi ces and perspecti ves on soci al responsi bi li ty are then 
largely In keeping with Friedman's admonitions. Yet profit maximisa- 
tion as the sole social responsibility of business should not be 
simply dismissed as self-serving. A closer analysis of Friedman's 
case reveals five principal arguments against corporate social 
responsibility: competing claims (the role of profit), competitive 
disadvantage, competenceg fairness (domination by business), and legi- 
timacy (the role of government). Howeverg while Importantt the 
counter arguments are considered more so. They acknowledge the Inac- 
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curacies of Friedman's model of capitalismq managerial discretiong the 
extent of corporate power, the 'moral minimumIq and the relationship 
between enlightened self-interest and the long-term profitability of 
the firm. 
So social responsibility may be a doctrine to which management adheres 
In the absence of any other basi s for acti on. Yet corporate social 
responsibilities may be Identified and even addressed by management. 
The doctrine of corporate social responsibility is a form of social 
control of business. There are other forms that seek more direct cor- 
porate accountabi li ty. Chapter Five examines the social control of 
business mechanisms, turning from the doctrine of corporate social 
responsibility and philanthropy to corporate accountability. 
Various solutions to the problem of corporate power have been advanced 
over many years. Those solutions which would maintain market society 
include radical solutions, such as nationalisation, and more piecemeal 
solutions. They involve pressure from within the organisation for 
social responsibility such as changes in corporate governance, and 
pressure from outside the organisation through increased disclosure 
by, for example, social audits or ethical whistle-blowing. Ethical 
purchase behaviour, particularly in consumer boycotts, constitutes a 
piecemeal solution involving pressure from outside the organisation. 
DesDite the great number and variety of solutions proposed to the pro- 
blem of corporate power those, at least, that would maintain the 
market system, may be said to Involve three forms of control over 
business: legislation, the market, and self-control. 
According to this analysis, a simple model may be proposed 
correspondi ng to the type of power involved. Studies of power 
generally acknowledge three types: force, inducement and manipulation. 
Galbrai th pIn looki ng at the types of power busi ness exerts over 
society, Identifies condign, compensatory, and conditioned power. 
Yet, it Is claimed here, society exerts power over business in a simi- 
lar way. Condign power or force operates through legislation. 
Compensatory power or inducement operates through the market. 
Conditioned power or manipulation operates through moral obligation 
and self -regulation. All three types have strengths and weaknesses. 
Legislation may not always work and there are limits beyond which it 
cannot be sensibly applied. It may also threaten the market system. 
The market, as Chapter Three concluded, is in itself insufficient. 
While moral obligation, in self-regulationg has in Chapter Four's exa- 
mination of the doctrine of corporate responsibility been shown to be 
problematical. It Is, In particular, elitist and does not involve 
di rect accountabi 11 ty. Though It is acknowledged that this form of 
control amounts to more than conscious efforts by the firm to endorse 
social responsibility, as it incorporates social conditioning - mana- 
gement action in accordance with social norms. 
The conclusl on reached on the soci al control of busi ness is that 
further control is requi red and thi s may be achi eved , perhaps 
necessarilyp through the market. So itis argued that consumer 
sovereignty could attempt to ensure social responsibility in business. 
This would be in keeping with, or at least only a slight distortion 
of, the competitive model of capitalism. In 'letting the market work' 
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it would also be appropriate to the current politico-economic climate 
In the West. But while ethical purchase behaviour sounds a good solu- 
tion, in practice it may be difficult. It demands informed choice. 
Only then could consumers vote in the marketplace on those social 
responsibility issues about which they are concerned. Choice requires 
competition. While information on social issues may be provided by 
organisations specially concerned with those issues: pressure groups. 
So Chapter Five has examined the mechanisms for the social control of 
business, proposed a model within which they may be incorporatedg and 
found them lacking. The market, perhaps overlooked by business and 
societv analvsts, may offer further potential for the social control 
of business in ethical purchase behaviour. But given the already 
acknowledged limitations to consumer sovereignty, this solution is not 
without its drawbacks. Pressure groups, howeverý who are already 
acting on business and on social responsibility issuesp might serve to 
enhance consumer sovereignty. Chapter Six examines pressure groups 
and their potential in this respect. 
Pressure groups have an important role in the political process and 
soci ety. They have been described as an "auxiliary circuit of 
representation. " Yet there are many different types of pressure 
group, some having more influence than others. In particular, there 
is the distinction between groups that are 'of'. the sectional groupsq 
and groups that are 'for', the promotional groups. Wi thi n thi s 
distinction, there is also a difference in their degree of political 
specialisation - in how political they are. The concern here is 
largely with promotional pressure groups of high political specialisa- 
tion, such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. They are the 
groups which have grown in numbers and influence over recent years 
and, for advocates of pluralism, are therefore viewed favourably and 
as contributing to political participation. 
Promotional pressure groups, however, are often of limited effec- 
tiveness because they lack the necessary resources. Three principal 
avenues of pressure are traditionally identified: the executive, 
parliament, and public opinion. But few promotional groups achieve 
'insider' statuso even If they desire it, and have largely to rely on 
public opinion. This reflects and exacerbates their absence of 
resourcesq especially their weak strategic locationg problems in 
ensuring commitment and cohesion - they are dependent on solidary 
incentivesq small group size and altruism, and their limited finances. 
Public support endorses a group's demands but may not be forthcoming 
for more radical groups. The only alternative then is direct action. 
The politics literature tends to ignore corporate power and, perhaps 
accordingly, the literature on pressure groups focuses on pressure 
group action against governments rather than business. Yet business 
may be a fourth avenue of pressure. Pressure groups may seek to 
change corporate behaviour org alternativelyq use business as an ave- 
nue of pressure to indirectly influence the public authoritiesv moti- 
vating public opinion or employing the 'insider' status of business. 
An increasing pressure group emphasis on corporations may be in 
recognition of corporate power but also because of limited access to 
the other avenues of pressure. 
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Promotional groups, for the most part, operate by mobilising legiti- 
macv for their cause. They do this bv providing information; 
directly, in the form of reports or their literatureq but also in 
their actions, such as demonstrations. They hope thereby to influence 
public and elite opinion. Different groups and different environments 
demand different strategies and tactics. Strategies Include the use 
of the law, embarrassment and confrontation, information and consti- 
tuency influence and pressure. There are many tactics, from letter 
writing to sit-ins. 
The strategy of embarrassment and confrontation is most likely to be 
used against the firm, for although it may be conceived as a 'private 
government', not all strategies and tactics employed against the 
public authorities are appropriate. The prime concern here is with 
pressure group use of the consumer boycott tactic against business. 
But the pressure group literature has little to contribute on this. 
Of importance, however, is that the factors in pressure group success 
and the circumstances promotional groups find themselves inp push 
these groups towards particular strategies and tactics. As they are 
largely tied to public opinion and this may be difficult to influence 
or ignored by the authorities, then the increasing number of promo- 
tional groups will be ever more likely to seek direct solutions to the 
issues they address. Business will then become increasingly involved 
and, given Its visibility and consequent vulnerability to 
embarrassment and confrontation strategies, protest tactics and direct 
action employed. This may happen regardless of corporate 'guilt'. 
simply because corporations constitute a convenient target. 
The consumer boycott may take the form of a protest tactic, merely to 
gain media attention. But it is more appropriately seen as direct 
acti on. DI rect acti on Isa last resort , deservedly so InI ts extreme 
forms. Consumer boycotts as a form of non-violent direct action 
(NVDA) and legitimised by their basis in consumer sovereignty, may 
provide promotional pressure groups with an effective and attractive 
tactic where their other efforts are frustrated. So Chapter Six shows 
that while ethical purchase behaviour requires the provision of the 
necessary information, pressure groups, whose role is to provide such 
information, are in need of effective pressure tactics. Pressure 
groups mav then seek a role in the marketing system. In doi ng so , 
political participation may be Increased and the exercise of power in 
society becomes more diluted. 
Chapter Seven examines the boycott tactic in detail, as a form of non- 
violent direct action and as it is used by pressure groups and others. 
Features of the boycott and principles In its use and response to it 
emerge as commonp whether it takes the form of the consumer boycott or 
as an international economic sanction. In parti cular ,ItIs an 
expression of disassociation with some repugnant thing -a moral act - 
and can be symbolic as well as effective. 
The increase in direct action by promotional groups is likely to be in 
NVDA. Direct action appeals to some groups for ideological reasons. 
In consumer boycottsý products may be avoided because they are seen as 
tainted; NVDA may be more appropriate to most promotional groups' 
aims, as a rejection of violence. Yet i ts use may be pragmati c as 
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well as principled, for NVDA has proved highly effective. It provides 
power through moral superiority. The exercise of power depends on 
obedience. NVDA recognises and challenges that obedienceg taking 
power away from immoral authorities and giving it to their critics. 
This may involve the firm when acting in concert with governmentp such 
as Tarmac in Its Involvement in cruise missile silo construction (see 
CND case), or independentlyp with the firm seen as a 'private 
government'. A Gallup survey confirms the conclusion that direct 
action is set to increase, with business ever more involved. This is 
most likely to be in NVDA, including consumer boycotts. 
Sharp's comprehensive study of NVDA identifies three classes of 
action, the withdrawal of cooperation being the most prevalent. 
Economic boycotts are classified under economic non-cooperation and 
Sharp offers a typology which includes the consumers' boycott as one 
action by consumers. There are weaknesses to his analysis, howeverg 
and an alternative definition of consumer boycott is proposed which 
emphasises consumer sovereignty. So, a consumer boycott is the orga- 
nised exercising of consumer sovereignty by abstaining from purchase 
of an offering in order to exert influence on a matter of concern to 
the customer and over the institution making the offering. Sharp 
suggests NVDA Is successful by achieving conversion of the opponent; 
though this is less likely than accommodation or non-violent coercion. 
It has to be acknowledged that the consumer boycott, although non- 
violent, does have coercive features. Sharp favours NVDA as it can 
achieve a redistribution of power. 
Yet how relevant Is NVDA to Bri tai n? Much of the li terature con- 
centrates on the classi c acti ons over ci vi 1 ri ghts or by Gandhi .A 
grid is proposed identifying key dimensions in the classification of 
NVDA. This distinguishes between principled or conscientious non- 
violence and pragmatic non-violence, and small-scale non-violence and 
the large-scale, classic action. Though only indicative of general 
tendencies, it is suggested that in accordance with thisq most NVDA in 
Britain is small-scale pragmatic non-violence and likely to remain as 
such. In which case, a role for the consumer boycott is again indi- 
cated. More importantlyq the issue is raised as to whether boycotts 
should be judged by their economic effects when in this country they 
are likelv to be principally symbolic acts. The likely illegality of 
many common forms of NVDA, including consumer boycotts, is dismissed, 
as they amount to only a minor breach of the law comparable to 
breaches of Sunday trading laws and tolerable as a valuable form of 
poli ti cal expressi on. With consumer boycotts In particular, their 
appropriateness to market society reinforces this judgement. 
The term boycott ori gi nated in 1880 wi th the ostraci sm of Captai nCC 
Boycott, an Irish land agent, over the treatment of his tenants. He, 
and his supporters, were boycotted in a number of ways. A continuum 
of boycotting may then be identified according to the extent of the 
ostracism involved and, because of this, and the many different par- 
ties that may use or be subject to the boycott, there is considerable 
variety in the types of boycott that may be found. Some types are 
more extreme and less acceptable than others. While some boycott 
actions are not referred to as such, strikes or Iblacking1p for 
example. The concern here is with the 'not buying from' types of 
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boycott. Although strikes or blacking are more commonly used by 
unions today, consumer boycotts were more important before labour, in 
the United States at least, became organised. Consumer boycotts 
appear to have been the key to unionisation. When thi s goal was 
achieved they were no longer necessary as the union could more effec- 
tively use the strike. Though where unions are weak, as In Third 
World countries or the grape boycott case, the consumer boycott is 
sti 11 used. The use of the consumer boycott by unions - and I ts 
effectiveness - is evidence of the use of the market to control busi- 
ness. 
The international economic sanction is another type of boycott and 
often referred to as an economic boycott. It achieved considerable 
prominence under the League of Nations following World War I, when it 
was considered an effective alternative to war. Hopes for the boycott 
in such a role were not fulfilled, but economic sanctions continue to 
be used and have proved effective and successful. 
An interesting variant is to be found in Remer's study of Chinese 
boveotts. The Chinese boycotts, although international in scope, were 
no t officially organised by the government and were said to be largely 
a spontaneous reaction by the Chinese people. In this way, they are 
more like consumer boycotts than international economic sanctions and 
so have some particularly useful contributions to make here. The 
methods in their enforcement and promotion, such as picketing and 
posters, were to be found in the labour boycotts reported and in more 
recent consumer boycotts. 
'Remer suggests their objectives may be publicity, punishment, and 
policy change. Their outcome may be effectiveness and success, though 
psychological impact may be as important in success as economic effec- 
tiveness. (He makes the distinction, found elsewhereq between econo- 
mic effectiveness and the achievement of objectivesq success. ) A 
boycott may be useful in bringing publicity and, as a passive measure, 
sympathy. Accordingly, it may be both a weapon of retaliation and a 
theatrical sword. As an international actiong there can be protec- 
tionist benefits as a spin-off. 
Drawbacks to the boycott areq however, identified. It may be a 
double-edged sword, with costs for the boycotter. It can also be slow 
and cumbersome. Moreoverg organisation and solidarity are identified 
as important in its effectiveness, perhaps more easily achieved in 
China. Sharp describes China as the "classic home of the national 
consumers' boycott" and Remer refers to a long history of boycotts in 
China, before the term, indeedg was conceived. There is then the 
question as to the boycott's cultural appropriateness to the West. 
The origins, organisation and effectiveness of the Chinese boycotts 
have cultural explanationsg particularly the cultural precedents of a 
passive resistance tradition and a highly structured society. But 
Western boycottsg later consideredg somewhat allay these doubts. 
The Chinese boycotts, and Remer's analysis, point to principles in the 
use of the boycott and common features. They are f ound to be of 
applicability to both consumer boycotts and more recent examples of 
international economic sanctions consideredg such as those over UDI in 
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Rhodesia. Analvsis of these boycotts also highlights target vulnera- 
bility and the role of sanctions to reinforce morality. Boycotts may 
not be futile because of this latter point, even if they are not 
effective. They can be used to punish, having an expressive function. 
Some sources suggest effectiveness may not be necessary for success, 
especially when success has more to do with punishment and showing 
that things are not being taken lying down than policy changes. 
Responses are principally in the form of adaptation, economic restruc- 
turing, and trading with or through other countries. It's suggested 
that boycotts may in themselves be inadequate. 
The Arab boycott is an international economic sanctiong probably the 
most significant and costly boycott involving businessq and also, in 
the Jewish resDonse, involves consumer boycotts. It demonstrates 
boycott effectiveness, but not success; unless the punishment of 
Israel is viewed as a sufficient, if costly, success. In i ts 
expressive role - as moral condemnation of Israel and its supporters - 
itis an example of ethi cal purchase behavi our. The Jewi sh response , 
spontaneous and organised counter-boycotts, is also ethical purchase 
behaviour. Boycott methods are indicated and factors in their 
effectiveness, for example, boycotts are difficult to control the 
further thev are removed from the grievance. 
More than this, the Arab boycott is also about social responsibility 
in business and management response to boycotts. Compliance with the 
boycott has been condemned - even where firms appear to be following 
the government line - and resulted in counter-boycotts. Some fi rms 
ended their compliance partly as a result of the economic effect of 
these boycotts but also because of the publicity. The conclusi on 
about boycotts in general being successful without being effective 
seems particularly true in the case of consumer boycotts. This, of 
course, harks back to observation in Chapter Six on pressure group 
strategies and tactics and the visibility of firms. Moreover, in the 
achievement of anti-boycott legislation by Jewish groups, it shows how 
pressure groups most often achieve successp by putting issues on the 
political agenda. Their consumer boycotts, as well as publicity and 
shareholder actions, played an important part in this. 
So, Chapter Seven is a thorough examination of the boycott tactic, 
acknowledging the similarities between different types of boycott as 
well as its origin and its basis in NVDA. The distinction and rela- 
tionship between effectiveness and success and the expressive function 
of boycotts has been emphasised. Boycotts need not achieve policy 
changes to be successful, punishment may have been the Intention. 
Boycotts may only be symbolic, theatrical - but perhaps double-edged - 
swords. Examl)les of consumer boycotts were considered in China and 
over the Arab boycott, and, in the latter case, involved social 
responsibility issues in business - illustrating their complexity. 
Chapter Eight concentrates on consumer boycotts andq as the final 
chapter in Part Twoq integrates the theoretical argument. An I mpor- 
tant part of this is showing how ethical purchase behaviour operates 
at the micro level by referring to the legitimacy concept and negative 
product augmentation. A model proposed identifies a role for pressure 
groups In the marketing system and incorporates these concepts. 
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There are hi stori cal precedents for consumer boycotts - and 9 there- 
fore , ethi cal purchase behavi our - wi th one source I denti f yi ng a con- 
sumer boycott in mediaeval England. Yet the literature on the topic 
is sparse. Boycotts, howevert seem less common in Britain than in the 
Uni ted States. Consumer boycotts may be classified according to the 
relationship of the seller to the perceived misdemeanourg giving rise 
to primary and secondary boycotts. This tends to affect their lega- 
lity. Though while recourse to legal action might be available, firms 
are loathe to use It because of the associated publicity. 
Interestingly, two American reviews of consumer boycott legality con- 
sider the action as a form of political expression; Harper suggests 
there Is an emerging right to boycott. Should a fi rm obtai n an 
injunction prohibiting a boycott, this may be overcome by merely 
citing the grievance and thereby implying appropriate action by con- 
sumers, or by using the indirect boycott. 
The use of the consumer boycott by the corporate accountability move- 
ment , di rectly relates thi s exami nati on of the boycott to the I dea of 
consumer sovereignty to ensure social responsibility in business and 
the theoretical argument. Vogel's work Identifies the efforts by 
pressure groups to achieve social control of business via the market. 
He considers their achievements limited, but he fails to distinguish 
between success and effectiveness in the use of the boycott and the 
boycott is shown to have some Impact as a social control mechanism. 
The examples cited are, like other consumer boycotts referred to, evi- 
dence of ethical purchase behaviour. 
The mechanism of the boycott involves a five stage process: attempts 
at peaceful adjustment, inauguration and endorsement of the boycott, 
effective notice of the boycott, enlist support, and conclude boycott 
when agreement reached and publicise settlement. The importance of 
first threatening the boycott was noted, as were control problems and 
the use of market segmentation In directing boycott efforts. Factors 
in boycott effectiveness and success include various characteristics 
of the product boycotted, the organisation and promotion of the 
boycott, the frequency of boycott actiong Its remoteness from the 
grievance, and support. 
Reference to consumer sovereignty might offer a theoretical explana- 
tion or justification for ethical purchase behaviour. But it doesn't 
explain why the individual consumer would wish to participate in a 
consumer boycott or ethical purchase behaviour generally. It's 
advanced here that there may be negative product augmentation, the 
unintended provision of unattractive product attributes. Dow's Saran 
Wrap, for example, became associated with charred infants because of 
Dow's manufacture of napalm. This suggests there may be a legitimacy 
element In the marketing mix. 
These concepts can be incorporated In a five-stage model describing 
the process which results in pressure group Influenced ethical 
purchase behaviour: firm's marketing system stable; pressure group 
awareness of firm's failing; pressure group response; firm's marketing 
system becomes unstable - through negative product augmentation; andy 
finally, ethical purchase behaviour - customers seek an alternative firm's product without the legitimacy shortcoming. Management 
393 
response may involve defeat at the hands of the pressure group or a 
tacti cal withdrawal, assuming the pressure group itself isn't 
defeated. Management may take anti cl patory acti on and recogni se 
pressure groups as a feature of the environment in which they operate, 
accounting for this by sustaining legitimacy within the marketing mix. 
Chapter Eight ends by identifying some preliminary conclusions. 
Notably that there is support for the ethical purchase behaviour con- 
cept and evidence of it, and support for the societal marketing con- 
cept. Popular support Is important in boycott actions and because of 
thi s, and their limited use in Britain to date, they may be more 
accuratelv referred to as having a latent potential in the social 
control of business. Pressure groups may operate as a countervailing 
power and seem, therefore, particularly in their enhancement of con- 
sumer sovereignty, to have a legitimate role in the marketing system. 
They may, in organising consumer boycotts transpose social costs into 
private costs. Finally, the study shows consumer sovereignty may have 
two dimensions: extent or domain, as well as degree. In turn, ethical 
purchase behaviour, in the recognition of this, offers the potential 
for greater political participation. Though not all political issues 
can be decided on in markets. 
So, to conclude. In keeping with the research questions, three domi- 
nant th4!. mes have emerged in Part Two, the presentation of the case for 
ethical purchase behaviour and the examination of consumer boycotts, 
one form of this. 
Firstly, on consumer sovereignty and its extent. It was established 
as the rationale for capitalism and hence of great importance to 
market soci eti es. It is Identified here as having two-dimensions: 
degree, the amount of consumer authority in the marketplace; and 
extent, the jurisdiction of that authority. The latter dimension 
constitutes a radical perspective on consumer sovereignty and is in 
acknowledgement of consumer interest in purchase beyond the more imme- 
diate characteristics of the product, as shown in ethical purchase 
behaviour. Yet despite the significance of consumer sovereignty, it 
may be limited on both of these dimensions. 
The second theme concerns the social control of business and the role 
of the market in this. Classical economic theoryg still predominant 
in business ideologies, suggests 'the market will answer all things', 
including the problem of the control of business. While such a role 
for the market Is advanced here, it Is in a different way to that 
envisaged by the classical and neo-classical economists and their 
adherents. Their belief in the market's capacity to deal with social 
issues falls down most notably on two points: in externalities (social 
costs), and in assuming efficiency and freedom more important than 
equity or altruism as the criteria by which the market's performance 
should be assessed. On the latter pointg it was noted that material 
progress may have been the most important social goal in the classical 
economist's day, but its relevance for affluent society is questioned. 
Moreover, within their argument, there is the assumption of a substan- 
tial degree of consumer sovereignty, which may not always exist. Here 
It is suggested that, by acknowledging the extent of consumer 
sovereignty dimension and ethical purchase behaviour, the market may 
394 
assume some responsibility for social issues and the social control of 
business in affluent society - In a way not envisaged by classIcal 
economists. 
The thi rd theme concerns the part to be played by pressure groups in 
this schema, by politicising the market and having an impact on the 
firm's legitimacy element in the marketing mix. The shortcomings in 
consumer sovereignty - at least in its extent - may be remedied by 
pressure groups. They may function to enhance consumer sovereignty by 
providing information on grievances of concern to consumers and 
involving business. Such a role would be in keeping with pluralist 
models of politics and, in the form of the consumer boycottv may pro- 
vide promotional pressure groups with a much needed and effective tac- 
ti c. The pressure group role also involves the identification of 
firms' responsibilities (a problem raised in Chapter Four) and, In a 
pluralistic fashion, their priorities and the extent of corporate 
responsibilitv. Firms may also need be less concerned about their 
undesirable externalities, as these social costs may be converted into 
private costs. 
Part Three provides further evidence for the argument in the survey 
research and case studies. The case studies highlight factors in 
boycott effectiveness and other conclusions on the boycott and the 
role of pressure groups. Though the social control of business and 
consumer sovereignty themes are most definitely also evident. 
